SOVIET AND SOVIET SURROGATE TRAINING OF INSURGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000200200004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Training of Insurgents
Soviet and Soviet Surrogate
NGA
Review
Completed
Top Secret
a[ 85- 10059C~
March 1985
Copy 4 0 3
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Intelligence
Training of Insurgent
Soviet and Soviet Surrogate
Center, OGI
This paper was prepared by the Insurgency Branch,
Office of Global Issues. Major contributions were
made b 3Bice of Training and
Education; the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis; the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis; and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency
Top Secret
GI 85-10058C
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Soviet and Soviet Surrogate
Training of Insurgent 25X1
Key Judgments The Soviet Union and its surrogates-East Germany, Bulgaria, Cuba, and
Information available Vietnam-conduct and facilitate a substantial number of military training
as of 1 February 1985 programs for Third World insurgents. we have 25X1
was used in this report.
identified 20 major training sites worldwide and established that Moscow
and its surrogates have trained guerrillas involved in at least 32 of the 40
major insurgencies during the last two decades.
In addition to its own training programs, the USSR encourages and
provides considerable funding and logistic support for training by its
surrogates who, by extension, bear the brunt of any fallout. The East
Germans have developed a continuing training relationship with Libya,
and Cuba is heavily involved with a number of Latin American insurgent
groups. This distancing gives the USSR plausible denial and thereby the
ability to maintain diplomatic relations with governments that are combat-
ing Soviet-surrogate-trained insurgents.
Training by the Soviet Union and its surrogates has produced thousands of
guerrillas who receive instruction in basic military and guerrilla warfare
skills and use of modern weaponry, including artillery and surface-to-air
missiles. These insurgents also receive instruction in political organization,
ideological indoctrination, and, in some cases, training in staging terrorist
attacks. The heaviest concentration of facilities is in Cuba, where Havana,
faced with extensive demands for training, has been forced to assign
quotas. Current priority is given to insurgents from El Salvador, Guatema-
la, and South Africa (SWAPO).
Insurgent training has enabled Moscow and its allies to:
? Initiate, revitalize, or perpetrate armed struggles against pro-Western
regimes.
? Improve ties with successful revolutionary regimes in Angola, Mozam-
bique, and Nicaragua.
? Establish a network of contacts and, in some cases, agents, within the
Third World.
Top Secret
GI 85-10058C
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Third-Party Training
Middle Eastern Actors: Trainers But Not Surrogates 5
B. Cuban Insurgent Training 11
C. 17 25X1
v Top Secret 25X1
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Scope Note
This paper addresses the insurgent training of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
Emphasis is on who does the training, where it takes place, what is taught, and
who attends. The following definitions were used:
? Insurgents are members of an organization committed to a protracted political/
military struggle to replace a national regime or create an independent country.
These organizations usually consist of an irregular military force that fights
guerrilla war and a covert party organization that mobilizes resources and
popular support.
? Insurgent training consists of instruction in basic military skills-small-arms
use, land navigation, field hygiene-the principles of guerrilla war, and political
organization-cadre development, propaganda techniques, and front
organizations.
? Surrogate trainers are those countries with close political, economic, and
military ties to the Soviet Union whose:
- Training programs for insurgents are extensive.
- Efforts, at a minimum, are coordinated with and monitored by the Soviets.
- Programs draw heavily on Soviet resources to finance and conduct training.
- Training supports-and not coincidentally-Soviet policy interests.
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i op ,ecret
Soviet and Soviet Surrogate
Training of Insurgents
Since the 1948 Communist International in Delhi,
when Stalin's call for wars of national liberation was
made, the Soviet Union has helped train a majority of
Third World insurgents. The Soviets have developed
elaborate and well-equipped training facilities, exten-
sive courses often lasting up to a year in guerrilla war,
a complex logistic network, and a bureaucracy to
direct and coordinate their efforts.
25X1 Moscow has tasked separate elements of the GRU,
the KGB, and the International Department of the
Central Committee of the CPSU with organizing,
7FX1 conducting, and facilitating insurgent training.
the UKU estaoiisnea a
25X1 Center for the Training of Special Personnel (insur-
gents) in the mid-1970s-when Soviet-backed guerril-
las were active in Africa and the Middle East.
Third-Party Training
In addition to running internal training programs, the
GRU and the KGB provide considerable support for
surrogate-sponsored training, primarily by Cuba for
Soviets provide food, uniforms,
Laotian Government officials, and Thai Commu-
nists Students are reportedly part of the Phak Mai
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and military equipment to insurgent training camps
in Laos. The instructors for these Laotian programs
are drawn from Vietnamese military personnel,
25X1 or Green Star movement. 25X1
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certain insurgents.
assistance. In many cases, moreover, Moscow has
found that its surrogates do a better job at training
fits.
Beyond allowing the Soviets to be more selective in
whom they train inside the USSR, in our judgment,
Moscow's ability to have others train insurgents out-
side affords the USSR a number of additional bene-
First, it is easier and cheaper to train Africans in
Africa and Latin Americans in Cuba than to trans-
port them in large numbers to the Soviet Union.
Moreover, for health and experience reasons, the
tropical climate and terrain is more conducive to
realistic jungle guerrilla tr i n is Moscow,
especially in the winter.
Second, there is less risk, more distance, and plausible
deniability involved in third-party training. Although
the Soviets accrue the benefits of a silent benefactor,
the burden of any negative reaction falls on their
surrogates.
Third, training by Moscow's surrogates provides an
additional bond between the Soviets and their allies.
Most surrogate training is conducted with Soviet
equipment, coordinated with Soviet advisers, and
often supported with Soviet financial and logistic
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A substantial portion of Soviet Bloc insurgent training
25X1 is carried out by the Cubans.
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the Cubans conduct an
of backgrounds
aggressive training program aimed at several levels of
an insurgent organization, covering a wide variety of
subjects, and tailored to students from a wide variety
Over the years, Cuba has been the primary provider
of insurgent training for most Latin American leftist
revolutionary groups and for numerous African
groups-insurgents from Angola, Congo, Zimbabwe,
Kenya, Togo, and Tanzania during the 1960s and
1970s, and from the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) today. Evidence suggests that
the demand for Cuban training is so substantial-it is
often free-that the Cubans have had to set priorities
Cubans became more patient.
There is considerable evidence of close Soviet-Cuban
coordination during Cuba's extensive involvement in
insurgent training in Africa between the late 1960s
and early 1970s. During the same period, however,
Moscow and Havana frequently clashed over Cuba's
training of Latin American insurgents. Moscow, moti-
vated in part by its diplomatic rivalry with China and
recognizing US power in Latin America, favored
caution. Havana, although fearful of the United
States, pushed for immediate revolution throughout
the region. The Cubans favored training and support-
ing radical factions willing to take immediate violent
action. In the mid-1970s, after insurgent failures in
Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Argenti-
na, and in response to continued Soviet pressure, the
Since the success of the Sandinista revolution in
1979-which demonstrated the potential for armed
revolution in the region-evidence suggests a conver-
gence in Soviet and Cuban policies toward insurgency
training in Latin America. Moreover, evidence sug-
gests that Moscow is willing to let Havana take the
lead in Latin America. This, we believe, reflects an
increased Soviet confidence in Cuban intentions and a
recognition that Cuba-because of its proximity, cul-
tural affinity, Third World credentials, and the revo-
lutionary mystique of Fidel Castro- d to
cultivate and train Latin Americans.
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Ton Secret
most North
Korean insurgent training is for Koreans and is
closely tied to North Korea's determination to unify
the Korean peninsula. These Koreans are recruited
within North Korea, and, to a lesser extent from
South Korea and overseas Korean communities. We
estimate the number of these trainees to be substan-
tial. We have no evidence to indicate any Soviet
involvement in this training or support for an insur-
gency on the peninsula.
North Korea does maintain a small program of
insurgent training for some foreign students both at
home and abroad, an effort oriented primarily to-
ward generating foreign support for their unification
Middle Eastern Actors:
Trainers But Not Surrogates
training programs
Libya, Iran, Syria, and, to some extent, the Palestine
Liberation Organization continue to train insurgents.
The Iranian, PLO, and Syrian programs have a
regional orientation, and Libyan training encompasses
Islamic dissidents and insurgents around the world.
Iranian, Syrian, Libyan, and PLO insurgent training
is generally independent of Moscow. Moreover, each
of these actors pursues its own agenda, propagates an
ideology that is anti-Communist, and draws heavily
on non-Soviet resources to finance and develop its
dents from a wide variety of national origins
Iran's regionally oriented training program provides a
heavy dose of radical Islamic ideology and Ayatollah
Khomeini's plans for the elimination of Western
influence on Muslim societies. Iran has trained dissi-
Syria's involvement in insurgent training-primarily
motivated by its desire to force an Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon and keep its potentially hostile neigh-
bors off balance-generally involves the provision of
support and facilities for training members of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard and other regional
groups.
Libya's insurgent training programs were designed
primarily for Palestinians and other Arabs involved in
operations against Israel. But, as Qadhafi's ambitions
as a revolutionary leader grew and the more moderate
elements of the PLO increasingly minimized the
importance of terrorism, the Libyans be an to train
insurgents from many parts of the world 25X1
African insurgent groups have emerged in the
1980s as favorite candidates for Libyan training.' 25X1
The PLO insurgent training effort-primarily Fatah
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)-over the years has instructed dissidents from
throughout the Third World. This training, like the
PLO itself, has a long history of Soviet ties. F__
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with considerable political, economic, and military
potential. Members of two insurgent groups trained
by the Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans have come
to power in Africa-the MPLA in Angola and
FRELIMO in Mozambique-and the Soviet- and
Cuban-trained Sandinistas were successful in Nicara-
gua. Although the training itself was not responsible
for the ultimate success of these groups, it certainly
enhanced insurgent combat effectiveness while
strengthening ties between Moscow and members of
these organizations. These benefits are, however, not
always the case. In Zimbabwe, the group-ZAPU-
supported by the Soviets, ultimately lost to the
Chinese-, Yugoslav-, and North Korean-backed
Top Secret
In general, Soviet and Soviet surrogate training for
Third World insurgents is a relatively inexpensive,
low-risk means of projecting power into key Third
World countries-El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, South Africa,
Namibia, Thailand, among others-and a direct chal-
lenge to Western objectives and interests. Over the
years, thousands of trained guerrillas and their cadres
have returned to various parts of the Third World
where they initiate, revitalize, and perpetrate revolu-
tionary struggles against pro-Western regimes. Al-
though it is difficult to measure the quality of the
training these guerrillas receive or of their subsequent
battlefield performance, US training and insurgency
experience suggests that their basic tactical train-
ing-weapons, land navigation, small-unit maneuver,
etc.-is excellent. Most students arrive with few
military skills and, thus, experience a uantum lea in
their soldiering.
The insurgent training of the Soviet Union and its
surrogates also burnishes the revolutionary image of
each donor, supports the spread of Marxist ideology
and revolution, and represents a long-term investment
ZANU forces, led by Robert Mugabe.
Cuba, the most active training surrogate, uses its
program to project political influence throughout the
Third World and provide additional leverage for
obtaining Soviet military and economic assistance.
Moreover, Cuban insurgent training supports Castro's
determination to bring other Marxist-Leninist govern-
ments to power in Latin America in hopes of further
reducing his sense of hemispheric isolation and per-
ceived vulnerability to pressure from the United
States. In certain circumstances, insurgent training
provides Havana with significant sway over partici-
pants; Cuban influence is not only exerted over the
perceptions, political attitudes, and ideology of the
students, it frequently affects their actions.
Finally, the Soviets and their surrogates collect con-
siderable intelligence-a source of substantial poten-
tial influence-and sometimes recruit agents through
their insurgent trainin ro rams
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Appendix B
Cuban Insurgent Training
Cuba's insurgent training has evolved through a series 1984
of distinct phases:
ments in South Africa.
1961-68 Following Fidel Castro's consolidation of
power, the Cubans embarked on an ener-
getic campaign to support armed insurgen-
cy in Central and South America-espe-
cially in Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala,
Colombia, Bolivia, and Nicaragua-train-
ing an estimated 2,500 Latin American
leftists inside Cuba. The Cubans were also
active in Africa, starting with an insurgent
training camp in Ghana in 1961 and a
second camp in newly independent Algeria
in 1962. Following Che Guevara's tour of
Africa in 1964, training support began for
anti-Congolese and anti-Portuguese move-
25X1 1968-77
to increase markedly.
Cuba's commitment to revolution through
military means-a re-creation of its own
success-was not entirely shared by many
reform-minded Communist parties in Lat-
in America nor by the USSR. On the heels
of insurgent failures in Venezuela, Colom-
bia, Guatemala, Peru, and Argentina and
in response to pressure from the Soviet
Union, the Cubans began to scale down
their insurgent training.
1977-83 In early 1977, following revolutionary suc-
cesses in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethio-
pia and Fidel Castro's tour of Africa and
the Middle East, Cuban training reacce-
lerated; Cuban advisers and troops began
to flow into Ethiopia and a significant
insurgent training effort for foreign stu-
dents was initiated in Cuba. By 1980,
following the Sandinista victory in Nicara-
gua, the training of Salvadoran insurgents,
Honduran Communist Party members,
and other Latin Americans had also begun
Groups in Southern Africa and Latin
America-especially El Salvador-remain
the primary recipients of Cuban insurgent
training. Following the late 1983 US inva-
sion of Grenada, the Cubans-reportedly
concerned for the survival of the Sandinis-
ta government in Nicaragua-temporarily
scaled down their support to Latin Ameri-
can insurgent groups.
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Soviet and Surrogate Training for Active Insurgencies
A Soviet Union
A East Germany
^ Bulgaria
o Vietnam
0 Cuba
* Nicaragua
Third World country insurgency
associated with Soviet Union/
surrogate trainers
Independent active insurgency
4,0
Western
Saharan
Guatemala
1s
ietnam
lo0r
Nicaragua
P D.R.Y.
(South Yemen)
Thailand
'G
Oda
Philippines
El Salvador
0,
Sri
Lanka
Colombia
A0
Namibia'hu
AA11
South
Africa
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Top Secret
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