STATUS OF NICARAGUAN OPERATIONS AND ATTENDANT PROBLEM AREAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001700090019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 29, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20S03
FOR: Dr. James Timbie
Advisor for Strategic Affairs
Office of the Deputy Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT: Unclassified Paper on Nicaraguan
Military Buildup
19 November 1984
STAT
Attached you will find an unclassified
paper on the Sandinista military buildup that
the DCI promised to Deputy Secretary Dam at last
Friday's luncheon.
Hope this helps.
STAT
Cheers:
Attachment:
As Stated
Interdepartmental Affairs
Special ss s n or
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19 November 1984
NICARAGUA MILITARY BUILDUP
Talking Points
The Sandinista military buildup has greatly accelerated over the past
year, causing increased concern not only in Washington, but also in the
Central American region itself.
-- Even without the delivery of MIG-21's, the recent direct
shipment of the sophisticated MI-24 helicopter gunship by a
Soviet ship was unprecedented and undoubtedly represents a
Soviet decision to play a more direct role in strengthening
the Sandinista regime.
-- This year Soviet Bloc deliveries to Nicaragua of military
goods is up some 25% compared to last year, and could reach
some 15,000 tons by year's end, because at least five more
Soviet ships are currently en route to Nicaragua.
-- Until the recent MI-24 delivery, the Soviets generally
preferred to leave the shipment of major weaponry, such as
tanks and artillery to surrogates, such as Cuba and
Bulgaria. Soviet cargoes generally included such
military-related items as MI-8 transport helicopters,
military trucks, field kitchens, and mobile workshops.
-- Thus the recent Soviet delivery, which also included
minesweepers and goods still not identified, signifies a new
departure by Moscow, and we are now forced to monitor all
potential Soviet arms carriers closely.
The Sandinistas like to justify their continued military buildup as
purely defensive. They cite the threat of US intervention and the
US-supported counterinsurgency to justify the acquisition of new Soviet
weaponry. They-say their military buildup represents a threat to nobody.
The facts speak otherwise. Let's review them.
-- The Sandinista buildup began well before there was any
anti-Sandinista insurgency, and well before relations with
the US deteriorated to the point of military tension.
ILLEGIB
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-- In fact, the military buildup began the moment they took
power. The first Cuban military advisers arrived in Managua
on July 19, 1979--the very day the Sandinistas celebrated
their revolutionary victory.
-- Although the US wanted good relations with the Sandinistas,
and even offered military aid in addition to extensive
economic support, we were largely ignored. Instead, the
Sandinistas preferred to align themselves with Cuba, and in
late 1979, a secret military pact was signed.
-- Cuban arms aid also began to arrive in late 1979, and in
early 1980, the first arms agreement was signed with the
Soviet Union.
-- Nicaraguan military personnel left for Cuba and the Soviet
Bloc to begin intensive training on tanks, artillery, and jet
combat aircraft.
All this time, the Sandinistas were pretending that they wanted good
relations with the US and peace in the region.
-- Meanwhile, they were secretly supporting a massive arms flow
to El Salvador in support of insurgents there. These arms
fueled the so-called insurgent "final offensive" in early
1981.
-- Once this offensive failed, and a captured pilot admitted he
secretly had flown arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador, the
Sandinistas changed their tune. They admitted they had
provided arms, but denied they continued to do so.
-- Again the facts speak otherwise. While the Sandinistas were
protesting their innocence, in early 1981, they allowed the
Salvadoran insurgents to set up secret communications
facilities in Nicaragua as well as establish their overall
military headquarters there.
-- These communication facilities continue to operate to this
day, assisting in the flow of covert arms and ammunition from
Cuba and Nicaragua to insurgents in El Salvador.
Meanwhile, the Sandinista military buildup continued, providing a
shield behind which to spread revolution throughout the region.
-- In early 1981, the first Soviet tanks and heavy artillery
began to arrive. Moscow did not send them directly,
however. Instead the arms were shipped via Algeria in an
attempt to hide Soviet involvement. Later Bulgaria would
assume the role of a Soviet arms intermediary.
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-- The anti-Sandinista insurgency did not become a problem to
Managua until March 1982. At that time, they proclaimed a
state of emergency, which has been extended ever since.
-- Thus the Sandinista military buildup was hardly the result
either of a US threat or an active insurgency.
And what is the situation now?
-- Nicaragua has received nearly half a billion dollars in arms
over the last five years.
-- It now has the largest active duty military force in Central
America--some 60,000 men.
-- With reserve and militia units, the total rises to about
120,000, and the Sandinistas now say they want to arm as many
as a million.
-- Furthermore, the buildup has become a definite offensive
threat to its neighbors.
-- The Sandinistas now have a force of over 100 Soviet T-55
medium tanks. No other Central American country has any.
-- And the Sandinistas have an artillery force of nearly 200
guns, including Soviet 122 mm rocket launchers, with massed
firepower unmatched in the region.
With the largest ground forces in the region, the SandinstasA~need
only a comparable Air Force to complete their buildup. Thus they have
long desired to obtain modern-jet fighters, and have made no secret-of
their determination to get them.
-- They have sent pilots to the Soviet Bloc for training, and
they are building the largest combat fighter base in the
region at Punta Huete outside Managua.
We are certain that only US demarches have so far prevented the
delivery of MIG-21 jet aircraft.
Even though the recent Soviet ship deliveries did not include
MIG-21s, they did deliver sophisticated MI-24 helicopter gunships. This
devasting weapon is used by the Soviets to hunt down Freedom Fighters in
Afghanistan, and it undoubtedly is intended for a similiar use in
Nicaragua.
-- I would like to point out that Congress has so far balked at
the mere suggestion that we provide even less-advanced v
helicopter gunships to El Salvador.
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While this Soviet arms delivery was underway, along with a similar
one by the usual Bulgarian route, the Sandinistas were claiming that they
were willing to sign a Contadora Peace Treaty.
-- But the draft they are willing to sign would almost
immediately end the US support to friends'in return only for
general assurances that the Sandinistas would later agree to
limit their military buildup.
-- Furthermore, the draft i,s weak on verification measures to
ensure that Nicaragua has stopped exporting revolution and
sent home all their Cuban miltary advisers.
-- The. Intelligence Community estimates there are some 3,000
Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua, but the Sandinistas
have admitted to only some 200.
Thus verification is a problem from the very start.
-- And let me assure you that we have completely reliable
information that the Cubans are there, even in combat zones
close to the Honduran border.
-- The Sandinistas have denied this, but we can no longer trust
their denials. Just as we know that they continue to support
insurgents, not only in El Salvador, but also in Honduras and
Guatemala, as well.
What of the internal situation in Nicaragua?
-- The Sandinistas have conducted an election in which the
largest democratic oppositon group refused to participate
because of Sandinista restrictions.
-- An election in which the major opposition candidate was
stoned by a Sandinista mob before the international news
media.
-- An election in which the two largest independent parties also
tried to pull out, but were prevented from doing so by mobs
and legal maneuvers.
-- An election which a key Sandinista leader labeled as a farce
in a secret speech to Nicaragua's Communist Party.
-- Copies of this speech, which were smuggled out of Nicaragua,
should be must reading for every American, for it shows
clearly what the Sandinistas intend to do.
-- Their goal is to build a Marxist-Leninist state in
Nicaragua--another Cuba in this hemisphere.
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The Catholic Church i NNicaragua, despite 'repression and
intimidation, despite mob violence and insults to the Pope himself,
despite censorship and forced exile of priests, has remained a steadfast
opponent. of the Sandinista regime.
The Catholic Church has opposed the military conscription law
in Nicaragua, which forces young men to serve in the
Sandinista Party's own Army. Not in a national Army, but in
a partisan military force with political commissars, just
like in the Soviet and Cuban armies.
-- The Catholic Church has also called for a national dialogue
and real democracy in Nicaragua. Not just a dialogue only
with the parties of the Sandinista's own choosing, but a
dialogue that includes the armed opposition as well..
-- But the Sandinstas'continue to label the anti-Sandinista
insurgents as US puppets, despite the fact that US aid has
been cut off for over six months.
-- Yet the anti-Sandinista insurgents continue to grow in
strength despite the.US aid cutoff, their ranks swelled by
disaffected peasants, repressed Indians, and even the urban
youth which has long been the target of Sandinista
recruitment efforts.
-- Thus the anti-Sandinista now have a force of nearly 15,000
men--the largest insurgency in Central America.
-- It is larger even than the one in El Salvador, which has been
building for more than a decade.
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