THE NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R000400880003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DRAFT ARA/PPC 4/15 2030 0572A
The New Opportunity for Peace in Nicaragua
PREPARED STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE LANGHORNE A. MOTLEY
ASSISTANT EEUBCOTONEWEFOR STERNTHEMISPHERENAFFAIRSS
BEFORE E THE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN-AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APRIL 17, 1985
Mr. Chairman, President Reagan's April 4 initiative offers an
important opportunity for Nicaragua to move toward peace -- with
its own people, with its neighbors, and therefore with the United
States.
The President's proposal, to link U.S. policy to an internal
dialogue mediated by the Roman Catholic Church, creates a
particularly hopeful and realistic opportunity for two reasons.
First, it builds on a continuing and impressively broad regional
consensus on the actions required for a sustainable resolution Iof
the Central American crisis. Second, the President has identified
an alternative to the two extremes which the American people want
any Administration to avoid: a second Cuba, this time on the
Central American mainland; and a second Vietnam, with American
troops mired combat.
This is thus an opportunity for us as well as for the
Sandinistas. But only Congress can give the President the means
to make it work, the leverage which the experience of the past six
years has shown to be necessary to induce changes in Sandinista
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I, The Central American Problem
The President's peace initiative is set against what nearly
now agrees to be the outline of Central America's crisis-
everyone The Central American countries are in various stages of
political development, beset for the most part by decades of
social, economic and political inequities, and driven more
worsening terms of
recently to the edge of economic disaster by
trade, world recession, and unproductive national economic
policies. Taken together, these are the infamous 'root causes' of
rebellion and violence.
But -- as the National Bipartisan commission on central
America detailed so well -- Cuba and the Soviet Union areown
exploiting historical poverty and repression to advance their
to is interests in the hemisphere. Those interests are
stra g
inexorably hostile to the United states. And experience ove`Prsix
long years of crisis has amply demonstrated that the goals of the
and to date the Sandinistas, are also
Cubans, the Soviets,
contrary to the national interests of democratic nations in the
region.
II. U.S. Policy
The four continuing goals of U.S. Policy in Central America
h
e
t
ed by president Reagan to a joint Session
i
n
were outl
futi~ Re
Congress in April, 1983:
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-- In response to decades of inequity and indifference, we
will support democracy, reform and human freedom....
-- In response to the challenge of world recession and, in the
case of El Salvador, to the unrelenting campaign of economic
sabotage by the guerrillas, we will support economic
development....
-- In response to the military challenge from Cuba and
Nicaragua -- to their deliberate use of force to spread
tyranny -- we will support the security of the region's
threatened nations.... [and]
-- We will support dialogue and negotiations -- both among the
countries of the region and within each country.
The most central reform is a change in political attitudes and
systems. Some
States seeks
That remains
time ago, Secretary Shultz said that
Central America
a good
never repressed its
the various sectors
than confrontation,
summary of
own people
the United
more like costa Rica than Cuba.
our basic attitude. Costa Rica has
or sought to subvert its neighbors;
of Costa Rican society rely on dialogue
whether in national elections
Legislative Assembly or when
Costa Rica's primary concern
that we are 'interfering' in
dealing with foreign problems. But
about the United States today is not
Central America; it is that we appear
capable of withdrawing from our responsibilities. Costa Rica is
in the forefront of that large and growing number of nati
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calling upon Nicaragua to support and not oppose the democratizing
trend in the hemisphere.
At the same time, the Bipartisan Commission, the
Administration and the Congress have recognized that reform alone
is not enough. Only a comprehensive and sustained approach which
deals simultaneously with all of the interlocking problems of the
region can succeed. Economic aid is necessary to deal with the
ravages of depression and civil war and to help provide the bases
for longer-term growth with equity. Security assistance and other
demonstrations of U.S. national will, backed by military power
have provided an effective shield behind which the rest of our
policy has been able to unfold.
On April 12, Secretary Shultz forwarded to the President a
report assessing the situation in Central America and our programs
and policies there since the Bipartisan Commission submitted its
report in January 1984. I?ask that the-Secretary's report be
included in the record and considered an integral part of this
statement. The basic conclusion is threefold: first, events have
shown that the Commission was right in its judgments and
recommendations; second, we have since made important progress in
implementing the comprehensive policy advocated; and third, we --
the Administration, the Congress and the Central Americans
themselves -- have much more to do before the task is completed.
One aspect of the Secretary's report is worth underscoring --
the dramatic progress in El Salvador since early 198 ghrld Zfoagl
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has recognized and applauded the benchmarks: last year's
presidential elections followed by legislative and municipal
elections less than three weeks ago; the triumphant assertion of
the democratic, reformist center against the violent extremes of
left and right; the continued decline in politically-motivated
killings; the public confidence in President Duarte which enabled
him to make his historic offer of dialogue with the guerrillas;
and the practical recognition from Tokyo to Paris to Mexico City
that democracy is the future of El Salvador.
But less than two years ago there was no consensus. As
recently as the beginning of 1984, many honest observers saw
little hope for what was called the 'elusive' democratic center.
They doubted that the repressive political culture of the old El
Salvador was really doomed. They believed polarization so
complete that no amount of U.S. aid would provide relief and that
the United States was being drawn into direct military invglvement
on the side of dictators and unpopular. governments.
The critics and the skeptics were wrong. Duarte and a million
and a half voters made believers of most of them. Today, few who
hear the phrase 'military intervention' think of any possible
application in El Salvador. There was and will be no second
Vietnam in that country. But neither will it become a second Cuba.
The Salvadoran experience speaks directly to where we stand
today in Nicaragua. Alternatives to civil war and foreign
entanglement exist in Nicaragua as well.
Executive R ;~ S y 2 a I a
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III. Nicaragua in the Balance.
Sandinista Nicaragua today is the 'odd-man out'. Nicaragua is
the major exception in a Central America moving toward democracy.
It is also the major obstacle within the Contadora process. The
Sandinista leaders are profoundly at odds with the Nicaraguan
people, with the Nicaraguan Catholic Church and with democratic
leaders throughout the world.
The record of the past six years provides the critical
background. All of us know the facts about Sandinista rejection
of normal relations with its neighbors in favor of the Soviet
Bloc, despite extraordinary U.S. economic assistance during the
first 18 months after Somoza fell. There is little disagreement
today about Sandinista internal repression, about the falsity of
the 'election' facade set against 'divine mobs' and a censored
press, or the unprecedented build-up of the military forces, the
presence of thousands of Cuban, Soviet and other Bloc military
personnel, or about the continuing support for guerrillas and
terrorists in neighboring Central American countries.
United States policy is aimed directly at bringing about a
change in this behavior. So is the policy of all of Nicaragua's
neighbors, as well as the specific, agreed objectives of the
Contadora process itself.
One aspect of the record, however, may not be adequately
understood, and it is one of direct relevance to this he
ring.
f wative Q
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That is the history surrounding the attempts at internal dialogue
on the part of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition. As another
integral part of this statement, I would offer a special
documentary report, which places the current calls for dialogue --
including President Reagan's peace initiative -- into the context
of the Contadora process, the appeals of the Nicaraguan Bishops,
and the calls of hemispheric leaders for dialogue within Nicaragua.
The documents speak for themselves. But it is worth noting,
again, how starkly the record contrasts the recent histories of
Nicaragua and El Salvador and how uniformly the Latin Americans
themselves support internal dialogue in Nicaragua. If the United
States is somehow 'imposing' democracy, dialogue and
reconciliation on Sandinista Nicaragua, that would come as news
indeed to the Central and South Americans.
IV. The President's Proposal j
President Reagan's April 4 initiative grew out of this
historical context. As illustrated in the documentary record, the
immediate precursor of the President's proposal was the Nicaraguan
Bishops' acceptance March 22 of the mediation role proposed in the
February 22 and March 1 calls by the internal and external
democratic opposition for Church-sponsored dialogue and a cease
fire in place. The opposition's offer was characterized as fair
and promising by a wide spectrum of observers; But the
Sandinistas rejected the entire idea, just as they had excoriated
the Bishops for their Easter Pastoral letter in 1984, which had
F
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called for the same kind of dialogue. President Reagan has asked
the Sandinistas to reconsider and has asked you to help provide
the incentive.
The Salvadoran government has crossed the psychological
threshold for dialogue with armed guerrillas. Are the Sandinistas
exempt from any obligation to engage in a dialogue with their
opposition? President Reagan's offer is a pragmatic incentive to
the Sandinistas -- and a commitment to them -- to facilitate the
difficult decision the nine Comandantes face to cross that
threshold. With the help of Congress, that incentive will be
clear: the one aspect of our behavior which the Sandinistas have
sought to change in every available forum -- U.S. funds to support
democratic resistance forces -- is theirs in exchange for a
genuine effort toward reconciliation among Nicaraguans.
The President has made clear that we have a moral obligatiofi
and a national interest not to-abandon Nicaragua's democrats in
exchange for empty promises or sham elections. Only real dialogue
and genuine democracy will allow the opposition -- which took up
arms only because the democratic route was unavailable -- to lay
them down once again. The President's offer is designed to help
the Sandinistas recognize that their acceptance would not be a
zero-sum outcome. Nor would it be for us. But an ally abandoned
-- whether Costa Rica, or Honduras or the Nicaraguan people --
would by definition be a losing proposition for the United States.
Can we realistically expect the Sandinistas to accept ndw what -- -- ----
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they have steadfastly rejected in the past? Can we expect
'realism' or 'pragmatism' from 'ideologues' or 'fanatics'? The
record of recent years sugge?ts we can. While the United States
was trying 'constructive engagement' with the new Sandinista
regime in 1979-81, including economic aid, they militarized and
subverted. But when pressure was applied by the armed resistance,
the comandantes began to hedge, at least rhetorically. To use a
favorite term from the Marxist lexicon, they began to respond to
changes in the 'objective conditions' they faced. And there is no
'objective condition' so sobering as the growing resistance of
their own people. Even ideologues recognize that kind of reality.
It is important to read the President's proposal carefully
within the framework of what has already happened in and out of
Nicaragua. What the President has not done-is provide a 'final
outcome' for the dialogue. That is for the Nicaraguans themselves
to work out. What he has done is to facilitate the 7f
self-determination of Nicaragua's future by Nicaraguans, soiething
the Sandinistas have heretofore prevented. And he has not
provided the basis for an invasion of Nicaragua. In fact an
invasion is an avoidable outcome in Nicaragua, as it had been
avoided in El Salvador, if the United States acts resolutely.
Finally, President Reagan has not unilaterally injected the
United States into the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.
Again, the historical context makes this clear. Nicaragua is
being asked no more than what was demanded of El Salvador by the
Congress and many others around the world, including th Executtvc RE~istt ~9~
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Sandinistas themselves. The Sandinistas are called on to do no
more than what they themselves promised in 1979 to their own
people and to the OAS (including the United States) or underook in
the 1983 Contadora Document of objectives -- which recognized that
regional peace was impossible unless, in each country affected by
violence, a dialogue is undertaken between the government and
opposition. And the United States has been called on by
Nicaragua's Central American neighbors to do no more than help
defend them against an aggressive garrison state armed and
supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The documents of current history establish the legitimacy of
the President's offer. Looking just at the Latin American region,
and quoting only from the public record, the immediate reaction
has been significantly positive: Duarte of El Salvador saw the
mirror image of his own experience; Betancur of Colombia
emphasized the perfect fit "within the philosophy and within the
reach of the Document of objectives which the countries of Central
America freely signed"; Mexico's De la Madrid underscored the
cease-fire aspect; Lusinchi of Venezuela noted that "the
Nicaraguan Government would not lose anything by entering into
conversation with the opposition"; Ecuador's Febres Cordero cited
El Salvador and Guatemala as favorable precedents; Costa Rica's
Monge gave his "enthusiastic support"; and more encouragement came
from Suazo of Honduras, Barletta of Panama, and Alfonsin of
Argentina.
The democratic resistance has accepted the President request
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to extend their cease-fire offer until June 1. It is now up to
the Sandinistas to respond to the many voices -- and, I stress
again, it is not just our own -- calling on them to make peace
with their own citizens.
V. The Choice Facing the Congress
A critical element of the President's proposal to the
Sandinistas is the incentive to be provided by Congressional
approval of the immediate release -- under the formula carefully
defined on April 4 -- of the $14 million already appropriated.
What exactly is implied in Congress' choice? First, a vote in
favor is a demonstration of continued national commitment to a
policy in Central America that has worked well thus far. It would
also provide the President with the authority he needs to deal
with a complex negotiating situation -- with the capability to
increase pressure, but in the hope that Congressional support will
help make its use unnecessary.
Some say that a vote against would be a vote for peace,
because the democratic resistance would then give up, and, like it
or not, we would then learn to live with the Sandinistas. First
of all, although we as a nation have often not learned well from
history, there are certain lessons so recent and so painful that
we have paid attention. One of these is the lesson of Cuba:
Despite Castro's enforced mastery of his island, we have not
'learned to live' with a nation still intent on acting as a Soviet
proxy against U.S. interests at every available opportunity.- .,,2Ga/ III
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Nicaragua, moreover, is not an island, and the
anti-Sandinistas are not 'mercenaries'; the vast majority of them
would continue to fight with or without support from the United
States. More would die, Nicaragua would suffer as a whole, but
peace would not come. The only prospect would be unabated
irregular warfare and destruction -- for years to come.
The situation today in Nicaragua is perilous precisely because
both sides are ready to settle in for the long term: On one side,
the Sandinista Comandantes entrenched along the same repressive,
ideological, and subversive lines staked out by Fidel Castro in
his reconstruction of Cuba twenty years before. And on the other,
the anti-Sandinista opposition, growing in popular support,
digging in on the classic model of prolonged civil war. The
outlook is also ominous: a drawn out conflict, bloody,
debilitating, and exacting a heavy toll of inocent lives.
That is why the opportunity for internal reconciliatipn
through dialogue is so important -- now. And that is why we
Americans have a special responsibility to profit by the
experience of the past six years in Central America and act, now,
to seize that opportunity. We have learned from El Salvador that
dialogue within the frameworK of democratic and constitutional
order is politically possible when a government possesses the
self-confidence that results from being democratically elected.
And we have also learned that the Sandinistas will not change
without powerful reasons to do so. Such a reason is aa- Tt-
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is up to the Congress to help the President make it happen. A
'yes' vote could provide the breakthrough incentive. A 'no' vote
would remove the incentive and guarantee the prolongation of the
conflict. A 'yes' vote is a catalyst, not for an overthrow, but
toward peaceful resolution.
We are not saying that a 'no' vote would result in an instant
disaster. But it would surely leave the territory open to steady
erosion, with far less hope for meaningful change. We would not
see an immediate effect of that 'no', either in the field, or at
the next Contadora meeting, but the impact would come in the not
distant future.
No one wants to see more suffering and more bloodshed in
Central America. No one wants to see relations between Nicaragua
and the United States frozen into the kind of hostile and
confrontational stalemate that has characterized US-Cuban
relations since Castro turned his island into a Soviet pr,xy.
We have before us an opportunity to prevent a tragic
repetition of history. We must grasp it by demonstrating to
Nicaraguans -- both the comandantes and the democratic opposition
-- and to the rest of the world that we are united in our
principles and our goals. The President's proposal offers the
opportunity for the American people, through their elected
representatives, to demonstrate their resolve in support of people
struggling for democracy.
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VI. Conclusion -- the Unanswered Questions
Mr. Chairman, ten weeks ago I appeared before this
Subcommittee to review the broad principles which have guided our
policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. We discussed, as was
inevitable, the particular problem of Nicaragua. At that time, I
asked one question, "Will Nicaragua Change?" I asked it in
several ways -- and at least one of these was repeated by a member
of this committee to other witnesses:
-- "Why negotiate unless the agenda has something in it for
each side?"
-- "If the Nicaraguans in the armed resistance are abandoned,
why should the Sandinistas negotiate with them?"
And, a rhetorical question:
-- "If anyone knows of a more effective way to create a
bargaining situation with the Sandinistas, let us know."
To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, no one has developed any better
answer to those questions than what has formed the basis of our
policy. It has had its clearest, most hopeful articulation in the
President's offer of April 4. And I believe it to be the
responsibility of the Congress to give the President what he needs
to help Central Americans -- and Nicaraguans in particular -- to
achieve peace.
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QUESTION: Exactly what will you be supplying to the resistance
forces between now and June and during the period of
negotiations, should the Sandinistas accept this proposal?
ANSWER:
The President has pledged that no U.S. funds would be spent
on "arms and munitions" for the armed Nicaraguan resistance
while its cease-fire offer is on the table or, if the offer is
accepted, while talks were underway.
As we have not held detailed discussions with resistance
leadership on this issue, it is difficult to respond with
specifics. In general, we plan to provide food, clothing and
medical supplies, and to facilitate transportation and
communications as needed to ensure the well being and surviJal
of the resistance forces during the interim period and should
the Sandinistas accept the President's peace plan during the
period of negotiations. All of this activity will be carried
out in the spirit of the President's proposal and in
consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.
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