YOUR MEETING WITH PFIAB, 14 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000701480001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: PCZ
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PFIAB Meeting
14 March 1984
Please return to:
SA/DCI/IA
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Your Meeting with PFIAB
14 March 1984
Contents
Tab A DCI Briefing
Tab B Tentative Agenda for the Two-day Session
Tab C Topics to be Covered by Secretary Shultz
Tab D Your Talking Points on the Red Team
-- Critique of State Department Position
-- State Department Position
Tab E Actions Undertaken with Respect to CC&D
-- Your Recent Correspondence
Tab F Talking Points on Hostile Foreign Presence Issue
Tab G FBI Director's Presentation to Senate Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism (14 March)
Tab H Writings of Bob Kupperman (He
w i l l address PFIAB on subject of terrorism.)
Tab I Critical Correspondence re:
Tab J Intelligence Performance on Soviet Leadership Transition
(my memo to you)
-- The Jack Anderson Column
-- Background
Tab K SOVA Talking Point
Tab L Actions in Support of PFIAB 7 January - 9 March
Tab M Your Talking Points for the Last PFIAB Session
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with PFIAB, 14 March 1984
1. You are scheduled to meet with the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board on 14 March from 9:15 to 11:00 a.m. We have
not received a detailed agenda but have been informed privately that the
PFIAB would like you to address at least the following two subjects:
Soviet leadership transition and, in particular, charges made in a Jack
Anderson column on that subject; and the situation in Lebanon.
2. This book includes the following materials for your use:
-- DCI Briefin . The presentation contained at Tab A was
prepared lay the NIC. He treats not only the
two issues that PFIAB suggested you might address but also
other issues of topical interest. These include the
Iran-Iraq war; increased Soviet military presence in Vietnam;
the Salvadoran elections; the situation in Mexico; Soviet
responses to NATO's INF deployments; and the prospects for
decreasing the level of violence in southern Africa.
-- At Tab B is a copy of the tentative agenda for the two day
session. You will note that Secretary Shultz is expected to
attend and he apparently has been asked to address a number
of subjects. At Tab C you will find a list of the subjects
that he is expected to address. These include a number of
subjects dear to our heart, including hostile foreign
intelligence presence, equivalency and reciprocity in
diplomatic representation with the Soviet bloc; political
analysis of the USSR; counterterrorism; and Mexico.
-- At Tab D are talking points prepared) on the
Red Team as mandated by NSDD 65 and 121. Also included at
this tab are the views of the Department of State on this
subject, as well as our critique of their position.
-- At Tab E is a list of the actions we have taken in recent
times with respect to CC&D.
-- At Tab F are talking points on the hostile foreign presence
issue.
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-- At Tab G is a draft copy of FBI Director Webster's
presentation before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism scheduled for 14 March. It should give you a
pretty good idea of what he will say when he appears before
PFIAB.
-- At Tab H is a copy of lagenda for combatting
terrorism. I am told that Bob Kupperman of Georgetown will
discuss counterterrorism during his session. Also at Tab H
is a little bit of background on Kupperman including some of
his past writings.
-- At Tab I is a copy of the key items of correspondence from
PFIAB, Bud McFarlane and yourself (DCI) concerning
-- You will also find at Tab J a copy of the key portions of the
package that I prepared for you last month on the
Intelligence Community's performance in handling the Soviet
leadership transition. This includes the Jack Anderson
column mentioned in paragraph one above.
3. Other items of interest: at Tab K are talkin
oints prepared by
who is Chuck Briggs' Executive
ssistant, indicates that his counterpart at PFIAB suggested that we
might want to have PFIAB raise this subject on our behalf, with the
Secretary. It would seem to me that it might be wiser to hold.this for
one of your luncheon meetings rather to in effect do an end run around
the Secretary of State. Nonetheless, I have included it in case someone
asks you your opinion on this matter.
4. Finally, at Tab L is a tabulation of all the actions we have
taken to support PFIAB during the 7 January to 9 March timeframe; while
at Tab M is a copy of your talking points for the last PFIAB session.
5. You should be aware that Fritz Ermarth is scheduled to meet with
some of the PFIAB members on Tuesday afternoon; they will discuss the
Soviet leadership transition. I have asked Fritz to prepare a memorandum
on his session so that you will have it before your meeting on Wednesday.
6. If I can do more to help in preparing for this meeting, please
call.
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PFIAB 14 March 1984
1. CHERNENKO'S ACCESSION
Source of support
-- Ustinov, Gromyko, Tikhonov
-- Regional leaders and government ministers
- Emphasis on collectivism
Trappings of office
-- Head of Defense Council and Politburo
-- Defines of policy lines
- Key indicators of staying power
-- Chairman of Supreme Soviet
-- Central Committee plenum
- An interim ruler, no bold new policies likely
US INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE
- Fundamental difficulies
-- Lost source
-- Less open source Soviet political information
- Improvements underway
-- More and better analyists
-- Investigation of alternative views and hypothesis
-- Seeking high-quality sources
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2. MIDDLE EAST
Iran/Iraq war
-- Iran efforts to oust Iraqi regime
--- Inflict a military defeat
--- Flood Baghdad with refugees
-- Iraq seeks to influence Iranian leaders to quit war
--- Inflict a military, defeat
--- Damage economic targets
-- Iran may attack Gulf states
--- Targets oil facilities and desalination plants
--- Commando and/or air raids effective
--- Gulf states have porous defenses
-- Iranian impact probably minor
--- Most likely--2-3 million barrels per day
---- covered by inventory, with a temporary spot market increase
--- Unlikely but possible-- 5 million barrels per day
---- could severely impact west
- Lebanon
-- US and Israel separated from Lebanonese government
--- Assad trying to impose order on factions
---- Christians fear a Muslim state
---- Shiites want a share of the power
---- Druze and Sunnis now confront Israel
--- Geneva talks will legitimize Syrian control
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3. SOUTHEAST ASIA
- Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay
-- Addition of armed BADGER aircraft--5 strike, 2 tanker, 1 ECM, and 1
photo recce
-- Naval presence--4 attack subs. 1 frigate, 1 minesweeper, and
auxilliaries
-- Within range of US forces
--- Clark Air Base
--- Subic Bay Naval Station
--- SLOC between Pacific and Indian Ocean
-- Influences US Asian strategy
4. SALVADORIAN ELECTIONS
Presidential election 25 Mar
-- Six major parties--1 centrist, 5 rightist
--- Centrist (PDC) favored
--- Rightist ARENA and PCN strongest contenders
-- Runoff of top two in April or May
-- No widespread insurgent effort this time, but will take advantage of
opportunities
Death squads
-- Leaders out of official positions
-- Ceased claiming responsibility for deaths
-- Some decrease in number of bodies in the streets
Election results
-- Nearly 80% should vote
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-- PDC should get over 40%
-- Probable runoff with ARENA
INF RESPONSES
- Europe
-- SS-20 base construction resumes
-- SS-12/22 moved forward
- Atlantic
-- Three D-Class SSBN in Y-Class area
- Pacific
-- One D-Class SSBN in Y-class area
- NIO for Foreign Deception and Intelligence activities
-- "Hap" Hazzard incumbent
-- Chairs Deception/Denial Analysis Committee
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-- Analysis units in community agencies
--- staffed by experienced personnel
--- trained by NIO
NIE and several studies scheduled this year
SOUTHERN AFRICA
- Opportunity for disengagement
-- Angola/Namibia
--- Luanda must control SWAPO
--- Pretoria suspended withdrawal based on SWAPO violations
-- South Africa/Mozambique non-agression pact to be signed 16 March
-- Soviets suspect US intentions, fear loss of influence in the region
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Technological Advances and
Consequent Dangers:
? ? Threats to Civilization
?
Robert H. Kupperman
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 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES SERIES papers are written for and published
by The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown
University. The views expressed in these papers are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Center.
Series Editors: Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr.
Editors: Jean C. Newsom, Nancy B. Eddy
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006
[phone]
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VOLUME VI
SIGNIFICANT
ISSUES ? SERIES
Technological Advances and
Consequent Dangers:
Growing Threats to Civilization
by
Robert H. Kupperman
A Paper Presented at the
International Symposium on the Coevolution of
Man and Biosphere
Helsinki, Finland
September 1983
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All Rights Reserved
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Kupperunan, Robert H., 1935-
Technological advances and consequent dangers.
(Significant issues series, ISSN 0736-7136 ; v. 6, no. 1)
"A paper presented at the International Symposium on
the Coevolution of Man and Biosphere, Helsinki, Finland,
September 1983."
1. Technology-Social aspects. 2. Technology and
civilization. I. Title. 11. Series.
T14.5.K87 1984 303.4'83 84-1815
U 1984 by Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.
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About the Author
Robert H. Kupperman
Senior Associate and Director, Science and Technology Programs,
CSIS
Dr. Kupperman has served the government as the head of the
transition team for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as
the chief scientist for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
and as assistant director for government preparedness in the Office
of Emergency Preparedness. He currently consults widely on national
security issues and is a leading expert on counterterrorism, advising
both the United States and foreign governments.
Dr. Kupperman is a member of the Army Science Board and a
fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. His recent works
include Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Hoover, 1979). He
holds a Ph.D. from New York University.
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Technological Advances and Consequent
Dangers
I n reviewing the history of humanity, it is striking how enormously
compressed and foreshadowed is the period marked by "civili-
zation." Fossil records separate early man from animals on the basis
of toolmaking-the first example of technology, or the use of artifacts
to extend the dimensions of human life. That fossil record extends
back for a quarter of a million years, but not until the past hundred
centuries or so has civilization been the organizational principle of
mankind.
For almost all of those 10 thousand years, the threats to life have
been inherently self-contained and self-extinguishing. The historic
record is rife with evidence of natural cataclysms: vulcanism, seismic
convulsions, climatic excursions, and epidemics are all common-
place occurrences in the short span of the history of civilization.
Man-made disasters such as wars and their aftermath are so common
as to provide a natural framework around which political and social
history has been constructed and taught for centuries.
But the historical record makes it clear that, until recently, neither
man nor his civilization has been truly threatened in the sense of
absolute survival. Pre-civilized man was mobile and thin-spread
across a widely differing range of physical environments. As these
environments altered, slowly or catastrophically, man adapted or
died-but on a very local level. Elsewhere, other men, the majority
of the individuals of a minority species, always seemed to have
flourished and expanded, pressing relentlessly outward against the
constraints of geography. With the advance of technology to hold
the environment at bay came sedentary organized civilization, along
with the greater threats to life posed by the survivalist elements that
characterized that organization-the proximity of large numbers of
individuals and social dependence on immobile long-term assets
like farms and forests.
With the increased vulnerability of this "investment" phase of
civilization to drought and flood, blight and disease, erosion and
exhaustion, war and conquest, the scale of the threat posed remained
within the culture's ability to face it. Even the worst blows dealt to
civilization then were dissipated by the distribution of cultural assets,
by the existence of physical and psychological "hinterlands," and
by the cushioning function of institutional diversity and indepen-
dence. The list of threats to life made good is as long as written
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 history itself-the consumption of the cedar forests of Lebanon, the
fall of Rome, the Black Death, the Spanish destruction of-meso-
american society, the Mongol conquest, the desertification of the
North African coast. But all of these, important as they have been
for the future that followed, and large as they must have loomed to
observers, were nonetheless self extinguishing flames in a larger
context. Even the great war of 1914 can be assessed in parallel terms:
a disaster, tragically costly in lives, but still an incident that civili-
zation was able to comprehend and that culture was competent to
repair. Diversities, distances, and differences, systemic inefficien-
cies of civilization in themselves, provided the recuperative forces
necessary to maintain continuity.
Since the Great War, technology has grown at an almost exponen-
tial rate, as has the human population that grows increasingly depen-
dent upon it. Mankind has, in the ecological sense, expanded into
every suitable niche, and even into some not so suitable. It has been
technology-whether the wooden dibble of Africa or the permafrost
engineering of Siberia-that has allowed man and his civilization
to expand so far.
It has been other technologies that have permitted civilization to
stay and prosper throughout its global range. These technologies
are so pervasive as to be "transparent" to the casual observer, so
much part of civilization as to seem virtually invisible. The exten-
sion of technology in the service of civilization has perhaps reached
the point of no return, at which the interlocking infrastructure that
has evolved is so taken for granted and at the same time so complex
as to allow for no realistic alternative.
Think about some of these interlocking technologies, their devel-
opment and their implications. Any example quickly reveals a frag-
ile dynamic cycle of production, transportation, and consumption.
Bread for sale in a major urban American area contains wheat grown
in Alberta, milled in Chicago, baked in New Jersey, and consumed
in New York. A century of agricultural research has bred the grain
to resist cold and blight; the steel and automotive industries provide
the tractors and trucks to plant, harvest, and ship; the chemical and
medical industries provide the safe insecticides and preservatives
and leavenings and flavorings necessary to an economical product;
a massive road and rail system allows bulk transport; clean water
and cheap electricity are a major element in production, storage,
and delivery; and the end item, a one pound loaf of white bread,
sells for 69 cents-or 13 minutes of labor at the current minimum
wage.
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The price of that efficient, economical infrastructure is leanness,
and the cost is vulnerability to disruption. The same holds true in
all great conurbations: modern technological efficiency in the pro-
vision of food, water, energy, medicine, transport, and communi-
cation has been oriented toward economic affordability without
much attention to complex network fragility. In developing tech-
nological tools to manage environment, materials, and energy to the
ends of higher qualities of human life, civilization has created an
infrastructure whose success and importance to social survival make
it, ironically, one of society's greatest weaknesses.
It is a truism to reflect that the more advanced a civilization
becomes, the more complex and interdependent its technological
base becomes. Industries and institutions competitively barter their
way into efficient interdependence so that no single function can
stand alone. That same efficiency dictates that technological infra-
structures interlock, both by hazard and by'choice, and also leads to
rigid interconnections to assure reliability.
Those rigidities also assure that failures or problems that begin at
a modest scale can propagate along and across interlocking networks
with exponential effects. The greater a society's dependence for
survival on its technological infrastructure, the greater its vulnera-
bility to a collapse triggered naturally or artificially at a key point.
Perhaps technology is allowing the maintenance of human life and
civilization at an artificially high level, or perhaps mankind is in
danger of losing those hinterlands so necessary in the past to recover
from disaster.
With the life support system of society so entwined, it seems
certain that the propagation speed and range of a major modern
disaster will exceed the absorption capacity of the system. Even the
most centrally managed of human societies cannot cope with fun-
damental system failures multiplying at a biological rate. The anal-
ogy of a stressed society to a stressed organism is valid: a critical
point is reached, a cascade of organ-system failures ensues, and
death comes quickly.
It has been evident for many years that the psychological reserves
of human society were being inexorably eroded by the tensions of
modern life, and it is now also clear that the physical underpinnings
of that life are at risk, placing in jeopardy the society they support.
If we seek to characterize the families of massive failures to which
our modern infrastructures are liable, the catalog becomes as com-
plex as the technologies themselves. Every network can be attacked
successfully at many points, unraveling the macrosystem at an expo-
nential rate. It may be more useful to identify the next tier upward
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 of the effects of technological vulnerability, to address the question
of what are the most serious threats to life by technological inter-
dependence and related psychological unpreparedness for disaster.
The easiest threat to recognize is one that has always been with
humanity but only now looms as a simultaneous danger to all pop-
ulations - hunger. Technology has thus far only deferred the end
condition of the Malthusian equation by the near-magic of agricul-
tural productivity. Carefully designed "green revolution" crop types,
aggressively pressed into cultivation in the large areas of the globe
still being only marginally cropped, hold out the promise for far
better nutritional food stocks in the future than today. Institution-
alized management, rather than predatory exploitation, of both tra-
ditional and unconventional oceanic food supplies can add greatly
to that stock. Minimal changes in preservation and storage efficien-
cies can have large leverage effects on food availability.
The essence of the Malthusian dilemma, however, is the biologic
rate of human population growth, a rate made possible by the tech-
nological advances in biology, medicine, nutrition, and sanitation,
as much as food production. Much of that production has been
advanced at the expense of genetic diversity and robustness in high
yield crop plant material, which opens the threat of evolving blights
and diseases running unchecked across hemispheric agricultural
zones. Losses in these circumstances could be catastrophic.
If the problem is "exponential," only a non-linear solution may
fit, and no one can confidently predict such a long-term trend in
food production, much less storage, processing, and distribution. It
must be underlined that the processes at work here are unidirec-
tional: we cannot resolve the problem by proscribing a subset of
technology or its applications in order to revert to a lower threshold
of danger, or by trying to rely on starvation as an answer to hunger.
Even centrally managed societies cannot reverse human expecta-
tions and survive.
A second and increasingly recognized danger, reinforced by the
interconnection and interdependence of modern society, is that of
disease, especially at the level of the epidemic and pandemic. The
science and technology of medicine--the antibiotic revolution-are
slowly suppressing the need for (and perhaps even the body's ability
to produce) the range of antibodies once the common heritage of
civilized man. The loss of these natural defenses, coupled with the
natural social drive to preserve and extend life at both ends of its
spectrum, is leading to a swollen population inherently susceptible,
inherently under-protected, and therefore inherently, and increas-
ingly, at risk in the event of a rupture in our thin biochemical armor.
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Add this problem of reduced immunity to the next tier, that of
evolving disease organisms that have become sophisticated in
defeating the once effective armamentarium of standard antibiotics.
The evolutionary rate of microbes threatens to exceed the rate of
medical control development, and resistant strains of diseases are
now endemic in hospitals and clinics around the world.
The third tier, added to weakening populations subjected to a
growing variety of pathogens, is the loss of natural quarantines.
Today, it is possible to reach any corner of the globe virtually any
day, and the exigencies of commerce and politics require that most
of the world's population be in physical communication at all times.
The airplane is the most visible and rapid of such links, but it is the
daily global interchange of organic materials-from food to cosmet-
ics, from paper to paint-that assures an eventual homogeneity of
human risk. Man and the mobility of his civilization are the modern
epidemical vectors of greatest importance.
On this already stark picture of mankind at self-imposed risk, we
must draw two more specters: one, the explosive appearance of new,
treatment-resistant diseases from whatever sources, is suggested by
some of the serious waste product problems just now being uncov-
ered in industrialized countries, as well as by the still-mysterious
"immunity deficiency syndrome." Two, the history of human exper-
imentation at the frontiers of the unknown is such as to almost
guarantee contaminant releases into the natural environment, no
matter what precautions are taken. What this habit of conditioned
carelessness means in an era of biological research and genetic
engineering cannot be predicted, only feared. That law of human
behavior that suggests that things do go wrong-and in the least
convenient way-has uncomfortable implications for life in the face
of modern biology in the hands of the uncaring.
Civilization has been spared these threats, at least in their most
extreme forms, but the potential for them has grown. Until now, the
diversity of man and the reach of civilization have insured that the
strengths and resources from the physical and psychological "hin-
terland," remaining intact despite disaster, would provide the mate-
rials and capabilities for civilization to restore itself and begin to
grow again. The strengths found in this hinterland have reinforced
civilization before, but now civilization is facing threats so great
that none of its resources might be able to protect it.
Thus far, this assessment of technological threats to life has touched
only upon the intrinsic and the involuntary; when humans take (or
even threaten) action, damage must be included in the calculation,
and the end of the species becomes a remote, yet terrifying possi-
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 bility. Conventional arms are achieving a sophistication, an effi-
ciency of focused destructive power, and a graduation of lethality
never before imagined. If employed for any length of time in their
most destructive forms, it seems clear that modern weapons in
inventory today are capable of destroying technological infrastruc-
tures on at least a regional or national scale while at the same time
killing a large fraction of the people within the geographic zone
involved. The worst campaigns of World War II demonstrated how
high direct and collateral casualties can be and how vital the phys-
ical and psychological hinterland is to the organized survival of
populations at war. It is not clear that such hinterlands would still
exist in the event of a third world war limited to non-nuclear
weaponry but with that weaponry deployed on a global battlefield
and targeted for maximum effect. Assuming that all maritime nations
would be combatants (whether by choice or not) and that the sub-
marine would effectively bar all shipping in the great ocean basins,
areas without food and fuel self-sufficiency would quickly collapse.
Add to this even the most benign of nuclear scenarios-a "con-
tained" thermonuclear exchange between great powers-and the
added deaths (in the hundreds of millions). The added societal
disruption (virtually all the major infrastructure nodal points of civ-
ilization wiped out) make any escalated modern warfare anathema
to life.
The nuclear exchange, of course, is the most dramatic symbol of
man's ability to eliminate life: it is not the only one, and may not
even be the most likely to be employed. The powerful family of
biological and chemical agents developed over the past several
decades offers opportunities for purposeful (or, of course, acciden-
tal) mass destruction of life to even the least advanced societies. It
is not hard to envisage a virulent, highly contagious pathogen released
for limited political purposes ravaging a continent. (Just think of a
smallpox epidemic in an era in which virtually nobody had been
vaccinated.) The risk of disaster on a planetary scale can be seen on
the horizon. Though a controversial issue, some scholars have made
extreme predictions suggesting that following a massive thermo-
nuclear exchange, enough dust would be lofted into the upper atmo-
sphere to diminish the sunlight below that is required for mammal-
ian or even plant life. This means that man can, by error or by choice,
create remote global environmental conditions, which in the minds
of some experts, could be more severe than those that may have
killed the dinosaurs.
So we find mankind, at the flourishing height of civilization, pro-
foundly endangered by the physical (or technological) and psycho-
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logical structures upon which that civilization rests. Famine, plague,
and war all wait in the wings, eager to play their parts. This discus-
sion is not intended to suggest any sense of inevitability of the
possible collapse of civilization, and it has not been from a neo-
Malthusian or Club of Rome sense of despair in positive values of
technology that the catalog of threats and vulnerabilities has been
drafted. It is offered rather to provide both an agenda of worth and
a sense of urgency.
Retreat into a future dominated by idealized images of a bucolic
past will not serve modern mankind well at all. Much has been done
to study and define such a revised, contratechnological direction to
social evolution. Thus far, it seems that the models of ruralism and
cellular isolation all fall down on the statistics of energy: the models,
if universalized, simply do not provide enough consumable energy
to meet current, much less projected, energy needs. It is not by
rejecting technology but rather by managing its development and
application that society can begin to act in its own defense against
the threats it has created: the easiest problems to address are those
requiring large and apparently "wasteful" investments in infrastruc-
ture redundancy and resiliency.
Today it makes economic sense to route all technological links
over the easiest paths. This means that highways, canals, railways,
pipelines, power lines, and telephone wires (together with the sup-
port and control systems for these) will inevitably come together at
natural gates, passes, and crossroads. A first step is simply to remove
this temptation to nature (and to man) by dispersed routing of critical
networks. A second step is to provide inherent backup, or overload
capacity, within the functional network to allow graceful deterio-
ration of service under stress rather than system collapse. The major
networks that need to be bolstered in terms of surge and rerouting
include the regional electrical grids, gas and liquid pipelines, and
such diverse potential chokepoints as deep water port facilities,
computerized records, city water supplies, and unique pharmaceu-
tical production plants. Even a minimum policy of maintaining a
spare inventory of long lead time network components (e.g., large
transformers and switches and certain pumps) can offset the vul-
nerability of life to catastrophic network failures.
Beyond the expensive but easily comprehended challenge of rein-
forcing and relaxing the critical technological life-support networks
so that they can better absorb stress and extinguish failure lies a
much greater challenge, that of designing the institutions of civili-
zation to survive and, at the same time, flourish. This suggests pur-
poseful activity at both the technical and psychological level to
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 create social units structured around self-sufficiency to afford quar-
antine and insulation from network failures but that still enjoy easy
interaction with neighboring units and beyond. Such a model, which
does not yet seem to have been developed, should encourage diver-
sity without cultural isolation or estrangement. It should prove resil-
ient to many classes of attack, in that each of its units provides first-
order shock absorbency and each unaffected unit participates in the
hinterland role. The models can appear to be, as in the network
case, economically inefficient but societally enriching. In other words,
beyond technology is the system of values that should govern its
direction, its use, and its extent of dominance over life.
We must continue to look to tailored technologies for continued
and improved support to future life. There appears to he at least one
if not several "green revolutions" still to be achieved in agriculture
alone. Energy options already exist that would eliminate the crisis
content of current oil importation policies-again, it is a matter of
investing in the future through research and development, with
technological objectives tempered by the requirements of life rather
than the dictates of economy,
Beyond these guideposts for a civilization at peace we must address
that threat of war, particularly nuclear war or accident, which can
arise with such speed as to overwhelm civilization and the life it
supports. War is at best the result of miscalculation or of ignorance;
at worst, it is a galvanic national contraction in the absence of any
alternative. What can technology offer that can reduce the impact of
error and offer alternatives to self-immolation?
The KAL 007 incident in September 1983, when a Korean civilian
airliner was shot down by a Soviet fighter, is significant in this
context, not because of its specifics but because of its generalities.
The West does not need reminding of the Soviets' predeliction for
absolutist action in response to perceived threats to their national
security. What is worth reminding ourselves of is that the Soviet
response system is not rich in alternatives and has little capacity for
graceful rebound from shock. The implications of this systemic rig-
idity, were an important and exfoliating crisis to develop, are sob-
ering; the absence of' consultative or interactive mechanisms for
injection of political judgment into the security equation makes for
the possibility-even the probability-ofvery stark futures indeed.
The emerging geopolitical environment must be examined care-
fully in order to understand the dangers and risks that lie ahead.
The foci of power and real leverage now extend beyond the super-
powers to encompass many nations. For better or worse, the super-
powers can no longer set the rules of the game, can no longer claim
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condominium rights to any piece of the world, and can no longer
guarantee the outcome of events set in motion by themselves or by
others.
The quest for scarce resources has introduced a new and quali-
tatively different format for relations between the industrialized and
developing worlds. The reality of interdependence provides under-
developed nations not only economic but also substantial political
leverage. This process of differentiation between the resource-
sufficient and the resource-needy has created internal as well as
bloc instabilities. We should anticipate that frictions over resource
distribution will intensify, making efforts at international coopera-
tion more difficult.
The proliferation of new technologies-some benign, some lethal-
adds a new dimension to the power paradigm. There appear to be
few permanent barriers (and given the emerging political environ-
ment, a great many incentives) to the acquisition of sophisticated
weapons or delivery systems. The effect of such weapons lends real
leverage to the claims of radical national or subnational groups who
might otherwise be regarded as "crazies" or criminals. Motivations
and capabilities have become far more difficult to gauge at a time
when the traditional international order (the bipolar structure) has
become far less effective as a mechanism of restraint.
In short, the future holds out the prospect of a large number of
small crises, any one of which might escalate out of control. Man-
agement of these crises need not be purely ad hoc-a great deal can
be done in advance to discourage automatic, emotional, rigid or
trigger-happy responses. Such crisis avoidance merits the highest
rank on the world's agenda.
It is time to think beyond pure strategies of assured destruction
or damage limitation to assure national survival. The end result of
any strategy of deterrence will never be true peace but merely the
absence of war through bilateral terror. There are no winners and
losers in a thermonuclear exchange, and any belief that an exchange
can be "zero sum" is singularly inappropriate in an age fraught with
ultimate risks. No matter how brutal the Russians may seem, collab-
orative exercises in crisis simulation and new methods of consulta-
tion and communication may be the only means of preventing a
single tragedy from snowballing into a cataclysmic series of events.
The arms control debate that echoes around the world today touches
only a part of the problem, in that it focuses on relatively minor
limitations on the means of destruction and not on the issues that
could lead to their use. This is not to suggest that the problem of
arms control is not important, which it is, especially given the esca-
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 lation potential after any single detonation. It does, however, sug-
gest that arms control is not sufficient to afford any guarantee of
future security.
Robust force structures that are relatively insensitive to cheating
by the other side must be explored as well as the kinds of offense-
defense mixtures that could buffer verification errors or limit dam-
age from third-party attacks. Above all, it is necessary to look at new
means of joint crisis avoidance and management techniques that
focus on the identification of the critical decision points affecting
the participants, on the basic military and political issues involved,
on crisis avoidance means, on suppression of violence in the event
of confrontation, and on societal recovery of equilibrium and direc-
tion after the crisis is past.
Were the "unthinkable" to occcur-and there is every reason to
be concerned that it might-we must have tested ways of saying
"stop" to the parties involved. One possible option would be to link
the national command authorities of the superpowers (perhaps ulti-
mately including a number of other powers in the network) to explore
the critical elements of each sides' decision-making processes before
a crisis occurs. Reliance on the communications and consultative
mechanisms at the political level clearly does not always work.
Whatever substantive judgments Andropov and Reagan might have
reached about the Korean jetliner became irrelevant in the face of
a rigidly based Soviet military decision to act.
One institutional mechanism to begin discussions about crisis
control techniques is the Standing Consultative Commission, a
bipartisan permanent body of military and intelligence profession-
als that takes up alleged treaty infringements. It would be equally
reasonable for such a body to consider joint efforts that result in
mutual advantages rather than mutual stalemates. Ultimately, how-
ever, such an effort will require sophisticated analytic modeling and
computational capabilities to deal with the technical aspects of the
problem. The International Institute of Systems Analysis in Vienna,
directed by both American and Soviet scientists, could be a potential
meeting ground for future cooperative study.
The risks of sharing data in these kinds of joint simulations should
not be ignored. In attempting to understand fully the dynamics of
each other's decision-making process, the danger that the Soviets
might be deceitful enough to hide their true command structure-
and their intentions-cannot be dismissed. The root question, how-
ever, is whether the strategic gains from such exercises would out-
weigh the potential for tactical losses, and we will never know the
answer if we never try. We must make the attempt, or run the risk
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of blundering into situations that could make the Korean airliner
tragedy appear minor by comparison.
What is clear is that traditional means of arms control have accom-
plished very little. What is equally clear is that present efforts at
crisis control are wholly inadequate. One hot line by which the U. S.
president and Soviet premier can confer makes little sense when
mid-level military personnel can set a chain of events into motion
from which neither Reagan nor Andropov may escape. Indeed, the
problems have become too complex and too important to be left in
the hands of either diplomats or defense planners alone. Nor should
the technical capabilities of the scientific community be consigned
to academic isolation-the creativity and rigor that the scientific
community has so effectively applied in the natural sciences should
be brought to bear constructively and realistically on this family of
problems. Although this concept of true collaboration may appear
naive in a world made cynical by a history of failure, we need the
tonic of hope and idealism to make our odds of survival more than
a long shot.
While it might have taken months to deliver a declaration of war
a hundred years ago, it would have taken months to go to war and
possibly longer to sue for peace, much less to mobilize the men and
supplies needed to fight it. The technology was such that small
military units were capable of inflicting relatively small damages.
Today, small numbers of unsophisticated, angry people can travel
the globe in the span of a day, can communicate with others almost
instantaneously, can carry hi-tech weapons of disproportionately
large lethality and, unless we are very careful, can drive the super-
powers and the rest of the world into a conflagration from which
humankind cannot escape. It is necessary now to prevent technology
and technological advances from becoming the penultimate device
from Pandora's fatal box.
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Wa,,hington 1) ( 20006
[phone]
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Tentative Agenda
Wednesday, March 14
8:30 - 9:00
9:15 - 11:00
11:00 - 11:10
11:10 - 12:45
1:00 - 2:00
Chairman's Time
DCI Update
Break
Discussions with Mr.. James Nolan, Director of the Office
of Foreign Missions
Working Lunch/Task Force Reports
CI Task Force Report
Thursday, March 15
8:30 - 8:45
8:45 - 10:00
10:00 - 11:00
11:00 - 11:45
11:45 - 1:00
1:00 - 2:00
Reading Time
Task Force Reports
Discussions with Secretary Shultz (numerous subjects)
Executive Session
Lunch - Executive Dining Room, OEOB
Discussion with Dr. Robert Kupperman, Director of Science
& Technology Programs, CSIS, on the subject of Terrorism
Discussion with Judge Webster, Director, FBI, on the
subject of Terrorism
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SECRET
SA/DCI/IA
FROM: EA/ExDir
SUBJECT: March PFIAB Meeting
Executive Registry
84 = /,r=
14 February 1984
1. PFIAB has asked that the DCI/DDCI meet with the Board from
0915-1100 hours on 14 March. 0 probably told you that the DCI normally
provides the Board with a worldwide intelligence briefing which is prepared
by the NIC (Hal Ford) and that I provide a list of CIA activities involving
the Board.
2. On occasion, the PFIAB asks the DCI to brief on specific subjects.
The staff does not, as yet, have a list of topics for the DCI but it has
invited Secretary Shultz to speak on the following topics:
- U.S. and Soviet parity in staffing theirrespective missions
in the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
- Presence of Soviet nationals in the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow and their possible replacement by U.S. nationals.
- The quality of U.S. Government political analysis
on the USSR.
- Coordination of crisis situations with regard to
terrorism.
- PFIAB concerns with regard to
3. As soon as the staff has topics for the DCI's discussion, I will
pass them on to you.
SMUT
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GUNFIDLNIIHL
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-01651-84
12 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DCI
FROM:
National Intelligence icer for Counterterrorism
SUBJECT: FBI Director Webster and the PFIAB
1. As I advised you by telephone on 12 March, and as I had been advised
by my IICT colleague at the FBI, Mr. Webster to date has not asked his FBI
subordinates to prepare any formal statement or talking points in anticipation
of his appearance before the PFIAB this week. My FBI colleague believes this
may be so because Webster will appear before two different Congressional
committees earlier this week and therefore will be so up to speed on terrorism
and the FBI that he will not need specific preparations for the PFIAB. I will
be advised if Webster later does ask for specific talking points for the
PFIAB.
2. In the meanwhile, I attached the draft of an opening statement
Webster will make before the. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate on 14 March. The first 2 1/2 pages of that
statement suggest that Webster may intend to repeat later to the PFIAB. It
unblushingly takes credit for FBI effectiveness against terrorism and
terrorists in the US Webster/FBI implied confidence in the FBI's
, -- - -_ - -.1,14- ..,,,,,+~ -4
preparations for the
1984 should be noted.
Attachment:
As Stated
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE THREAT OF TECHNOLOGIES TO LIFE
Address
By
Robert H. Kupperman
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Presented At The
International Symposium On The Coevolution Of Man & Biosphere
Helsinki, Finland
September 7, 1983
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THE THREAT OF TECHNOLOGIES TO LIFE
From whatever viewpoint we choose to look at the
history of humanity, we are struck by how enormously
compressed and foreshadowed is that period to which
we can, in good conscience, ascribe the character of
civilization. We can find a fossil record for mankind
that, perhaps arbitrarily, separates early man from
animals on the basis of tool-making -- the first ex-
ample of technology, or the use of artifacts to extend
the dimensions of human life. That fossil record ex-
tends back for a quarter of a million years, but not
until the past hundred centuries or so can we point to
"civilization" as the organizational principle of man-
kind. Besides the technologies characterized by the
ages of stone, bronze, iron (and now perhaps polymers),
civilization entails writing, calendars, agriculture,
settlements, and governments. For almost all of those
10,000 years, the threats to life have been inherently
self-contained and self-extinguishing. The historic
record is rife with evidence of natural cataclysms --
volcanism, seismic convulsions, climatic excursions,
epidemics are all commonplace occurences in the short
span of the history of civilization. Man-made disasters for example, wars and their aftermath -- are so common as
to provide a natural framework around which political and
social history has been taught for centuries.
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But the historical record makes it clear that, until
recently, neither man nor his civilization has been truly
threatened in the sense of absolute survival. Pre-civilized
man was mobile and thin-spread across a widely differ-
ing range of physical environments. As these environments
altered, slowly or catastrophically, man adapted or died --
but on a very local level. Elsewhere, other men, the ma-
jority of the individuals of a minority species, always
seemed to have flourished and slowly expanded, pressing
relentlessly outward against the constraints of geography.
With the advance of technology to hold the environment at
bay came sedentary organized civilization, and with it came
greater threats to life posed by the very survivalist ele-
ments that characterized that organization -- proximity of
large numbers of individuals and social dependence on im-
mobile long-term assets like farms and forests. But even
with the increased vulnerability of this "investment"
phase of civilization to drought and flood, blight and
disease, erosion and exhaustion, war and conquest, the
scale of threat remained within the scope of the culture.
Even the worst of blows dealt to civilization then were
dissipated by the;distribution of cultural assets, by the
existence of physical and psychological "hinterlands", and
by the natural shock-absorber function of institutional
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diversity and independence. The list of threats to life
made good is as long as written history itself -- the
consumption of the cedar forests of Lebanon with the fall
of Rome, the Black Death with the Spanish destruction of
mesoamerican society, the Mongol conquest with the deser-
tification of the North African coast. But all of these,
important as they have been for the future that followed,
and large as they must have loomed to observers, were
nonetheless self-extinguishing flames in the tapestry of
life. Even the great war of 1914 can be assessed in
parallel historic terms: a disaster, horribly costly in
life and lives, but still an incident that civilization
was able to comprehend and that culture was competent to
repair.. The hinterland held -- diversities, distances,
and differences, all in themselves systemic inefficiencies
of civilization, provided the recuperative forces necessary
to maintain continuity.
In the years since the Great War, technology has grown
at an almost exponential rate, as has the human population
that grows ever increasingly dependent upon it. Mankind
has, in the ecological sense, expanded into every niche
suitable for life -- and even into some not so suitable.
It has been technology -- whether the wooden dibble of
Africa or the permafrost engineering of Siberia -- that has
allowed man and his civilization to expand so far.
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It has been other technologies that have permitted
civilization to stay and prosper throughout its global
range. These technologies are so pervasive as to be
"transparent" to the casual observer; they have become
so much part of civilization as to appear virtually in-
visible. The apparently natural extension of technology
in the service of civilization has perhaps reached a point
of no return; the interlocking infrastructure that has
evolved is so taken for granted and at the same time so
complex as to allow for no realistic alternative.
Think about some of these interlocking technologies,
their etiologies and their implications. One can start
virtually anywhere and find oneself breaking into a fragile
dynamic cycle of production, transportation, and consumption.
Take the simple questions raised by the appearance of a
local bread for sale in a major urban American area:
wheat grown in Alberta, milled in Chicago, baked in New
Jersey, and consumed in New York. A century of agricultural
research has bred the grain to resist cold and blight; the
steel and automotive industries provide the tractors and
trucks to plant, harvest, and ship; the chemical and medical
industries provide the safe insecticides and preservatives
and levenings and flavorings necessary to an economical
product; a massive road and rail system allows bulk trans-
port; clean water and cheap electricity are a major element
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in production, storage, and delivery;, and the end item, a
one pound loaf of white bread, sells for 69 cents -- or
13 minutes of labor at the minimum wage. This level of
guaranteed efficiency is not without its price; the
"price" of that efficient, economical infrastructure is
leaness, and the cost is vulnerability to disruption. The
same holds true in all great conurbations: modern tech-
nological efficiency in the provision of food, water,
energy, medicine, transport, and communication has been
achieved in the direction of economic affordability with-
out much attention to network and intranetwork fragility.
It seems that, in developing technological tools to manage
environment, materials, and energy to the ends of higher
qualities of human life, human civilization has created
an infrastructure whose very success -- and therefore
importance to social survival -- makes it, ironically, one
of society's greatest weaknesses. It is a truism to reflect
that the more advanced a civilization becomes, the more
complex and interdependent becomes its technological base.
Industries and institutions competitively barter their way
into efficient interdependence so that no single function
can stand alone. That same efficiency dictates that
technological infrastructures interlock, both by hazard and
by choice; efficiency further leads to rigid interconnections
to assure steady-state service reliability. Those rigidities,
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of course, also assure that failures or problems that begin
at a modest scale can propagate along and across interlock-
ing infrastructural networks with exponential effects. The
greater society's dependence for survival on its techno-
logical infrastructure, the greater its vulnerability to a
cascade collapse triggered naturally or artificially at
a key node. Technology perhaps is allowing the maintenance
of human life and civilization at an artifically high level;
perhaps mankind is in danger of losing the hinterlands so
necessary in the past to recover from disaster. With the
life support system of society so entwined, it seems certain
that the propagation speed and range of a major modern
disaster will exceed the absorbtion capacity of the system.
Even the most centrally managed of human societies cannot
cope with fundamental system failures multiplying at a
biological rate. The analogy of a stressed society to a
stressed organism is valid; a critical point is reached, a
cascade of organ-system failures ensues, and death comes
quickly.
It has been evident for many years that psychological
reserves of human society were being inexorably eroded by
the tensions of modern life; it is now clear that the
physical underpinnings of that life are at risk -- and of
themselves place at risk the society they support.
If we seek to characterize the families of cascade
failures to which our modern infrastructures are liable,
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the catalog becomes as complex as the technologies them-
selves; virtually every network can be attacked success-
fully at many points, unraveling the macrosystem at an
exponential rate. It may be more useful to identify the
next tier upward of the effects of technological vulner-
ability, to address the question of what are the most
serious threats to life by technological interdependence
and related psychological unpreparedness for disaster.
The easiest threat to recognize is one that has always
been with humanity but only now looms as a simultaneous
danger to all populations -- hunger. Technology has thus
far only deferred the end condition of the Multhusian
equation by the near-magic of agricultural productivity.
Carefully designed "green revolution" crop types, aggressively
pressed into cultivation in the large areas of the globe
still only being marginally cropped, hold out the promise
for far better nutritional food stocks in the future than
today. Institutionalized management, rather than predatory
exploitation, of both traditional and unconventional oceanic
food supplies can add greatly to that stock. Very small
changes in preservation and storage efficiencies can have
large leverage effects on food availability. But the essence
of the Malthusian dilemma is the biologic rate of human popu-
lation growth, a rate made possible by the technological
advances in biology, medicine, nutrition, sanitation --
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and food production. It should be noted that much of that
production has been advanced at the expense of genetic
diversity and robustness in the high yield crop plant
material; this opens the threat of evolving blights and
diseases running unchecked across hemispheric agricultural
zones. Losses in these circumstances could be catastrophic.
if the problem is "exponential", only anon-linear solu-
tion may fit, and no one can confidently predict such a
long-term.-trend in food production, much less storage, pro-
cessing, and distribution. And it must be underlined that
the processes at work here are unidirectional; we cannot
resolve the problem by proscribing a subset of technology
or its applications in order to revert to a lower threshold
of danger, by trying to rely on starvation as a answer to
hunger. Even centrally managed societies cannot reverse
human expectations and survive.
A second and increasingly recognized danger reinforced
by the interconnection and interdependence of modern society
is that of disease, especially at the level of the epidemic
and pandemic. The science and technology of medicine -- the
antibiotic revolution -- is slowly but certainly suppressing
the need for (and perhaps even the body's ability to produce)
the range of antibodies once the common heritage of civilized
man. The loss of these natural defenses, coupled with the
natural social drive to preserve and extend life at both
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ends of its spectrum, is leading to a. swollen population
inherently susceptible, inherently under-protected, and
therefore inherently, and increasingly, at risk in the
event of a rupture in our thin biochemical armor. Add to
this problem of reduced immunity to the next tier -- that
of evolving disease organisms that have become sophisticated
in defeating the once effective armentarium of standard
antibiotics. The evolutionary rate of microbes threatens
to exceed-'the rate of medical control development; resistant
strains of diseases are now endemic in hospitals and clinics
around the world. The third tier, added to weakening popu-
lations subjected to a growing variety of?pathogens,is the
loss of natural quarantines. Today, it is possible to reach
any corner of the globe virtually any day; the exigencies
of commerce and politics require that most of the world's
population be in physical communication at all times. The
airplane is the most visible and rapid of such links, but
it is the daily global interchange of organic materials --
from food to cosmetics, from paper to paint -- that assures
eventually a certain homogenity of human risk. Man himself,
and the mobility of his civilization, are the modern epi-
demical vectors of greatest importance. On this already
stark picture of mankind at self-imposed risk, we must draw
two more specters: One, the explosive appearance of new,
treatment-resistant diseases from whatever sources, suggested
by some of the serious waste product problems just now being
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uncovered in industrialized countries and by the still-
mysterious "immunity deficiency syndrome." Too, the history
of human experimentation at the frontiers of the unknown
is such as to almost guarantee contaminant releases into
the natural environment, no matter what precautions are
taken. What this habit of conditioned carelessness means
in an era of bilogical research and genetic engineering
cannot be predicted, only feared. That law of human
behaviour-which suggests that things do go wrong -- and
in the least convenient way -- has uncomfortable implica-
tions for life in the face of modern biology in the hands
of the uncaring.
Thus far, this assessment of technological threats to
life has touched only upon the intrinsic and the involuntary;
when humans will to do or even threaten to do, damage is
included in the calculation, the end of the species be-
comes a remote, yet horrific possibility. Conventional
arms are achieving a sophistication, an efficiency of
focused destructive power and graduation of lethality,
never before imagined. If employed for any length of time
in their most destructive modalities, it seems clear that
modern weapons in inventory today are competent to destroy
technological infrastructures on at least a regional (national)
scale while at the same time killing a large fraction of the
people within the geographic zone involved. The worst
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campaigns of the Second World War demonstrated both how
high direct and collateral casualties can be and how
vital the physical and psychological hinterland is to the
organized survival of populations at war. It is not clear
that such hinterlands would still exist in the event of a
third World War constrained to non-nuclear weaponry but
with that weaponry deployed on a global battlefield and
targeted for maximum effect. One example suffices, were
we to predict that all maritime nations would be combat-
tants (whether by choice or not) and that the submarine
would effectively bar all shipping in the great ocean
basins, areas without food and fuel self-sufficiency
would collapse, and quickly. Add to this even the most
benign of nuclear scenarios -- a "contained" thermonuclear
exchange between great powers -- and the added deaths (in
the hundreds of millions) and the added societal disruption
(virtually all the major infrastructure nodal points of
civilization wiped out) make any escalated modern warfare an
anathema to life. The nuclear exchange, of course, is
the most dramatic symbol of man's ability to eliminate
life: it is not the only one, and may not even be the
most likely to be employed. The enormously powerful
family of modern biological and chemical agents developed
over the past several decades now offers opportunities for
purposeful (or, of course, accidental) mass destruction of
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life to even the least advanced societies. It is not hard
to envisage a robust, highly contagious pathogen released
for limited political purposes ravaging a continent. (Just
think of a smallpox epidemic in an era in which virtually
nobody has been vaccinated.) And we can see on the horizon
the now measurable risk of disaster on a planetary scale.
Though a controversial issue, some scholars have made extreme
predictions suggesting that following a massive thermonuclear
exchange,. enough dust would be lofted into the upper atmo-
sphere sufficient to diminish the incidence of sunlight
below that required for mammalian or even plant life. This
means that man can by error, or by choice, create remote
global environmental conditions, which in the minds of some
experts, could be more severe than those that may have killed
off the dinosaurs.
So we find mankind, at the flourishing height of civiliza-
tion, profoundly endangered by the physical '(Or technological)
and phychological structures upon which that civilization
rests. Famine, plague, and war all wait in the wings of
the history of humanity, eager to play their parts. It has
not been the thrust of this discussion to suggest any sense
of inevitability of the possible collapse of civilization;
it has not been from a neo-Malthusian or Club of Rome sense of
despair in positive values of technology that the catalog of
threats and vulnerabilities has been drafted. It is offered
rather to provide both an agenda of worth and a sense of
thapncu to i tc Ariciracc _
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At the outset, it should be made clear that retreat
into a future dominated by idealized images of a bucolic
past will not serve modern mankind well at all. A great
deal has been done, in Europe and America, to study and
define such a revised, contratechnological direction to
social evolution. Thus far, it seems that the models of
ruralism and cellular isolation all fall down on the
statistics of energy: the models, if universalized, simply
do not provide enough consumable energy to meet current,
much less projected, energy needs. It is not by reject-
ing technology but rather by managing its development and
application that society can begin to act in its own defense
against the threats it has already created. To a first
order, the easiest problems to address are those requiring
large and apparently "wasteful" investments in infra-
structure redundance and resiliency.
Today it makes economic sense to route all technological
links over the easiest paths. This means that highways,
canals, railways, pipelines, power lines, and telephone
wires (together with the support and control systems for
these) will inevitably come together at natural gates,
passes, and crossroads. A first step is simply to remove
this temptation to nature (and to man) by dispersed routing
of critical networks. A second step is to provide inherent
backup, or overload capacity, within the functional network
to allow graceful deterioration of service under stress rather
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than system fracture. A trivial example suffices: to
reduce costs, the eight-lane automobile beltway encircl-
ing Washington DC was built without parallel service roads
or turnoffs; two months ago, a single truck accident at
3:00 in the afternoon closed all lanes in both directions,
and some 50,000 vehicles were immobilized for up to 4
hours. The major networks that need to be bolstered in
terms of surge and rerouting include the regional electrical
grids and'the gas and liquid pipelines. In this category
also fall such diverse potential chokepoints as deep water
port facilities, computerized records, city water supplies,
and unique pharmaceutical production plants. Even a minimum
policy of maintaining a spare inventory of long-lead time
network components (e.g., large transformers and switches and
certain pumps) can ameliorate the vulnerability of life to
catastrophic network failures. Note that, two weeks ago,
a single guerrilla attack on power lines in El Salvador
paralyzed the western half of that beleaguered -- and not
highly industrialized -- nation.
Beyond the expensive but easily comprehended challenge of
reinforcing and relaxing the critical technological life-
support networks so that they can better absorb stress and
extinguish failure lies a much greater challenge -- design-
ing the institutions of civilization to survive and, at the
same time, flourish. This suggests purposeful activity at
both the technical and psychological level to create social
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units structured around self-sufficiency to afford quarantine
and insulation from network failures but that still enjoy
easy interaction with neighboring units and beyond. Such a
model, which does not yet seem to have been developed,
should encourage the richness of diversity without cultural
isolation or estrangement. it should prove resilient to
many classes of attack, in that each unit of itself provides
first-order shock absorbency and each unaffected unit par-
ticipates in the hinterland role. The models can be seen
to be, as in the network case, economically inefficient but
societally enriching. In other words, beyond technology is
the system of values that should govern its direction, its
use, and its extent of dominance over life.
We must continue to look to tailored technologies for
continued and improved support to future life. There
appears to be at least one if not several "green revolutions"
still to be achieved in agriculture alone. Energy options
already exist that would eliminate the crises content of
current oil importation policies -- again, it is a matter
of investing in the future through current research and
development, but with a set of technological objectives
tempered by the requirements of life rather than the dictates
of economy. Beyond these guideposts for a civilization at
peace we must address the threat of war, particularly
nuclear war or accident. That can arise with such speed
as to overwhelm civilization and the life it supports. War
at best is the result of miscalculation, of ignorance; at
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worst, it is a galvanic national contraction in'the absence
of any alternative. What can technology offer that can reduce
the impact of error, that can offer alternatives to self-
immolation?
The KAL 007 incident is significant in this context,
not because of its specifics but because of its generalities.
The West does not need reminding of the Soviets' predeliction
for absolutist action in response to perceived threats to their
national security. What is worth reminding ourselves of is
that the Soviet response system is not rich in alternatives
and has little capacity for graceful rebound from shock. The
implications of this systemic rigidity if an important and
exfoliating crisis were to develop are rather sobering; the
absence of consultative or interactive mechanisms for injection
of political judgement into the security equation makes for
the possibility -- even the probability -- of very stark
futures indeed.
We must be prepared to examine carefully the emerging geo-
political environment in order to understand the dangers and
risks that lie ahead. The foci of power and real leverage
now extend beyond the superpowers and a few select powers to
encompass many nations. For better or worse, the superpowers
can no longer set the rules of the game, can no longer claim
condominium rights to any piece of the world and can no longer
guarantee, with any certainty, the outcome of a chain of events
set in motion by themselves or by others.
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The quest for scarce resources has introduced a new and
qualitatively different format for relations between the
industrialized and developing worlds. The reality of inter-
dependence provides underdeveloped nations not only economic
but substantial political leverage. And this process of
differentiation between the resource-sufficient and -needy
has created internal as well as bloc instabilities. We
should anticipate that frictions over resource distribution
will only intensify, making efforts at international cooper-
ation that much more difficult.
Too, the proliferation of new technologies -- some
benign, some lethal -- adds a new dimension to the power
paradigm. There appear to be few permanent barriers (and
given the emerging political environment, a great many
incentives) to the acquisition of sophisticated weapons or
delivery systems. The effect of such weapons lends real
leverage to the claims of radical national or subnational
groups who might otherwise be regarded as "crazies" or
criminals. Motivations and capabilities have become far more
difficult to gauge at a time when the traditional international
order (the bi-polar structure) has become far less effective
as a mechanism of restraint.
In short, the future holds out the prospect of a large
number of little crises, any one of which might escalate out
of control. Management of these crises need not be purely
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ad hoc -- a great deal can be done in advance to discourage
knee-jerk, emotional, and rigid or trigger-happy responses.
Such crisis avoidance merits the highest rank on the world's
agenda.
It is time to think beyond pure strategies of assured
destruction or damage limitation to assure our national
survival. The end result of any strategy of deterrence'will
never be true peace but merely the absence of war through
bilateral terror. There are no winners and losers in a thermo-
nuclear exchange; any belief that an exchange can be "zero-
sum" is singularly inappropriate in an age fraught with ultimate
risks. No matter how brutal the Russians may seem, collabor-
ative exercises in crisis simulation, new methods of consul-
tation and communication may be the only means of preventing
a single tragedy from snowballing into a cataclysmic series
of events.
The arms control debate that echoes around the world today
touches only a small part of the problem, in that it focuses on
relatively minor limitations on the means of destruction and
not on the issues that could lead to their tragic use. This
is not to suggest that the problem of arms control is not
important; it is, especially given the escalation potential
after any single detonation. It does, however, suggest that
arms control is not sufficient to afford any guarantee of
future security.
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We do need to explore robust force structures that are
relatively insensitive to cheating by the other side. We do
need to explore the kinds of offense-defense mixtures that
could buffer verification errors or limit damage from nth
country attacks. Above all, however, we must begin to look
at new means of joint crisis avoidance and management tech-
niques that focus on the identification of the critical
decision points affecting the participants, on the basic
military and political issues involved, on crisis avoidance
means, on suppression of violence in the event of confron-
tation, and on societal recovery of equilibrium and direction
after the crisis is past.
Were the"unthinkable"to occur -- and there is every
reason to be concerned that it might -- we must have tested
ways of saying "stop" to the parties involved. One possible
crisis management option would be to link the national command
authorities of the superpowers (perhaps ultimately including a
number of other powers in the network) to explore the critical
nodes of each sides' decision-making processes before a crisis
occurs. 'Reliance on the communications and consultative
mechanisms at the political level clearly does not always work.
Whatever substantive judgements Messrs. Andropov and Reagan
might have reached about the Korean jetliner became irrelevant
in the face of a rigidly based Soviet military decision to act.
One institutional mechanism to begin discussions about
crisis control techniques is the Standing Consultative Commission,
a permanent body of military and intelligence professionals
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from both sides which takes up alleged treaty infringements.
Would it not be equally reasonable for such.a body to consider
the kinds of joint efforts that result in mutual advantages
rather than mutual stalemates. Ultimately, however, such.an
effort will require sophisticated analytic modeling and compu-
tational capabilities to deal with the technical aspects of
the problem. The International Institute of Systems Analysis
in Vienna, directed by both American and Soviet scientists,
could be a potential meeting ground for future cooperative
study.
The risks of data sharing in these kinds of joint simu-
lations should not be ignored. In attempting to fully under-
stand the dynamics of each other's decision-making process, the
danger that the Soviets might be deceitful enough to hide their
true command structure -- and their intentions -- cannot be
dismissed. The root question, however, is whether the strategic
gains from such exercises would well outweigh the potential
for tactical losses -- and we will never know the answer if we
never try. We must make the attempt for we most certainly will
run the risk of blundering into situations which may make the
Korean airliner tragedy appear minor by comparison.
What is perfectly clear is that traditional means of arms
control have accomplished very little. What is equally clear is
that present efforts at crisis control are wholly inadequate.
One hot line by which the U.S. president and Soviet premier
can confer makes little sense when mid-level military personnel
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can set a chain of events into motion from which neither Reagan
nor Andropov may escape. Indeed, the problems have become
too complex and too important to be left in the hands of either
the diplomats or the defense planners alone. Nor should the
technical capabilities of the scientific community be con-
signed to academic isolation; the creativity and rigor that
the scientific community has so effectively applied in the
natural sciences should be brought to bear constructively
and realistically on this family of problems. Although this
concept of true collaboration may appear naive in a world made
cynical by a history of failure, we need the tonic of hope and
idealism to make our odds of survival more than a long shot.
A hundred years ago, it took months to deliver a declaration
of war much less to mobilize the men and supplies needed to
fight it. The technology was such that small military units
were capable of inflicting relatively small damages. Today,
small numbers of unsophisticated, angry people can travel the
globe in the span of a day, can communicate with others almost
instantaneously, can carry hi-tech weapons of disproportionately
large lethality and, unless we are very careful, can drive the
superpowers and the rest of the world into a conflagration from
which humankind can not escape.
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OPERATIONS CENTER/CURRENT SUPPORT GROUP
N t'lv I ; ll l CI l ll THE WASHINGTON POST, Pg. C-11 27 February 1984
Item No. 1
CIA No Longer..
.
t -well Informed
About Kremlin.
The press has reported, quite cor-
rectly, that U.S. intelligence was
caught asleep at the switch by the
death of Kremlin leader Yuri V. An-
dropov and his replacement by Kon-
stantin U. Chernenko.
An insider admitted to me that.
the CIA wasn't sure whether Andro-
Pov was dead or alive during his last
'days. The first signs of his passing
were noticed by The Washington
Post's Moscow correspondent, Dusko
Doder. The Post alerted U.S. gov-
ernment officials several hours be-
fore the first intelligence sightings
reached Washington.
After Chernenko had already been
anointed, the CIA's Kremlinologists
were still predicting that Mikhail
Gorbachev would be the new Soviet
leader. Not until Chernenko ap-
peared as head of the funeral com-
mission did the CIA conclude that
he had emerged as chief comrade.
He had been a low fourth on its list
of likely prospects.
How could America's multibillion-
dollar intelligence apparatus be
scooped by a lone journalist? Does
this mean our intelligence system
can't be relied upon to monitor the
decisions and actions of the Soviet -- computers can summo
d
i
n up
eta
led
leadership? _L, information about any Soviet leader.
In search of the answers, I exam- The agency has been able to diag.
road more -than 50 classified docu- nose their health, for example, with
ments, ranging from "Confidential" uncanny accuracy.
.to 'Top Secret Umbra." Ialso con-
sulted top CIA officials both Last July-ng before. the world
pest Neil any inkling. that Andropov was
.and present. y., ,. seriously :ill--I was Able .'to'-write:
..They.eoncede that-the CIA has no "Andropov's;days are numbered, and
di
t
i
li
rec
p
pe
nes into the Politburo he knows it. My CIA sources are bet-
d
an
few informants behind the grim,
fortress-like walls of the Kremlin.
They blame this on former president
Jimmy Carter, who virtually wiped
out the CIA's human-intelligence
network within the Soviet Union.
One insider, trying to explain Car-
ter's action, suggested that he prob-
ably believed "high-tech intelligence
had made old-fashioned intelligence
obsolete." Another source just
shrugged and said: "I think Carter
felt this kind of espionage was im-
moral."
Yet despite its blind spots, the
United States has the best techno-
logical intelligence in the world. U.S.
agencies can intercept messages,
break codes, monitor conversations
and photograph just about every-
thing that appears on the Soviet sur-
face. Some photographs are detailed
enough to identify a bolt in a Soviet
tank.
Because the old men of the Krem-
lin have been in power for decades,
the CIA has also had time to inves-
tigate their backgrounds and analyze
their behavior thoroughly. The CIA
ting that he will die within a year.
That's how bad his health
is. ? .. . Andropov's tenure as top
an in the Kremlin could be the
shortest in Soviet history."
Classified CIA reports, which de-
scribed Andropov down to the miss-
ing part of his right eyebrow, warned
that he would be "a formidable ad-
versary," skilled in political intrigue,
perfectly willing to use violence and
terror, dedicated to Marxist dogma,
"ruthless," and "cunning."
In contrast, top-secret reports de-
scribe Chernenko as a master bu-
reaucrat, skilled at "handling paper
work." Unlike Andropov, who sought
to put his own stamp on the Polit-
buro, Chernenko is expected to func-
tion more as "chairman of the
board." In the words of the CIA, he'll
be "responsible for seeing to it that
Politburo decisions are carried out-
that is, as the top civil servant of the
Politburo, not as its master."
Given his advanced age and frail
health (he's 72 and is reported to
have emphysema), Chernenko will
be another interim leader.
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UUNHULNTIAL
16 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Chronology Preceding Andropov Death Notice
1. Follows a chronology of Wire re o t'
r
1984 and
communications on the night of 9-10 February
Y precddngg
the Soviet announcement of the death of Yuriy Andropov: '
~n adv spry tom London=:Bureau repot ed hat .
IBC had ea ned that And, ropov'sson ;had ;returned
ome ~ t `f ` .~ ,.
f
ami }.;tea ons, BBC and LD were said
to"'be
alerf and watching Soviet media.
1815 Advisory from LD/BBC reported that as of 1800 EST
Moscow radio and television were-following their
l
regu
ar schedules.
Ops andCPAS citing reports that Moscow tad o,or
televis~ion=was bro'adcastin sb'
g om er.music. The
Wire editor advised callers of the LD/BBC media
advisory on Soviet media behavior.
1830 Wire editor called London Bureau on the telephone
(communications were temporarily down) to report
consumers' notification of alleged changes in Soviet
media behavior. London editor, after checking with
BBC, advised that Soviet media behavior appeared to
be normal. A followup message to London and to
Okinawa, which also monitors Soviet broadcasts, asked
for media updates.
2005 Advisory from :Okinawa reported normal Soviet media
behavior.
2105 Advisory from LD/BBC reported that television had
followed normal programming until its signoff at
2020 EST but did not carry its normal program preview.
No unusual behavior was noted on the major radios;
the Mayak music station was noted*to be broadcasting
classical music following a scheduled newscast.
2110 OCPAS senior watch officer called, having seen a
copy of the Okinawa advisory received via another
circuit, and asked to receive media advisories unedited.
The Wire complied and filed all subsequent advisories
to OCPAS.
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25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT;- Chronology Preceding Andropov Death.. Notice (2)
2230 Wire received a call from London editor, who
advised that BBC had staffed up for the night to
maintain -a watch on Soviet media.
2230 Senior Ops Officer called asking for analysis
of media behavior reports. The Wire contacted
an AG analyst, who subsequently arrived at Head-
quarters and maintained contact with OCPAS as well
calling London and Okinawa bureaus. (Analyst's
chronology is attached.)
2300' Advisory from LD/BBc re
ort
d
h
p
e
t
at major Soviet <
radios $were following normal
he
e
sc
dul
s, ut;,with,
so ber~,classical'' music being
g piaye
The Mayakd;between~pxograms
.music station was reported to have been
carrying classical
scheduled newsca music since 2000 EST except for
sts
.
,0100 LD/BBC 4advi-tor y
`reported; that Moscow.` TV had,: signed
on and was carryin
do
m
g.
cu
entaries. The 0000 EST
newscast was reported to have
i
carr
ed an earlier
broadcast leadership speech containing references to
Andropov. Major Soviet radios were reported..to...be
,carrying normal programs interspersed with classical
music. The Mayak station. continued to play classical
music. -
0240 A LD/BBC advisory reported that..-all Moscow-,-domestic
service radios ..linked up as
.usual:; to -;broadcast the
scheduled 0200 :EST ..
newscast., which..containedf an$ item
on' foreign reaction to 'Andr'opov's PRAVDA inter`view.
Following the newscast, the stations returned to in-
dependent scheduled programming.
0540 A LD/BBC wrapup of media observations over the previous
hours noted that Mayak at 1905 and 2305 EST had
prempted scheduled comedy programs to broadcast
classical music. Other domestic services had been
carrying scheduled programming. The Moscow international
English-language :;service. was reported'to";have ? preempted
a scheduled voice program at 0430 EST to carry solemn
music, which was followed by a scheduled newscast at
0500 EST.
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Chronology Preceding Andropov Death Notice (3)
Chief, Wire Services Staff
(Distribution: D/FBIS, C/OPS, C/DRD, -C/AG)
Okinawa , advisory at: this tune . as zwe11. as'. at