(SANITIZED) PAPER ON CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001602490001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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20 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence?~
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: (Paper on Chile
It complements the memorandum entitled "Chile:
Scenarios o Dramatic Political Change" prepared by the Office of Global
Issues and forwarded to you in October 1985. This is part of our
continuing effort to "think the unthinkable" about important countries with
unstable political systems
2. Basically, the author lays out three scenarios whereby the Chilean
political landscape could be dramatically changed over the next 18 months:
-- Pinochet's sudden death would probably lead the military to
invite approved civilians to participate in a civil-military
"provisional government" which would either set about planning
a more democratic transition to a popularly elected government
or serve as a vehicle for continued military rule--and of
political agitation against it.
-- Deepening social and economic crisis would lead the military
to force Pinochet to resign with the same results as in
scenario one.
C.
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SUBJECT: Contractor Paper on Chile
-- Leftists could seize power by fomenting a popular uprising of
uncontrollable dimensions or by exploiting a civil war
resulting from a violent split in the armed forces. If
leftist agitation appeared to be getting out of hand,
opportunistic generals, seeing the handwriting on the wall,
might also seize power preemptively and announce the advent of
a "socialist regime" broadly aligned with Cuba and the USSR.
At bottom, however, the author does not believe that dramatic changes of
the sort he lays out will occur, feeling instead that any changes over the
next 18 months are likely to be gradual in nature and engineered by
Pinochet in an effort to stay in power.
3. ALA believes the paper overstates the degree to which the Chilean
military currently stands behind Pinochet. Otherwise, however, we believe
the scenarios presented are reasonable and concur in the judgment that the
odds favor evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in Chile over the
next 18 months.
4. The author did not have access to classified information in
preparing the paper, which can be handled as unclassified when detached
from this memorandum.
o hn Helgerson
Attachment:
"Future Developments in Chile: Scenarios
Expected and Unexpected"
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SUBJECT: I (Paper on Chile
Distribution:
Originals - each addressee
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - D/ALA
1 - ALA/SAD
DDI/ALA I(20 December 85)
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FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE: SCENARIOS EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED
The purpose of this paper is to think a bit about the unthinkable--the sudden,
unexpected collapse of the Pinochet regime in Chile, and the possible consequences. The
period for which we are projecting extends roughly to early 1987, or about eighteen months
from now.
Perhaps it would be proper to begin, however, by stating that in the best professional
opinion of this analyst, no dramatic changes are likely to occur in Chile during that period.
This is so because:
-- General Pinochet, though 69 years of age, appears to be in excellent physical health,
-- He appears to enjoy the absolute loyalty of the Army, and effective control of the
other two armed services and the police (carabineros),
-- The opposition, though slowly beginning to organize around a common agenda, is
still unable to mobilize as an effective political force,
-- Those elements most capable of carrying out an assassination (the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left [MIR] or the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Movement [MPMRJ)
appear to prefer other avenues to power.
Pinochet's health. Given the highly personalistic nature of the regime, the health of the
Chilean President is the subject of widespread speculation, since no other figure in the armed
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forces seems capable of replacing him. For his part, the Chilean President has done nothing
to groom a possible successor, and has in fact retired from the military almost all of those
generals who could reasonably challenge his hegemony in the armed forces.
The loyalty of the armed forces. Both Pinochet and his opponents are well aware of
the fact that the support of the armed forces is utterly crucial to his continuance in power,
and also to the successful consummation of the political transition envisioned by the
Constitution of 1980. Traditionally, the Chilean army has been characterized by a high degree
of professionalism--rigidly hierarchical, and hermetically sealed off from the mainstream of
civilian society. Hence it is difficult for opposition politicians to discover, much less exploit,
whatever differences of opinion may arise within the officer corps.
A strong bond exists between Pinochet and the Chilean military: partly one of honor
and conviction, partly one of self-interest. As an institution, the armed forces have a crucial
stake in the political system which emerged since 1973. They have, in fact, sworn to defend
the Constitution of 1980, which assures Pinochet the presidency to 1989, and establishes in
apparent perpetuity a new political system in which the military will possess extraordinary
discretionary and supervisory powers. Also, Pinochet has significantly improved the pay,
allowances, and social stature of the military (and their wives).
It is known that there are differences within the armed forces on all of the major
political issues, with the Air Force the most "liberal" wing, the army the most "conservative"
(e.g., pro-Pinochet), and the Navy somewhere in between. Nonetheless, the only service
whose political views count is the Army; no important change can take place without its
unreserved support, and insofar as is known, there are no serious divisions within that branch.
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The opposition. While it is true that the opposition has shown unexpected vitality and
capacity for growth in recent months, as evidenced by the Grand National Accord, there are
still many obstacles to a solid consensus. The major point of contention is the question of
the role of the Communist party in the transition: the Socialists favor some form of
"cooperation" with the party and its front organization, the MDP, while the other parties tend
to prefer to maintain their distance from it. (Even so, within Christian Democracy there are
conflicting currents, particularly in its youth wing.)
There are also some differences of opinion on how, precisely, the transition is to be
speeded up or qualitatively changed--whether through civil disobedience, negotiations with
the regime, or international pressures. The bottom line, however, is that unless and until the
Chilean Army decides that it is in its own interests to break with the regime's current political
blueprint, there is nothing that the opposition can do to alter decisively the course of events.
The Revolutionary Left. Since roughly 1980, the Communist party and its allies have
publicly favored the use of violence to bring about the downfall of the regime, and have in
fact engaged in terrorist activities against police, military and civil authorities. This places
them somewhat outside the parameters of the Demoratic Alliance. Since this is a sharp break
with the party's line in the past, it suggests that the leadership believes that Pinochet is
bound to remain in power to 1989 and beyond, that it would be best to stake out early the
most "advanced" possible position. Certainly the party has reason to regard Pinochet as its
best ally, since he polarizes opinion, delegitimizes the regime internationally, and--by denying
them any form of modest success--discredits the more moderate forces within the
opposition. If this presumption is correct, then the assassination of Pinochet would definitely
not be on the agenda of the Communist party or its allies.
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THE CONTEXT - 1985-1987
The next eighteen to twenty-four months could be regarded as "pre-transitional": they
bring us mid-way through the four years prior to the plebiscite of 1989. The regime hopes
that during this period two things will happen: one, the opposition will recognize the futility
of its efforts, and/or fall to quarrelling among its constituent parts; and two, a new political
force broadly supportive of the government's goals (the UDI, or Independent Democratic
Union, or something like it) will have an opportunity to sink roots into Chile's political soil and
preempt the older parties when, according to the regime's own blueprint, the lid on legal
party activity must be lifted.
At one time this seemed at least a conceivable scenario, particularly during the years
1978-1981, when the country experienced an unprecedented economic boom. In the context
of a depression in copper prices, a staggering foreign debt, and growing reluctance on the
part of foreign investment to commit itself to new Chilean projects, it appears virtually
beyond reach. Even a modest upturn, such as some economists predict, will not be enough
to generate a firm constituency approaching (if not exceeding) a majority on behalf of the
government when elections are held in 1990.
The period 1985-87 is likewise crucial to the opposition, since if it cannot show some
forward movement, by 1987 its constituent parties will be under considerable pressure to
move closer to the Communists, or at least to work with them in a tactical sense. (Such
pressures already exist, particularly within the youth and student organizations, but so far
have been resisted at the highest levels.) One new qualitative factor is the role of Cardinal
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Juan Francisco Fresno, who has become something of a mediator between the opposition
parties and the regime. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the Church--already
regarded as "infiltrated" by the regime--can obtain anything from the regime which it is
presently unwilling to concede.
Both the government and the opposition place enormous importance upon relations with
the United States, which each believes (rightly or wrongly) could weigh in decisively on one
side or the other. The government does all it can to assure the Chilean public that its
relations with the United States, and most especially with the Reagan administration, are
excellent, while the opposition searches the horizon continually for signs of change in US
policy, or for decisive action by the US Congress which could, in some (undefined) way, alter
the balance of forces on the ground.
SCENARIOS FOR UNEXPECTED CHANGES
SCENARIO ONE: Pinochet's Sudden Death.
This could occur either through natural causes or by political assassination. Since
Pinochet is at the age where many men contract fatal ailments, notably cancer, or suffer fatal
heart attacks, this cannot be discounted as a possibility, but without very good medical
knowledge (such as we did not have, for example, on the Shah of Iran) it is impossible to
predict.
As noted above, assassination does not seem to be on the agenda of the two
organizations most capable of carrying out a successful attempt--the MIR or the Manuel
Rodriguez Patriotic Movement. On the other hand, this does not discount the possibility of
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such an act being carried out by a splinter faction, a lone gunman, or even--to extrapolate
from incidents of this type elsewhere in Latin America--a member of his own personal
bodyguard.
The sudden death of Pinochet would wholly alter the political equation. For one thing,
the armed forces would instantly be released from fealty to his person (and even, in a way,
from the Constitution of 1980, since he is specifically named in that document as the
President to 1989). For another, since Pinochet's "legitimacy" within the armed forces is
traced to the coup of 1973, there would be no serving army general who could claim right of
succession, at least on that basis. No doubt the army commander presently serving as
Pinochet's proxy on the junta would, by reason of service seniority, accede to the presidency,
but the man himself was selected for his present position precisely because he lacks the
qualities and political talent of the incumbent.
Under these circumstances, there would, to be sure, be an attempt to continue with the
political blueprint contemplated by the Constitution of 1980. But' it would be of short
duration, because Pinochet's sudden disappearance would raise a whole host of pressures and
expectations which could not easily be contained. For one thing, it would be an opportunity
for the more moderate (or perhaps merely more pragmatic) members of the armed forces to
speak up in favor of a more rapid and expeditious transition. For another, it would be an
excuse for members of the Chilean business elite who have held back in the past to "go
public" for a return to democracy. For another, it would provoke widespread popular
demonstrations, and an increase in international pressures for political liberalization.
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Thus it is likely that shortly after Pinochet's death, the generals would begin by inviting
a small group of approved civilians to join them in a civil-military "provisional government."
From here events could take one of two courses: the new government might invite
members of the opposition to join them in revising the Constitution of 1980 and planning a
more democratic version of a transition, with elections for a new Congress to be held as
expeditiously as possible, instead of 1990, as presently contemplated. In that case there
would be little incentive for the Democratic Alliance to persist in their ambiguities concerning
the Communist party; a growing climate of confidence would develop between the opposition
and the armed forces; and a reasonably orderly transition could be contemplated.
. Or, the military might persist in following the current timetable for transition with no
changes--either on its own, or in conjunction with some civilian allies drawn from the most
unrepresentative sector of the right Given the expectations and the psychological climate
which Pinochet's sudden disappearance would inevitably generate, this would provoke
widespread popular protest, the defection of many civilian elements who have supported the
regime in the past, and a further chilling of relations with the United States. Moreover, it is
unlikely that under these circumstances the government would retain its will to power: there
would be, inevitably, differences of opinion within its ranks, and in the absence of an
undisputed source of authority, confusion and a loss of direction.
This could lead to a stop-go response to events: hard-nosed declarations and
measures followed by sudden, frantic attempts to conciliate public opinion through rapid
concessions (return of exiles, lifting of restrictions on the Communist party, etc.). It might
also lead to a rapid succession of cabinets and of political plans, in which, the
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UNCLASSIFIED
government--having clearly lost the initiative--would eventually cede it to the streets and/or
to a coalition of the most vociferous and militant members of the opposition. The latter,
inevitably, would have some connection with, or tolerance of, the Communist party, and might
join the government only to open the door for a coalition with the MDP. At some point the
only alternative to this course might be the sudden reassertion of military power through an
exceptionally repressive "coup within a coup."
Checklist of Indicators to Watch for Scenario One.
(1) Pinochet's health, physical appearance, any hard medical information. It would also
be useful to know more about the health of his wife, since she is generally regarded as an
exceptionally influential counsellor--perhaps the only one he trusts--and certainly the one
most capable of persuading him to change course.
(2) Doctrinal views of the Communist party, the MIR, and the MDP generally on the role
of political assassination in the struggle for power.
(3) Entry into Chile of terrorist elements most likely to carry out a regicidal
assassination--the Basque ETA, the PLO, the IRA, Argentine Montoneros or remnants of the
Argentine ERP.
(4) Pattern of terrorist activities in Chile (To what degree does assassination figure?
What capabilities have been demonstrated?).
(5) Presence or absence of Chilean militants in other areas of the world where
assassination and crimes of state are common (North Ireland, Lebanon, etc.).
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(6) Incidents of infiltration into the Chilean secret service (the civilian force which
guards Pinochet's person).
SCENARIO TWO. The "Portuguese" Option".
The metaphor here is drawn from the Portuguese Revolution of 1974, in which the
armed forces overthrew a government which it had supported for decades, and in which it
had figured prominently. The immediate precipitant was the war in Africa, which had taken a
harsh toll in the lives of officers and enlisted men, and for which there seemed to be no
foreseeable end. Once the Caetano regime was overthrown, the generals turned to
quarrelling among themselves and seeking out alignments with various parties, including the
Communists, who used their alliance with one general officer to come perilously close to
capturing the revolution.
It should be fairly obvious that the situation in Chile is radically different from that of
Portugal. There is no colonial war; the leadership of the armed forces is unified in its
opposition to the Communist party; the current chief of state is not a civilian like Caetano but
a general to whom they have sworn their loyalty.
Nonetheless, if one thinks of the Portuguese metaphor more broadly, it is obvious that
the revolution in Portugal was brought about by the decision of a group of officers not to
continue to sacrifice the well-being of their institution to the political interests of a small
coterie in Lisbon and the African colonial capitals. In that sense, it is not wholly
inconceivable that at some point in the future, the armed forces in Chile would regard their
continued co-stewardship with Pinochet as too expensive to continue.
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To flesh out this scenario, one must cast about for a series of functional equivalents to
the war in Africa: (a) a yet sharper decline in the price of copper, and therefore in the health
of the Chilean economy generally, (b) widespread riots and demonstrations, which the
carabineros might prove incapable of handling, (c) a qualitative decline--due to increased
international pressures--incapacity of the military to acquire armaments, thus raising the
political costs of the regime to intolerable levels. All of these would have to be fairly
catastrophic in dimensions, and would also have to be accompanied by credible assurances
by the opposition--publicly as well as privately--that there would be no "war crimes trials" or
post hoc adjudications of military stewardship from 1973.
This scenario envisions a deepening economic and social crisis, gathering accelerating
force over a relatively short period of time (let us say, the Chilean winter, which is
June-August). Perhaps begun by an illegal strike, or a shooting incident involving the
carabineros and younger demonstrators, it could mushroom into more or less spontaneous
violence and upheaval, which the political parties would use as a pretext to call for
widespread demonstrations.
At some point the carabineros would prove incapable of containing the disorder, and it
would be necessary to mobilize the army and send it into open combat with citizens. The
failure to extinguish protest by a single bloody confrontation might require another, and this
could lead to serious stresses within the service institutions, particularly if it appeared that
they would be required to do this sort of thing on a continuing basis.
One could then envision a confrontation between Pinochet and his commanders that
would lead to the former's resignation. What would follow from that, however, is less clear.
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UNCLASSli ILL)
1
As in Scenario One, the military might invite the opposition to support an accelerated
transition, or conversely, it might attempt to continue Pinochet's timetable without him. (This
could generate the same difficulties outlined in Scenario One, with some of the same
possibilities.) If we were to follow the "Portuguese" metaphor fully, there might be a split
within the armed forces, in which generals would choose up sides between various political
forces, and bargain with one another to represent them in a reconstituted junta. That, of
course, would be a formula for permanent instability.
Checklist of indicators to Watch for Scenario Two.
(1) General economic conditions--copper prices, unemployment, inflation, cost of basic
foodstuffs, dollar-peso relationship.
(2) Morale and professional capabilities of the carabineros.
(3) Relations between carabineros and the Army (To what degree are the former willing
to do the latter's "dirty work"? Indications of dissatisfaction? Expressions of Army reluctance
to pull carabineros' chestnuts out of the fire?).
(4) Decline in Chile's relative strategic position (patterns of arms acquisition of
Argentina and Peru--balanced against Chilean capabilities).
(5) Outcome of the trials of the service chiefs in Argentina and also the general stature
and economic situation of the armed forces in that country (as a metaphor for Chile).
(6) Public assurances by politicians on the future role of the military in a
redemocratized Chile. (How often does the term a "democratized" armed forces appear? This
is a red flag to the institutional pride of the latter.)
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(7) Conversations, if any, between politicians and the military (these would most likely
take place outside of Chile, in such locales as the United States, Argentina, Peru, Spain,
Panama, or in Geneva, where General Carrasco, currently in gilded exile because of his
hostility to Pinochet, serves as Ambassador to US organizations).
SCENARIO THREE. The Advent of a Revolutionary Marxist Regime.
This could take place in one of three ways. (a) A popular uprising led by forces of the
left, would spread to uncontainable dimensions, and then perhaps be joined by elements of
the armed forces. Or, (b), some army generals, seeing the handwriting on the wall, might
preempt the left by seizing power, banishing Pinochet, and announcing the advent of a
"socialist" regime broadly allied to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Or, (c) finally, popular unrest,
and the incapacity of the armed forces to contain it, would lead to a split within the armed
forces and a civil war, in which the anti-Pinochet forces, perhaps assisted by governments in
Bolivia, Peru and Argentina, would prevail.
In all three cases, a coalition government of some sort would emerge, in which,
however, the Communists would exercise a critical role. In subcases (a) and (c), the new
Chilean government would have the appearance of being "left-Social Democratic" for a brief
period, until all non-Marxist forces were eased out.3 In subcase (b), the military might hold
1/ Perhaps, as in Cuba in 1933, in which the enlisted men ousted their officers, consummating
the first "social revolution" in a Latin American army.
2/ In some ways this is what happened in Peru in 1968, and in fact many Chileans believed in
July and August, 1973 that it was the most likely outcome of the impasse between Allende
and the opposition.
3/ Even so, the regime would continue to claim that it was non-Communist, and receive
some support for its position from irresponsible Latin American leaders, including chiefs of
state of neighboring countries.
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onto power, utilizing the Communists and other forces of the left as subordinate elements to
whip up popular support, and also, to administer a centrally-planned economy and a
controlled press, television and educational system.
Checklist of Indicators to Watch for in Scenario Three.
(1) Chilean military contacts with Cubans, Soviets, or Eastern bloc states.
(2) Chilean military contacts with the Communist party.
(3) Postures of Argentine, Bolivian and Peruvian governments towards the Pinochet
regime (willingness to allow their countries to be used as bases for conspiracy, training or
armed opposition, or infiltration of weaponry and personnel.) This includes also the concrete
capacity of such governments to police their own territories and to control subversive
activities at home. (For example, the development of an important Sendero Luminoso base in
Southwestern Peru would create a whole new dimension to this problem.)
(4) Expression of Communist party views on possible alliances with "democratic
elements" in the military.
(5) General indicators of political instability and the possibilities of massive social
upheaval.
(6) Growth of disciplined, Communist-led protest in the poorer districts (poblaciones)
of Santiago and other major cities (as opposed to spontaneous upheaval).
(7) Unrest within the lower ranks of the army, particularly on the part of
non-commissioned officers.
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FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
These "unthinkable" scenarios become a little more interesting when placed alongside
what is clearly the most "thinkable": a combination of international pressures (negotiations on
Chile's foreign debt), pressures from the Church, shifts within the armed forces, and perhaps
even a change of heart by Pinochet, leads to a new approach to the transition. The
government would initiate negotiations with the opposition; there would be serious discussion
of modification of the Constitution of 1980; perhaps the date of congressional elections would
be advanced. At the same time, some arrangement would be worked out for the safety of
General Pinochet and his family once he retires, to which all of the parties would have to
make some sort of commitment, perhaps even to Communists.
However one may choose to rank this scenario in order of likelihood, it is important to
note that it is the tacit objective of almost all of the international pressures against the
regime. Both the Carter and Reagan policies could be described as having had this
desideratum, and of course the same applies for most of the governments of Western Europe
and Latin America. It is also the basis upon which most of the democratic opposition in Chile
operates. Neither they nor we are prepared for any surprises, yet only some unforeseen
development, such as suggested above, can seriously alter the balance of forces in that
country during the next eighteen months.
4/ There is genuine concern in Argentina that a social upheaval in Chile would have
"spillover" effects into its own country, and, of course, the military there are concerned with
the possible advent of a trans-Andean Marxist regime.
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SUBJECT (Paper on Chile
Distribution:
External
The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs
The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Raymond Burghardt, Senior Director for Latin American Affairs, National
Security Council
Peter W. Rodman, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Robert S. Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs
Internal
1-DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - NI0/LA
1 - SRP/ADCI
1 - C/PES
1-DDI
1 - D/OGI
1 - OGI/FSIC
1 - OGI/FSIC/PI
1 - D/CPAS
1 - SA/DA/CPAS
1 - C/IMC/CPAS
1 - OCR/DSD/DB
1 - D/ALA
1 - C/ALA/SAD
1 - C/ALA/SAD/SC
1-CDOLA
1-
/ALA/SARI
20 December 85)
SECRET
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