NSPG MEETING ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR/BUCKLEY KIDNAPPING 30 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200450001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 30, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
SECRET
NSPG Meeting on Iran-Iraq W4r/Buckley Kidnapping
30 March 1984
Contents
Tab A The Revised Talking Points that You Requested
Tab B Draft CPPG Paper
Tab C Earlier Talking Points Prepared for You by Bob Gates and
Dick Kerr
Tab D DDI/NI0/NESA Review of the CPPG Paper
Tab E Graham Fuller Memo to You Concerning Support to the Iraqis
Tab F Recent NIDs F---]Indicating Dissension in Iran
Tab G
DDI/NESA Memos
-- Consequences of an Iraqi Collapse
-- Indicators of an Iranian Attack on Persian Gulf Oil
Facilities and of an Iraqi Collapse
Tab H The Oil Supply Picture (Prepared by Maurice Ernst)
-- NSDD 134
Tab I Talking Points on Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons (Prepared
by David Low)
DDI/NESA Memos on Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons
Mid-East Press Reports of Buckley's CIA Relationship
RFfRFT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
SECRET
29 March 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: NSPG on Iran-Iraq War/Buckley Kidnapping, 30 March 1984
1. You are scheduled to attend an NSPG, Friday, 30 March, from 11:00
to 12:00 in the White House Situation Room. Attendance is limited to
principals only; the subjects for discussion are the Iran-Iraq war and
the Buckley abduction. This is apparently intended as a discussion
session rather than a decisionmaking meeting.
2. At Tab A are the revised talking points that you requested.
3. With respect to the Iran-Iraq war, I am told that this meeting is
designed simply to review the actions we have taken to date.
4. I would note that a number of the deadlines suggested in this
paper appear to be the product of an awfully leisurely pace. It seems to
me that if we are really concerned about a possibly imminent Iraqi
collapse and forestalling that then these deadlines should be tightened.
5:` At Tab C are talking points for this meeting prepared for you by
Bob Gates and Dick Kerr. At Tab D is a review of the CPPG paper (which
is at Tab B) prepared by the DDI and Graham Fuller. At Tab E is a memo
from Graham Fuller to you that argues the need for aiding Iraq sooner
rather than later. The programs that he suggests include support to the
Iraqi air force and USG support for a pipeline which will relieve Iraq's
economic descent.
6. At Tab F are recent NIDs that indicate internal dissent
within the Iranian leadership--specifically, those items which suggest
pressure on Khomeini to end the war now. Page one of the CPPG review
notes that "Iran does not seem at all interested in a peacefully achieved
)EGRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
outcome and is apparently impervious to outside urging." You may want to
remind everybody that there is less than a totally united front in Iran
on continuation of the war. At Tab G are two memos prepared by
DDI/NESA: the first treats the consequences of an Iranian breakthough at
Al Basrah and the second is a discussion of indicators of a prospective
Iranian attack on Persian Gulf oil facilities and of an Iraqi collapse.
At Tab H is a brief memo prepared by Maurice Ernst on the oil supply side
of our Iran-Iraq war strategy. Also at this Tab is the recent NSDD on
this subject.
7. At Tab I are talking points prepared for you by David Low on
Iraqi use of chemcial weapons. At Tab J are two
b DDI/NESA on the Iraqi chemical weapons program
8. If I can do more to help, please call.
cc: DDCI
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 t. ?) : LorA 17- 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0 r-- r L
--
THE WHITE HOUSE 90351
Marc)
27, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TiE SECRETARY OF TIDE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF .-
SUBJECT: National Security-Decision Directive (NSDD-134)
on United States International Energy Policy
(S)
The attached National Security Decision Directive establishes
certain U.S. international energy policy goals and objectives.
(S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachment
NSDD-134
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 ~....... ~.. . .
SECRET swr SYS Ple 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 27, 1984
!NATIONAL SECURITY VECISIOH
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 134
United States international Energy Policy Goals and Ob4ectfves (S)
This Directive outlines certain U.S. international energy
policy goals. It is designed to supplement policy guidance
included in National Security Decision Directive Number 87.
Because it is desir4ble to maintain flexibility in order to be
able to tailor specific responses to the situation, only broad
guidelines will-be presented. (S)
1. Certain U.S. International Energy Policy Goals
The best policy to guarantee the continued flow of oil from
the Persian Gulf in the near term is to ensure, along with our
allies and countries in the area, freedom of navigation in the
Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as protection
of key oil production and transshipment facilities; and over
the longer term to favor increasing the number of alternative
outlets for Persian Gulf crude. (S)
The international energy policy of the U.S. concerning major
oil supply disruptions is based upon four fundamental princi-
ples:
o Primary reliance on free market forces.
Support for measures to enhance energy supplies in
an emergency. ?
Provision of energy supplies for defense and broader
national security purposes under all circumstances.
o International cooperation with other energy consum-
ing countries through the International Energy
Agreement (IEA) and other mechanisms to reduce
panic, minimize economic dislocations and assure
that the U.S. and its allies do not suffer unaccept-
able harm as a result of an oil supply shortfall,
(S)
Since the U.S. cannot escape the economic and geopolitical
consequences of a major oil supply disruption, we must be
prepared to deal with such a situation on a cooperative basis
with our allies. It is recognized, therefore, that some
flexibility is needed in developing an international response
to an energy disruption. Different countries have different
economic and political environments, as well as different
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B00420R000200450001-0
capaDilities to respond to a. supply interruption. U.S. policy
should strive to obtain commitments from our allies to
policies that will fairly share the burden and reduce the
adverse impacts of a major oil supply disruption by means
which accommodate the respective approaches of the U.S. and
its allies,. (S)
Ii. Implementation of U.S. International Policy Goals
Representatives of the U.S. should immediately begin to
discuss with or allies on a bilateral basis and with the
IE.A the nature of the problem and appropriate responses which
tailor each country's commitment to its capabilities. For the
U.S. this means primary reliance on free market forces and the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). While we must remain
flexible in order to be able to adapt to circumstances, the-
SPR can be a valuable U.S. tool to offset a world supply
shortfall. In most circumstances, an early draw of SPR oil in
large volumes will be our best poll
impato-a-major disruption. (S)
commitments to appropriate policies which include, but.are not
limited to:-coordinated stock behavior (bearing in mind the
need for flexibility of decision at the time of the dis-
ruption), an effective public information strategy. to calm the
market and other means to reduce their demand on world oil
markets.- In all circumstances we should encourage the major
consuming countries to increase stocks prior to a crisis,
encourage the expansion of our allies strategic oil and gas
stocks as the best means of dealing with a supply disruption,
and explore appropriate incentives within the IEA/OECD for
other countries to engage in pre-crisis stock building and
stock draws whin a, crisis occurs, (S)
Because less disruptive alternatives should be utilized first,
we should seek to postpone implementation of the IRA emergency
sharing system for as long as possible. If activation of the
IEA allocation program is required, the U.S. will stand behind
its commitment to the international Energy Program. (S)
III. Further Work
Because domestic oil production is the most secure and best
means of enhancing U.S, supplies in a shortfall, I direct the
lust our allies. {U)
Consistent with U.S. policy as stated above, in our dis-
cussions with other ccuntries, we should seek to obtain
In order to establish an effective public information strategy
in support of U.S. international- energy policy.. I direct the
Departnert of State and the Department of Energy to work
together to create expeditiously a framework--for-the--
dissemination of accurate information on international oil
market conditions and to create public understanding of the
fact that -- owing to the integrated nature of the world oil
market -- a major disruption and the resulting price increases
on the U.S. is inevitably a serious problem for us, and not
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B00420R000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
Secretary of Energy to conduct a thorough assessment of
short-term domestic supply measures, including further re-
search into the question of spare crude oil productive capaci-
ty in the United States, including the possibility of
increasing the flow of Alaskan oil southward. (S)
SECRET
SECIMT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
Iq
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP86B0042OR000200450001-0
OPERATIONS CENTER/CURRENT SUPPORT GROUP GD 9(/ )
News Bulletin FBIS Unnumbered Item 29 March 1984
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Item No. 1
(ATTN Cl ':PR STATE !MR ONLY: UNNUMBERED ITEM FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
NENP CITES KUWAIT! PAPER ON KIDNAPPED DIPLOMAT BUCK LEY
NC291046 CAIRO MEAA IN ARABIC 1031 GMT 29 MAR 84
(TEXT) KUWAIT! 29 MAR (MENA) -- THE KUWAIT; NEWSPAPER QPPPS
TODAY REPORTS THAT WILLIAM BVc'KL FY { THE' THIRD SECRETARY OF THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WHO MRS KIDNAPPED OUTSIDE HIS RESIDENCE
-IN LEBANESE C.{PI TRL HAS A IMPORTANT POST IN THE U.S. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I N THE MIDDLE EAST AND T PT HE JOINED THE !L ` I
STATE DEPARTMENT ONLY LAST YEAR.
THE PAPER SAYS BUCKLEY IS ONE OF THREE AMERICANS WHO WERE
ABDUCTED IN BEIRUT. I T QUOTES WELL INFORMED SOURCES AS SRYINO T==
0 SOVIET INTELLIGiENCE~>1ftETWWOR art'E T!N G IN SYRIA AND LEBANON
UNCOVERED B