A STATEMENT OF THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA BY AN INFLUENTIAL OFFICIAL OF THE INDONESIAN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 1, 1999
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 3, 1948
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6.pdf265.1 KB
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g Sanitized - Approved F 0457R00210039T CLASSIFICATION SECR GO.TT?RCL -~ CENTRAL IN LLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. 411 i O RATION REPORT 40001'r SUBJECT A Statement of the Situation in Indonesia an Influential Official of the Indonesian Republic Return to CIA PLACE ACQUIRED DATEOF INT by 25X1A2g DATE -Z 3 December I-AS NO. OF PAGES 3 25X1A6a 25X1X6 Library NO. OF ENCLS. 4 3101_ (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 2. Unfortunately this has cost lives. ?oeso's PKI, the gangsters and mercenaries, used as tools in the occupation of and withdrawal from Madioen, beastially murdered many administrators, policemen, and other officials and I'asjoemi leaders. We were luckily able to restrain the revengeful feelings of our you;h and the f'asjoer.-i, but when radioen was retaken, they were not -orevented in tine from applying "summary justice". It was evidently necessary. 3. The exact figures of the victims of Noeso's PKI are still unavailable. but it may presently be estir..ated.at 1500, including the nissing.. Fatalities were limited chiefly to the Madioen Verder (Farther Vadioe") Residency, with a small number in the Paerwodadi and 11onogiri Residencies. 441, The number executed through "snmr^ary military trials" is presently estirated ? 600 to 700. This is still going on. cn t he military police action was and is being carried out according to four darned chases: 0 H ?. Phase I: The arrest of PKI and Front Demokrat Ral-jat (FM) leaders and other V_ undercover operatives in the areas outside t'.adioen simultaneously with the isolation of the I"adioen Residency. M co o ~ Phase II: Thrusts to Yadioen from the east and west for the nurpose of re- I ,) capturing; I'adioen City, as the headquarters of the r'oeso-Republic, Down as O .~ the "Iteooeblik Front Nasional". a ~' a Phase III: The clearing of the ?adioen Residency and the pursuit of the Voest?: A 0 Barmy ("military justice"). v o ~ ~ A CLASSIFICATION CO'TTROL !STATE NA T10N C 8~7r~ ARMY x l+IR i]C_ 1_______._... Lek pirc ar of G Glj;~* Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP8 009004-6 4 ft_" 1. The military rolice dragnet to disarm the gangs employed as units of force by toeso's Par tat Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and to arrest the PKI leavers is gradu- ally completing its work. Moeso's PKI is being eliminated gradual."y. since the army has automatically justified a course of action which the :SoeN,arno- Hatta government proper was loathe to institute. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6 S. '/C0MOL - 25X1A2g CM TM" IRTELLIOUtB AGIECT Phase IT: The recapture of the northern residencies, Semarang, Pati and Bodjonegoro. 6. This procedure is fully in accordance with the current police action. Practically all the leaders have nabs been either Lrremted or executed in the field. I 7. The number of persons arrested throughout the residencies is certainly not small. It. is estimated at 6,000 to 7.000. The motto now is: better to arrest ten extra than one too few. After the bitter experience of a humane, super- democratic government, we are not taking any more chances. If a messenger crosses the status quo line he mmmust be searched, as required by no. This is logical, for the Moeso-Asir Sjsrifoedin plan covers occupied territory too, judging by documents we found. 8. In case mass. confusion sooner or later 'breaks out in occupied territory, such outbreaks would occur in our territory too. We must be careful that no more PRI leaders are free to circulate in society,'and the fighting forces (Angkatang Perang), the police and various authorities should see to it. Unfortunately, there are also some hard-headed democrats and so-called "super- hammane" men who have never agreed with this group and who would just as soon bring about the immediate release of many acknowledged PSI and FDR members. To this group of "super-democrats", alias idiots, generally belong the men and authorities who have not the faintest idea of administering a country, but imagine they know it all. aowever, we are keeping a firm hand, 'on what we have. 10. The northern residencies are easily coming, over to our side. In.the beginning the rebel brigade commander, Soediarto, delayed a few days before surrendering, and now the four remaining cities, Patio loedoes, - Djoevono'and Rembeng, are occupied and have come over to us. Whenever the surrender and transfer of authority is troublesome, the.Republiean government settles the natter, leaving it to police action and technical administration to restore order, stabilize the political and economic situation, and to prepare for an eventual break- through. 11. We are not allowed to lose eight of the last. The Dutch are now busy, with a press and radio campaign asserting that the Republic cannot remain master of the situation. They exaggerate the destruction an& acceptance of Communism. The Dutch radio at Soerak ta,omn 19 October 1948, became so fanatic as to make the mistake of saying: "The Republic pretends to have eliminated the PHI- Moeso, but is now faced with the Masjoemi and the Partai.Nasional Indonesia (P11), which are the same as the PUI."- The Dutch commentator evidently does not know that these two are white-hot right wing politically, and 100 per cent behind the government. In the meantime, the Dutch clearly blame the Republic for the confusion in the occupied territory and Radio Batavia made it known on 20 October 1948 that the Dutch will protest to the good Offices Committee (GOC) against infiltration by armed troops of the Republic. This is all very naive. The confusion is in their own territory and the Republic is blamed and held responsi- ble% The unrest in the occupied territory is indeed such that no Dutchman dares to wander from the cities alone and unarmed. The Indonesian administrative officials working with the Dutch mast all travel with an armed escort. Many could commute to their homes, but choose to live in the city. Places where such conditions exist are Garoet, Tjiamis, and Tasik. The plantations are far from secure. These are good barorae ,,ors by which to z asuro the peaco, order and security in the occupied territory. '/CONTROL - Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6 s ,CM/CONTRob GhM"'1RAL INTEEMWEEN-ft AGEICY 13. There are factors which point to a new police action: a) the resignation of 'ran Moak, followed by that of Abdnel Nadir (Widjojoatmodjo) and van Mook's secretarial staff; b) the non-acceptance of Cochran's proposal; and c) the radio and press campaigns. The Americans mast now realize that an eventual breakthrough would mean a war for all concerned - the Indonesians, the Dutch, and the interested powers, including the Americans. 9.4. Our government flirts with no country, and that is a fact; it desires no object from any other country. That is the reason fat our delegation's answer to the Cochran proposal which was radically amended by the Dutch, who are obstinate and constricting. We will accept only the Da Bole proposal. 15. Yesterday (20 October 1948) evening a report, which has not been traced or confirmed so far, announced that Amir Sjartfoedin, Wikann, Abdoel Rachman (of the PKI's Magian Y) and Setiadjit have been apprehended in the neighborhood of Madfoen. Since this report mast be reliable, only Moeso remains at large; but that is a question of time. 16. The Madioen police mast be completely replaced. The shake-up is in progress. The number of dead and missing police in the Madioen area is approximately 150. In the Pati, Semarang, Bodjonegoro. and Solo areas the. highest figure is ten. The half-buried bodies we find are difficult to identify. 17. It appears that we expect a second crisis, unless the outside world Intervenes. We will tackle it, however, and we must come through. 18v. Our hope is founded on obtaining foreign materiel such as transport, weapons, clothing, etc., for this means not only a relief for us, but a breach in the Dutch blockade. The latter is of especial interest to us. 19. Theban and Sempoe (near Patjiten) will be open and safe for any ship, beginning next month. OO$TROI+ __1 T Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6 25X1A8a Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002100390004-6