INPUTS FOR THE DCI RE EXCELLENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00885R000901100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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~~)(
19 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA
Deputy Director, Management, Planning and Services, DI
Chief, Career Management Staff, DO
Executive Officer to the DDS&T
Administrative Officer, DCI
FROM: Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Inputs for the DCI re Excellence
1. Recall that the DCI, in his 13 June 1985 address on Excellence in
the Auditorium, said "Every three months, or as frequently as it emerges
as appropriate, we will make available to you a more comprehensive
listing of initiatives taken and outstanding performances turned in than
I have been able to give you today.;-I~ hope and expect this will
stimulate new ideas and practical initiatives, as well as inspire by
example."
2. During our 14 June post-mortem we discussed and came to agreement
on two separate, but related, issues deriving from our collective
experience leading up to the DCI's 13 June speech:
-- What it was the Director had in mind for his periodic calls
for "examples of excellence."
-- Establishing a common data base for maintaining information
relating to employee recognition (through cash awards,
certificates, etc.)
3. At this meeting, we set 1 October as the date the uniform data
base should be able to provide information (if called upon) in a common
format for all Directorates (this is taking place under DDA lead). It
was also anticipated that we would solicit Directorate "examples" at the
same time.
4. The Director, however, does not want to wait until then; he has
asked me to obtain your inputs next month. So, what is wanted? I will
leave each Directorate to determine the maximum number of examples sent
forward, but would hope to obtain at least five from each of you.
a. As to the format, one should provide information in a
descriptive paragraph noting the name(s) of the individual(s)
concerned, what was involved and why the example is worthy of
recognition. Included as a separate paragraph should be a
statement noting what, if any, recognition was made of this
event (realizing that in many cases, such examples do not
merit specific cash awards, etc.).
A~~l~i~#~~~~~~~ ?I~~~r~~! ~s~ ~~(~
O-- %o ~
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A~~ieis~~a~i~{e - iere, eel Use 0~l~
b. The examples that will be determined by each of your
organizations should be along the lines of, and written up
like, those used by the DCI in his speech. In many cases,
such examples will simply be instances of "someone just doing
their job."
5. Please have your inputs to me by Wednesday, 14 August.
(Remember, as we discussed, we are not now seeking any data re who got
awards, statistical info from the computer, etc.)
STAT
Ad~ieis~~~~i~le - le~e~~~l Use O~i~.
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SECRET
25 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Director of Logistics
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Excellence in the Office of Logistics
Congratulations on the splendid work in the Office of Logistics
in supporting
William J. Casey
SECRET ~~/~~
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Director of Security
The Excellence Program
1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 19 July 1985,
requesting "examples of excellence" which might appro ria ely be
forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. Attached herewith is a package 'of material which 1
believe reflects a cross-section of "excellence" on display
within the Office of Security over the last few months. I have
taken the liberty of providing examples showing the initiatives
of individual officers as .well as those by specific components
where there has~been a strong collectiveLeffort by a number of
3. I considered it appropriate in several instances to cite
he s cific cases which wer n cluded
If these
examp es are orwar a or a use o he I n a public
presentation, you may possibly wish to sanitize the write-up by
deleting the names.
~. If any additional information is required in connection
with this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
25X1
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Paul H. Nl:tze
8 O-JUL 1985
SDI: The Soviet Program
STAT.
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Fulluuring ie an address by Ambassador
Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser lu the
President and the Secretary ujSlate an
Arms Control Maltera, bejure the Chau-
tauqua Cui{/ertnce an Soviet-A>cerican
!i'elatiuna, Chautauqua, New Yuck,
Jute 88, 1985.
Soviet commentary on the U.S..Strate-.
gic Defense Initiative (SDI) research
program has been strongly negative.
9'I-e.Soviets have accused ue of expand-
ing t)-e arms race into a new area by'ini-
liating "tl-e militarization of apace." In
(leneva, they have demanded a ban on
research, development, testing, and de-
1-loyment of what they call "space-strike
arms" and .i-ave conditioned progress in
ti-e negotiations on offensive nuclear
force reductions on prior U.S. accept-
ance of this ban.
One might conclude from this Soviet
commentary that tl-e Soviet Union has
no program comparable to our SDI.
Such a conclusion would be far from
correct.
Soviet Strategic De[enae Efforts
Soviet military doctrine stresses that_of,
fensive and defensive forces must inter-
act closely ~to achieve Soviet aims in any
conflict. Accordingly, the Soviets are
heavily involved in strategic defense, .
with programs that go far beyond re-
search. In fact, over the last two dec- .
ades, tl-e Soviet Union has spent
rougi-ly as much on strategic de[ense as
it has on its massive- offensive nuclear
fc-rces. As part of this huge effort, the
Soviets havo deployed around Moscow ~-
the world's only operational antiballistic
missile (ABM) system, a system they are
currently upgrading with a projected
completion dal.c of about 1987. They also
have an indepth national air defense
force, a vast political leadersl-ip survival
program, and nutionwicle civil defense
forces and programs.
~Furtl-cr, tl-ey have been conducting
e numt-er of activities that are inconsist-
ent with and tend to undermine-the
ABM.1'reaty. For example, t)-eir deploy-
ment of a large phased-array ballistic
missile tracking radar near Krasnoyarsk
in Siberia constitutes a violntiun of the
treaty. We are concerned tl-ut, in the
e6-gregate, Soviet ABM-related activities
could provide them the basis for deploy-
ment of an ABM defense of tl-eir na-
tional territory, which would also violnte
the treaty.
Soviet strntegic defense programs
are not restricted to the more traditional
approaches. The Soviets 1-ave also been,
pursuing, since the 1960x, research into
advanced technologies for strategic de-
fense. These tecl-nologiea include high-
. energy lasers, particle-beam weapons,
radio frequency weapons, and kinetic
energy weapons. These are tl-e same
types of tochnologies being researched
in the U.S. SDI program. Moreover,
during this same period, the Soviets
have~.had an active and expanding mili-
tary apace program.
Ti-e Soviet version of SDI has been
overlooked in.tl-e recent public debate: ,
Indeed, taking advantage of the closed ?
nature of Soviet society, Soviet strategic
defense efforts have proceeded corr--
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jrlclcly Irec from debates of Lhc sort structton of ground-blgc 1 lax r ASAT -
o
p ype space- lase they may (-e able to test a prototype
material l will cover is quite technical, I laser ASAT wealrons by file early 1990x, space?baecd particle-beam weapon in-
hope it will give you a better aplrrecia- and, if their technology developments tended to disrupt satellite electronic
lion of the extensive efforts file Soviets prove successful, they could deploy equipment in t-te.mid- to late 1990x. One
have been conducting for years. operational space-based lasers for ASAT designed to destroy satellites could be
purposes in lire mid 1990
first ar?e occurring now in lire West over facilities at o rational sites. 1'Itese 1 article-Beam Weapons. Since tits
~ early 1970x, the Soviets have had a re-
tlte utility and implications o[ our i facilities could be available by tits end of search program designed to explore the
program. ~ the 1980s and would greatly increase technical feasibility of a particle-beam
Let me address the Soviet version of Soviet ASAT capabilities. Moreover; weapon In space. For lire ASAT mission,
SUI in some detail. While some of the they could test rot
t 1 d
Soviet Progreso in
Advanced Ue[ense Technologies
s? tested by the year 2000. Early in the
For the ballistic missile defense-or next centr~ry, fire Soviets could have a
BMD-mission, lire Soviets could have prototype space-based BMD system
prototypes for roar d b d l b
r
g
-axe asera y ready for testing.
high-Energy Laecr Research. 1'Ire fire late 1980x. Testing of tiro co-n?
Soviet Union's high-energy laser pro- ponents [or a large-scale operational Radio Frequency Weapons. Tire
gram began in file mid=19C,Os artd lies system could begin in ttre early 1990x. Soviets have conducted research for
been much larger than the U.S. effort. With high priority and some significant decades on sources of high-power radio
The Soviets (rave built over shat[-dozen ~ technological risk, the Soviets could skip frequency=or ftF-signals and the
major research and development some testing steps and be ready to de- antennas that would be required to
facilities and test ranges, irrcludirig some pploy a ground-based laser BMU system direct and focus the signals on distant
at file Snry Sltagart missile test center by lire early to mill-1990x. Tire many dif- targets. 1'Irese signals have ttre potential
where they also do traditional anti- ficulties associated with [fielding an to interfere with or destroy components
. ballistic missile work. Tltey have over operational system would normally re- of missiles, satellites, and reentry
.10,000 scientists and engirrcers quire much develcrlrnterrt time, however, vehicles. In tiro 1990x, lire Soviets could
associated with lire develulrment of arrd initial operational delrloyment is not test aground-based RF.weapon capattYe
lasers for weapons. likely in this century. The Soviets can be of damal,*ir-g satellites. Aspace-based
The Soviets crave conducted research expected to pursue development of a RF antisntellite weapon will probably ?
on the three types of gas lasers tltnt tiro sppace-based laser I1M1) system for. possi- -not be tested until after the year 2000.
United States considers promising [or ble deployment after lire year 2000. Kinetic Energy Weapons. In the
weapons applications: the gas-dynamic The Soviets have also begun to de- area of kinetic ener wee the
la.~er, the clcct.ric dicc:harfic laser, and vcl~p several hifih-cnar~? L~..~r w~al~ns Crn?iMs hair a v;rriegtyi? of In~RslandinR
the chemical laser. They ha~?e also been for air defense. These include lasers in- research programs underway. These
working on other types of lasers drat tended .for air defense of high-value stra- weapons use the high-speed collision of a
Life United States had not seriously con- . tegic targets in. t-re Soviet Union, for small mass with the target as file kill
sidered for weapons applications until point defense of strips at sea; .and for air mechanism. As early as 1966, the
very recently. These include excirner and defense of theater forces. Following past Soviets Itad an experimental gun that
[ree?electron lasers. practice, Urey are likely to deploy air could s)toot streams o[ particles of a
The Soviets are also irursuirtg defense larters to complement, rattier heavy metal, such as tungsten, at
related laser weapon teclrrtologicn, such than replace, iirtcrcelrtors and surface- velocities of over 60 kilometers per sec-
ns efficient electrical power sourcen and to-air missiles, or SAMs. 1'he strategic and in ~a vacuum. Current Soviet efforts
high-quality optical components U S ex? d f
air a ease laser is probably at least rn include research and development of
ports believe tl-e Soviets are generally lire prototype stage of development and electromrr rtetic rail
capable of supplying the necessary prin-e could be operational by the Into 1980x. It projectiles to ultrahigh v loc t eseastwell
power, .energy storage, and auxiliary most likely will be dcltloyed in conjunc- as outer advanced systems. These p~~-
contponerrts for most laser nerd oilier Lion with SAMs in a point defense role. grams could result in Cite near term in a
directed energy weapons. As evidence of 1'he ship-xrrne laser will probably not be short-range space-based system useful
this capability, the Soviets Itnve de- operational until lire early 1990x. The [or satellite or space station defense or
veloped a very powerful rocket-driven ~ .theater air defense laser may be opera- [or close-in attack by a maneuvering
generator, which has n_ o courrtegrnrt in tional sometime sooner and is likely to satellite. Longer range space-based
the West. 4'he Soviets may Irnve also . be capable of structurally rlamaging air- systems could be developed as early as
achieved the capability to develcrlr fire craft at clrise ranges and producing tiro mid-1990x.
necessa
ry optical systems [or laser
electro-olttlcal and eye damage at
weapons.
t
di
grea
er
stances.
Tire Soviet irrogram ltas now pro- . Finally, file Soviets are developing The Soviet 1liilitary Space Program
grossed beyond tectinolo6-y research, in an airborne laser. Suclt a 1.1ser could In addition to their huge and compre-
some cases to Lire develolrrrtent of I-roto- have several missions, including ASAT lrenstve program of fiesearctt into ad-
type laser weapons. For lire nrtliasrlel- operations, protection of triglt?value air- . ' vanced strategic defense technologies,
life-or ASAT-mission, lire Soviets craft, and protection against cruise ttte Soviets have the world's most active
Sary S-raQan ~ t site titatc~lrl hptrt`p~ . missiles'Assunrirtg nsuccessful develop- . military space program. Tltis program
---?-_??~~. ?,....< Y,.~gcarns nave rCaCneU -
tt:P r~irt wl?v_ro t};Py cnulrl bP~n ern-
Soviets conducted about 100 space
launches. Of these, same t?01?n were
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l~rrrcly military in nature, with much of Should the Soviets decide to deploy program. A number o[ the signatories o[
tlrc remainder serving boUr military and in space extremely large payloads
in
thi
tt
l
h
i
t
b
,
-
s
e
er
ave,
n
act,
een irrstru-
civil functions. By way of compnrieon, eluding components of a space-based mental in Soviet programs researching
fire total number of U.S, space launches ballistic n-iasile defense, they would re- both conventional and advanced ballistic
in 1984 was about 20. quire space booslera capnlrle of placing missile defense technologies. Among
The Soviets believe in fire combined In orbit thousands of tons per year. The these aro Mr. Y. P.. Velikhov, ttre I)epu?
arms concept of warfare in wlriclr all two new Irooalera they are developing-a ty Director of the Kurclratov Atomic .
t
es of forces
i
t
t
d
yp
are
n
egra
e
info medium-lift vehicle comparable to our
military operations to achieve tiro Titan and aheavy-lift vehicle com-
desired goals. Space syalems inlay s ma- irarable to our Saturn V-will meet this
jor role in this equation. Soviet sirrrce requirement. 1'hcsc boosters should be
systems dedicated to military missions available ns early as lire late 1980x.
include satellites that perGrrrn ream- . Finally, the Soviets have ambitious
naissance, missile launch defection and plans for their mnrrned space programs:
attack warning, command and control, Tlrey plan to replace their current
and ASAT functions. Dual-purpose salel- Salyut apace l;tatiorrs with large space
I't ti t f
are used for communrcalrons, nnvii;n-
tional support, and weather prediction
and monitoring.
In the reconnaissance area, flits
United Stales Iran no rnunterpsrrt t.o the
Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites,
the EORSAT [electronic intelligence
ocean reconnaissance satellite) and the
nuclear-powered RORSAT (radar ocean
reconnaissance satellite]. 1'Irese Soviet
satellites have the mission of locating
and identifying U.S. and allied naval
forces in open ocean areas and targeting
them for destruction by Soviet arrllslrip
weapons. Four such satellites were
launched in 1984.
In the ASAT area; the Soviets have
had the capability since 1971 to attack
satellites in near-earth orbit with a
ground-based orbital .interceptor. Again,
the United States has no comparnlrle
operational capahility. Using a radar
sensor and a pellet-type warlrcad, fire in-
terceptor can attack a target in orbit at .
various altitudes during tlrc interceptor's
first two revolutions. An irrlerccirt dur-
ing the first orbit would minimize the '
time available for a target satellite to
lake evasive action.
The interceptor can reach targets
orbiting at altitudes of more than 6,000
kilometers, but it is probably irrteniied
for high-priority satellites at lower alti-
tudes. It is launched from the Tyuratam
more cosmonauts on a permanent basis.
Such a complex would enhance their
space-based military support and war-
figlrting crri-abilitics. Missions could in-
clude military research and develop-
meat, reconnaissance, imagery interpre-
t