YOUR THURSDAY MEETING WITH REAR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER, 9 AUGUST 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000400800013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 8, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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8 August 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: Your Thursday Meeting with Rear Admiral Poindexter,
9 August 1.984
.1. You are scheduled to meet with Admiral Poindexter, Thursday evening
at 5:00 p.m. in his office.
2. The NSC had only one item for Thursday's agenda. This concerns:
3. For our part, you may wish to raise the following items:
-- Soviet Activities in the Grain Market. Last week during the DDCI's
session with Admiral Poindexter, the Admiral speculated that the
reason the Soviets were so active in the grain market now might be
that they were anticipating breaking the grain agreement just prior
to the election. This, of course, would be part of their effort
to embarrass the Administration. He asked what we thought of this
scenario and a response was promised. At TAB B is a paper that you
can hand over to the Admiral. This paper notes that: the Soviets
are indeed buying unusual amounts of grain from the US. Moreover,
we cannot exclude that they are planning actions that could involve,
or lead to an embargo--this is because delivery commitments are all
fairly early, September-December; none extend into next year.
However, the more likely explanation is that they are hedging against
a poor harvest outlook. (It is my understanding that this paper,
should you concur, will be turned into a NID.)
L-39 Aircraft for Nicaragua. Fritz Ermarth andl (have done
talking,points for you on this one, which are at TAB C. As
you know, L-39s may be slated for delivery to Nicaragua. These
trainer aircraft have hard points for gravity bombs and have had air-
to-air missiles associated with them. Thus, they could represent a
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JGI.RC 1
modest enhancement of Nicaraguan military capabilities. More
importantly, this could be the start of a progression leading to the
delivery of modern fighter aircraft to Nicaragua. The USG has a
stated policy that it will not countenance this, but the question is
just what will the USG do if L-39s are sent to Nicaragua; and after
that if MIGs are sent? It seems like this ought to be thought about
now. Also at this TAB are tables that describe the L-39 and other.
aircraft in the region.
Leaks. In light of the latest developments I have
asked for talking points, which are at TAB that a ow you to
stress your concerns about this most serious example of the
insecurity of national security information. Also at this TAB is the
DDI/CRES assessment of the damage caused by the JANES publication of
as well as the example in the Washington Post.
4. If I can be of any additional assistance as you prepare for this
meeting, please call
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TALKING POINTS ON JET FIGHTERS TO NICARAGUA
A majority of NFIB agencies believe that the Soviets will send L-39s to
Nicaragua before November as part of a process leading to the deployment of
MiGs later.
A more optimistic case can be made: The L-39s are a substitute for MiGs
for a long period, not a precursor to MiGs.
A much more pessimistic case is also possible: If the Soviets see that
L-39s will be tolerated, they may rush in MiGs before the election to
exploit a momemt of maximum inhibition on the US response. This may be
unlikely, but cannot be excluded.
Logic says (unfortunately we have no explicit evidence) the Soviets have two
motives:
Exploit US elections to introduce the fighters needed to give Nicaragua
a not-incredible air defense.
Create a nasty crisis (which they can afford to lose) to embarrass the
President acutely before November.
Which ever has priority, there is pressure on the Soviets to move fast.
This does not mean for certain they will act. Their inherent caution may
stop or slow-things down. But we cannot be sure at the moment.
The policy community is debating how to react: Should L-39s be treated
"just like MiGs" or should they be regarded as "tolerable"? Should we
precede L-39 arrival in Nicaragua, assuming we see them coming, with a
demarche to the Soviets, and of what content, or wait till they get there?
Should we try to ignore the matter until after the elections?
These issues are important, but they duck the crucial one: What are we
going to do if the "intolerable" (however defined) occurs? An air strike?
Covert/irregular operation of some kind? What? And with what confidence in
success?
We could try some "graduated escalation", such as constant overflights
of Nicaragua with threats to attack ground sites if fired upon, or
blockade actions.
This approach would draw the whole thing out, allow political pressures
on Washington to intensify, and possibly give the Soviets an opportunity
to out the screws to us elsewhere, specifically in Berlin.
When the US acts as a superpower in an East-West confrontational issue, it
must if at all possible act with swiftness, decisiveness, and awesome
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conclusiveness. Above all, if we warn that something is intolerable, it
will be disasterous for the President and for his foreign policy if we are
seen wallowing around in political and operational doubts.
This is exactly what happened to Jimmy Carter on the Soviet brigade in
Cuba; it helped end his presidency.
If the Soviets have a political aim beyond just getting jet fighters
into Nicaragua, it would be to do the same thing to Ronald Reagan.
The first order of business is to create the operational plan or plans to
take out aircraft targets, plans in which we have operational and political
confidence whenever they may be needed.
If there is real doubt about the willingness of the administration to
follow through on them when the intolerable occurs, then it would be
much better to back quietly away from the position that advanced
fighters are intolerable before there is a big bloodletting within the
bureaucracy.
Once the issues are squarely faced, there will probably be a strong desire
to keep the whole thing under wraps until after the elections.
Be prepared, however, for the L-39 story to leak. The opposition is
likely to start claiming that the Administration plans "acts of war"
against Nicaragua after the election.
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CENTRAL AMERICA-CUBA: SELECTED AIRCRAFT COMPARISONS
Aircraft Type Country Principal Uses/ Combat Speed* Armament*
(series inventor Employment Radius* (knots)
production (nm)
L-39 (1972) Cuba
Basic and advanced 320 378 L-39ZA (attack/recon
jet trainer; ground version): single 23 mm dual-
support/ barrelled cannon; four underwing
reconnaissance hardpoints which can accommodate
various combinations of bombs
up to 500 kgs; four air-to-
surface rocket pods (16 57mm
rockets each); infrared air-
to-air missiles
Super Mystere Honduras (14) Fighter; ground 250-350 650 Two 30-mm cannon; am carry
(1950s) support (Mach infrared air-to-air missiles,,
1.12) or two 500kg bombs
CASA-101 Honduras (2) Basic and advanced 150-200 350
(1978) trainer; ground
support
Can be fitted with six weapons
pylons for rocket pods, 125kg
or 250kg bombs, or pod-mounted
machineguns/tdn' *&.
Comment
Capable of
frc,A
unimproved
airstrips
Only three
operational--five to
seven flyable;
pilots fly only
about 2 hours per
month
Two more on
order, delivery
possible later
this month
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A-37B (1968)
Honduras (10)
Guatemala (10)
.El Salvador (5)
Ground support/
light attack
140
440
T-33 (1948)
Nicaragua (3)
Guatemala (3)
Limited ground
attack/counter-
insurgency role
378
455
:G-21
Cuba (114:
Fighter/
310-410
1,205
1960-1973)
20-C/E/F
interceptor;
(w/o ext
(Mach
94-J/L/N)
ground support
fuel
tanks)
2.1)
420-490
(w/ tanks)
lit . bW CAi
200 kgs of AN.
Can carry up to 2
,
conventional bombs and rockets on from sim_a
eight external wing pylons. One unimproved
62-mm minigun airstrips
7
.
16W Wvwinimw)
None as originally designed, Nicaragua uses T-33
but modified i 4ese-gus"Ir primarily for strip
oeee to accept Ever-ain-e alert; only tiro
rocket u der AI wing appear operational
~~ any one n believed
operational ii
Guatemala
Standard armament includes one
23-ma gun; four air-to-air
missiles, up to four 250kg or
500kg bombs,.or up to four
rocket pods with 16 or 32
rockets each
Prepared runway of
800-1,000 meters
required for
operation
NOTE: Figures given represent generalized characteristics which will vary according to mission, fuel, and payload.
This table is classified SECRET in its entirety.
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