AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001502000013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 19, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
A
17
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
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DDA
7
DDO
8
DDSBT
9
Cjim/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
X
N
1 01A
18
19
20
21
22
El
19 Aug. 85
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Executive Registry
85- 3227
19 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Africa
is, together with the amount o support the ovie s have
put into ozam ique and Angola over the last year or so, and the Congressional
action on the Clarke Amendment, suggests that perhaps the time has come to look
at a new policy for Southern Africa. It might look something like this:
Angola - Shift to a US policy of support for the pro-western armed resistance
movement of UNITA and its goals of a "National Unity government" with the least
hard-core communist elements of the current government leading to genuinely
democratic elections and the removal of the Cuban/Soviet bloc personnel.
Mozambique - Shift to a US policy of full support for the pro-western armed
resistance, RENAMO, and work with friendly governments to bring about a "National
Unity" coalition between RENAMO and the least pro-Soviet elements of the current
communist government.
Namibia - Help the pro-democratic Namibian political groups to organize so that
they can compete effectively in genuinely democratic elections to be held under
supervision of an international commission of genuinely democratic countries--not
the United Nations which has a conflict of interest, since it has already recognized
the communist SWAPO guerrilla organization as "the sole and authentic representative
of the Namibian people".
Union of South Africa - Encourage peaceful evolution from the apartheid system
while also assuring that the communist-led violent opposition groups are unable to
bring a hostile, anti-western repressive dictatorship to power in the name of
equal rights for all.
I attach some material Fred Wettering and John Helgerson have provided recently.
I would like to get this updated along the lines I discussed with you this morning.
I also attach a memorandum I sent to Graham Fuller, who will be back here tomorrow,
designed to get additional material for the same broad purpose.
William J. Casey
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SECRET
Executive - 5t; y
85- 3226
19 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Emerging Troubles
1. It seems to me that we should resensitize the President and NSC
principals on the combination of troubles we see as possibly emerging.
This will bring up to date the story we developed in the Don Regan
briefing. For this purpose I wonder if you could do the following:
a. Update the very good paper you did on Iran about two
months ago.
b. Do a similar paper on the Syrian/Iranian/Libyan squeeze
to surround Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon.
c. Perhaps there should be a separate piece on Lebanon.
See the attached article byGeorgie Anne Geyer, which
appeared in this morning's Washington Times.
d. Do an update on the piece you did on Sudan shortly
after the one you did on Iran.
2. By the way, General Vessey and others were powerfully impressed
by the letter you wrote for the Soviet Foreign Minister to Gorbachev.
Vessey suggested you ought to write another one on advising the West
how to respond to the new Jordan strategy for the Middle East.
William J. Casey
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AL WOW= J,-Pa-sey
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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
19 August 1985
GEORGIE ANNE GEYER
Planned
chaos in
Lebanon?
Several years ago, some mem-
bers of the Lebanese govern-
ment of more-or-less
President Amin Gemayel esti-
mated the value of the shells and
bullets expended on only one night
of savage fighting there at $5 mil-
lion.
That kind of extraordinary outlay
of money and weaponry - a devel-
opment privately remarked upon
with a kind of awe among analysts
from Western Europe to the Middle
East - is leading to some startling
new speculation on what Lebanon
really is all about.
Some of them are saying that, far
from being an accidental or out-of-
control war, Lebanon, on many lev-
els, is a deliberate and . planned
chaos. As one analyst intimately con-
nected with the war put it to me:
"The story not told is that this is
an international war. It is the Span-
ish Civil War of our times. At stake
are a number of things, from the fate
of the Palestinians to whether the
Soviets take over the whole area.
"One key area the Soviets did not
control was Lebanon. Now, there is
Georgie Anne Geyer is a nation-
ally syndicated columnist.
The Lebanon war
most definitely is
being used and
molded from outside,
in particular by the
Soviets.
Soviet control - but negatively." He
paused for emphasis. "This is Viet-
nam II;" he added.
What is important to watch in
Lebanon is the sheer amount of
weaponry and money for weaponry.
This tells both the story and at the
same time why this story is so dan-
gerous that none of these analysts
wanted to be quoted.
Basically, they agree on this argu-
ment:
Lebanon, with its longtime deli-
cate balance between factions, could
have fallen apart into warring clans
and sectors. But. without the little-
reported and unprecedented inter-
national supply of arms, it would
never have reached the stage of sav-
agery that goes on day after day even
now.
There are missiles launched from
trucks, and they are shot off at the
rate of 36 ever? half-minute. For the
most common gun, thee 152mm,
every shell costs $1,000. Private
armies have D-72 tanks, which the
Soviets give to some Warsaw Pact
countries; and some Palestinian
groups have helicopters.
The enormous preponderance of
weapons comes across the Black Sea
from the Soviet Union through the
Bosporus to land at such ports as
Tyre and Latakia. Some come
directly by land across Syria, again
with Soviet markings.
Figures used by the Foreign and
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Commonwealth Office in London say
that Syria, the Soviets' main foothold
in the Arab world, heads the list of
Soviet-arms recipients for the :last
five years. In 1983 alone,-supplies to
it were worth about $1.7 billion.
One curiosity also little known is
that the Soviets obtained about 20 :
percent of their hard currency earn-
ings, . again in 1983 alone, from
repayments of principle and interest
on arms sales in these countries,
So while the attention of the lead-
ers of the world's traditionally
organized countries (the United
States and Western Europe) is _.I
focused on the "big" issues of
nuclear arms and their control, it is
telling that virtually no one is
watching the supposedly "periph-
eral" area of Lebanon.
I called the prestigious Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies
in London and asked whether they
had any information on the amounts
of arms going into Lebanon.
"In a word, no," a military
spokesman told me. "We watch the
big stuff:' Then he asked the key
question: "How do you cover stuff
from the Syrians to their proteges?
From Iran to the Hezbollah? Zb
Christians from Cyprus?
Knowledgeable sources can't,
'because the data is too scarce:'
. Because the entire Lebanon war
is orchestrated in such an "irreg-.
ular" manner, the constituted
authority of the world .cannot get a
grip on it. And, indeed,'that is pre-
cisely why it is orchestrated in such
a way.
O ne caveat: it would be far too
much to say that the entire
Lebanon wart which now has
gone on for 10 horrifying years, was
planned from afar - from Moscow
or Damascus. There are too many
fissiparous protagonists in Lebanon.
But what begins to become clear
when. you separate some of the
strands of the Lebanon war is that it.'
most definitely is being used and ~
molded from outside, in particular
by the Soviets, through their maca-
bre arms input and the control that
gives them.
The useful chaos of the moment
can, then, in their eyes, lead to a quite !
different future, as yet unforeseenone in which the Soviet Union plays`:
a major role. The analysts also say, j
for instance, that the little-known 1
Lebanese Communist Party
increasingly is inserting itself into
important posts.
The Spanish Civil War of our
time? When one thinks about it, it l
doesn't seem as unlikely as it might
sound at first.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
US/South Africa Relations
---------- -------------------
FROM: r EXTENSION NO
Frederick L. Wettering _-NC_#0291-0785
-
NI0 for Africa ATE
7 June 1985
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
~
VC/NIC
1 to 5:
2.
I've asked Fred to rev up a
quick, short, SNIE on prospects for
S
th Af
i
W
ill h
C
r
ou
ca.
e w
ave a
on-
3.
cept Paper TOR for your considera-
tion as soon as possible. In light
- - --
f S
th Af
i
'
l
k
-
--
-
o
ou
r
ca
s ro
ey pro-
e as
4.
vider of raw materials to the West,
and in light of the technological
--
- -
revolution in the field of material
S'
sciences, we are hoping to include
DCI
in our SNIE a box that will address
th
sti
f
h
th
i
i
e que
on o
w
e
er
n com
ng
6.
years Western dependency on South
Africa's mineral wealth will change
and th
i
f thi
t
t
h
l
i
l
e
mpac
s
o
ec
no
og
ca
~'
revolution on South African economy.
- --
8.
-
NI0/Africa
Herbert E. Meyer
10.
11.
14.
13,
DC1
14.
EXEC
REG
15.
use Pill
oQRM
1-79 610 EDITIONS GPO : 1983 0 - 411-632
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SECRET/
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #02910-85
7 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering 1~~
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
US/South Africa Relations
Recent conversations
as we as discussions With~
have strengthened my belief that the US
policy community may not be paying sufficient attention to an emerging
trend in US/South Africa relations. A summary of my argument is as
follows:
a. KEY JUDGMENT: The South African Government (SAG)
increasingly appears to perceive the United States to be less
relevant and less important to its short-term regional and domestic
interests. While Pretoria will strive to maintain cordial bilateral
relations, cooperate in intelligence sharing on Soviet Bloc
activities, and keep their options open by listening to US diplomatic
proposals, the Botha government is likely to become less responsive
to US regional proposals and increasingly deaf to US requests,
suggestions, and demands concerning South African domestic actions
and policies. I anticipate that this trend will accelerate in coming
months as Washington and Pretoria--both under political pressure at
home--tailor their actions and statements to domestic constituencies.
In sum, US leverage is likely to be decreasing at a time when US
public interest in South Africa's domestic scene is increasing.
b. DISCUSSION: South African cooperation with US diplomatic
efforts in the region has rested in large measure on Pretoria's
belief that Washington is in a unique position to talk to all major
parties and governments in the region. For the last four years and
partly as a result of US diplomacy, however, South Africa has
developed its own lines of communication with neighboring states and
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no longer need depend on the US to talk to Angola, Mozambique, or
Zimbabwe. Moreover, South Africa increasingly questions the ability
of the US to "deliver" these governments in any negotiated agreements.
In my judgment, the South Africans--at least for the
shortrun--believe the US initiatives regarding Angola and Namibia are
dead in the water and, as a consequence, Pretoria has developed
alternative policies and strategies for pursuing its interests. In
particular, they feel comfortable with pursuing on their own policies
that will try to maintain lines of communication with the MPLA,
increase support to UNITA, and develop a Namibian government and
security force which may ultimately draw in SWAPO. (I believe the
last of these is unlikely but that Pretoria believes it can be
done.) In essence, Pretoria believes these policies meet its core
security interests while rendering US efforts a useful, but not
critically important, exercise. As such, South Africa can avoid
taking positions or making statements that "embarrass" the SAG or
force it to make potentially dangerous new concessions.
In Mozambique, South Africa supports our Mozambique
initiative but increasingly sees itself as having been induced to
extensively support a Machel regime whose survival prospects are
increasingly suspect and whose commitment to the Nkomati process may
be questionable as its political fortunes decline in the face of the
RENAMO insurgency.
At home, the SAG has shown renewed determination to
maintain control of the security situation as well as reassert a firm
hand "guiding" black aspirations. In South African eyes, President
Botha is offering extraordinary new concessions--at a breakneck
pace--to expand the dialogue with blacks and permit greater black
political participation. At the same time, we see a renewed
ruthlessness in dealing with UDF oppositionists and the anarchic
violence in the townships. I believe the government will not
hesitate to turn more and more to such "stick" measures if they
determine that is what is required to restore order in black
townships and stop the coercion and intimidation of blacks who might
otherwise support cooperation with the government. The likelihood
that some of these measures will be directed against blacks who are
perceived in the West to be legitimate political opposition forces is
high given the SAG's historic difficulty of distinguishing between
criticism and subversion.
Finally, a number of forthcoming measures from both
Washington and Pretoria will increase the level of tension and widen
the gulf between the two nations.
-- Demonstrations and public criticism from prominent US
figures and greater media attention will generate greater
resentment in SAG government circles.
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JCI.KC I I
US measures, such as restricting exports to South Africa,
limiting loans, or banning sale of Krugerrands cited in the
Lugar or Grey bills, will provoke either direct or indirect
South African reprisals. The SAG already has threatened
(and then hedged) to expel one million guest workers from
neighboring states, and reprisals against US companies of
some sort--even to the level of petty harassment--can be
anticipated.
The SAG--citing the infringement on its sovereignty--is
almost certain to forbid measures in the Lugar or Grey
bills that call for Embassy mandatory enforcement of the
Sullivan principles or the dispersal of millions of dollars
in scholarships to South African blacks.
In South Africa, further SAG arrests, detentions,
intimations, and trials of nonwhite critics will provoke
new outcries in the US. SAG covert attacks on ANC and PAC
bases and personnel in neighboring states--which are likely
to increase--will have the same result.
-- SAG efforts to reassert control of rebellious black
townships almost inevitably will create more bloody
incidents. Given that the unrest is likely to continue
over a long period of time, we can anticipate new and
ongoing protests from US groups opposed to the South
African government. The lack of SAG security force
training in nonlethal control will only magnify the issue.
c. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US: I believe the still prevalent view
in State that the SAG must come up with new concessions in order to
keep the Namibia-Angola initiative visibly alive--particularly as a
result of the South African fiasco in Cabinda--is erroneous and
likely to lead to disappointment.
The policy thesis that we retain a unique role and an
actual mandate to craft and promote solutions to regional southern
African problems has been overtaken by events and no longer
accurately reflects political realities in southern Africa.
While the SAG will still listen politely and selectively
share information, they will feel much less compelled to respond to
our prescriptions or requests for statements, gestures, concessions,
or positive actions. As in the past when pressed, the government
increasingly will look to its own counsel, claim the "outside" world
doesn't understand, and stiffen and reaffirm its resolve to find a
"South African" solution.
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This decreasing responsiveness will be clearest in the
SAG's growing intolerance of US advice, suggestions, or lectures on
how the SAG should handle its internal affairs. They will resist new
and increased US Embassy involvement in SAG internal affairs and
could even be tempted to curb existing US activities such as support
to black trade unions, human rights organizations, or existing
scholarship programs.
d. CONCLUSION: While I see some chilling and distancing in
US-South African relations, I nonetheless see at least the
possibility that useful bilateral relations can be maintained on many
issues of mutual concern. This requires, however, that we accept at
least for the moment that the SAG sees the US as of less relevance
and importance and that Pretoria will be less responsive except when
it serves its clear interests. In these areas, such as following and
frustrating Soviet and Cuban activities in the area, cooperation can
be sustained as long as both parties recognize that a new and
evolving relationship is emerging.
Fre erick L. Wetteri5g-
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: Mozambique
1. I am concerned about the policy implications of the deteriorating
military and economic situation in Mozambique, and would like to bring you
up to date on recent developments that have heightened our concern and what
we are doing to improve our reporting for the policy community.
2. Over the past six months the RENAMO insurgency has gained ground
and is now threatening a major attack on Maputo. Economic discontent is
rising as the regime is unable to deal with its military and economic
problems. The Portuguese, who recently have sent some high level visitors
to Maputo, are extremely concerned about the desperation in Maputo, and
report that Machel is threatened by at least two major groups of coup
plotters--one made up of pro-Soviet hardliners, and another that is colluding
with RENAMJ.
3. I believe the South Africans are committed to the Nkomati process,
but they too are becoming alarmed. Last week the deputy chief of Africa
Division
gloomy assessment
discussed Mozambique
reported there is a consensus in Pretoria that the
situation in Maputo may be reaching crisis proportions. was ' ressed
with the unusual unanimity
DDI-
4. I sent~ over to State to brief Frank Wisner on his discussions
in Pretoria, Harare, and London, and to share our heightened concern. Wisner
seemed to share many of our worries. He has called an interagency meeting
of Mozambique watchers for 5 June to discuss the situation.
on the severity of Machel's problems. lso
5. We are getting in touch with Fred Wettering,
to see if he came back with the same gloomy
message. At a minimum, I believe we need to re-examine the draft SNIE on
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Mozambique that you recently reviewed. The current draft probably should
be altered to account for the deteriorating situation. We will also try
to include more speculation on several potential scenarios--including a
pro-Soviet coup, a collapse of the Machel regime, or even a RENAMO victory
with Machel or others in FRELIMO returning to the bush to fight on. The
latter is particularly worrisome to Pretoria, which has no appetite for
becoming the sugar daddy to a RENAMO government under siege from a FRELIMO
insurgency supported by the black Africans and the Soviets.
'4 /'
hn L. Helgerson
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? matnnc2O5DS
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Proposed CPPG Meeting on Southern Africa
JUL. 1.985
1. I believe there is a need for the Crisis Pre-Planning Group to
examine some of the specific policies and tactics applicable to the
southern Africa region. While the 26 July NSC meeting underscored
continuing consensus on the broad policy objectives towards South Africa
and southern Africa, some of the specific applications of these broad
objectives seem to make a questionable contribution to the overall policy
objectives.
2. Policies of the past four years have led us to support a Marxist
government in Mozambique against a growing insurgency which controls most
of the country and to jeopardize the popular leader of an insurgency
against a Communist government in Angola in order to accelerate a
political process in Namibia which is likely to install a Marxist
government there.
3. Specifically, in Angola, the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops
would result in the collapse of the MPLA government and a victory for
Savimbi. Thus, the MPLA, the Soviet Union, and Cuba will not go for any
such deal. The latest version of our proposal--a somewhat exiguous plan
for an extended Cuban withdrawal over three years, referred to as the
synthesis"--has been rejected by the MPLA, UNITA, and South Africa (as
well as Cuba and the Soviet Union). Incredibly, the blame for the
impasse has passed from the Communists to the South Africans, which is
4. There is broad agreement in the Intelligence Community that the
only pressure capable of moving the MPLA into dealing with Savimbi and
dispensing with its Cuban guardians is greatly increased military
against our intention and interest.
pressure from UNITA.
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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
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5. The SWAPO movement, the likely beneficiary of a Namibia
settlement, appears increasingly weakened by inter- and antra-tribal
conflicts and by military defeats, but its ties to the Soviet Bloc appear
even stronger. Meanwhile, South African attempts to construct a moderate
political grouping in Namibia capable of challenging SWAPO in an
election remain unsupported)
6. In Mozambique, a recent SNIE noted that the insurgent RENAMO
movement would continue to drive the Machel regime into aller and
smaller islands of control over the next year.7 7
7. I believe the CPPG should examine new policy options for the
southern Africa region. I would suggest the following be among the
options examined:
Shift our diplomatic efforts from Cuban troop withdrawal in
Angola to proposals for reconciliation meetings between MPLA and
UNITA, as both Savimbi and the South Africans have encouraged us
to do. While the MPLA would likely resist this at first, it
would again return the world focus on MPLA inflexibility rather
than South Africa's, and could provide a framework for actual
talks should increased pressure-from Savimbi broaden the limited
sentiment for talks extant within the MPLA.
Give Savimbi the legitimacy he deserves and desires, by agreeing
(as we did in December 1981) to a new visit by Savimbi to the
United States where he would be received at senior levels.
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~LURLT
-- Rather than sending new missions to Luanda with new formulations
on Cuban withdrawal--moves which discomfort and weaken Savimbi
and produce no results--should we not wait for battlefield
pressures to move the MPLA to come to us? We should not
categorically exclude ourselves from contacts with the MPLA,
however.
/I . i &m J. Cr. C
William J. Casey
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Topics for DCI/Chief of Staff Meeting on 15 June 1985
While the Soviet Union and Libya suffered some reverses in
Africa in the mid 1980s, mostly due to their inability to
provide significant economic assistance, these two nations and
their surrogates, have continued to operate aggressively on the
continent in seeking to expand their political and military
influence. The Soviets have demonstrated a serious commitment
to retain their foothold in Angola and Ethiopia and to improve
their position in other parts of Africa. Libya has moved
equally aggressively resulting in success in such areas as
Chad, the Sudan, Burundi, Niger, Zaire and Nigeria. In 1984
the USSR promised more than one half billion dollars in
economic development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, ninety
percent of it destined for the socialist states. We estimate
nine thousand Soviet economic technicians were in sub-Saharan
Africa in 1984. Soviet military deliveries to sub-Saharan
Africa in 1984 were valued at U.S. $1.7 billion and there were
four thousand eight hundred Soviet military technicians in
sub-Saharan Africa that year.
SECTION II: Soviet and Libyan Initiatives and Threat in Africa
In the Horn of Africa the most prominent example of Soviet
initiatives and ensuing threat to U.S. interests is Ethiopia.
There are about three thousand Soviet advisors serving
primarily with key military and intelligence units. The Soviet
Bloc is the primary source of Ethiopia's military equipment and
training needs. In December 1984, a Treaty of Friendship was
signed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and
Ethiopia's "vanguard Marxist-Leninist party," the Ethiopian
Workers Party.
In Sudan the Libyans are currently arming the Sudanese
Revolutionary Committees and inciting them to act against the
'current regime. The Libyan objective is to install a more
radical, anti-West regime and drive a wedge between Sudan and
Egypt. Sudanese terrorist Abdullah Zakariah returned from
Tripoli to Khartoum the day Sudanese-Libyan relations were
restored with about one hundred of his armed followers.
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The Libyans have provided financial and military assistance to
southern Sudanese dissident leader John Garang and will'
probably continue to do so as leverage with the new Sudanese
leadership. The Soviets have arranged delivery of forty-eight
tons of military equipment to Garang in Ethiopia through its
regional ally, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
In neighboring Chad, Libya has occupied one third of the
country with about five thousand troops since 1982 and
continues to try to overthrow the pro-West government of
Hissein Habre by funneling money and materiel to anti-Habre
dissidents in northern and southern Chad. Libya also furnishes
weapons to Chadian dissidents through the territory of Chad's
central African neighbors: Cameroon, The Central African
Republic and The Congo. Libyan assassination attempts against
President Habre have been uncovered.
Romanian arms recently arrived in Somalia. The Somalis
appear to be courting the Soviets, although Soviet assistance
to rival Ethiopia remains a stumbling block to closer relations
between the two countries. Until the recent reestablishment of
Somali-Libyan relations, Libya openly provided support to
Somali dissidents. Despite his agreement to halt such aid,
Qadhafi has promised continued support to the dissidents.
In southern Africa, the Soviets are reemphasizing their
ties to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to
demonstrate the importance of the Soviet role in southern
Africa. In addition to Soviet support, SWAPO receives
assistance from Libya. The Libyans have recently trained SWAPO
troops in Libya and supplied SWAPO with weapons and arms.
South Africa is a high priority target for the Soviet
Union. Although there is no formal Soviet presence there, the
USSR has cultivated such liberation groups as the Africa
National Congress (ANC), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and
the South African Communist Party (SACP) and provides arms and
training to the ANC and SACP. Soviet Bloc intelligence
services also funnel financial and military support through the
liberation committees of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and the United Nations.
The Soviets have been providing Mozambique with a
significant amount of military hardware and recently signed a
new economic agreement with that country. Intelligence
reporting also indicates that the Soviets are involved in coup
plotting against the Machel government, primarily through
Marxist hardliners within the government.
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Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviet Union is actively
engaged in efforts to influence public opinion in Zimbabwe
through influential members of the local media. Through
Botswana the USSR maintains peripheral contact with the ANC and
the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. In Lesotho, there has
been a notable increase in communist placement of items in the
local media in the last year. Lesotho also receives arms from
the Soviet Bloc.
In the Central African region, the main bastion of Soviet
influence and action, is Angola. Their influence is derived
mainly through military assistance. Since 1976 nearly all of
Angola's weapons and military equipment has come from the
Soviet Bloc since 1976. In 1984 alone, the Soviets provided an
estimated $850 million worth of military hardware including
weapons of increasing sophistication and advanced fighter and
fighter-bomber aircraft. There are about one thousand seven
hundred Soviet and Bloc military personnel in Angola in
technical, training, internal security and intelligence
capacities. In return, the Soviets have obtained access to
facilities for reconnaissance flights over the south Atlantic
and permanent stationing of vessels at Luanda Port. Soviet
surrogate Cuba has about thirty-five thousand military
personnel in Angola.
Despite the anti-Soviet posture of Zairian
President Mobutu, the Soviets have made efforts to subvert/
influence elements of the Zairian populace through travel and
study programs and cultural events. The Zairian government,
however, keeps a close watch on Zairians in contact with
Soviets. The Libyans, however, have been supporting a variety
of dissident groups, including a number based in Tanzania, with
that government's knowledge and consent. Evidence of
increasing Libyan support to the dissidents in the last several
years points to the possibility of increased training and arms
aid. The Libyans may have succeeded in forming a more viable
coalition of dissident organizations.
In neighboring Burundi, the Soviets have been supplying
military materiel since early 1983. In May 1985, Libyan leader
Qadhafi made a two-day unannounced visit to Burundi during
which he reaffirmed his support for Burundi President Bagaza
and verbally attacked Zairian President Mobutu. There is
reporting that Qadhafi provided Burundi over U.S. $50 million
and agreed to renew arms shipments. After the Burundi visit,
Qadhafi continued his public denigration of Mobutu in Rwanda.
That government hastened to assure the West that Qadhafi had
not been invited and that Rwandan policy toward Libya had not
changed.
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In the important East African nation of Kenya, Presidet Moi
is very concerned about Libyan activities in the Horn and other
parts of Africa. There are now six Libyan-sponsored Islamic
Call Society (ICS) regional committees in Kenya. Their primary
purpose is to propagate Islam, but Qadhafi has used them to
advance his revolutionary concepts. The Kenyans continue to be
skeptical and basically suspicious of Soviet intentions and
have required them to maintain a low profile. Nevertheless,
the Nairobi University Study Organization is an affiliate of
the Soviet Front International Union of Students (IUS) and is a
member of the IUS Executive Committee. The Kenyans have
evidence of a Soviet link to the early 1985 student unrest at
the university. The Soviets are providing some political and
financial support to Kenyan dissidents resident in Zimbabwe and
their support to Kenyan dissidents abroad is well known.
In Tanzania, the Soviets are well entrenched and their
primary goal is to encourage the Tanzanian government to
maintain its socialist political orientation. The Soviets have
provided extensive military assistance and training for the
Tanzanian People's Defense Force. The Soviets probably have an
agent of influence at the senior level of the government. The
Soviet relationship with the Tanzanian Intelligence and
Security Service (TISS) has been a vehicle for disinformation
fed to the Tanzanian government, including allegations of
wrongdoing by the U.S. Government. The Soviets and their Cuban
surrogates have offered on more than one occasion to help TISS
expose all U.S. intelligence personnel and their activities in
Tanzania.
The Soviets exercise a. dominant influence in the Seychelles
in the military, educational and technical areas. Key
Seychelles government officials, including President Rene, are
Marxists. The Soviets have use of Seychelles military
facilities. There is Soviet influence in the
government-controlled media. The Soviet proxy North Koreans
serve as military advisors to the defense forces.
In Madagascar, the Soviets have played heavily on Malagasy
President Ratisiraka's desire to stay in power and his fear of
South Africa to become the primary supplier of military
equipment and training for the Malagasy.
In West Africa, the Nigerians have allowed the Libyans to
reestablish an embassy. Libyan agents have been dispatched to
spread Qadhafi's doctrine and Libya has requested permission to
reopen an Islamic studies center in the predominantly Moslem
Kano region.
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In Niger there has been a recent indication that dissidents
may be receiving Libyan backing for a possible coup. The
Libyans are known to be building an airfield just north of the
Nigerian/Libyan border.
In Mauritania, the Libyans have provided several billions
of dollars for construction and development projects. They are
trying to involve themselves in education and cultural areas
and are seeking to reopen its people's bureau. There has been
a recent indication of possible Libyan involvement in a coup
plot in the military.
In Benin, there are about one hundred and fifty Soviets
resident. Libyan-Beninese relations have been close since the
mid-1970s, but have cooled over Libya's failure to deliver
promised economic assistance. Benin is a transit point for
Chadian dissidents en route to Libya. Two Libyan-sponsored
Islamic conferences will take place in Benin in 1985.
The Soviets have a two hundred and thirty person presence
in the small country of Guinea Bissau and are highly
influential in the military assistance and cultural areas. In
February 1984 Guinea Bissau and Libya negotiated, and may have
signed, a military pact for overflights, military security and
training.
Senegalese President Diouf is suspicious of Soviet
intentions in West Africa and he limits the Soviets to
education and cultural activities. Yet, the one hundred and
ten person Soviet Embassy is Moscow's regional West African
headquarters. There are indications of Soviet support to
Senegal's two larger Marxist opposition parties. Senegalese
labor and youth are in touch with Soviet international
organizations in these fields. In about 1981 Libya provided
paramilitary training to Senegal's largest Marxist opposition
party.
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