STATUS OF NICARAGUA(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 29, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROU11NG SUP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/Pers
14
D/OLL
15
D/PAO
16
SA/IA
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPD/OIS
19
N10/LA
X
20
21
C CATF
DO X
221
1
xeci rve ecre
29 Nov 84
Dcft
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
19 November 1984
FOR: Dr. James Timbie
Advisor for Strategic Affairs
Office of the Deputy Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT: Unclassified Paper on Nicaraguan
Military Buildup
Attached you will find an unclassified
paper on the Sandinista military buildup that
the DCI promised to Deputy Secretary Dam at last
Friday's luncheon.
Hope this helps.
Q
Cheers: 25X1
Special Assistant for
Interdepartmental Affairs
Attachment:
As Stated
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
19 November 1984
NICARAGUA MILITARY BUILDUP
Talking Points
The Sandinista military buildup has greatly accelerated over the past
year, causing increased concern not only in Washington, but also in the
Central American region itself.
-- Even without the delivery of MIG-21's, the recent direct
shipment of the sophisticated MI-24 helicopter gunship by a
Soviet ship was unprecedented and undoubtedly represents a
Soviet decision to play a more direct role in strengthening
the Sandinista regime.
-- This year Soviet Bloc deliveries to Nicaragua of military
goods is up some 25% compared to last year, and could reach
some 15,000 tons by year's end, because at least five more
Soviet ships are currently en route to Nicaragua.
-- Until the recent MI-24 delivery, the Soviets generally
preferred to leave the shipment of major weaponry, such as
tanks and artillery to surrogates, such as Cuba and
Bulgaria. Soviet cargoes generally included such
military-related items as MI-8 transport helicopters,
military trucks, field kitchens, and mobile workshops.
-- Thus the recent Soviet delivery, which also included
minesweepers and goods still not identified, signifies a new
departure by Moscow, and we are now forced to monitor all
potential Soviet arms carriers closely.
The Sandinistas like to Justify their continued military buildup as
purely defensive. They cite the threat of US intervention and the
US-supported counterinsurgency to Justify the acquisition of new Soviet
weaponry. They say their military buildup represents a threat to nobody.
The facts speak otherwise. Let's review them.
-- The Sandinista buildup began well before there was any
anti-Sandinista insurgency, and well before relations with
the US deteriorated to the point of military tension.
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
-- In fact, the military buildup began the moment they took
power. The first Cuban military advisers arrived in Managua
on July 19, 1979--the very day the Sandinistas celebrated
their revolutionary victory.
-- Although the US wanted good relations with the Sandinistas,
and even offered military aid in addition to extensive
economic support, we were largely ignored. Instead, the
Sandinistas preferred to align themselves with Cuba, and in
late 1979, a secret military pact was signed.
-- Cuban arms aid also began to arrive in late 1979, and in
early 1980, the first arms agreement was signed with the
Soviet Union.
-- Nicaraguan military personnel left for Cuba and the Soviet
Bloc to begin intensive training on tanks, artillery, and Jet
combat aircraft.
All this time, the Sandinistas were pretending that they wanted good
relations with the US and peace in the region.
-- Meanwhile, they were secretly supporting a massive arms flow
to El Salvador in support of insurgents there. These arms
fueled the so-called insurgent "final offensive" in early
1981.
-- Once this offensive failed, and a captured pilot admitted he
secretly had flown arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador, the
Sandinistas changed their tune. They admitted they had
provided arms, but denied they continued to do so.
-- Again the facts speak otherwise. While the Sandinistas were
protesting their innocence, in early 1981, they allowed the
Salvadoran insurgents to set up secret communications
facilities in Nicaragua as well as establish their overall
military headquarters there.
-- These communication facilities continue to operate to this
day, assisting in the flow of covert arms and ammunition from
Cuba and Nicaragua to insurgents in El Salvador.
Meanwhile, the Sandinista military buildup continued, providing a
shield behind which to spread revolution throughout the region.
-- In early 1981, the first Soviet tanks and heavy artillery
began to arrive. Moscow did not send them directly,
however. Instead the arms were shipped via Algeria in an
attempt to hide Soviet involvement. Later Bulgaria would
assume the role of a Soviet arms intermediary.
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
-- The anti-Sandinista insurgency did not become a problem to
Managua until March 1982. At that time, they proclaimed a
state of emergency, which has been extended ever since.
-- Thus the Sandinista military buildup was hardly the result
either of a US threat or an active insurgency.
And what is the situation now?
-- Nicaragua has received nearly half a billion dollars in arms
over the last five years.
-- It now has the largest active duty military force in Central
America--some 60,000 men.
-- With reserve and militia units, the total rises to about
120,000, and the Sandinistas now say they want to arm as many
as a million.
-- Furthermore, the buildup has become a definite offensive
threat to its neighbors.
-- The Sandinistas now have a force of over 100 Soviet T-55
medium tanks. No other Central American country has any.
-- And the Sandinistas have an artillery force of nearly 200
guns, including Soviet 122 mm rocket launchers, with massed
firepower unmatched in the region.
With the largest ground forces in the region, the SandinstasNneed
only a comparable Air Force to complete their buildup. Thus they have
long desired to obtain modern jet fighters, and have made no secret of
their determination to get them.
-- They have sent pilots to the Soviet Bloc for training, and
they are building the largest combat fighter base in the
region at Punta Huete outside Managua.
We are certain that only US demarches have so far prevented the
delivery of MIG-21 jet aircraft.
Even though the recent Soviet ship deliveries did not include
MIG-21s, they did deliver sophisticated MI-24 helicopter gunships. This
devasting weapon is used by the Soviets to hunt down Freedom Fighters in
Afghanistan, and it undoubtedly is intended for a similiar use in
Nicaragua.
-- I would like to point out that Congress has so far balked at
the mere suggestion that we provide even less-advanced
helicopter gunships to El Salvador.
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
While this Soviet arms delivery was underway, along with a similar
one by the usual Bulgarian route, the Sandinistas were claiming that they
were willing to sign a Contadora Peace Treaty.
-- But the draft they are willing to sign would almost
immediately end the US support to friends in return only for
general assurances that the Sandinistas would later agree to
limit their military buildup.
-- Furthermore, the draft is weak on verification measures to
ensure that Nicaragua has stopped exporting revolution and
sent home all their Cuban miltary advisers.
-- The. Intelligence Community estimates there are some 3,000
Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua, but the Sandinistas
have admitted to only some 200.
Thus verification is a problem from the very start.
-- And let me assure you that we have completely reliable
information that the Cubans are there, even in combat zones
close to the Honduran border.
-- The Sandinistas have denied this, but we can no longer trust
their denials. Just as we know that they continue to support
insurgents, not only in El Salvador, but also in Honduras and
Guatemala, as well.
What of the internal situation in Nicaragua?
-- The Sandinistas have conducted an election in which the
largest democratic oppositon group refused to participate
because of Sandinista restrictions.
-- An election in which the major opposition candidate was
stoned by a Sandinista mob before the international news
media.
-- An election in which the two largest independent parties also
tried to pull out, but were prevented from doing so by mobs
and legal maneuvers.
-- An election which a key Sandinista leader labeled as a farce
in a secret speech to Nicaragua's Communist Party.
-- Copies of this speech, which were smuggled out of Nicaragua,
should be must reading for every American, for it shows
clearly what the Sandinistas intend to do.
-- Their goal is to build a Marxist-Leninist state in
Nicaragua--another Cuba in this hemisphere.
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
The Catholic Church in Nicaragua, despite repression and
intimidation, despite mob violence and insults to the Pope himself,
despite censorship and forced exile of priests, has remained a steadfast
opponent. of the Sandinista regime.
-- The Catholic Church has opposed the military conscription law
in Nicaragua, which forces young men to serve in the
Sandinista Party's own Army. Not in a national Army, but in
a partisan military force with political commissars, just
like in the Soviet and Cuban armies.
-- The Catholic Church has also called for a national dialogue
and real democracy in Nicaragua. Not Just a dialogue only
with the parties of the Sandinista's own choosing, but a
dialogue that includes the armed opposition as well.
-- But the Sandinstas continue to label the anti-Sandinista
insurgents as US puppets, despite the fact that US aid has
been cut off for over six months.
-- Yet the anti-Sandinista insurgents continue to grow in
strength despite the. US aid cutoff, their ranks swelled by
disaffected peasants, repressed Indians, and even the urban
youth which has long been the target of Sandinista
recruitment efforts.
-- Thus the anti-Sandinista now have a force of nearly 15,000
men--the largest insurgency in Central America.
-- It is larger even than the one in El Salvador, which has been
building for more than a decade.
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
Iq
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
)_Executive Registry
84- 9998
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Nicaragua Military Buildup
That is a very good memo you did on the Nicaraguan military buildup.
I'd like to see a supplement on the capability and significance of heavy
guns other than the helicopter gun ships which the Sandinistas have received,
how they might be used, and what the contras can do to defend themselves in
terms of policy and tactic, as well as defensive weapons. How can that
artillery force mentioned on page 3 be applied and avoided? I'd also like
specifics on the helicopter gun ships which the Congress denied El Salvador.
If you can get this to me sometime before I go to see McFarlane this
afternoon it would be useful.
William J. Casey
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
999~_), 1
A/NIC/LA
29 November 1984
SUPPLEMENT TO NICARAGUA MILITARY BUILDUP, 19 November 1984
The Sandinista artillery inventory--not including antiaircraft
artillery--features such relatively heavy weapons as the BM-21 122-mm.
truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers, 152-mm. howitzers; and 85-mm.
field/antitank guns. Attached are data sheets on these weapons systems;
ranges are given in meters.
-- The howitzers and field/antitank guns would be useful to
Nicaragua for either intimidating its neighbors or defending
the country from an invasion by conventional armed forces.
They are not particularly useful against the Contras.
Lighter pieces of artillery and even tanks have proved more
useful to the Sandinistas in insurgent areas.
-- The multiple rocket launchers can serve either of those two
purposes, but also represent a threat to massed
concentrations of personnel. They would be very effective in
attacks on Contra base camps. Moreover, compared to other
conventional artillery, they have a significant psychological
impact on ground troops--as the Contras have told us.
-- The Contras could attack these rocket launchers with machine
guns and grenade launchers currently in their inventory.
The idea would be to disable the vehicle and the crew.
-- However, the Contras would need to increase the level and
distance of patrolling to locate the rocket launchers and
decrease the potential scope of their own operations, since
the rockets have a range of from .5 km to 20.5 km. That is,
they would have to fight in small groups, limit the period of
their occupation of objectives such as towns, and stay well
clear of roads or other flat terrain on which the rocket
launchers can travel.
With regard to gunships for El Salvador, our information is that two
types have been under discussion:
-- One is a Hughes 500 light observation helicopter refitted
with two 7.62 mm. electrically-powered miniguns.
3 1
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
-- The other is a version of the World War II vintage fixed--wing
C-47 transport to be fitted with three 50-caliber machine
guns. (These are similar to the "Puff, the Magic Dragons"
used in Vietnam, although in this instance not armed with the
more capable, rapid fire 7.62 gatling guns.)
-- Neither is in the same league with the MI-24 Hind, which is
an armored gunship making it impervious to most infantry
weapons. It is armed with rocket pods and a heavy (12.7 mm.)
gatling gun. It is also capable of carrying bombs and 4-6
antitank guided missiles.
Attachments:
As stated
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
SECRET
This Soviet multiple rocket launcher was first observed in the 7 November 1964 Moscow parade. At least two improved models have
been observed since May 1966, and various other models have been derived from the basic 122-mm system. The launcher tubes are ar-
ranged in four banks of 10 tubes each and are fired from off carriage.
A spiraled groove runs the full length of each 9.8-foot tube. The rocket has a lug attached which rides in the groove. This arrangement
causes a spin of the rocket at launch, stabilizes its flight, and improves its accuracy. This new spin-stabilized rocket fired from the longer-
than-average tubes provides the Soviet Army with a weapon which is more accurate than other comparable Soviet launchers.
The launcher is mounted on the Ural 375 6x6 truck, a 4.5 ton-class vehicle. This vehicle can easily carry the launcher, pull an ammo
trailer, and provide a stable firing platform. Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, North Korea, Egypt, Iran, India,
Libya, Peru, Angola, and Morocco have BM-21's. North Korea has a domestic version of the system consisting of 30 tubes mounted on a
ZIL-151 /157 truck. Egypt has received some of these. Romania has a 21-tube model mounted on an SR-113 Bucegi truck. China also has
truck-mounted versions, one on a 6x6 CA-30 chassis, another on a 6x6 CQ-260 "Red Crag" chassis.
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
Vehicle:
Weight (w/Ichr & rkts) .................
Maximum speed ..................... .
Cruising range ........................
Launcher:
Weight ............. ................
Elevation ............................
Firing quadrant limits ..................
Traverse .............................
Reload time ..........................
Rocket:
Caliber ..............................
Length ..............................
Weight ..............................
Range (maximum) ....................
(minimum) .....................
Warhead
Type ................................
Weight ..............................
Fuze ................................
CEP (maximum range) ...................
Air transportable ........................
13.3 mt
76 km/hr
481 km
2.72 mt
+0? to +75?
+ 0? to + 75? within traverse and cab limitations
Aprx 120? left and 60? right of center
10 min
122-mm
3.43 m
66 kg
20,500 m
500 m
HE Frag
19.25 kg
Point detonating with superquick, long and short delays
218 mat 2?3 range; 202 m at maximum range
Yes
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
SECRET
The D-20 was first observed in the 1955 Moscow Parade. It is deployed in 18 or 24 gun battalions at Army and front levels, primarily as
a general support type system. Recent organizational changes at Army level have increased the 6 gun batteries to 8 gun batteries - thus,
24 guns (three 8 gun batteries) per battalion.
The D-20 has essentially the same carriage, recoil system, shields, and cradles as the 122-mm gun D-74. The principal visual differences
are the larger, more prominent, double-baffle muzzle brake and the shorter but larger outer diameter tube of the D-20 as compared to that
of the D-74. Recent information is that the Soviet classify this weapon as a howitzer (rather than as a gun-howitzer as widely believed for
many years).
Poland, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, and Vietnam have D-20s. A Chinese produced D-20 is
designated Type 66. North Korea, also, probably produces the D-20
Maximum range ....................................
Weight (travel position) ..............................
Length/width/height (travel position) ..................
Traverse/ elevation limits .............................
Crew with driver ....................................
Emplacement /displacement time ......................
Ammunition;
Types available ................................. .
Projectile weight (Frag/ HE/CP/ HEAT) ...............
Rate offire (1/15/30 min) ............................
Precision - Per/Ped @ 12,100 m' ......................
Direct fire engagement range .........................
Armor penetration'
(HEAT) @ any range ..............................
Principal prime mover (track/wheel) ...................
17,230 m
5.9 mt
8.14/2.03/2.47 m
60?/-2? to +45?
10
8to10min
Frag-HE, HE, CP, HEAT, Flechette Shrapnel,
Stink, III, Chem, WP
43.6/40.0/27.4 kg
4/40/65rds
46/8.5 m lest)
900 to 1,000 m
450-mm lest)
AT-S/ZIL 135, TATRA-813
70% maximum range - Frag-HE projectile.
2 0? obliquity.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86M00886R001400130014-1
 Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86MOO886ROO1400130014-1
SECRET
This gun is a lightweight, low-silhouette, dual-purpose weapon designed for field and antitank use. It is an adaptation of the 85-mm gun
used on the T-34/85 tank and has typical tank-type recoil and recuperator cylinders mounted between the shield, thus giving the gun
tube a clean appearance forward of the scalloped shield. Other recognition features are the double- baffle muzzle brake, tubular trails,
and the small caster wheel located above the spades in the traveling position.
The Auxiliary-Propelled Antitank Gun SD-44 is a motorized version of the D-44 and features a motorcycle engine mounted on the left
trail. Capable of transporting its crew of six under its own power, this gun can operate for relatively short distances on surfaced roads or
over moderately rough terrain. For longer distances, it can be towed by a prime mover. The auxiliary power arrangement facilitates the
rapid emplacement and displacement of the weapon the battlefield.
The D-44's role in the Soviet Army has been taken over to a large extent by other weapons; however, significant numbers are still
found in some Soviet as well as Bulgarian, GDR, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian units. In addition, the weapon has been supplied to
Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Albania, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Mali, Yemen (Sane), Yemen (Aden), Sudan, Iraq, Guinea, Somalia,
Pakistan, China, and Tanzania.
Maximum range (HE) ..............................................................
Weight (travel position) ............................................................
Length/width/height (travel position) ................................................
Traverse/elevation limits ...........................................................
Crew with driver ..................................................................
Emplacement-displacement time ....................................................
Projectile weight (Frag-HE/APC-T/HVAP-T/HEAT-T-FS/SMK) ..........................
Rate offire (1/15/30 min) ..........................................................
Precision Per/ Pod @ 11,0002 .......................................................
Direct-fire engagement range .......................................................
Armor penetration3
APC-T @ 1,500 m ...............................................................
HVAP-T @ 1,500 m .............................................................
HEAT @ any range ..............................................................
Principal prime mover (track/wheel) .................................................
C&P data for SD-44.
' 70% maximum range Frag-HE projectile.
0? obliquity.
SECRET
15,650 m
2.3 mt
8.3/1.7/1.4 m
54? /-7? to + 36?
5
1min
9.5/9.2/3.4/7.3/10.1 kg
10/60/90 rds
40/4.5 rn
1,200-1,500 m
122 mm
178-mm
300-mm
AT-P/light truck-GAZ-69
Approved For Release 2008/12/05: CIA-RDP86MOO886ROO1400130014-1