PROPOSALS FOR CIA COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001100010044-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: January 17, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: (Option. j
EXTENSION
Proposals for CIA Counterterrorism Initiatives
C/IAD/
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SEC. CL. ORIGIN
IATE OF DOC DATE RECD
L7/1/84
ro D is C/IAD
'ROM gIAD
ROUTING AND RECOFIHEET
SUBJ. Proposal for CIA
i t[nitiatives
Orig & 4
CountertcrrorlSill
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24 JAf'l TS"
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
January 17, 1984
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
John,
Per discussion', the
attached proposals should
be implemented if we are
serious about doing every-
thing possible to counter
terrorism. However, both
people and space (particularl
the latter) will be needed.
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Arm,
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S E C R E T .-
.SJ~~OI~,,j. ~
1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
VIA: Chief, International Activities Division
FROM:
International Activities Division
SUBJECT: Proposals for CIA Counterterrorism Initiatives
Background: The U.S. government's response to terrorism,
random and/or state-supported, is one of the most hotly debated
topics in town, and this is not likely to change in the near
future. Nor can we hope that the incidence of terrorism will
decline in 1984. Sand trucks at the White House, Presidential
commissions and House committees finding fault, Community
committees, DoD elements and NSC staff spawning ideas ranging from
more studies through 'worldwide fusion centers' to anti-terrorist
hit teams - all these signs indicate that the USG is scared,
frustrated, and looking either for a solution to the problem or
someone to blame. The Agency is and will continue to be under
extreme pressure to come up with some answers, and some action.
I believe that we must find a way selectively to focus all of
CIA's resources and skills on: (a) analyzing and taking action on
threats and threat indicators, (b) managing, containing, and
resolving if possible terrorist incidents as they occur and (c)
responding to and professionally following to resolution incidents
after they have occurred. We have some of this capability in
place, some of it is being constructed right now, and some is
still in the concept stage. It cannot be done on the cheap. We
will need more people, additional funding, and allocation of
scarce work space. I believe that the following proposals will
increase our ability to protect U.S. personnel and interests
around the world, show the Community and the Government that we
are taking the most effective possible protective action, and
incidentally help to deflect and re-channel some of the energy
that has recently given rise to suggestions that are either
inefficient, illegal, or potentially damaging to our continuing
primary intelligence missions.
ACTION IN PROGRESS: At your direction we have created a
The C/NE has agreeed t?at~it will have detailed to it
an
experienced NE officer who will specifically monitor threats to
terrorism specialist,
- ;~!r HT!CE
~1U_i7CES
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and work next to the operations officers and area referents in
When the new section, under guidelines presently
being constructed for your approval, senses that a terrorist
threat to U.S. interests anywhere in the world is at a level where
action should be taken, warning notices and specific action
recommendations will be sent to field stations, and high-level
interagency suooort will be coordinated in Washinaton_
PROPOSAL: This new unit needs an action arm,
that can be o erred for immediate dispatch to
The personnel are available
and in most cases would be the same who would re-
spond-
What is needed is concept approval
and authority to task other Agency compon-
ents for nominees or a trained and exercised 'ready
reserve'. Contingency funding should be identified,
so that travel can commence with no delay.
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II. 'ACTION IN PROGRESS: 25X1
has been successfully deployed and is, at least 25X1
on paper, ready to go again. s primary utility is as an
augmentation of the affected Station's intelligence collection
capabilities during a terrorist incident, typically a
hostage barricade situation. It may be that, like Delta 25X1
is waiting for the sort of crisis that is not likely to occur
again. But it still has utility, and is a concept flexible enough
to adapt to new uses as proposed abo low. It needs to be
exercised periodically, so that the personnel aet 25X1
experience with each other and with e new equipment
PROPOSAL: I should be exercised at least
twice yearly. This will be a drain on personnel
and financial resources. Present resources may
require supplementing; top management approval in
principle for the time and expense is necessary
and must be forcefully communicated to subordinate
Agency elements.
III. NEW CONCEPT: As the wave of the future seems to be
ssassinations, there is a need for a
which can be dispatched immediately
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e approve in concep
and funding be identified. would suggest that
such a team be assembled on an ad hoc basis for
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IThe essential thing in such a concept
is that it be very flexible, able to provide meaining-
ful response to incidents of all types, with a mech-
anism in being that can assemble the proper team rep-
idly from a pool of capable officers. Along those
lines, we believe that such a team badly
needs access to skills not readily available in
CIA, that of experienced, trained criminal investi-
gators. A terrorist act is by definition a
criminal one - not necessarily susceptible to
resolution by FI-trained officers and techs. We
should actively recruit and integrate into our
counterterrorist operations some experienced,
capable, street-smart criminal investigators. (A
possible source for these and other needed personnel
is addressed in proposal below.)
IV. PERSONNEL: We recognize the difficulty of finding
personnel with the requisite skills and experience, and of moving
slots around in a constrained environment. But counterterrorism
is a top priority subject and we simply must apply the necessary
resources to it or risk both criticism and (perhaps worse) the
proliferation of other government counterterrorism elements whose
activities could end up being counterproductive, inefficient
and/or dangerous.
PROPO e authorized enough extra
slots 7~ ~_ to handle the present level
of responsibilities and the projected increases.
As to the need for specialized skills not
necessarily available in CIA's manpower pool,
we suggest a tack that may be both effective and
politic - that is, detailees from the military,
FBI and State, with demonstrable expertise in
criminal and forensic investigation. These officers
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(3)
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polygraphed and cleared for SCI and Agency information on
a need-to-know basis. If we got the right people, this
would do two things; give us the required skills and
demonstrate to the Community that CIA was leading an
integrated response to a serious problem that affects us
all. Because
counte Le-quires in a tirst instance an
intelligence response, intimately involved with sources
and methods and sensitive liaison relationships. And
when we have enough intelligence to thwart a
terrorist-operation, or to wrap up anetwork, it is CIA's
relationships with foreign liaison and police services
that will be needed.
would be
If these slots are approved, and it is agreed that other
Community elements can and should contribute manpower, it
is very important that the request, or tasking, come from
a level high enough to guarantee respectful attention and
the assignment of extremely competent officers. We would
suggest a DCI initiative at the NFIB level.
account the need for work spaces. Expansion
Also, any mention of additional personnel must
responsibilities should be considered in the context of
the DDO/DDI co-location problem, with high managerial
priority.
V EXPANSION OF LIAISON COOPERATION: As mentioned above,
liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and internal
security services are our best hope for prior warning of and
effective action against international terrorists. These
relationships are extremely important, and it is necessary that we
devote considerable effort to nurturing them. We need to convince
the senior officers of the services with which we deal that the
USG is deadly serious about the terrorist threat and committed at
the highest level to dealing with it, with their help. Continuity
of experience in dealing with liaison, linguistic ability,
mobility, and substantive background in counterterrorist
operations are qualities that we should develop in the Directorate.
PROPOSAL: That we give high priority to CT
liaison, to include reciprocal visits by senior
officials; that we attempt to get foreign CT heavies
in to see the DCI or DDCI when they visit Headquarters.
We should conti expand on the 'circuit riding'
visits to overseas stations.
Consideration should be given to the establishment of one
or more PCS positions in Europe and the Near East for
counterterrorism specialists, who would work with liaison
at their post and in nearby countries on a regular
basis. (This concept, and the ability to rotate officers
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between Headquarters and the field, would make
positions more attractive to the strong case officers we
need.)
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