SIG TALKING POINTS CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000801600002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 3, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

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SECRET 25X1
3 January 1984
Political and military trends in Central America continue to
be mixed, with the situations in El Salvador and Nicaragua
particularly fluid. In El Salvador, the government and the
military are taking steps to quell rightist death squad activity.
-- The Assembly has also promulgated the new Constitution,
resurrected the long-dormant Phase II of agrarian reform,
and extended Phase III for an additional six months.
-- The presidential election. has been set for late March, and
political maneuvering among the major parties is now in
full swing.,
-- Extremist Assembly leader D'Aubuisson has resigned his
position to run for President; the new Assembly leader is
from a more moderate political party.
In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas continue to relax repression
and to make gestures toward the internal oposition.
-- Opposition elements have taken advantage of reduced press
censorship to criticize the regime.
SECRET 25X1
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SECRETI
-- The government has announced limited amnesties for Miskito
Indians and insurgents who defect from other groups.
Throughout the rest of the region, Honduras, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Costa Rica are preparing for the next?Contadora
negotiating session which begins in Panama on 7 January.
-- They are concerned that recent peace initiatives by the
Contadora group will force them into a defensive posture
at the negotiations.
The major immediate challenges in the region meanwhile
continue to be military.
In El Salvador, the military stalemate continues, but the
Army has been more aggressive since Defense Minister Vides
revamped the command structure in late November.
-- The General Staff has been strengthened by the appointment
of better personnel, and more competent commanders have
been assigned to major field commands.
-- The Army has launched a major offensive in the east to
regain territory long-held by the guerrillas and to reduce
the insurgent threat prior to the elections scheduled for
late March.
Nevertheless, the guerrillas remain a serious threat, as
underscored by their year-end attacks against a brigade
headquarters and a key highway bridge. They also have
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SECRET
demonstrated they can defeat the new small hunter battalions in
the Salvadoran Army
-- As a result of the continued arms flow from Nicaragua over
the past year and increased insurgent success at capturing
weapons, the guerrillas-now have been able to arm some
9,000 to 11,000 combatants.
-- The government, with some 37,500 men, thus has less than a
4 to 1 force advantage, not enough to defeat the
insurgents in the near term.
At best, the Army must strive to take the action to the
guerrillas prior to the elections rather than remain in static
defensive positions.
-- The insurgents fear the elections, and they are likely to
step up urban attacks and sabotage both to demonstrate
their strength and to discredit the balloting.
-- US facilities, particularly in San Salvador, may also be
inviting terrorist targets.
Cuba is likely to provide adequate supplies for an election
offensive, but Nicaragua has been signaling some reduction in its
support to the Salvadoran insurgents.
25X1
25X1
the guerrillas are concerned 25X1
about such a reduction and are making efforts to conserve
3 25X1
eL+rnti+m
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.% SECRET I 25X1
Nicaragua's possibly changing role apparently is a tactical
step by the Sandinistas to remove a pretext for US-supported
intervention and to ease external presures.
-- The fragile Nicaraguan economy has been hurt by the
anti-Sandinista insurgents, and the military costs of the
fighting continue to increase.
-- The Sandinistas claim they suffered over 600 civilian and
military deaths and sustained $100 million in economic
damage in 1983 alone.
-- The Sandinistas probably doubt they can defeat the
insurgents as long as insurgent forces
have a secure base in Honduras.
Thus, Managua probably will use the Contadora talks in an
effort to end the insurgency by diplomatic means.
-- The Sandinistas have prepared draft treaties that would
result in an immediate end to support for the insurgents.
-- They may point to their own expulsion of the Salvadoran
insurgents as a sign of their good faith.
Meanwhile, anti-Sandinista forces continue to be active on
three fronts.
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cvrnvm
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-- Fighting is particularly heavy in the north, where the
insurgents are attempting to seize and hold territory.
-- They may achieve some temporary success but probably
cannot hold major towns against Sandinista counterattacks.
In Guatemala, the military retains the tactical advantage
and has returned to a high level of aggressive patrolling after a
lull in operations following the coup last summer.
-- The Mejia goverment plans to expand troop strength by some
3,000 men, which will help the Army offset mobility
problems caused by a shortage of helicopters.
-- The Army has purchased equipment which will increase its
firepower and improve communications as well as
strengthening the civilian defen::e forces which now
reportedly have 500,000 members.
Meanwhile, the insurgents are stepping up urban terrorism to
demonstrate their continuing viability, and they have planned a
rural offensive for January.
-- They have already attacked the Honduran and Salvadoran
embassies, and have
targetted the US Embassy.
-- They may score some isolated successes with ambush
operations in the countryside, but they are unlikely to
make major advances against the military.
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SECRET 25X1
As in El Salvador, the insurgents' ultimate objective
probably is to disrupt and discredit the scheduled July 1984
Constituent Assembly elections.
-- The Cubans are still supplying weapons and training to the
Guatemalan guerrillas and are urging the orthodox
Communist Party, which has remained outside the insurgent
alliance, to join the struggle.
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