SIGNATURES ARE NOT SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00462R000100130018-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100130018-3
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, NIC
Herbert E. Meyer
Attachment:
"Signatures are not security"
by David Hart, The Times,
June 3, 1985
Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100130018-3
 Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100130018-3
THE TIMES MONDAY-JUNE 3 35
Ivzt`estions the value of aft Mosec~; ores
'The >1r eigiil 3' `rs creti' l; sir Geoffrey
Home
rind . "fit :German
. coutitrttp(it,: Hah%4Mt-n'ich Oensch-
fence initiativb''thari'1M Thatcher;
and Chanc'ellor' kghl:'~13ii ^a recent
Gallup poll shows' tfthf; rn Baitain,
Mrs 'hatcher has a bette'r'idea of the
votc s' wisp0 th,Sij,C ffrey: 48
per , cxpt 'thou t Bri)aiili, should join,
an re~e}rc , 3 peroeigt thought, not.
Although S ,1G, . opponents in the
foreign otlioeaof',tbe claim that
their oppo?iti s . on, many
factors -.. scd t cis~tt t} ut technical
feasibility, 'fear' off" c ,'cost and of
being Ied:by,the itoe by';teehnlogy -
it.is largely. based, on (heir profound
respect, for ;the,Agti-ballistic missile
.(ABM) treaty .- which 'was signed in
Moscow in ' 1h72 by.Illixon and
. ,Brezhnev as , part ot` 'the Salt I
ag~emcnts.. .
.,?'Rte American approach to arms
control at that time was informed by
two principles. First, that the two
superpowers could be~ taken as two
broadly similar entities. Secondly,
that these two Entities would-be less
likely to attack each other and more
likely to reduce their' arsenals of
nuclear weapons if' each kept itself
widely vulndrable. But because the
US and the' Soviet Union are, in
fact, controlled and directed by
entirely different systems, by people
with very different views, under
different pressures, their under-
standing of the purpose and effect of
treaties differs widely, as does their
readiness to adhere to them.
Fortunately this seems to be well
understood by the British electorate.
In the same.Gallup poll, 59 per cent
said they thought the Russians could
not generally be trusted to keep to
their agreements on nuclear- arms as
against 25 per cent who thought they
could.
The US position at the beginning
of the Salt' negotiations was that
vulnerability could be ' accepted
provided there was some limitation
of offensive weapons' immediately
and further substantial limitation
followed within a reasonable time.
The Russians were extremely reluc-
tant to accept this principle and tried
fur more than two years to get
agreement on limitation of ABM
weapons without any limitation on
offensive weapons. It was not until
1971 that they accepted the principle
of some limitation on offensive
weapons.
' fd 4I
In a unilateral declaration in the
Salt Protocol, the American chief
negotiator stated, inter alia:
Both sides recognize that these
initial ' agreements would be steps
toward the achievement of more
complete limits on strategic arms.
If an agreement. providing for more
strategic offensive arms limitations
were not achieved within five
.years, US supreme interests could
be jeopardized. Should that occur,
it would constitute a basis for
withdrawal from the ABM treaty.
Strategic nuclear arms have not
been limited. Quite the reverse. In
1972 the Soviet Union had 1,500
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
500 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and 150 bombers capable of
delivering a total of 2,000 nuclear
warheads. Today it has ,1,398
ICBMs, 982. SLBMs and 423
bombers capable of delivering. 8,800
nuclear warheads. The Americans
have increased their arsenal as well,
but by significantly less, both in
quantity and quality. Apart from the
unsatisfactory increase in offensive
weapons, the Russians have de-
creased their vulnerability by build-
ing a proscribed radar installation at
Krasnoyarsk.
There are elements in the Foreign
Office who believe that the construc-
tion of this massive, phased-array
radar may not constitute a violation.
For most western officials, including
officials at the MoD, there is
absolutely no doubt that it demon-
strates a blatant disregard for ABM
treaty provisions. The only question
is whether it ; was knowingly
authorized by political leaders in
Moscow or simply constructed on
military authority.
Within the last 18 months the
Soviet Union has also successfully
tested its SAX 12 missiles in an
ABM role. If this ABM capability is
taken together with Krasnoyarsk,
which can. be plugged into the
national Soviet air defence system at
will, the Russians have the building
blocks for a national ABM defence
that can rapidly be put together not
just a minor infringement but a
violation of the fundamental prin-
ciples of the treaty. Despite this,
President Reagan, referring to' SDI
weapons, said at Strasbourg on May
8: "When the time' for decisions on
the possible production and deploy-
ment of such systems comes, we
must and will discuss and negotiate
these issues with the Soviet Union."
The Americans seem to be ready
to honour a treaty the Soviet Union
has clearly violated. In such
honouring they will be giving-
Moscow an effective veto over
American deployment of any de-
fensive weapons that SDI research
President Reagan also said at
Strasbourg that "aggression. feeds on
appeasement and weakness itself can
be provocative". By continuing to
adhere to the., ABM treaty he is
indulging in a form of weakness that
may increasingly be, provocative to a
Soviet Union where,. with a con-
tracting economy and the Marxist
millennium necedin ever further
from, view, the military have a
ferocious and increasing grip on
political power.
Security is, the,first consideration
of sovereign states. Treaties can
increase security, and. they can
decrease it by lulling one party into
weakness and self-deception. The
ABM.treaty is beginning to jeopar-
dize western security. President
Reagan . should. give reasonable
notice to Moscow that the US will
withdraw from the. ABM treaty
unless Krasnoyarsk is dismantled
and the SAX 12 verifiably
destroyed.
Since, by conforming with either
of these demands, the Soviet Union
will be tacitly admitting that it is in
fundamental breach, it is unlikely to
co-operate. If it remains unwilling to
adhere to its terms the treaty is
without positive value. Indeed it
undermines western security. Under
these circumstances President Rea-
gan should withdraw from the
treaty.
C Ti,... v...p.pen i.i,.H.~ 19rS
Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP87-00462R000100130018-3