A STUDY OF CZECH PLANNING, INDUSTRY, AND RESEARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R004700410019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 2, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

GLASS! `t :!CA T ION
Approved For( .21 D D$/I'ENCMJRDP82-O0457ROalt1 M 9
I FO 1ATI
COUNTRY Czechoslovakia
"s1:-) IcCT A study of Czech Planning,
industry, and Research
ACQUIRE1
PLT E
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"1S DOCUt7Rt'S COI174431 INTOt717AT10* APWXCl1NOT 1S RATIOLiA. DOM10E
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o d lys CCNTi tS t0 ASV CA9NER TO AR URAUTIORt^aRD PARSON it DCOv
RF -;?' CD NO.
DATE DISTR. 2 MAY 50
` NhbL I IAL NO. OF PAGES ? 9
NO. OF ENCLS.
LUSTED SELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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Trans ,lion
The
Period
1. After the liberation of Czec'ho'slovakia in ''ay 1945, the inisters concentrated
their efforts on canvassing for votes, thus tending to neglect t1^eir adninistra-
tive duties. Everyone -mntod to be in direct touch with the "inisters, who
aoe led to arrrovo of the idea that nothing; should interfere with their close
contact with the people. They stressed this principle in their speeches.
2. At that ti-?e there was _:uch confusion about t?'e oranniz.ettion of industry and
the theories of socialist rlanninp. In the Ministry of Industry the prevail-
ingz orini3n eras that in ustry was to be in by direct contact betT.een the
:inistry and the works councils. 'then a rrofesrror of the List Technical Nigh
School, in a statonent to the "..inietry of Industry, o-phnsized the necessity
for independence eryi frosdon of deciriion by industry, inister Laus^.,an, who
was a forT'er -Vadent and ,he closest collaborator of the professor, publicly
rebu!od the professor, Baying: "Professor, don't forgot that you are now a
menbor of the general rana-,e^.ent of an enternriso t:rhich is called the Czecho-
slovak Per'ublic".
3. The corridor-- of the 1i.niotry of Industry ~rere filled with !' e- begs of work
councils and deletions. After a lonh writ. these noonle 1.jere comforted with
a vague assurance that the "overnnent would tackle the probloM and try to
solve it. :ei'lbers of the war'cs councils, fearing that they might be di; -
cha.r :d and that more radical 'cork:r councils 'could be set ur, hastened to
deliver this neesa"e to the workers. In July 1945, the Co*r??unist-dor:innt?d
JRO (Revolutionary Trade Union Organization) realized that the national coun?,
ails in the factories would be deprived of their authority, especially since
these councils often did not insure Conniunist majorities,, Subsequently,
deurees were issued, stating that works councils were to consist chiefly of
workers, who were to be invested vr_'a.th great powero
4v Thereaft -~r, the Conmxniets trnnsfe ?red po r to now organizations which they
considered were --ore reliable. Ourrinr! the period from 1945 to 1949, the fo'l-
lowing units ,isre established: nation-.1 comriitteea tor'-s councils (song of
whose ne-berr. are elected and some nominated by UP'C), trade union organizations
in factories, social directors, security officials, basic Corirntnist organizations,
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and "cadre-men" in factories. ALL the new organizations acquired rower from.
their predecessors '!rhich, however; continued to maintain a lirited jurisdic-
tion. The "cadre--men", who are ono of the latest developents in Corgi waist
tactics;, are carefully selected and politically oriented members of the Cor.
monist Party; they are directly srihordinate to the secretariat of the party.
Their rule over the freedom and lives of all factory workers is absolute,
and their power extends to person l affairs as well as to manage'ient of the
factories. Specialists find them ;elves helpless in making; professional de-
cisions. c lthou.?h the leading of `.'icials and not the "cadre. men" are responsi-
ble for the econoriic mt:.nagFr nt of factories, these "cadres-pan" are the real
rulers of the factories. Fear impels managers and erec:ta?ists to aim for the
highest efficiency and greatest resuitsa
5. After the 1945 liberation, chaos hit the Czech lands even to a greater degree
than in Slovakia. One of the less t*ll-known reasons for this saturation was
the fact that there was a rslatival y greater number of educated rersona in Bo-
hemia and Moravia. Because of this scarcity of educated persons in Slovakia,
the "lovak intellectual had littl:s difficulty in obtaining high positions in
the central government at Prag a and in the administrative sections in Slovakia;
he was also favorably placed in Prague to defend Slovak rights. This situation
gave careers to Slovaks who had never expected them;, while Czechs t, r limited
by competition. Tiany- qualified parsons employed in offices, factories, and
other enterprises vainlymiaited prominent positions. After the liberation they
discovered that positions which ware formerly attained by diligence were acquired
through left-wring talk or through accusing chiefs of anti-social or reactionary
attitudes. As a result, nearly all the leading officials were discharged from
their posts or suspended in accordance =.4ith "the people's will", and with the
encouragement of radical candidates who wanted these jobs. iithin a short time
after the liberation, nearly all specialists were assigned to new riositions and
experienced men were wasted on insignificant 7ork. Almo,^t every specialist who
voluntarily resigned was released from the u,erks councils,,
6. The resultant losses in industry were ire nse and entirely disproportionate to
the advantages that could be realized 'r regulation of industry. The armar ,ent
industry sustained perhaps greater damage than any other industry. This tins
caused by a belief, publicly expr:issed, that there was no need for arms and
that in case of emergency they could be obtained from the UFISR? Public dis-
cussions were held on a rlan to rove the Skodn and Zbro jovka armament works,
including workers and specialists, to an area behind the Urals in the USSR0
This plan did not emanate from the USSR but from the new regime, which was
eager to prove itself pro-Soviet. During ,this period, the Russians were rela-
tively distrustful of the new govsm?ont.
After the confused months following the liberation in 1945, disillusionment
concerning direct cooperation between the r ovarnment and the peorlo suddenly
occurred. The principle of organizing -industry into 14national eutorpriso&
on a horizontal basis had been curried out: All factories were grouped
according to production such as mines, mechanics, chemistry, textileag, Woods,,
ceramics, power, etc?,, and for every group a general management was ant, up to
direct and conrdlnotm,,
'?o S`!ovat:ic~ t7 ere C c r.i; for s tiro appointed according to the Kosice Agree-
ment, area managements with jurisdiction similar to that of the general manage-
ment in Czech lands were established in industry. These area manage mients were
subordinated to thou central m anar,,emant in Prague for some purposes and to the
qualified Commissioner of Industry in Bratislava for others0 This inthor com-
plicated organization did not cr=ate any serious difficulties and seemed to
satisfy the Slovakian desire for self -administration.
9. It is characteristic of this reriod that organization of the aarrement industry
a1onss horizontal lines was not carried out. The Ceak Zborjovka or ,mint
factory in Str akonice rartaIned an inderendent nation=al e.n crnrise,, ,nd the
s nari?snt factory in Povazska Bystrica, which 1-"f d. been a part of the Zbrojovaka
Brno since its origin, was ieparnted from the main enterprise and L:::came an in-
ddependent national ent=rorise destined for peacetime productionv No section for
the production of armaments was eet up in the metallurgical industry, since such
production was considered to be a by-product of the national enterprises. Only
for theA~td'oa~Oib$1 fF2[34e84(40'~a was headed
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the creation of national enterprises, subordinated
to the g rioral r:anagc-ient and/or the area managements was a good idea,, Dif-
ficulties occurred because the administrative orc':ans were eroded and the
horizontal div^i sion of industry, patterned after the Russian sys';em, was
carried out in all industries. The originators of t'-Is system did not ren.-
ognize the essential difference between Russian and Czech industry; the
latter had previously enjoyed a good position in the. international market
and had ')een organized vertically. Oonsoquontly, there was difficulty from
the This iron works and the coal nines at Vitkovice near 4 oravska
Ostrava were closely linked and it was very difficult in 1946 to split them
into two general managements, one for the mines and the other for the furnaces.
The Skoda plant was producing nearly all typos of metal products--guns, heavy
machines, automobiles, trucks, tractors, light mechanisms,, etc. According to
the horizontal principle, this plant was to be divided into soveral branchasr,
but it was almost impossible to establish several national enterprises in
such a plant. A similar situation arose in the armamnt factory at Fovazeka
Bystrica, which had its own program in the foundry industry (50 percent of
Czech capacity in 'ar'cing brass and aluminum.) and its own pro?ram in the anra-
runt and machine indusrcrios , The cell-known Bata shoe factories and many textile
plants had their own machine factories and foundries.
ll.. Although the horizontal division of industry in advantageous from the organs-
national and technical points of view, the benefits that can be dewed by the
well developed Czech industry are doubtful.. The management of the metal in-
dustry overcame its problems by not strictly applying the horizontal principle
and by making several compromises.
12. Irdiately after the establishment of the general directorates, the government
decided to industrialize Slovakia. The objectives of this industrialization
were to prev,nt emigration from E'1ovskia, to utilize surplus labor, and to ar-
rive at an equalization of social levels between the Czechs and the Slovaks,,
as was urged by President Bones. Prior to the Taro-Year Plan, 1,200 million
crowns from a total budget in the Czech petal industry of 3,000 million crowns
were designated for ^lovakia, although only one-tenth of the retal industry is
located there. Besides official support, this industrial.azation received the
support of both the Communists, who tried to use the growing labor force to
further their policy, and the Minist.-7 of National Defense, which ,.ranted to
transfer important military production to tree East. There was no evidence of
direct Russian pressure in this respect.
Damim
13, The centre, planning organ in Czechoslovakia began to function rather late.
Dr. Outrata was arpointed General .ecretary of the Economic Council immediately
after the liberation in 1945, but the Central Planning Office and the Price Of
fake 4,Yore not placed ureter him. Among the central authorities, -,any political
and personal struggles grew out of political wirepu?.ling. The nucleus of Plan-
erg became the Central Planning Com'i:tssion (ustredni planovaci komise ITPK , which
hold meetings day and night, and was presided over by Dr. Outrata.
)4~ The T ,.,Yo Year Plan was actually not a plan but only a formulation of ;ghat the
factories intended to produce. There was little interference from higher
echelons with these individual programs, and there was no statistical basis
to the plans, especially where they concerned consumption and sale. Never-
theless, the T wao Year Plan was psychologically effective when used as a slogan
on the factory worker' a .a partly ended the sterilea discussions which fook
place, not only in factories, but a-lso in the "inistries. In a sense the Two
Year Plan uric -ore successful than the subsequent Five Year Plan, for which
there i s issued such a groat number of questionnaires, forms, and analyses
covering different points of view that neither the factories nor the central
authorities were. able to comply with there. Because there was no real basis
for the plan, a motto such as "thro . xecution Plaan for 1950" was proclaimed,.
but it was actually a "One Year Plan". The following years were obscured IT
vague numbers and phrases. and not even the investment plan for 1950 in precise.
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l Production plans for the years 1949 and 1950 were w arcvned by counter-plans
and plans fror^ the so-called planed mfror boneath". These new Toms of r1an-
ning were introduced as a result of pressure from the Communist Party, which
included such plans in their political propaganda. The tarty believed that any
programs , set up by the official rranagenent of the factories and by t a gen-
oral nanagerient of the national enterprises should be exceeded through the
initiative of workers. The official manager ants would then be proven guilty
of cowardice and bureaucracy and even of being reactionary. Such practi:.e is
a keynotsof Cornrryunist policy at the beginning of its rule in all states, and
perhaps it is a consequence of the philosophy of dialectical naterialisrrr, The
USSR abandoned this method during 1928-1929, but the Con?unist secretariats ii.:
Czechoslovakia use it at rresent even with a member of the Communist Party.
16. Planning has proved to be the most loosely nrgrinized of all activities in Czecho-
slovalcia., and it has become the most copular occu-ation for everyone. Natior21
co n ittees, communities, towns, ministries, political parties, the youth federa-
tion, and nearly all other or'ianizations have their own well-staffed planning
sections. The constant polehics of local planning grouts with the central plan-
ning authorities rrovide sufficient activity, however unproductive, for these
no?rity formed planning units. Detailed technical ~.nr'.c, supervision of quality of
production, development of projects, and other responsible functions of industry
do not inspire as much interest as does plar_ninrr,. The chief" diver: ?on of persons
having a nediocro professional knowledge consista of raking lists of uorthr-rhile
!oals--an activity ,given inporWince by socialisrr. Young r+erople, whose only eco-
nonic concern Is how to spend their monthly salaries, discuss mmerous theories
with conviction and propose decisions for extensive problems. For inntance, how
~?as it possible to reduce the chemical rro''uction budget by one and a hale' billion
croc~ms and to divide this sum between the nines and textile industry in rrroportions
to be determined by a special commission, whose rerbers had fixed the nges in an
automobile rer~rir shop the previous week?
}
I7. In the zesent .eta of the econc , both blare and praise era acmf bs od = .thlout discrimina-
tion by anonymous and irresponsible members of the Communist political secretariats.
3'irisdiction of even the highest administrative organs is not definitively estab-
lished. Russian rianninr; exports very rarely appear in Prague, and several lec-
tures given by some of them were not of value. R ssian literature on p1annir+..7 is
very diligently translated; it, does not compare, however, with like writings from
Uestern countries, although it night be assured that this doctrine of planning
would be better defined by a country practicing socialism.
Pan s o Utarv 1=. rtan
a, The Skoda Works at Plzen were damaged by air raids at the end of the last
war, and heavy machinery, sr,elting equipmnt, and several blast furnaces were
destroyed. After the war, the corks received no orders for weapons, and the
rschinery producing guns was at a standstill for some tyre after 1945. Be-
cause of the lowered morale of workers and of the shortages of some raw ma-
terials, the plant was not able to produce the required heavy rachines, ?rhich
night have roved of value as exports because of the des trzuction of German
industry. Under pressure of the ministry of National Defense, production
weapons is to be resuried.
b. The : underground factory of the "'rode .,forks (sic, probably Wizen.) was heavI37
damaged at the end of the tsar through the explosion of three freight cars
loaded with pentrite. After the war, this section was rebuilt at a cost of
approxirateiy 150 million crowns and is now fit for production, Above 7round,
another building extending over 14,000 sq.m. was added to the other buildings,
and a new foundry for heavy castings has also been started. This construction
project at the Skoda T?orks was ana^aounced as an urgent one, and "vol.+.antaxyt?
labor brigades from all factories in ^lova?cia were forced to work there in
order to speed up construction. During 1946-194P., when this constrv.ction was
FIoirag on, it was intended that the plant be used for r aceti -e u-~rr:duction and
a largo machine factory i s to be established. For this reason.; Skoda-r `.7or?ks
was al?.ottecl equipment from a large German machine factory which had chiefly
manufaccturcd presses; this equipment was received as reparations. In order
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to fariixarize the -.?rorkers with the production of shaping ruchines (obrabeci
stroje), about 2,000 of these machines were rranufactured. with the political
changes in 19V`' hotwrever?, the Skoda "Torks trt ordered to return to tear pro-
duction. The actual production progran is ?lott nown, out it is asrurted that
mane and artillery a-munition will be ride `hero. Furthermore, reconstruction
voric -ust still be corpleted in the valley where the !?nrtcs are located.
c, A branch factory of the Stcoda 'Tories at Dubnica is to be built at Banovice for
the production of artillery ai ni.nr3 arparatus required undo r the Five Year
Plana The investment plan of 1950 devirnates a certain amount for this con-
struction,
d. The Sicooda ' orks at Adanov a, +re not damaged durlrig the war, and they are now
renewing their military rroduction of artillery am nunition,
i9o Z~ D15?
a, After the war ZbrojovIm Brno stopped the rroduction of rifles and nachine guns,
export demands being filled fron stocks on hand. The factory was converted to
the production of Zetor tractors A1thourh nearly all the top personnel wore
dischart ed, the remaining, errloyroes succeeded in preserving the good reyAitation
of the factory by continuing research. En ineers- .ko had been formerly engaged
in a: rs research proved their competence in constructing textile machines, trac-
tors, iabo:c-saving devices, ball bearings, polariratere (He~irovsky-NoJodiy sys-
te.), presses, measuring instruments, etc. The Brno factory is also to be con-
verted to the?product3on of all t*s of weapons
b. Tioleic Brother: produced a hunting rifle and an automatic pistol which, however,
were not successful in a Czech co ^petition; this tits ,,on _jr a pistol which was
ride in the Strakonice armament factory and which was successful as an export
to Eft;, A new automatic rifle constructed by Kautsky in good but exrenaive
to rroduco0 Development of rockets did not Teske proress, and a competition
f on the "Bazooka" was lost by the armament factory to one furnished by Prokop
1 f rom the ; "ilitary Technical. Institute, The 30-r~r^. machine gun has t.?j, models,
one from the Brno armament factory and the other from the Vsetin armament fac-
tory. The V'setin model is constructed by Ing. Cinka and is better in prin--
ciple, The Brno model is constructed by Kautsky and has eomo defects, yet it
is not undergoing farther develop' ent
c. The "Tichyr" system of anti-aircraft aiming, devices is being further developed
in the Vsetin armament factory. The on ;inaal construction, although theoreti-
cally interesting, is not advantageous. The optical raining apparatus on a simi-
lar principle is a better one.
d. The great capacity of the Vset.in armament factory to produce rachine guns of
a ?gr caliber (12.5 to 30 run) is not utilised after the warn The facts ryr,
rcii_ca nrzd not been bombcad., made badly needed textile machinery, awing machines,
and raea juri.ng devices for troVIcshopso Recently, conyvorcion to military pro-
duction has been planned for thi factory, but it is riot believed that the typo
of weapons ?;o be rroducod has been detoi node The only persons ;h .o had knowl-,
edge of they weapons., Colo Breda and Col, Zoli.nk , are now dead, Col. Brads,
cer-,piaiued about the ; ussicn technical missions in that they were distrustful
anti. revealed nothing to the Czechs. Despite taro wars of negotiations, not
even tho quo ^tion of a common caliber for the infantry u as settled. The sane
covipiaint tr s made by those who negotiated to obtain the plans of a Russian
tangs: to be _1anufactured at Irabovice in Slovatci,a. A rail lire connecting
Veetin with thie factory was built during the tTar,
eau Since 119,.9 the armament factory (sic, probably Brno) has been headed by Ing.
Iov?otny, who is a commercial enf:iaeer, a forcer inspector of the Control Of-
fice, and an ag ,r site Comnnmistw 'Novotny knows 'A nothing about arms, and
In-cause of his antipathy to them, he speedily had rroduction shifted to
peacetime goods,, Consequently, exports to twenty five countries, where the
ZB machine Ids have been used since pre-tear days and where there, is a luck
of spare parts for these gusts, were delayed. Novotny was appointed gen,Dral
manager of the rational enterprise, Czechoslovak Precisioini "ac?bineryr Industry,
for his oontribw ions to the coup d}etat in February 1%8 His toe n .cai
depr=aty, Dobreriysl,, is an industrious and educated parson but is unable to hold
an i.r.n xntant position. The manager of the Brno armament facto 3s Trig, piach.
A: t,er Pr? ?~I i !4 ~ iS~ , ~ ~7c 1 U 9 s pardoned
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f, The First .?7ach..ine Factory (Prvni Brnonslca) in Brno was in c"haoa after the
1945 liberation. All leading p3 rsonne3, were released, and the plant is
now headed by a worker. Production continues only because of the efforts
of sore specialists who succeeded in retaining their positions in the con-
struction section and in the ~.rortroorns. The sections nanufacturinga equip-
raent for breweries. sugar factories, and refineries are relatively successful.
20. Pe sic vs'~ r
In 3.94 the Povarska Bystrica arnaraert factory was producing a :luntion at one-
thIr3 "rapacity. It has been ordered to cease all peaceti. production by 1950
and to convert to military production. The section makinn artillery ammunition
of all calibers is already producing at one-half its capacity. It is generally
known tha conversion of production cannot be carried out until the end of 1950
because of a lack of machines and of prototypes for arms. To suitable building
to house the present production of motorcycles and iceboxes Is available, Pro?-
duction of cartridges had been approxinateiy one and a half million units,
including caps, daily. Since a large portion of the workrooms t as devoted to
the poacetins production of motorcars and ieeboxes, the capacity was cut in
half. Part of the aniiunition ma,ciiiner-y ir,, being stored. Recently the plant
changed ita nano to the "Klement Gottwald Plant".
21. 2P Jorks
The CID UTorks (Ceskomoravv~ix.Itolben Drank) in Prague was in constant con
fusion after the liberation boo fuse the old experienced directors had been
expelled. Asa leader in the factory, Sidlik was appointed to head it, but
he was later under arrest for a period of time because of personal contro-
versies In the factory. Real leadership of the factory was hold by the Corr-
muri.sts. Dostal, the ranger, was irmrisoned for a longer period than Sid
lik? Recently, Dostal was employed as an inspector of the heavy metal in-
duntry in Slovakia. Ing. Gauge, who became a professor in the Technical.
Iiigh School and whose son is in the United States, was arrested recently.
Ing. Uasserbausr9 a fine technician, was placed in an unimportant position,
Production is maintained through the help. of the plant archives which are
rich with dray ags.
1). 'The arrest of Sidlik is only one of lice cases of arrests of leading per-
; ona:l.ities in the industry in spite of their merthership in the Corrvnist
Party. As 9;m-,pies can be mentioned the arrest of the forrmr manager of
the Skoda ' TorkE at Dubra7 ca and of Ing? Soucek, the deputy to the general
manager of the Skoda 'forks. Ing. Soucek was a radical Co nmznist, The
x .sort for his arrest was a3ler;edl;7 that he did not meat the terms set for
fulfillment of Russian orders, but rumors have it that he was engaged in
espiorn ?-'c, Soucek appealed to Zarotocky, the present Prime :14inister, who
obtained the records of this care from the ini st ry of Interior. Zarotoclq
then stated that there was no reason to inputs blame to Soucek, and It is
said that Zapotoottr -aas very much aroused by the methods used by the police
and the !ainistry, of Interior. Thereafter, Soucek was released from prison,
fvftnr havlnrs served four months. Apparently there i s a secret or r,?i 9-A-Lion
in thin the Cor wii st Party and with in the t'inistry of Interior that mikes
Crests even without the consent of the Government. There are many cases
of arrested rersons who do not kiuow 't'ae crimes with which t!1e3y are charged,
even after their release,
c, The CKI) plant at Blansko did not suffer any damage during the wear and has
not been e ndadw It manufactures turbines, mill machinery, cranes, corr-
p ressor ,, large refrigerating arran[;' mont:a , etc The equipment and t. a na-
chinery in the -pant are antiquated. ITo funds for improver?ort of the from
Cory h been allotted in the Two Year Plan, and only costs of deproci.ra-
`ion are provided for in the Five Year Plan,
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CE -TTAL I,1-,T71 LIa~;Ca"TIME i3'= ITCY
22''. & i11 j t2 '$F.` o r:~As9
The uxplosia and tiynthecia factories in Soa^atin were not r1lannged during the
is ry and personnel chanr'es there were not so drastic as in other plants.
Production was Inersaseci to include the manufacture of artificial rubstances9
The quality of polder for guns and rlflen was reduced. During the wear ,gun-
rr trk r that caused .d arch smaller flash than ordinary aauapo .dor
:mss :produced.
21, 0 . t]. Intl
CO he nilitarv progran of the optiotal industry in no well advanced that it is
not necessary to i"port optic^l devices except for scientific and -nasuring
instrunentn. Iieopta can manufacture all tyres of binoculars, telescopes,
distanceorrasurinr instruments, periscopes for tanks, cameras for aviation,
pta co-,-,Id be used for radar work, which has been neglected in
C echo 1lovakia.
?J4.
a, The following optical device factories were amalgamated into the national
enterprise :eopta: Optikotechin3_ at Prerov, "Pl3 and ."TRH' at Prague, a
factor; in Traaovany, the Kolar, and several smaller factories. The chief
manager of =eopta is Ing. i'asok, an engineer expert in rroduction but not
nuaL11 ea to be chief of such an entorrrise, this Job was always held by a
sreclalaat in physics and research. The specialists in the optical device
industry more Ing. Polak, recently euployed with Data in Canada, and Ing,
Tav3 .nee, recently employed with the Goorz firm In Bratislava, The theorists
in this field dislruted with each other, and the leaders did not ,succeed in
applying their knowledge to production. For this reason... the leadustr~;~ r,, awed
the opportunity to dominate in. the field of cameras and rojection arparatus
and wrs soon surpassed by Germany industry. The optical factories In Czecho-
slovakia had been relatively well ecgxipped, and if devolopraer tal '.rork had
kept pace with capacity, export possibilities ninht have been great.
b Dr. 11rdina was enga d in an Interesting invention: a device in which a
ray of light caught after reflection by a selenium coil makes a noise which
informs a blind person of objects in front of him. Color photography is being
oorkedd out in detail by Lindner, a aecial,ist in the Technaa factory at Novo
Tleasto pad Vahem.
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d, The Germans built an optical factory In Trnovany during the war in accordance
1t th their policy of dispersal of industry. The machines from this factory
were to be moved to S1ovnkia,, but only about 1,,500 of then have been actually
tr ansfora ed for use, of the Slovak metal Industry. No rachinory or oglui nt
in this fact=7 was replaced because the total capacity of the optical. in-
dustry was found to be too high. It is intended to remove this factory to
"lnvakia, but no decision has yet been ^ade. The region near the Tatra noun
tins or near Zvolon is under consideration. rA* MM - El Ea
Karim near Brno, a large and modern factory for producing? shapatn ; rio',hiraea (abre ci
stroje) and extending over 60,000 aq.rt,,, is again in operation after having sustaairnd
much damage from air raids during the -ar. It is heeded by a very well qualified
manager, Ing. Lucas. Ing. Frikxyl left this factory and is 'now enr+loyed in the
central nanagnent of TOS (United ciachines Factory-?-.Spojene tovarny obrabeteich stroju).
Special products from this factory are rrecision boring, nachinos and additional parts
for those, machines to allow other uses. The factory equipment is very modern; 3,500
perr,ons are employed there.
~~ ~';'~ ket ^ ?
At the and of the last uur, various ter:-es of rockets, model. ' - tr xad_U- , had been
deve.lo? d by_ the Gex mns. As the developmental institutes :tn. Gerriany, such as
Poenerrnac7?e, were constantly attacked. by air, they were transferred to Podmokly.
Afterthe surrender Toy Gerrard, a g eat develop ntal rater for V-1. V-2 and
other rockets in un~?inished :Late ,as I' a,`~ 'ma lty. ; iz v ?r
took none off' the mterial to the TY' Ft. The factory was c lira- ducted "by the lL'traa~: the '
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26.
Technical and Aircraft Institute (VTIJJ), jrrhich was repre tinted by Ltn Cola
P?iofi tcka. Many disputes regarding the jurisdiction of the factory vere had,
since the factory wanted its independence. The Azr has a great need for
engineers who could continue in construction work independently. Ind. OcJatrcil
was appointed as technic ,._ dvisor and Pmkop as a const pr. The raterial
stored in the factory held much promise,, but there are few persons available
to work on it and continue the development of rockets. Special interest is
given to anti-aircraft rockets directed by short wave t r. thi arget. Sc
theoretical suggestions have been made, but these rockets cannot be expected
to matorialize in the near future. The Podmokly Institute is to be moved
to Slovakia also, but no appropriation for this has been made in the Five
Year Plan.
Priba,,+e ,. , taLQ At=
During the war, an experimental insitute of the r-'affenunion woe established
Apribam, where a developmental center for the Skoda 'forks, the Brno armament
factory, and the rorztin explosives factories was to be concentrated. About
150 enr'ineeres, doctors of technical sciences, and mathematicians were emmployed
there; they wore en-,aged in theoretical work but they achieved no practical
result. Engel,, the chief of the institute during the war, hinted that a new
"Wundereaffo" would be created. This institute has been abolished,
27. P022 F dories
a. The production of artillery ammunition was stopped at Podbrezova during the
"lovak revolt in the autumn of 1944, and then contact nines were produced
for use of the revolting arr.q. After the war, the factory produced woodwork-
ing machines, as did the Pisok factory which had been making bridges. No
military orders have been received by the Podbrezova factory up to the present
time. The fo*.mndry activities at Fbfflvezova consist of the rroduction of cast
iron and metallic tubes and plates, totaiZing about 100,006 tons a year.
Large amounts wore designated by the Two Year Plan to expand production at
the factory. During the past t*.enty-five years, production has been constant
and the factory has sustained yearly losses of 20 to 30 million crowns. Re-
contruction of the foundries will be finished in 1951. A new workroom for the
production of woodworking machines was built in 1948, and a new bridge factory
was completed in 1949.
1r. The total production program for Brezno in 1950 was fixed at 30,000 tons of
heavy structures, such as bridges, cranes, and iron structures for factory
buildings. During srarti? this factory can produce gun-c?errirages and parts
of tanks. 11ronec has electrical furnaces for the production of cast iron
and steel.
?o9a tozr?1?s.
24. K&&
The original titan of the Czech General Staff to set up production of quality
steel at Prakovice was not realized:. The Poldina Hut at Kladno transferred this
Prakovee factory to the use of the lovak metal industry, and ^roduction was
changed to saws for metal cutting, "Ajax" hammers, vices, etc.
29. The Five Year Plan aims to expand the heavy machine industry. Objections have
been raised, one reason being that there is little iron in Czechoslovakia. In
addition the prices received ?or 'one kilogram of products in heavy inMiustty are
^>Gny tines lower than those realized in the precision nachine industry. For this
reason, the mechanical and precision machine industry would offer greater gains
in foreign exchange.
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30. The gx atest obstacle to fulfilling the plan for heavy industry is a :b~.c,k, of
skilled workers. 'Torkcrs are recruited from those who were o-ployed in other
industries. Highly skilled workers are requirod; sometimes even. against their
'.rashes, to hold political and administrative posto in the "dictators'h__p of the
working class". Personnel engaged in construction must be very experienced be-
cause defects in construction are costly. Present workers nave been trained on.ev' ix-
cycle production. One night In 19V,,, a worker spoiled three crankohafts valued
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31, he leading personality in heavy industry is Dr, Fabin; !cr., who has rar P problems
to solve. Plants for the heavy naeh.ine Industry are to b-i built in Sl:nralcia,
according to plans for exranding `Io-, k industry, They are to be Wilt in Tur-
ciaans2cy :qty Martin, ' osice, Dr3zno, Le-rice.. 11rabovee, Snina,, and near Zilina,
which is to have a blast furnace with a capacity of 700,000 tons yearly.
32. The General Staff controls the selection of strategic locations of heavy industry
plants. They prepared maps di riding Czechoslovakia into several zones from the
strategic point of vireo The territory of northern TToravia, near '"oravska Ostrava
and below the Tatra tauntains, is considered to be the most important. The socorxl
anc
area extends through "lovakia from east to t; at between Nove Mesto and Trencin.
These maps are kept in a special roan and are accessible only to higher officers,
who inspected then during conferences, ho under the direction of the recently
retired General Kasalicky, on the location of heavy inclustry.
33. The region south of Kosice is not considered secure, but the region in northern
Moravia near : ior'avska Ostrava and in ".?iavakia bias been approved. 'Hove s;esto nad
Vahon was selected as the seat of Tdch n only upon condition that it would be
the developmental center for civilian use. Military development ^rss to be locatei
Wore to the north. Although these strategic areas wore c'iosen by the officers
on the Goneral. Staff, it is possible th?t they were approved by the "oviets. The
lines were drawn to form circular areas which are to be defended if ene*hy armies
should penetrate the southern section---an unir port,ant area from the point of view
of industry. Such an industrial fortress is ev .dently intended for the coal
basin- surrounding i ioravska Dstrava ro-Ad. Karvi.nna, including the adjoining Polish
coal mines and furnaces.
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3,1. Nodoled after Russian research, a great net of experimental institutes in all
fields and subordinate to the Research Council is planned. Research is to be
financed by appropriations from the goverraraent, and a law concerning research
has been introduced,, At present, specialists are spending most of their tine
at conferences or procuring statistics and filling out complicated fors and
questionnaires. The Research Council Is now occupied obtaining information
on what plants and developmental sections are doing.
35. The main purpose of the proposed lay r, however, is to create a legal basis for
the nationalization and control of private laboratories and enPerizental work-
shops.. The majority of the para. raphs in the law contain only lego1 titles
for nationalizatie; i.e. , expropriation of private property. Like other na-
tieonalization decrees, this law r~rovides for compensation for nationalized
nroporties, aaltho:a!h practically no compensation has been previously paid..
36. The Documentation Center? hiaded by Ing. iodonos., is a Mood source for indus-
trial mnio:amaatiort it makes excerpts from foreign "professional" =writings and
.cords the results achieved by nationalized industries. Any nationalized
-p]ant can obtain ::information from this center.
9
37s. Not even such important and technical work as research and experimentation
was saved from inter erence by the Communists and demagogues. The real scien-
tats, researchers? investiantors, and construction experts were either not organized
politically or ereare conservative in thinking. Those who did join the C ors unisst
Party , usally refused to follow the orders of the secretariat and thus were in
disgrace or considered suspect.
3 a The Corariuniat Party substituted for realp'o ss the so-cal3ed "movement of im-
provers".. Such a club was founded ina rer^y factory. Theoretically every employee
can participate in this movement, but actually only workers are allowed. Many
cases occurred in which a worker ae;reed to pretend authorship of an improvement
or invention so that the responsible technician could receive remuneration, even
the chief of the plant may not know the zeal author of an invention. This "move-
ment of i r.provers" has its own mar azine?
39, Nothing of importance has been done in the fields of atomic onor and bacteriological
science? toy theorists and mathometicianns dealing with atomic energy exist, but
without 3.aborator-_,'.es they can arrive at no results. The ^oviettr are speeding up
the mining and transporting of uranium from Czech uranium Mines to the USSR; the
e pact destination is not known, however..
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