1. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HO CHI MINH GOVERNMENT AND THE FREE LAOS 2. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND THAI IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R004600070004-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 13, 2000
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 31, 1950
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R004600070004-4.pdf233.39 KB
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CL4 w~ iF C ATiON Ct)r%i'Z ~l. iTt f J./c(,'iT} oJ, TT ..,. UfFIC~T ri,;c;r1I.Y Approved Foiri i ~~~ 3plq :A@1ADP82-0RjF3 0~$ O F O R F EP RT CD NO. 25X1A 4t,4 CONFIDENTIAL COUNTRY - Thai land/Indochina. SUBJECT PLACE ACQUIRED ;)ATE OF INFO. 1., 25X1X 1, Relations Between the Ho Chi Minh Government and the Free Laos 2; Relations Bat ;oen the Vietnamese and Thai in 25X1/~A] ortheastern Thailand meeting in Udon 2 The Free Laos claim contrc L of two sizeable areas in Laos, each comprising several thousand square Recontl ?,, the Free Laos liberated Mong Sing;hn Communication bet- Bien the two areas claimed by the Free Laos is dereandent upon No Chi Government communication channels, which act ns r&.ay stations.. The tarnmunications agreement was made with Prince Soup- hctnavong in Bangkok., * * * DATE DISTR. NO. OF PAGES 3 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW The Free Lao movement now .i i lars!ely dominated both politically and mili- tarily by Viet Linh elemor.13, vino also are supplying some financial and material support to the Lr" s - Recently, Rouen (sic), Nguyen Due Cuy@s deputy, Tran Van A1n,. nd certain unidentified Lao leaders hold 3, Thal. officials in nortieast Thailand recently have adopted a more aloof attitude toward the Vi einamese in compliance with Thai Government orders,**** The Thai officials, hcp.ver, still are in sympathy with the general move- uient of liberation fre:r, the French rule, 4,, The Thai .nd Lao pop?iation favor the Vietnamese liberation movement? Al- though the'e is some 'ear of business competition from the energetic Vi.et- 25X1X nPmese, the native nhabitants g'et along fairly well with the Vietnamese and resent t0 em muc! loss than they do the Chinese Viet Minh ele1m0nts fear and hate the Thai officials in northeastern Thai. .mild. This att.; ? .do jr, a now development and resulted from the recent Thai . Government rests otions on the Vietnarnesc, which included the closure of i.heir cchoolsa 'Sao prominent Viet Minh leaders state that Thai officials now are eoopera??ti *L . with the French in the capture of Viet Minh members attomptinc; to entt r Thai land. *'r** Individuals captured are turned- over t o the French. '%i Viet 14nh leaders promise to take rovenge on the Thai officials at an ,pt. ,rtune time. 10N&Qf9V~114e This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENT 1.1L in c?ccordance with the letter of -;d Cc'o!ier 1978 from the Director of C:en ral Inte!!egence to the Archivist of the lln;tod states. fty %?b 20@O1c'0 : CIA-RDF 82-00457 R004600070004-4 Approved For Release 2001/03/05: CIA-RDP82-00457R004600070004-4 CONlIDEi, `.f. is/coy.TR :iL - U.S. OFFI()I.9.LS ONLY 25X1A 7, The Vietnamese in Thailand live quietly, are obedient to Thai authority, and do not display the aggressive attitude of the Chinese0**.**** One of Tran Van An's functions is to see that the Vietnamese obey the Thai law, The Vietnamese are employed in various capacities, except as servants. The Viet Blinh organization forbids the Vietnamese to work as domestics* The Vietnamese are most successful as fartners, mechanics and laborers. Their success is attributed to three factors: as political refugees with no financial resources, the Vietnamese were forced to work to exist; the Vi~:tnamese charges less for his services as a laborer than the local in- habitants; finally, the Vietnamese do their work with thoroughness., S, Th. Viet Minh organization in northeastern Thailand apparently receives 25X1X it.-, entire support from the Vietnamese population in the area - A )atanvial portion of the contributions appear to be voluntar Laoorers are reputed to save up to a quarter of their daily rice ration, which they sell and turn the proceeds over to the Viet Minh. Members of the professional class are said by Viet Minh leaders to mice up to 50 per-- cent of their income to the Viet Minh organization. According to the Governor of Sakon Nakhon. only two percent of the Vietnauneso refugees favor th Bao Dai Government. 25X1A Viet Binh members are staying out of local politics. They prefer the political philosophy of Pridi, particularly his Pan-Asian policy, to that of Phibul. However, the Vietnamese are entirely concerned with maintaining th.3ir position in Thailand and with pushing their own political aims, thus, they are avoiding anything which would seam to be an alliance with dissi- dent and out of power political factions in Thailand, which would only se:;?ve to jeopardize their position and further alienate the Thai Government, Comment. For previous reports on the relationship be-- 25X1A twe;en the Viet Aii.nh elements and the Free Laos, and on the resis- tance movements in Cambodia and Laos, 25X1A Comment.-. The areas claimed by the Free Laos have not been located. Presumably, the Laos are claiming all the territory not actually occupied by the French, 25X1A 25X1A 4:*.w 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A Comment contain infornation on the relav:i.on.s between Prince Souphanavong and the Ho Chi Minh Government? Comment. further inform+ti,on on the cia. s ,owarc this Vietnarne in northeastern ?hai.land oportu on Vietnamese personalities and acti-- :Fi ties in northeastern Thai land,-. 25X1X'y'F** Comment. lnstrand of cooperating with the French by intensi- fying restrictive measures against the Vietnamese, the Thai authori- tie* would do wall to adopt a more lenient attitude: In so doing:, it seems probable that the Vietnamese ill-feeling toward the Thai would be largely eliminated and the possibility of Vietnamese co- operation with the Chinese would be avoided. Actually, the Viet- namese are the most feared and effective business rivals of the Chinese. Therefore, if Vietnamese friendship can be gained by the Thal, the Vietnamese would serve as a valuable counterforce to the Chinese in northeast Thailand, in the event of unrest., CONFID TIAL/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2001/03/05: CIA-RDP82-00457R004600070004-4 Approved For Release 2001 /03/05 : C V I V f 1 U 7A004600070004-4 CONFIDE /cONTAOL c U.S. 0FF1 C71Ls ONLY 25X1 A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1X ~Comrnent.. Although the Vietnamese in northeastern Thailand arc peaceful at the present time, they are always a potential danger. They number from 30,000 to 40,000 individuals, including women and children, who are unified through the Viet Minh organi- zation and the conmon desire for national freedom. Intense Viet- naLnese dislike of .the Thai Government is increasing: as a result of the Thai. Government cooperation with the French and the adoption of restrictive measures.. such as, the closure of Vietnamese schools, the prohibition of religious celebrations (Annamese Now Year), and the adoption of aggressive police actions. Viet Minh propaganda is extremely effective and widespread among Vietnamese refugees. The propaganda stresses the qualititeR of unity, sacrifice and obedience, but avoids the mention of Communism. If the Ho Chi Minh Government .^:arts to take aggressive action against Thailand, apparently they can count on the full cooperation of the Viet- namese in Thailand. CONFI ENTI AL/CONTROL m U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY CONFIDENTIAL. Approved For Release 2001/03/05: CIA-RDP82-00457R004600070004-4