REPORT OF THE MILITARY-ECONOMIC ADVISORY PANEL TO: ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00357R000900040002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved Fo elease 2003/12110 : qlA-RDP82-0035%00900040002-1
Confidential
Report of the Military-Economic
Advisory Panel to:
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Confidential
Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP82-00357R000900040002-1
 STAT Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP82-00357R000900040002-1
Approved For Release 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP82-00357R000900040002-1
 Approved FoLjelease 2003/12/10 : CIA-RDP82-0035WO0900040002-1
CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT OF THE MILITARY-ECONOMIC ADVISORY PANEL TO
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Summary of Key Points
Since its inception in 1973 the Military-Economic
Advisory Panel has examined questions concerning the
adequacy, utility, and validity of CIA's and the Com-
munity's work on the?Soviet economy as it relates to the
military power and potential of the USSR. Our early con-
cerns stressed questions of evidence, methodology, and
inter-office cooperation within CIA. Subsequently, at
the direction cif Director George Bush, the Panel expanded
its focus to the Intelligence Community as a whole and
broadened its outlook.
Responses to Panel suggestions have, on the whole,
been positive and productive, particularly where we have
called for incremental efforts in familiar problem areas.
In other areas, particularly those involving departures
from the analysts' experience or new organizational or
methodological emphases, the responses.have not always
gone as far or as fast as we would have liked. We discuss
the specifics in the body of the paper, but there are a
few areas of continuing concern worth highlighting at the
outset.
The central concern remains the analytical research
base. With the new collection systems now available,
today's analyst has more detailed data from technical
sources at hand than ever before. But in the case of
economic and political analysis on the USSR the same num-
ber of analysts--or fewer--.are now working on this body
of, data and are spread more thinly over problems more
worldwide in scope than fifteen years ago. There are
several interrelated aspects of this problem:
--Human Capital: What are the personnel requirements
for today's and tomorrow's specialized intelligence
analysis problems, and whose reponsibility is it
to develop this essential resource? Will suffi-
cient manpower resources be available to maintain
the necessary analytical capital stock? This
need should be studied with at least as much care
as the justifications and specifications for new
technical collection systems.
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--Basic Research and Interdisciplinary Analysi ..
TE-c attrition over time of basic research efforts
on the Soviet Union, both in and out of govern-
ment, has seriously weakened the evidentiary base
of political and economic analyses in particular,
and works against successful integrated analyses
on longer term intelligence problems in general.
--Soviet Area Focus: A workable organizational
solution to integrating specialized Soviet studies
has not yet been achieved. There is a wealth of
information available on purely military, techni-
cal, economic and political aspects of the USSR;
there is little effort to integrate this informa-
tion into more balanced assessments of Soviet
motives, plans, and capabilities. Except in the
purely military and technical fields, senior
managers have had their attention and responsi-
bility spread too broadly.
--Collection Prior4_: The relative wealth of tech-
nical collection has overshadowed collection and
exploitation of human and documentary'sources --
parti.cularly overt sources--with a diminution of
the particular perspective often available only
from those sources.
A final summary point concerns the question of intel-
ligence in the public arena. Here, the issue that must
be faced squarely is credibility. Departmental intelli-
gence is sometimes perceived by the White House, the public,
and Congress as policy-biased, and consequently viewed with
distrust. In the past, CIA has had less of a credibility
problem because CIA analyses-wero less in the public eye.
The issue now, however, is no longer one of "whether" to
expose CIA analyses more openly. That alternative seems to
be foreclosed. The question becomes one of determining the
'forms and limits of exposure and of building the understand-
ing and skills needed for dealing with the intricacies of
public debate. Professional competence and objectivity must
also be maintained. This will require a strong commitment
on the.part of the Director to be forthright when intelligence
does not fully support a favored policy of any one of'the
consuming community.
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