AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR THE RESISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000400570001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1983
• Content Type: NIE

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Central
Intelligence
Afghanistan: Prospects
for the Resistance
National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
NIE 37-83
4 October 1983
Copy 4 3 6
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N I E 37-83
AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS
FOR THE RESISTANCE
Information available as of 26 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 9
The Situation in Afghanistan ................................................................................. 9
Soviet Goals, Costs, and Options ............................................................................ 13
A Political Settlement ......................................................................................... 14
Augmenting Soviet Forces ................................................................................. 14
Strengthening the Afghan Government ............................................................ 15
Reducing Military Activity ................................................................................ 15
Pressure on Civilians ........................................................................................... 16
Exploiting Insurgent Vulnerabilities .................................................................. 17
Reducing Foreign Support ................................................................................. 17
Implications for the United States .........................................................................
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate focuses on the prospects for the resistance over the
next two years. Although we discuss the longer term impact of some fac-
tors, we believe uncertainties about future Pakistani and Soviet policies,
and popular support for the resistance preclude judgments about the
_r &L- r I
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Figure 1
Afghanistan
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Almost four years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
resistance is an effective guerrilla force that controls much of the
country. In the next two years, barring drastic changes in Soviet or
Pakistani policy, the resistance will continue at a high enough level to
prevent a significant improvement in the Soviet position.
We believe that the Soviets are unlikely to make the major changes
in policy that could greatly reduce the level of insurgency. Moscow is,
however, likely to make minor changes that could lead to some
improvement in the Soviet military position in Afghanistan, but still
leave the resistance an effective fighting force in much of the country.
Greatly increased Soviet pressure on Pakistan could make it more
difficult for Islamabad to continue its crucial role in supporting the
insurgency, but we doubt that Soviet pressure alone will be able to
reverse Pakistani policy in the next two years.
For at least the next two years, the resistance will be a significant
military constraint but cannot prevent the Soviets from using Afghani-
stan as a base for projecting military power in the region, should
Moscow decide to do so. The war will be a continuing, if bearable, drain
on Soviet. resources.
Over the longer run, uncertainties about continued Pakistani
support, future Soviet policies, and popular willingness to bear the
hardships of war raise serious questions about the prospects for the
resistance.
The resistance is more simultaneous uprisings of a large number of
villages and tribes than it is a well-organized national liberation
movement. There are hundreds of insurgent bands, most operating near
their home villages. Fighters alternate periodically between their
insurgent band and their civilian occupations. Only a small number of
bands are based in Pakistan and Iran. Many bands-probably the
majority-tend to place parochial interests ahead of any national effort.
Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but primarily at the
regional and ethnic group level. Deep ideological differences-the most
important of which is between Islamic fundamentalists and moder-
ates-and the so far very limited cooperation across regional and ethnic
lines suggest that a united national movement is extremely unlikely
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during the period of this Estimate, and probably for years afterward.
Nonetheless, we expect the resistance to become more sophisticated
politically and militarily and to continue to adapt quickly to changing
conditions. Most groups have responded quickly to changes in Soviet
military and nonmilitary tactics.
The Soviets' perceptions-not ours-of their own progress in
attaining their longer range goals in Afghanistan will be the determining
factor in any Soviet changes in counterinsurgency policy. Soviet concern
about the difficulties of coping with the resistance is growing. Neverthe-
less, the Soviets still appear to believe that the costs are bearable, that
their relations with many countries are recovering from the damage
done by their invasion of Afghanistan, and that in the long run they will
overcome the resistance.
The main Soviet goal in Afghanistan is to maintain a Soviet-
dominated Marxist government in the country. This enables Moscow to:
- At a minimum, ensure against chaos and anarchy or the
emergence of another fundamentalist Islamic state on Soviet
borders.
- Ensure that there is no drastic setback to Soviet international
prestige that would follow the fall of the Afghan Marxists.
- Transform Afghanistan into a Communist society.
- Enhance Soviet ability to apply military and political pressure
on Pakistan, Iran, and other regional states; reduce Western
influence in the region; and contribute to isolating China.
The Soviets have already instituted a number of policies that they
believe will eventually turn Afghanistan into a viable Soviet-dominated
Communist state. These include economic policies that tie the Afghan
economy more closely to the USSR's and domestically put Afghanistan
on the road to socialism, changes in local government that would
increase central government control, the training of cadres, using the
education system to indoctrinate Afghan youth, and the formation of
party fronts to control various segments of the population. Moscow
believes that, in the long run, Soviet control of Afghanistan will depend
on the imposition of an effective new political order backed by Soviet
military power. Because of widespread resistance, reforms have been
implemented in only small areas--or not at all-and we believe it will
be a decade or more before these programs have a significant impact.
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The Soviets appear to have no deadline for accomplishing these
tasks and still believe that they can be accomplished without a
significant increase in the level of Soviet military commitment. There is,
however, growing concern about the lack of progress. The Soviets are
not likely to question their goals, but over time they could decide that
basic policy changes are necessary to achieve success.
Over the next two years, we see almost no prospect that the Soviets
will decide to reach a political settlement or reduce their military effort
in Afghanistan:
- There is little prospect that Moscow will make the concessions
that would permit a political compromise acceptable to a
majority of the insurgents. Any formula acceptable to most of
the resistance would mean the abandonment of Moscow's goals
in Afghanistan, and would be viewed as a Soviet defeat both in
the USSR and abroad.'
- The Soviets could reduce somewhat the costs of the war by
reducing military activity-for example, by trying to hold only
the main cities or by pulling back to northern Afghanistan. This
would, however, give the resistance safehavens inside Afghani-
stan, give it an opportunity to consolidate its control in much of
the country, and, unless the Soviets were willing to write off
large parts of Afghanistan permanently, make it more difficult
for Moscow to gain eventual control of the country.
Nor do we believe the Soviets will opt for massive troop
reinforcements:
= With a force of 400,000 to 500,000 men, the Soviets could
greatly extend the area they control and gravely damage the
resistance. The Soviets believe a force of this size would be
required. Although the level of the insurgency would decline,
.we believe some opposition would continue at least in the more
remote parts of the country.
- We believe such a proposed augmentation, however, would be a
contentious issue within the Politburo as it would substantially
expand Soviet economic costs and casualties, cause the Soviets to
draw troops from other areas, and limit Moscow's ability to
react to other military contingencies. It would also create an
international climate hostile to the Soviet Union and sympathet-
ic to Western foreign policy aims and defense spending.
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We do believe there will be some increase in the size of Soviet
forces:
- At a minimum, the Soviets will continue to send additional
small support and combat units to Afghanistan. Over the next
two years, this could increase the size of the Soviet force by as
much as 1.0,000 men. Moscow would not regard such reinforce-
ments as increasing its commitment in Afghanistan, and the
additional costs would be minimal. These new units would do
little more than shore up the Soviet position in a few areas.
- We cannot rule out much larger augmentations that could, over
the next two years, increase Soviet forces by 50,000 to 100,000
men. This would be intended to expand or strengthen Soviet
control in some parts of Afghanistan or to deal with some major
problems such as road security. The Soviets could decide that
the likely improvement in their military position would be
worth the additional costs. There would be some improvement
in the Soviet military position and some increase in the area
under government control, but the resistance would remain
strong in most of the country.
The Soviets might also conclude that crop destruction, attacks on
villages, and other scorched-earth tactics would reduce the insurgency:
- A widespread indiscriminate scorched-earth campaign against
the Afghan people is unlikely. Soviet leaders would presumably
realize that the demographic and economic damage could delay
the creation of a viable Marxist state for a generation or more,
and that the international costs could be as great as for a massive
augmentation.
- The Soviets might conclude that more selective use of scorched-
earth tactics would not negate their other efforts. Moscow would
hope to face the Afghan population with a choice between
accommodation to Marxist rule and severe hardships. Scorched-
earth tactics might also be used occasionally when driving the
population out of an area seemed to Soviet commanders to be
the only way to pacify it. Many analysts believe they have been
using such tactics for some time.
It is difficult for us to judge how much hardship the Afghan people
are willing to bear. In some areas, reported Soviet and Afghan
Government excesses have angered the population enough to bring an
increase in insurgency. Nevertheless, we believe that, faced with severe
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food shortages and heavy casualties, some insurgent bands will stop
fighting, if only temporarily, to end military pressure on their fellow
villagers. We believe, however, that this alone will not have a significant
impact on the overall level of resistance in the next two years.
The Soviet and Afghan Communists are likely to continue-and
probably step up-a wide variety of covert and overt activities, such as
arranging truces advantageous to the Soviets, to exploit disunity and
other insurgent vulnerabilities. These tactics will be most productive if
military pressure has already lowered the will to resist.
The insurgency could not continue at the present level without
outside support. The insurgents probably could obtain enough small
arms and ammunition in Afghanistan to continue some fighting even if
foreign aid stopped,.but without antitank rockets, heavy machineguns,
and modern landmines-most of which come from foreign sources
through Pakistan-insurgent capabilities would begin to decline within
months. Most bands do not appear to have significant stockpiles of such
weapons.
Should foreign support for the resistance increase, bands already
fighting would become slightly more effective, and in some parts of
Afghanistan new bands might form. Nevertheless, the insurgents would
have difficulty in using new kinds of some weapons, and the primitive
insurgent logistic system would set certain limits on the flow of arms.
The Soviets will continue to try to reduce foreign-especially
Pakistani-support for the resistance. They will pursue negotiations to
this end, in the hope of weakening Pakistani and Western support for
the insurgency without abandoning their long-range goal of dominating
Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, is likely to continue to support the
resistance over the next two years, especially if the Zia government
remains in power. Support for the resistance provides a number of
direct benefits to Pakistan, including stepped-up US military aid and
Islamic economic assistance that would constrain any Pakistani govern-
ment from abandoning the insurgency. Because many factors not
directly related to Afghanistan will influence Islamabad's policies,
however, we cannot be confident that Pakistani support will continue
over the longer run.
In any case, Pakistan will remain unable to deny all use of its
territory to the resistance or halt the flow of refugees. Pakistan could
force the exile political organizations to move their headquarters to
some other country, such as Saudi Arabia, where their ability to support
and influence bands fighting in Afghanistan would be severely reduced.
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Even the relocation of headquarters to eastern Iran would erode exile
influence in Afghanistan. Islamabad could also make it far more
difficult for :insurgents to operate from bases in Pakistan. Most insurgent
bands, however, are based permanently in Afghanistan and would not
be directly affected.
There is a broad consensus in Iran against any moderation in
Tehran's opposition to the Kabul regime and the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. The level of Iranian aid to the insurgents has increased,
but, even if the war with Iraq should end, Iranian aid is unlikely to ap-
proach what the insurgents now receive through Pakistan.
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DISCUSSION
The Situation in Afghanistan
1. Almost four years after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, despite overwhelmingly superior Soviet
firepower and technology, the resistance controls
much of the country and has become stronger and
more effective.
2. Military activity in Afghanistan has consisted
largely of Soviet and Afghan Government efforts to
destroy insurgent bands or drive them away from
important areas, and insurgent attacks on supply lines
and isolated posts in rural areas and sabotage and
assassinations in the cities. The insurgents are too weak
to overrun a major Soviet installation, or successfully
confront a main Soviet unit in the field, and generally
try to avoid contact during large sweep operations.
With an authorized force of more than 100,000 men,
the Soviets are unable to establish permanent garrisons
to maintain control of areas they clear, can block only
a few of the hundreds of insurgent supply routes from
Pakistan and Iran, and are unable to prevent frequent
and costly attacks on road convoys.
3. The Soviets have so far failed to transform the
disloyal and ineffective Afghan military into a reliable
force. Continuing desertions, defections, and casualties
have prevented the Afghan Government from increas-
ing the size of the annual forces much above 40,000 to
50,000 men-less than half of its strength when the
Communists seized power in April 1978. Paramilitary
forces, including police, tribal auxiliaries, and local
militia units, are generally even less motivated and
effective than the Army.
4. The Marxists control almost all towns of any
importance, but there is some insurgent activity even
in areas where Soviet and Afghan Government control
is strongest. Insurgents at times have controlled Qan-
dahar and Herat-the second and third largest cities-
and, the resistance has
controlled more than half the country's administrative
districts since early 1981F ~ There
are no good statistics on civilian casualties, but they
probaby run into the hundreds of thousands. Fighting
has driven more than 4 million people (about a quarter
of the population) into exile in Iran and Pakistan, or
from rural areas into Kabul.
5. There are hundreds of insurgent bands, some
completely independent and others associated with
regional organizations in Afghanistan or exile political
groups, the most important of which are based in
Peshawar, Pakistan.
Exile
leaders have little direct control of military operations
in Afghanistan and in many cases the relationship
between a band and an exile group is tenuous. The
regional organizations attempt to coordinate military
activity and control civil administration in their areas
of Afghanistan, but most are loose coalitions and even
the strongest do not control all local insurgents. Most
insurgent bands operate near their home villages and
men alternate between the band and their civilian
occupations. Only a small number of bands are based
in Pakistan and Iran, although most receive supplies
from one of these countries.
6. Almost all resistance organizations claim to be
fighting to free Afghanistan from the Soviets and to be
protecting Islam, but there are, in fact, wide differ-
ences in their goals. One major division is between
Islamic fundamentalists and moderates. The funda-
mentalists want to establish a theocratic government,
oppose any compromise with the Soviets, are suspi-
cious of the West, and strongly oppose any role for the
former royal family. The moderates are generally pro-
Western, want a secular government, believe some
compromise with Moscow is necessary, and see the
royal family as a unifying force.
7. Most Afghans have never had much sense of
national identity, and many bands-probably the ma-
jority-tend to place parochial interests ahead of any
national effort. The resistance is still more simulta-
neous uprisings of a large number of villages and tribes
than it is a well-organized national liberation move-
ment. Historical opposition to the authority of any
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central government, a desire to preserve local customs
(which tribesmen label Islamic even when they run
counter to the Koran), a culture that glorifies guerrilla
warfare, resentment among some ethnic minorities of
Pashtun domination, and even the profits to be made
from a successful raid all help fuel the insurgency.
8. Despite the lack of a central organization and
common goals, cooperation among resistance organiza-
tions has increased at the local level, sometimes even
among groups ostensibly associated with rival political
organizations. Although fighting between different
ethnic and tribal groups-historically common-is re-
duced, there is little active cooperation across ethnic
lines (see figure 4).
9. The ideological differences among the political
organizations and the so far very limited cooperation
across regional and ethnic lines suggest that the forma-
tion of a united national resistance organization is
highly unlikely during the period of this Estimate, and
probably for years afterward. We see little prospect in
the next two years that the insurgents will achieve the
degree of unity that would permit them to support
and control "main force" units able to fight the Soviets
in setpiece battles, even were foreign suppliers willing
to furnish the necessary training and equipment. The
lack of unity will also hinder the insurgents' ability to
influence international opinion and participate in
negotiations about Afghanistan's future.
10. There are probably more than 100,000 full- or
part-time insurgents who have aided the resistance in
some capacity. The bands are usually small-30 to 40
men-and are armed with rifles, heavy machineguns,
and antitank rockets. In recent months the effective
use of mortars has increased. Both tactics and weapons
inventories have improved considerably since the Sovi-
et invasion. Although some bands are well armed,
trained, and led, others still have serious deficiencies.
11. In five years of war against the Marxists, the
insurgency has shown an ability to adapt quickly to
changing conditions and a capacity for growth that
will contribute significantly to its ability to survive
changes in Soviet military and political strategy. When
the Soviets invaded, the insurgents quickly abandoned
tactics that were no longer effective and within a few
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months had developed ones effective against the Sovi-
ets. Subsequent changes in Soviet military tactics
resulted in temporary success that evaporated quickly
when the insurgents adjusted. Despite their lack of a
common command, the insurgent bands have grown
more sophisticated in their strategy and have increas-
ingly concentrated on Soviet vulnerabilities.
12. The resistance has also grown more politically
sophisticated. The political programs of the moderates
and fundamentalists-although a cause of friction in
the resistance-offer a clear alternative to Commu-
nism. At the local level, the resistance has assumed
responsibility for governmental functions in some ar-
eas and, despite limited resources, has often been more
responsive to popular needs than officials appointed
by Kabul ever were.
13. A loss of popular support, although unlikely,
would be a crippling blow to the insurgency. Given
the close ties between the insurgents and civilians,
most bands would probably stop fighting to prevent
the local population from suffering unbearable hard-
ships. If so, we would expect the decline to be gradual
and uneven. Pressure on civilians in some parts of
Afghanistan would become severe long before civilians
in other areas were seriously affected. Moreover,
whatever the cause of a collapse of the insurgency, not
all bands would stop fighting. Sporadic urban terror-
ism and rural insurgency bordering on banditry might
well continue for generations.
14. Since its installation by the Soviets in December
1979, the government of Babrak Karmal has attempt-
ed to win popular support by pursuing policies less
offensive to Afghan tradition and Islam than those of
its predecessors, by strengthening progovernment insti-
tutions-such as party fronts-and by trying to bring
non-Communists into the regime. These programs
have failed largely because Babrak has been unable to
disassociate Marxist rule from the excesses of his
predecessors, his less radical programs are unpopular
with most Afghans, his dependence on Soviet troops
tags him as a foreign puppet, and insurgent control
denies the government an opportunity to implement
its policies in much of the countryside. Adding to the
government's problems are an incompetent bureaucra-
cy of, at best, questionable loyalty and the deep rift in
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Figure 4
Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
S r--~ (
^vMaz6r-e' +,
Shanf
`s ?Khalm.
kh)
Zabo1
the ruling party. Because of social, ethnic, and tribal
differences and personal rivalries more than ideologi-
cal disagreement, the sometimes violent conflict with-
in the party has persisted despite Soviet efforts to bring
Babrak's Parcham and the rival Khalq faction
together.
15. Since Brezhnev's death the Soviets have reiter-
ated their hard line on the "irreversibility of the
Afghan revolution," have continued military pressure
on the insurgents, and appear to have tried to prepare
the Soviet public for prolonged involvement in Af-
ghanistan. At the same time, however, Moscow has
deliberately fanned speculation that Andropov is more
interested in a political settlement than was Brezhnev.
Hazara
Baluch
The effort to encourage the UN-sponsored dialogue
appears designed primarily to explore whether Paki-
stan can be induced into a settlement that would
restrict support for the insurgents.
16. Since late 1982 the Soviets have engaged in
negotiations with some insurgent leaders. This suggests
that Moscow is looking for more effective ways to
counter the resistance, but we do not believe the talks
foreshadow a major shift in Soviet policy. The negotia-
tions and local cease-fires with insurgent leaders in
Afghanistan are intended to permit the Soviets to use
their troops more effectively and to discredit or win
over some resistance leaders.
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y3t'? "`ayl `" Bay5n
Maymaaak, r ~,- (s marig' '! dal-e'
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Oandahar
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Soviet Goals, Costs, and Options
17. Soviet policies will, of course, be one of the most
important factors determining the future of the Af-
ghan insurgency. The Soviets have a wide variety of
options for dealing with Afghanistan. In deciding
which option to pursue, they will weigh the degree to
which each brings Moscow closer to achieving its goals
in Afghanistan against the costs.
18. The main Soviet goal in Afghanistan is to
maintain a Soviet-dominated Marxist government in
the country. This enables Moscow to:
- At a minimum, ensure against chaos and anarchy
or the emergence of another fundamentalist Is-
lamic state on Soviet borders.
- Ensure that there is no drastic setback to Soviet
international prestige that would follow the fall
of the Afghan Marxists.
- Transform Afghanistan into a Communist
society.
- Enhance Soviet ability to apply military and
political pressure on Pakistan, Iran, and other
regional states; reduce Western influence in the
region; and contribute to isolating China.
19.
Soviet media comparisons of Afghanistan to the two-
decade-long effort to subdue Muslim resistance in
Soviet Central Asia indicate the Soviets are prepared
for a long struggle in Afghanistan and that they expect
to win eventually, without any significant change in
strategy. The Soviets are concerned about their lack of
progress, but they do not seem to be questioning their
strategy or goals. Instead, they are looking for ways to
implement their strategy more effectively. Indeed, the
Soviets are already giving serious consideration to
some modification of their basic tactics.
20. Afghanistan has cost the USSR about $15 billion
since 1979, an average of about $5 billion a year. We
estimate Soviet military expenditures and equipment
losses since 1979 at $10 billion, but a third of this
would have been spent even if the Soviets had not sent
troops to Afghanistan. The Soviets have spent the
equivalent of another $2 billion on the Afghan armed
forces and provided about $200-300 million annually
to their Afghan allies in economic assistance. Indirect
costs to the Soviet economy-which include the diver-
sion of POL products and of rolling stock to transport
goods to Afghanistan-are estimated to have cost the
Soviets another $2 billion. Together these costs were on
the order of a quarter of a percent of Soviet GNP in
1982.
21. About 5,000 Soviets have been killed, 10,000
wounded, and many more hospitalized with serious
disease. These limited casualties have not been a
significant domestic problem.
22. Internationally, the invasion damaged the Sovi-
et image, set back efforts to improve relations with
many countries, and led to a whole range of political
and economic restrictions that have hampered Soviet
efforts to expand their influence. The Soviets, howev-
er, believe these costs are receding and cite such things
as the limited rapprochement with" China, improving
economic and political relationships in Western Eu-
rope, and growing Soviet influence in the Middle East
as evidence of the fading impact of the invasion.
23. Because Soviet policy is one of the most impor-
tant factors in determining insurgent prospects, we
have, in the remainder of this Estimate, examined
those prospects under different Soviet options. The
Soviets can try to:
- End the fighting by making enough concessions
to achieve a political settlement.
- Increase pressure on the insurgents by augment-
ing Soviet forces.
- Reduce military costs by cutting back on the area
or intensity of military operations.
- Continue to try to strengthen the Afghan Gov-
ernment and the People's Democratic Party
through programs such as training cadres.
- Continue to exploit insurgent disunity and other
vulnerabilities.
- Increase military pressure on civilians to reduce
popular support for the resistance.
- Reduce foreign-especially Pakistani-support
for the resistance.
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A Political Settlement
24. We see little prospect that Moscow will make
the concessions that would permit a political compro-
mise acceptable to a majority of the insurgents. There
is good evidence that the Soviets badly underestimated
the problems they would encounter in Afghanistan.
We believe, however, that preventing the fall of a
Marxist government on Soviet borders was important
enough that Moscow would have intervened even had
Soviet leaders foreseen the difficulties:
- Precipitate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
would be tantamount to admitting that the Soviet
leadership had made a major mistake, would
probably leave Afghanistan either in chaos or
with a strongly anti-Soviet government, and
would be seen internationally as a defeat for the
USSR. We see no prospect that in the next two
years the military or economic cost will rise to a
level at which Moscow would be forced to
withdraw.
- A coalition government dominated by the Com-
munists might be acceptable to Moscow. Even if
it had a prominent non-Communist as figure-
head chief of state, however, the insurgents and
most other Afghans would see it as a continuation
of Communist rule under another guise. Fighting
would continue, and unless Soviet troops re-
mained in Afghanistan the coalition government
would be short-lived.
- If Soviet troops were withdrawn and Moscow
abandoned efforts to influence domestic policies,
some of the people and the insurgents might
accept a government that gave Moscow some
assurance it would not take actions threatening to
the USSR and had, at most, token Communist
participation. Such a government would proba-
bly be weak, with former insurgent leaders re-
taining control of many parts of the country.
Some fundamentalist groups would continue to
oppose the government and would have some
chance of seizing power in Kabul. Such a govern-
ment could not guarantee Moscow either stability
on Soviet borders or a friendly regime in the long
term. Its establishment would be viewed as a
Soviet defeat both in the USSR and abroad and
would mean the end of prospects for using the
country as a base for projecting Soviet influence.
- Some have suggested that Moscow might agree to
a compromise in which, after Soviet withdrawal,
a pro-Soviet government retained control of Ka-
bul and a few other places, with the remainder of
the country under insurgent rule. We doubt,
however, that Moscow would consider such an
arrangement. It would mean the abandonment
of most Soviet goals in Afghanistan and would be
viewed as a Soviet defeat. If Soviet troops with-
drew, Moscow would have no guarantee that the
unaided regime would survive. If Soviet troops
remained, the situation would not be much
different from that discussed in paragraphs 30
and 31.
Augmenting Soviet Forces
25. With a larger force in Afghanistan, the Soviets
could expand the area under government control by
establishing a larger number of permanent garrisons,
expand their clearing operations to more of the coun-
try, increase the security of their supply lines, and
reduce outside support by gaining greater control of
border areas. Soviet ability to achieve these objectives,
of course, would depend on the level of augmentation:
- A modest increase in Soviet force levels with
additional security units, technical combat: serv-
ice support units, or combat support troops
would do little more than shore up the Soviet
position in a few areas. The costs of such an
augmentation, however, are minimal, and we
expect to see some additional small units arrive in
Afghanistan, especially if the insurgents appear
to be making even slight gains.
- With a more extensive reinforcement (50,000 to
more than 100,000 men, including major combat
units such as motorized rifle divisions), the Sovi-
ets could either increase pressure on the resist-
ance throughout the country or concentrate on a
particular problem-for example, road security
or the pacification of a few provinces. They
would not, however, be able to reduce the
insurgency significantly in most of Afghanistan.
- With a force of 400,000 to 500,000 men the
Soviets could block most insurgent supply routes,
establish garrisons throughout the country, and
greatly improve the security of supply lines.
Although the level of insurgency would decline,
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some opposition would continue at least in the
more remote parts of the country. The Soviets
believe a force of this size would be required.
26. Either of the latter two options would:
- Require a fundamental expansion of the existing
logistic infrastructure in Afghanistan and in areas
of the USSR bordering on Afghanistan.
- Require greater economic and military expendi-
tures, which would have to be sustained for at
least several years.
- Draw down strategic reserves or forces designat-
ed for employment against China or NATO.
- Be an admission that past policy in Afghanistan
was a failure.
- Revive Afghanistan as a major international issue
further setting back efforts to improve relations
with both Western and Islamic countries.
- Increase domestic anxieties about the war and
result in more economic dislocations.
27. These costs, of course, would be far less for
50,000 men than for 500,000. With the lower force
level, domestic anxieties in the USSR might not rise
significantly, Soviet forces elsewhere would not be
weakened greatly, and the international repercussions
would probably be manageable in Soviet eyes. We
cannot, therefore, rule out such an augmentation
during the next two years, especially if the insurgency
were to grow stronger.
Strengthening the Afghan Government
28. We expect the Soviets to continue programs that
they believe will eventually bear fruit, even though
past performance gives little hope of early success.
Despite a major ongoing Soviet training and indoctri-
nation program, Afghan military units will remain
generally ineffective for some time. We have observed
signs of slight improvement in some units, notably in
conducting operations with Soviet forces, and this
trend is expected to continue. Slow improvements in
the paramilitary forces are also likely as better trained
and ideologically motivated cadres come on board.
The rate of improvement, however, is likely to be so
slow that generally effective Afghan military and
security forces are unlikely before the early 1990s, if
then.
29. The Soviets will continue programs that they
believe are essential in the long run for Soviet and
Communist success in Afghanistan. They will continue
to strengthen ties between the Afghan and Soviet
economies and use land reform, rural development,
and reforms in the structure of local government (so
far unimplemented) to eliminate the power of the
"feudalists" in rural areas. Elementary and secondary
education-although currently absent from much of
the country-have already been remodeled on Soviet
lines, and higher education-once heavily influenced
by the West-has been tied closely to the USSR with
Russian, the main foreign language. The Soviets will
continue to try to strengthen the party fronts, which
now exist largely on paper, to control workers, women,
youth, and other groups. Eventually, the training of
cadres and efforts to indoctrinate youths will increase
the effectiveness of the government and lessen the rifts
in the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, but
these efforts will not have much impact until long
after the period of this Estimate. Efforts to increase
popular acceptance of Communist rule will continue,
although prospects for early success are bleak. In most
of the country, Kabul has too little military control to
permit it to influence the population through econom-
ic programs, propaganda, or police methods. The
government cannot even protect those who might be
inclined to cooperate with Kabul. Most Afghans will
continue to regard the Communists as a foreign-
controlled enemy and regard any promises from Kabul
with suspicion. Many will view any effort to change
Afghanistan-even programs not specifically Commu-
nist-as a threat to tradition and religion. The Soviets
could also try to reshuffle the Kabul government, but
Babrak's replacement or the inclusion of more non-
Communists in the Cabinet-if any could be induced
to join-is unlikely to change popular views as long as
Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan.
Reducing Military Activity
30. The Soviets could reduce the cost of the war by
reducing the overall level of operations or even by
pulling back to northern Afghanistan, but we doubt
that the Soviets would give serious consideration to
such options.
31. The level of fighting would probably decline as
insurgents in areas no longer threatened returned to
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their civilian occupations. Attacks on the periphery of
the Soviet-held area and the use of nearby insurgent-
held areas as safehavens, however, could eventually
force the Soviets to expand the area of their opera-
tions. Moreover, the consolidation of resistance control
in areas written off by the Soviets would make gaining
control of those areas more difficult in the long run.
32. The Soviets will continue to avoid major mili-
tary operations in areas they deem to be of little
military or political importance such as the remote
and rugged Hazara region of central Afghanistan
where they have not made a serious incursion for three
years. To demonstrate some central government con-
trol throughout Afghanistan, however, they will, con-
tinue to ensure that there is some government pres-
ence in all provinces, if only a garrison isolated in a
provincial capital.
33. The Soviets could step up military pressure on
civilians. In a few areas of Afghanistan, civilian casual-
ties and damage to crops, irrigation facilities, and
villages have already made the population reluctant to
bear the costs of the war. This has not led to a break
between the insurgents and the people. Instead, the
insurgents who come from the same villages and are
concerned about the safety of their own families and
property share the views of the civilians and cut back
operations, drop out of the war, or even switch sides. A
decline in morale after repeated attacks in the
Panisher Valley contributed to the local insurgent
leaders' willingness to agree to a truce with the Soviets.
A small number of bands continue to defect to the
government, most of them in areas where there has
been heavy military pressure. Many of the bands
redefect after a few months.
34. In most of Afghanistan, the resistance continues
to have strong civilian support. Only repeated military
operations, serious food shortages, and high casualties
appear to erode significantly the willingness to resist,
and the Soviets have not applied this kind of pressure
in most of the country.
35. The Soviets have the resources to step up
pressure on civilians. The bombing of villages and the
destruction of crops, in fact, would require fewer
resources than operations intended to surround and
destroy insurgent bands. A more extensive carrot-and-
stick policy-severe hardships for civilians who sup-
port the resistance, freedom from military operations
for areas where resistance ends, and government
assistance-could make serious inroads into the
resistance.
36. The Soviets could choose from several different
levels of pressure:
- A widespread scorched-earth policy, which could
include indiscriminate killing; the destruction of
villages and crops; and the use of chemicals
including herbicides, defoliants, and lethal
agents, would kill or drive into exile thousands-
if not millions-and would be likely to force
those who remained to reach an accommodation
with Kabul and Moscow. Soviet leaders would
presumably realize that the demographic and
economic damage could delay the creation of a
viable Marxist state for a generation or more, and
that the international costs might well be as great
as for a massive augmentation.
- By pursuing such tactics in only a few areas, and
avoiding or limiting the use of tactics-such as
chemical warfare-that would be especially
damaging to the Soviet image, the Soviets could
reduce civilian support for the resistance in the
most troublesome areas. Many analysts believe
Moscow has been pursuing such a policy for some
time. Despite US efforts to publicize Soviet ex-
cesses, there has been no significant impact on
Soviet relations with most countries. Moscow
might assess the benefits of attacks on civilians
and the economic base of the resistance in select-
ed areas as being well worth the cost.
- Even if the Soviets were to make no efforts
directed specifically against civilians, the cumu-
lative effect on the Afghan people of counterin-
surgency operations could in time wear down
civilian morale. Cumulative costs to the Afghan
people will continue to rise, and it is difficult for
us to judge at what level of hardship the war will
become unbearable for most civilians. Although
we believe it unlikely, we cannot completely rule
out a significant erosion of civilian support in the
next two years even without a change in Soviet
tactics.
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37. A perception that the insurgent cause is hope-
less-that the Soviets can never be driven from Af-
ghanistan-could also cause some bands to stop fight-
ing. These bands, however, are likely to be in areas
where government control is already strong. Most
insurgents are more interested in the fate of their own
village or valley than in events in Kabul, and so they
will tend to regard the war as worthwhile as long as
their own area remains free.
Exploiting Insurgent Vulnerabilities
38. The Soviets and the Afghan Communists are
likely to continue-and probably step up-a wide
variety of covert and overt activities to exploit insur-
gent vulnerabilities, especially insurgent disunity. The
fragmentation of the resistance makes it possible to
buy off bands or set them against each other, and the
preoccupation of most insurgents with the local situa-
tion makes them susceptible to arrangements with the
Soviets or the regime that may be advantageous
locally, but harmful to the resistance as a whole. The
most successful of these operations so far has been a
truce in the Panisher Valley with Ahmad Shah Ma-
sood, probably the best known of the insurgent field
commanders.
39. Insurgent leaders may agree only to temporary
truces and, if only because of pressure from their
followers, eventually resume fighting. Even a tempo-
rary truce, however, will enable the Soviets to shift
limited numbers of troops from one area to another
and will raise suspicions about the reliability of some
insurgent leaders both within the resistance and with
foreign supporters. Such arrangements, however, will
not necessarily discredit an insurgent leader. (Despite
some worries, most Afghans appear to be withholding
judgment about the truce in the Panisher Valley until
it is clear which side gained the most.)
40. Increased Soviet and Afghan Government infil-
tration of insurgent groups to obtain information or to
kill leaders may also have some success. The insurgents
claim they are identifying and killing most Commu-
nist agents; and many Soviet operations based on
intelligence from agents have been unsuccessful.
There have, however, also been intelligence successes
for the Soviets-notably, the rescue of Soviet civilians
kidnaped early this year in. northern Afghanistan.
41. The Soviets are also encouraging fighting among
insurgent groups. Fighting among insurgents so far has
not prevented the resistance from growing, although it
may have slowed that growth. Both increasing cooper-
ation among bands throughout Afghanistan and recent
defections of local leaders no longer willing to follow
the divisive policies of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar argue
against such clashes becoming a more serious problem
in the future despite Soviet efforts to encourage them.
Nevertheless, with or without Soviet encouragement,
some fighting among insurgent bands seems certain to
continue.
42. The Soviets are likely to increase efforts to
exploit insurgent vulnerabilities along these lines. Costs
are low in comparison to regular military operations.
Even if many operations fail (and successes are usually
temporary), the Soviets will still reap some benefits,
and there will always be the chance that some opera-
tion will lead to a major political breakthrough. These
essentially political operations are unlikely to have a
decisive impact on the resistance; but, in situations
where morale is low, popular support decreasing, or
tensions among insurgent bands particularly high, they
decrease an insurgent group's will to fight.
Reducing Foreign Support
43. The Soviets will also continue to try to reduce
foreign-especially Pakistani-support for the resist-
ance. The insurgents probably could obtain enough
small arms and ammunition in Afghanistan to contin-
ue fighting even if foreign aid stopped. But, without
antitank rockets, heavy machineguns, and modern
landmines (most of which come from foreign sources),
insurgent capabilities would be seriously degraded.
Because most bands have only small reserves of am-
munition and weapons, the decline would come quick-
ly. At a minimum, the insurgents would have to
reduce significantly their attacks on road convoys, and
some bands would stop fighting altogether. Over time,
the lack of such weapons could seriously affect both
the willingness and the ability of large numbers to
continue fighting.
44. The loss of bases in Pakistan and Iran would
hurt some bands but most are based permanently in
Afghanistan. Moreover, neither country has enough
control along the border to prevent all use of its
territory by insurgents. Pakistan and Iran would be
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likely to continue to be safehavens for insurgents'
families. It would be nearly impossible to halt the
influx of refugees or force them back into Afghanistan.
If the Pakistanis forced the exiles to move their
headquarters to some other country, they could con-
tinue most of their political activities, such as propa-
ganda directed at international opinion. Relocation to
Saudi Arabia or Western Europe, however, would
virtually eliminate their role in supplying insurgent
bands and severely reduce the influence of the exiles
on the insurgents. Moving headquarters to eastern Iran
would allow the exiles to maintain contacts, but it
would be more difficult for them to obtain supplies to
pass on to the insurgents, and their dependence on
Tehran would make them less acceptable both in
Afghanistan and abroad.
45. If aid increased, the primitive insurgent supply
system and problems in using new kinds of weapons
such as SA-7s might limit the impact. Nevertheless,
with more arms, bands now operating would become
more effective, and in some areas new bands would
form.
46. Foreign assistance to the insurgents is likely to
continue at the present level or higher if there is no
shift in Pakistani policy. Pakistan's role is crucial. In
addition to its own help, it is the conduit for most aid
from third countries.
47. Islamabad refuses to recognize the Babrak gov-
ernment and in the indirect UN-sponsored negotia-
tions with Kabul has insisted a settlement must include
a rapid and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces.
Pakistan is pursuing a
negotiated settlement seriously, but we do not expect
an agreement in the next two years.
48. Some of Zia's political opponents have demand-
ed that he recognize Kabul, seal the border, and begin
repatriating the nearly 3 million refugees who are
increasingly viewed by the Pakistanis as consuming
scarce resources and increasing the risk of conflict
with the Soviets. In addition to the refugee burden,
Pakistan sees itself vulnerable to a wide variety of
Soviet pressures, including efforts to increase tribal
dissidence along the border, help for opposition groups
in Pakistan, cross-border raids, and, Pakistan's greatest
fear, Soviet encouragement of pressure from India.
Moscow has tried to tempt Islamabad with offers of
Soviet economic aid and Kabul's acceptance of Paki-
stani claims on the long disputed border.
49. We believe that a major change in Pakistani
policy is unlikely in the next two years. Even were the
Zia government overthrown, the desire to continue
good relations with the United States, China, and
Saudi Arabia would at least slow any change in policy.
Within Pakistan, Zia could expect some trouble from
the large number of Afghan refugees, and, if they
were supported by Pakistan's Islamic conservatives, his
position might be weakened seriously.
50. In the longer run, however, Pakistani support of
the resistance is less certain. Islamabad's policy might
well change if the military government were followed
by a government willing to accommodate Moscow, if
tensions with India increased to a point at which
Islamabad decided it had no alternative but to placate
Moscow, if pressure from the USSR increased, or if
relations with the United States deteriorated because
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
51. To reinforce diplomatic pressure, the Soviets
have the capability to conduct military operations
against both Pakistan and Iran, ranging from cross-
border air and artillery strikes to cross-border incur-
sions and raids against refugee camps that are provid-
ing supplies and sustenance to the insurgents. These
operations can be conducted by Soviet and Afghan
forces already deployed in Afghanistan. Any opera-
tions of greater magnitude and scope than this would
require the redeployment of large forces from the
USSR. 25X1
52. Moscow has little reason to believe cross-border
raids would intimidate Iran and Pakistan; Islamabad
and Tehran have reacted to past limited incursions by
taking a harder line against the Soviets. Military gains
would be slight. Insurgent groups already take some
precautions-such as moving training bases periodical-
ly-in anticipation of Soviet raids, and probably could
adjust quickly to Soviet attacks. The relative lack of
success of Soviet efforts to interdict supply lines and
destroy insurgent bases in Afghanistan argues against
attempting similar actions against supply bases in
Pakistan. Moscow's desire to avoid adding to its inter-
national political problems or risking greater US in-
volvement in support of Pakistan also makes it likely
that the Soviets will continue to avoid systematic
substantial cross-border raids or attacks.
53. Should Moscow decide to step up pressure on
Zia, it would probably conclude that increased covert
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activity was a more attractive option. Support for
separatist groups, aid to the political opposition, and
encouragement of civil disorder would probably be
more effective and would entail fewer risks. The
Soviets could attempt to intensify tensions between
Afghan refugees and their Pakistani hosts.
54. There is a broad consensus among Iran's ruling
clerics and their lay allies against any moderation in
Indicators of a Decline in Insurgency
Although we believe it unlikely that the resistance
will decline significantly in the next two years, if it
does, we would expect to see most of the following
beforehand:
- Increased defections of insurgent bands to the
government and a greater willingness of insur-
gent and tribal leaders to abide by agreements
and cease-fires with the Soviets.
- Increased cooperation with the Kabul regime in
government-controlled areas and efforts by
some exiles to reach an accommodation with
the Soviets.
- A growth in the size of the Afghan Army and a
marked decline in desertions.
- Lower morale and greater reluctance to bear
the hardships of war among civilians in insur-
gent-controlled areas and a marked sustained
increase in the number of refugees fleeing
Afghanistan and into the cities.
- Increased Soviet battlefield success against the
insurgents such as a series of military defeats in
several parts of the country, the destruction of
the forces of a major insurgent leader, or a
lasting significant increase in the area under
government control.
The loss of Pakistani support would severely affect
the ability of the resistance to continue. Early indica-
tions of a change in Islamabad's policy might be a
weakening of Pakistan's position in negotiations on
Afghanistan, a greater Pakistani willingness to deal
with Moscow on a broad range of issues, and a major
effort to restrict Afghan resistance activities within
Pakistan. A substantially increased Soviet military
commitment in Afghanistan would also make it more
difficult for the resistance to continue. Such an increase
would probably be foreshadowed by logistic improve-
ments in both Afghanistan and the USSR, the mobiliza-
tion and movement of Soviet units, and propaganda
aimed at justifying a greater Soviet effort.
Tehran's opposition to the Kabul regime and the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The level of Iranian
aid to Afghan insurgents increased in late 1981, when
the Khomeini regime began to consolidate its control
at home and there was a further increase early this
year. Should hostilities with Iraq wind down or if the
economic situation further improves in Iran, the Irani-
ans may increase their support of Afghan insurgent
groups. Aid from Iran, in part because of poor Iranian
relations with most other countries supporting the
resistance, is unlikely to approach the level of support
now received through Pakistan. Moreover, Tehran will
continue trying to unite the insurgents under funda-
mentalist leadership, hoping they will be able to
dominate the opposition to the Afghan Government
and eventually establish an Islamic republic in Kabul,
and so will concentrate its efforts on fundamentalist
groups and the Shia minority.'
Implications for the United States
55. For both the United States and the USSR, the
major impact of continued resistance will be to hinder
but not prevent Soviet use of Afghanistan as a base for
projecting military power. Soviet troops are closer to
Pakistan and eastern Iran than in 1979, but, as long as
they are tied clown fighting insurgents, and Soviet
supply lines and installations are subject to insurgent
attacks, Moscow will find it difficult to use its forces in
Afghanistan to threaten more than cross-border raids
against either country. A buildup aimed at forcing
Pakistan to stop supporting the resistance is unlikely;
Moscow would probably calculate that using the addi-
tional men inside Afghanistan would be less costly and
more effective.
56. Afghanistan will continue to cost the USSR men
and money, and complicate relations with most of the
world's nations. In the next two years, however, these
costs will remain at a level acceptable to Moscow,
partly because the Soviets will limit their commitment
of forces and partly because the resistance, even with
increased foreign support, will be unable to raise costs
to Moscow dramatically.
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57. As long as there is no settlement acceptable to
the insurgents, Afghanistan will remain a potential
threat to the US interest in a stable and cooperative
Pakistan. The Afghan refugees are likely to stay in
Pakistan where, even with considerable international
aid, they will be a growing economic, social, and
political problem for Islamabad. At a minimum, Paki-
stan will have to take the new reality of a permanent
Soviet presence in Afghanistan into account in all its
foreign policy decisions. Over the long term Pakistan
almost certainly will become subject to increased
Soviet pressure. Overt Soviet pressure could require
additional US response. Covert pressure, designed to
weaken the military regime, could ultimately contrib-
ute to an unstable political situation in Pakistan or the
replacement of the current government by one much
less willing to cooperate with Washington on a broad
range of issues.
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