THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FRONT DEMOKRAT RAKJAT AND OF MOESO'S PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 1, 1999
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 7, 1948
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3.pdf568.41 KB
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CENTRAL INT LLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO NFORMA1ION RE ` 25X1A2g Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390 COUNTRY Indonesia SUBJECT The Activities of the Front Demokrat Rakjat and of Moeaot s Partai,i#erunis Indonesia Llbar y DATE DISTR. r1 December 1S4.8 NO. OF PAGES 6 25X1A6a OF ENCLS. A 25X1X6 SUPPLEMENT TO T. S ?tua.tion Prior to the Revolu utio L I. The FDR (Sajap Kin - Partat Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) ) succeeded in infiltrating the government, especially in the sphere of the military within the Tentera :Iasional Indonesia (Tll) Masjarakat and the components of the people's defense (i.e., FDR: the influence of the IDR reached 35 per cent of the armed forces including the Lasjkars, the Angkatan Laoet Repoeblik Indonesia (ALRI), the Folis. Tentera Laoet (PTL), 50 per cent of the Sosalit Division, and 40 per cent of the peadi Solo Brigade). ?. ter the fall of the cabinet of Amir Sjarifoedin (Renville Agreement), the FOR %r.ried out Illegal activities, such as pillage, criticism, terrorization, strikss w mc., in order to bring about the collapse of the Matta cabinet. After the arrival of l'ceso and Soeripno. the FDR and the PYI united. becoming an enlarged PKI. Action was taken to force the government to exchange consuls wah the USSR. C As their very last parliamentary act, the members of the Working Committee of the tomite Nasional Indonesia Poesa.t (KIII?). in a meeting; held the first mart of eptember i148, in which most of the merbers supnorted the gov=rnr+ente turned own a seemingly legal request of the PKI to the government to form a new 'parliamentary) cabinet. in solo. the .GDR/PTI became Provocative. Terrorization by the FDR increased anl the Gerakan Revolusie Ra.kjat (ORR) began activities In September. The Siliwa i lBrigade, which h.d about one com ny in Solo, was in charge of this activity. The quiclAy took charge of affairs In the city until the TLRI Division and the Solo- Tentera i*oet Repoeblik Indonesia (TLRI) of Jadan, assisted by about three battalions of the Solo Division. attacked a company of the Siliirangi Division at Srambaton, Solo. in order to dislodge it, this attempt failed. The Siliwangi strengthened itself with reinforcements from Klaten and Jogjakarta. It Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RD CLASSIFICATION Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390NA2g C L rHTn1l&Xff02 AGENT Division of the TNI left the city. The TIAI Soejoto Brigsde and a part of the Solo Division gent northward. The ?I X Jadan Brigade, one battalion of the TI! NasJarakat and some TAI battalions went southward with Brigade Commander Soeadi. 6. b r comparison the plan of the 1DE is given. Since the rationalisation plan not with failure among the army leaders, with men in only two key positions, Djoko- soejono as Acting Commanding Officer of the Territory of Jews and Sakirman as Chief of the Masjarakat Section, the situation was not is roey as they had pictured it and it was necessary for them to attempt a new plant 1) to takeover the leadership of the government and 2) to form a new government. Item I was to be carried out first in a seem ngly parliamentary phase and, afterwards in a non-parliamentary phase. 70 For military purposes, Solo was to be made into a "Wild West" and Nadloen was to become a guerrilla center for a long period; pressure was to be put on Eediri and Eedoe; dislocations within the military were to be brought about in accordance with the above plan so that they might strengthen their positions and consolidate the territory they occupied. More was, also the task of gathering weapons and the expulsion of Polisi Eesmanan (PE), security police, in Repaking and the few police troops which were active. 8. During the first half of September 1948, Moeeo, Amir Sjarifoedin, Setiad,it, etc., went in a group from Solo to Madiosn, via Bodjonegoro, Pati and Poervodadie propagandizing on a large scale. II. Situation Daring the Revolution. 9. At 3:30a.m., 18 September 1948, the PM/PEI. making use of three battalions of the 29 Brigade (Pesindo) which had arrived from Eediri, expelled the army. the CPI arm, and the police. They established a Soviet government (later called Pemerintah J5-cat Rasional - PIN) with Moeso as president, astir Sjarifoedin as Prime Minister, Soemarsono as Minister of Defense (later Military Governor), Abdoel Moetalib as Army Resident, Djokoeoejono as Commanding Officer (00). DabUu as Field. 00, etc. Steps taken by this government were: the seizure of all persons criticizing the revolution; the removal of all officials, even to the village level; the distribution of "bengk k5 land and land of enterprises; the release of all prisoners! Infiltration among those people easily swayed! and the dispatch of cadres. In sadioen there were summary executions of leaders 'loyal to the Republic, expulsion of the right wing leaders; pillage, disregard of rights and assassinations on a large scale. Student groups carried out illegal activities against the Mocso governments such as sabotage. 10. Moeso governments were established by Jadan on 19 September in the Kabupaten (Washiton Comment. A region administered by a Aupati) of Soeknhardio and on 20 September in Wonogiri. Alimin and Maroeto Daroesman were in Wonogiri. Police officials and members of the Pamong Prodjo were made prisoners. 11. Shortly afterwards Soejotots troops were attacked by the siliwangi Division from Solo; a Peopless Army Government (Moeso) was established in the E bupaten of Poerrodadf (Semarang) by Brigade CO Soejoto. 12. The Residency of Pati, excepting Tjepoe, for a while could not be held by the Republican Army and fell into the hands of Soejoto's Revolutionary Army (Tentera Pemberontak) and the Soediarto Brigade of the Soerakerte,4 Division. Phase One The President reveals that the nation is in a precarious situation: 13. The arrV and police, on 29 September 1948, undertook in Jogjakarta to seize hda/PES leaders, among others Tan Ling Djie, lendromartono, and a large nnnber of other outstanding leaders; other arrests took place outside the cit. IAE troops were driven ate. Up to the present, about 2,000 prisoners have been taken. Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3 25X1A2g cL INTILLIOME AG3K07 14. Left vino newspapers and periodicals have been banned. 15. Censorship of person, speech, correspondence (telegrams), etc., is in force. 16. Vital activities are being protected. 17. Similar steps bate also been taken in Solo; up to the present Scout 1,500 prisoners have been :soon. IS. 'Redoe d.elayed, action for three days due to the attitude of Seesalit. Afterwards Lt. Col. Sarbim took charge of the leaders of the army and took steps In conjunction with the police. Since the measures taken were sufficient, the situation in Redoe has improves.. 19. In Soerabaja and Kediri a delay of two dare occurred because the field (Pertea- puran) Chief of Staff for last Java, Col. Mahadi, was taken prisoner in Madioen and it was necessary to replace him with Col. Soengkono. Two battalions of the 29 Brigade were pursued in Eediri., Also Brigade CO Duhlen, Chief of Staff oaesnandsr, and TLRI Admiral Atmadji (who bad sided with Moos*) M. others were' captured. (According to reports,Atmsdji end boesnander have meanwhile been expected and Dahlan is being prepared for the death ?malty.) 20. The Malang Residency took earl steps to seize the left wing leaders (600 prisoners). 21. Bodaonegoro 'nespectedly was able to handle the situation, sine it bad at" a timely change in the leadership of the Bodjonegoro ari. ?bar seized about 300 local left wing leaders; although this step was perhaps a month overdue. 22. The Pats Residency initially began to arrest the left wing leaders in the Pats lCabupaten, but later they were overpowered by the TLRI and the Soediarto Brigade from Solo. The Sub--Territorial Commander (STO), the Resident, and the Chief of the Residency pollee fled and, others of our officials were taken prisoner. 23? The Sanjoemas Residency ( arnegsra) skillfully took all steps in time. 24. Total number of prisoners taken up to the present is about 8,000-9,000 (not including Madioen). Special arrests in Djogjasrtas 25. After the fall of Madioen, Lt. Col. Ilartono Hrotolfloesoemo, supreme leader of the Peoplede Defense (YDR), was arrested in Jogjakarta and Alimin, propaganda and agitation leader of the PII/ld1R, was arrested in Delaagga. IV. Steps taken by the Republican Government Military-Police Operations: 26. On 18 September 1948, Col. gatotsoebroto was Military governor of Soeralosrta, Semarsag, Pati, and Madloen. After the city of Soerakarta bad been cleared of left wing elements, the Siliva 1, reinforced by a fev battalions of the Soeadi Brigade, (formerly 4 Division), vadertook mopping up activities towards the south (Soekohardjo and Wonogiri) and towards the north (Sa.lam, 8alioso and Poerwodadi). Two Siliwangi battalions were sent via Tawangi ngoe to relieve Sarangan, Plaosan and Magetan and to heL.d towards Madioen; three battalions under Brigade CO Saidkin set out from Solo towards Madioen via Yalikeen, splitting into two groups, one going towards Sgaw ., the other southeastwards. One battalion of the TNI and one battalion of the National Police under M. Jasin, headed towards Madloen via 8gandjuk from 8edirt. One battalion left Sediri over the ridge of Mt. Willis to intercept Moesols arspr which might withdraw towards Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3 OIT'RAL IbTTBLLIGYNCB AG!NOY 25X1A2g Mt. Willis for guerrilla activifAy. One battalion left Treng alek (south) for Ponogoro Bad the Madtoen area. 27. On 30 September 1948, troops of the Sadikin Brigade entered the city of Madioen from the area of Walikoekoea-Geneng. Immediately thereafter the troops from Ngandjuk, moving viaTJaroebaoe and the police battalion of Jasin also entered the city and immediately set to work on reorganization. The police battalion of Jasin on the previous day was only three kilometers from the city but had to vast for additional troops before entering the city. Mossoas Army-withdrew to Doengoes and Iandangan opposite the slopes of Mt. Willis and were thrown into confusion by the Sabaroedin troops which had crossed over the ridge of the mountain. A large number of weapons and radio ports captured by our army were brought in by motor vehicles and horses. Meanwhile all of our Kabupaten were being brought under control and more police offices were occupied by our troops. A, part of Patjitan was still controlled bsr the IDR/PII. (It should be noted that the leaders of the revolution had undertaken a proper "purges. Several Baipati, lomnando Keaaanean Kota (XXK) Madioen, and about 200 police officials were killed in the confusion. The total dead and missing is about 1,000, including leaders of the right wing parties.) 28. The army and police are at present carrying out pacification activities. The directors of the revolution and disturbances are being arrested and executed. Our situation to improving. A part of Moeso's disorganized army, robbing and kidnapping on route, entered the forests along the foothills of Mt. Willis and headed towards the southern part of Iediri Residency. Another part of this arntr headed for the Wonogirt area, and another part sought to join the Red Army In Pati/Poerwodadi. Still others broke up into small groups and mingled with,the population. 29. The Soek-hardJo Kabupaten awl. the Wonogiri Kabupaten bAve been further strengthened by our side. Mater of the troops of Jadan have surrendered. The rest of the troops have hidden in the areas towards the south coast in the hilly terrain of Tirtomodjo in Wonogiri Iabupaten. Our operations against thee have almost reached a suceessa1 conclusion since we are massing forces from Wonogiri (Soerakgrta) and Wonosari (JogJalmrta). To the north the Red An W was driven from Salem and then pursued from Kalioso and Goendik. By 4 October, we had reoccupied Poerwodadi; afterwards we Improved the situation in the Poerwodadi Sabupaten. On this dame day the Red Army attacked Tjepoe and, begitueiug with the third day and before the fifth day, they occupied the northern part of T1epoe (Pats Resi- dency). Although previous to this time the army and police had. captured the outstanding local FDR/PKI leaders, the Lasjlr Boeroeh still considered itself strong and assisted the Red Army. They were unable to take the oil factory. The refinery was intact and still in operation on 10 October. Only one residue tank and one gasoline tank were burned, due to artillery fire. Since reinforce- ments arrived quickly from N avi,ve were further able to consolidate our occu- pation of Tjepoe. Meanwhile a part of the troops of Soediarto came back to the Republican.Armar` including some of the leaders of the Soedtarto Brigade. Soediarto also wished to return. Thus our army to now exerting strong pressure on Blora, the last strong point of the Red Army. Our army has assembled one battalion each from the following t 'Tjepoe Worosari and Koedoes. Also one battalion has come from B,)djonegoro via Djatirogo towards Rembang, in order to shut in Blora from the north. At Parakan in the Kedoe Residency there had also been a revolution. Major Mahmnd, a member of the Pesindo, used his battalion to expel the TRI and the police in Parakan and to terrorize the leaders of the arapr, police and Pa=ng Prodjo. This revolution was immediately suppressed by our army and the leaders retreated to the mountainous regions (Dieng). The greater part of these troops Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3 25X1A2g 035T ML fITULIGENCB AtinTCT s5- s rrendered. Major Mahmud and about thirty of his followers were forced to escape across the statue quo line on 8 October 1948, where they were protected by the Dutch Armor from our pursuit. In Wonosari (Jogjakarta) the FDR/PSI, supported by the Red Lrigy from Wonogiri, was also active, but it was suppressed by e-rw and police troops from Jogjakarta, supported by Republican troops in Wonogiri opposition was slight because our leaders were on guard prior to the action. 3i1.. The situation in Banten Residency is stable. The government remained perfectly capable of handling the situation, because prior to the revolution it had re- moved all undesirable elements. The I'DR/PSI was sufficiently controlled by simple regulations (house and city arrest). 35. Wherever our army retrieved a place from the hands of the revolutionists, the National Police undertook to eliminate dangerous elements and to disarm those not qualified to carry arms. Pamong Prodjo and the information officials immediately took up their duties. Coordination among the various officials was good. in Jogjakarta, Wonosari, Soerbisarta, and Poerwodadi cleaning up activities were carried out in a systematic manner. In Jogjakarta frequent cleaning-up activities are carried out. 36. In the areas continuously held by the Moesoists, executions were carried out by the army after a summary trial of the revolutionists and their collaborators. T. taus Taken y the Republican Oovernme Phase Three 37. The steps in this phase plan to bring about a cleaning up in the political sphere. This plan includes the necessity of enlarging the Masjarakat, which will be organized and controlled by the government. If it is a dangerous movement the Masjarakat will be isolated; if neutral it will be channelized; if healtbr it will prosper and cultivate those things which are good for it. The political sphere will be directed by the information office and the Pamong frodjo. The plan also stipulates that the Masjarakat will be predominantly national-democratic, with the Masjoemi and PHI as the leading ,factors. VI. that Matter 38. It is reported that the members of theme/PBI have carried out illegal acts everywhere, especially those aimed at sabotage and possible assassinations. We are constantly on the alert and are prepared. 39. It is obvious, according to information, that left wing armed troops are no longer in evidence In the area controlled by us. l.O. Loyal Hisboellah troops added strength to the government's means of control. The Barium Hanteng was at first active in support of the Republican Army. It appears that this was purely for the purpose of their material profit. Later they withdrew and became unconcerned, This group is becoming reaker day by day. 41. Several Sentral Organieasie Boeroeh Seloerosh Indonesia (SO331) branch labor unions withdrew from SOBSI and supported the government. Most of the unions, however, remained within the SOBSI with the intention of choosing new leaders. 4?.2. All units of the Mahasisiva supported the government. 43. The Baden Kongres Pemoeda Indonesia's attitude is ambiguous. On our side new youth groups have arisen. Among others, there are some in Soerakarta which support our idea. Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390007-3 Approved For Release 199Q/Q ~RDP 'I 0457R002100390007-3 t a 'TU-.L iNT :LLIGNC:9 AGENCY 25X1A2g The Gera]a Revolusi Bakjat (G W.) (Dr. Moe zardi was killed by, the 21)`R) the Akora rat, . other commanisticall7 oriented trties and unions are at nresen"; order observation. 4,5