U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS-A RETURN TO REALITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000200310027-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 22, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION ? 214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. ? WASHINGTON, D.C. ? 20002 ? [phone]
U.S. Soviet Relations-A Return to Reality
President Reagan's January 16 foreign policy address,
followed one week later by a presidential report to the
Congress that the Soviet Union has violated arms control
agreements, marked a turning point in Soviet-American rela-
tions. The President's address was in response both to the
complaints of the Soviet leadership and to the prophets of
gloom and doom on both sides of the Atlantic. Leading the
chorus of gloom, with expressions of bitterness and distress at
the failure of their four year effort to halt the deployment of
new Western missiles, the Soviet leadership broke off
Intermediate Nu-
clear Force talks at
Geneva and refused
to set a resumption
date for the START
talks on strategic
nuclear weapons:
This interruption
of the major arms
control negotiations
between East and
West, following on
the Soviet destruc-
tion of KAL Flight
007, was the final
nail in the coffin of
the policy of detente
that began collaps-
ing after the Soviet
invasion of Afghani-
stan in December
1979.
Following the
downing of the Ko-
rean airliner last
September 1, rela-
tions between the
superpowers percep-
falsehoods and shameless deception. With the Soviets threat-
ening to shoot down other planes that might stray over their
territory, and continuing to encourage European opposition to
the deployment of Western missiles, relations deteriorated
further.
To these events; must be added the novel appearance of
senior Soviet military commanders as press conference brief-
ers, the announcement of Soviet counter-deployments of mis-
siles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the disappear-
ance for six months of Yuri Andropov, generating speculation
about a power strug-
gle in the Kremlin.
All this has com-
bined to cause a con-
siderable increase in
anxiety in some sec-
tors of the public
and the media, both
here and in Europe.
The Soviets have
tried to take full ad-
vantage of this anxi-
ety with a massive
public relations
campaign portray-
ing the Reagan Ad-
ministration as lead-
ing the world toward
war. After the ac-
tion in Grenada and
the deployment of
Pershing II missiles
in Europe, the So-
viet press raved
about imperialist
aggression, a new
stage in the arms
race, U.S. militaris-
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
The death of Soviet President Yuri Andropov underscores the main
points made in this issue-that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union
requires national unity and constancy of purpose. The leadership of the
Soviet Union does not change rapidly; those aging leaders who have been
determining policy for the past year very likely will continue to do so. But
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union now have a new opportunity.
It is an opportunity to offer the Soviet leadership a new beginning, a
chance to improve relations regardless of past statements or actions by
either side. The President has made clear his desire to find a formula to re-
duce armaments and to establish a better relationship. Just a month ago
he offered to begin a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations based on peaceful
competition and constructive cooperation. He has now repeated that offer
to the Soviet leadership. This could be their opportunity to break with the
past and begin to move away from the policies that produced an
unprecedented military buildup and global adventurism. They could
begin by returning to the START negotiations, by saying publicly that
they will not attack civilian airliners in the future and by initiating the
withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. Such moves would be in the
mutual interest of both countries and world peace. More than ever, the
U.S. must present an image of bipartisan resolve to the Soviet Union. If
we do so and they seize the moment, it could be the beginning of a new
and better relationship.
tibly deteriorated. The Western response to the airliner
incident was relatively restrained; for example, Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko was refused permission to land at New
York and subsequently chose not to attend the U.N. General
Assembly session. But this and the President's strong denunci-
ation of the Soviet action apparently was felt keenly in the
Kremlin, which issued a counter-statement by Andropov
attacking the United States. Soviet belligerence reached a
new high as the Soviet press charged the U.S. with cynicism,
tic policies upsetting the balance of power, and even the
threat of war. The resulting uneasiness has led a number of
Europeans to call for a return to detente, which is an article of
faith for many on the continent.
These Europeans have found echoes in America from those
who consider any arms control talks, no matter how unsuc-
cessful, as mandatory rituals that somehow ensure peace
between East and West. Critics of the administration have
talked of a return to the Cold War and warned darkly of a
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slide toward nuclear war. For example, Averell Harriman has
written that we may be facing "the reality of nuclear war."
Columnist Joseph Kraft blamed "Pentagon hawks" (rather
than the Russians) for casting "a dark shadow" over the
future. The Washington Post and others have predicted "a
cold winter," while Time magazine in making Reagan and
Andropov co-Men of the Year implied equal culpability for
the deterioration in relations. The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists reflected the new mood by moving the hands of its
doomsday clock (surely the most discontinuous timepiece in
history), from four to three minutes before midnight.
The administration's critics have suggested that its commit-
ment to rebuilding our military strength, together with its
firm position both in the arms control talks and in deploying
new missiles to Europe, are the causes of the Soviets' antago-
nistic attitude. In other words, it's all the U.S.'s fault. Their
solution is for the President to make concessions to "restore
the dialogue," and then begin moving back toward a policy of
detente.
THE FAILURE OF DETENTE
Yet the evidence is clear that detente was a failure, at least
for the West. It is interesting what the Soviets say about
detente. The official Russian history entitled Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-1980, edited by no less than Andrei Gromyko,
explains that "The policy of detente being pursued by the
Soviet Union impedes the maneuvers of the aggressive forces
of imperialism... ". It is no wonder the men in the Kremlin like
detente.
More important, detente harmed U.S. interests. Initiated
early in the Nixon Administration to enlist Soviet cooperation
in ending the Vietnam War, detente was the hope that a web
of economic and social relationships could be developed
between the West and the USSR that would provide more
consumer goods for the Soviet people, create openings to a
closed society and gradually modify the aggressive expansion-
ism of the Soviet state. The key element of the policy was an
improvement in economic ties between East and West. It was
believed that these economic ties would become so important
to Russian development that the Soviets would moderate their.
international behavior rather than risk losing them. Thus, it
was a carrot and stick approach to dealing with the Soviets.
Economic incentives were the carrot and their withdrawal
was to be the stick. But it failed to work that way from the be-
ginning. The Soviets did not link their economic interests with
their international military or political behavior. While the
West held down military expenditures, the Soviets increased
theirs. They saw detente as a means of neutralizing the West
while they continued to stir up trouble to suit their own
purposes in the third world. They supported foreign adven-
tures in Angola, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and
Central America, finally conducting a blatant invasion of
Afghanistan, apparently without giving a second thought to
jeopardizing their economic ties to the West. Nor did their
economic relations deter them from suppressing the free trade
union movement in Poland.
As it turned out, the ties that were supposed to constrain
the Soviets instead deterred the West from taking firm action
against Soviet aggression. When martial law was imposed in
Poland, President Reagan's advisers convinced him to do
their military buildup, taking advantage of trade with the
West and the transfer of advanced Western technology to
develop strategic superiority and maintain it through an
aggressive program of military modernization 'and growth.
Part of that drive for strategic superiority was the develop-
ment and deployment of 360 modern mobile SS-20 missiles,
248 of which presented a new and serious threat to Western
Europe. It also included a dramatic increase in the number of
Soviet warheads on their intercontinental missiles, together
with improvements in accuracy. Soviet conventional forces,
and particularly the /Soviet navy, grew in strength far in
excess of Soviet defense needs.
Growing Soviet military strength, combined with the am-
bivalent attitude of the Carter Administration toward U.S.
allies and Soviet adventurism, enabled the Soviets to support
military activities through surrogates around the globe. The
fruits of detente, during which U.S. military power fell
sharply vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, left the United States a
helpless giant during the last years of the Carter Administra-
tion, unable or unwilling to defend U.S. global interests.
? President Reagan promised to set all this right, offering the
politics of optimism after four years of pessimism. He has
accomplished much of what he set out to do and now proposes
a new relationship with the Soviets based on the reality of
restored American power, with a renewed economy and
credible military strength, and a clear conception of the
Soviet Union as a predatory imperialist power.
Based on realism, strength and dialogue, the new policy
toward the USSR projects a credible deterrent, offers peace-
ful competition and proposes constructive cooperation. This
new posture of firmness and commitment, combined with an
offer of peaceful collaboration, must have come as a shock to
the Soviet leadership. After investing immense resources in
their quest for permanent military superiority, they now
confront the reality that their goal cannot be attained. Their
efforts to use arms control talks and international peace
movements to prevent the deployment of modern missiles in
Europe have failed. It is not surprising that they have sus-
pended the START and INF talks and are searching for a
new way to confront this unusual American president.
THERE IS A DIALOGUE
One of the most frequently heard criticisms is the need to
"restore the dialogue" with the Soviet Union. This implies
that there is no dialogue. On the contrary,-we arc dealing with
the Soviet Union both bilaterally and multilaterally in a
number of forums and on a number of issues, including arms
control. Examples are:
nothing more meaningful than order the lighting of candles,
sadly reminiscent of Jimmy Carter's refusal to light the
national Christmas tree during the Iranian hostage crisis.
Yet the most significant failure of detente was in the 52
military balance. Through the years of detente the Soviets
1
-The hot line. Despite the harsh rhetoric of recent
months, Soviet and U.S. expefis have been meeting
quietly to discuss ways of further improving the hot line
and other communications channels between the U.S.
and the USSR.
-Nuclear proliferation. The Soviets have continued a
regular pace of discussions with the United States on
ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an issue
that is clearly in the mutual interest of both nations.
-The CDE. The 35-nation Conference on Disarmament in
Europe now is meeting for a nine-week session in Stock-
holm to discuss European security issues. Despite the
anti-American tone of his opening address, Gromyko
said the Soviets would consider the Western proposals for
improved confidence building measures in Europe.
-MFBR. After refusing in December-to set a date for the
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Insiders Report
Tracking the Policy Process in Washington
A Time for Bipartisanship
THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR
Overhanging everything else is the uncertainty concerning
the Soviet leadership following the death of Yuri Andropov.
While Konstantin Chernenko has emerged as leader of a
geriatric troika, it is difficult to predict how long this interim
leadership will last.
The Soviets always have given great emphasis to collective
leadership and the lengthy Brezhnev illness followed by the
long Andropov disappearance has given them an opportunity to
demonstrate how they can collectively keep their system op-
erating. Despite speculation that the military or the KGB may
be in the ascendancy, informed observers claim there is little
hard evidence that either is the case. It is believed that the
Communist Party continues to be the dominant political force
in the USSR, operating through the Politburo and the party
Secretariat. The four newest Politburo members all have
economic or industrial backgrounds (two are electrical
engineers), supporting the view that the leadership has been
devoting primary attention to the country's chronic economic
problems.
Considering the Soviet obsession with seniority, it is gener-
ally assumed that the Soviet Union has been operating for the
past six months under a troika consisting of Defense Minister
Dmitri Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and
Konstantin Chernenko, who was widely considered a likely
successor to Brezhnev. As the three most senior members of
the Politburo (each has at least 53 years membership in the
Communist Party), they are among the most powerful and
well-entrenched members of the leadership. Until a new leader
appears, this collective leadership of old party apparatchiks
probably will continue to run things.
This does not mean that the U.S. should not try to improve
relations. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership now has a rare
opportunity to break with the past, to begin to establish a new
relationship based on a recognition of the new reality of a
stronger and more resolute America. The Soviets have tried
mightily to establish strategic superiority at great cost to their
economy and the well-being of their people. One estimate is
that they spent half a trillion dollars on their strategic buildup,
and their development of a nationwide anti-ballistic missile
defense means many more billions in the years ahead.
Given the intransigence of the Soviet leadership, the likeli-
hood of an improvement in relations is a long shot. Still, it is
worth a try. Their emphasis on improving their economy, if
combined with a recognition that the U.S. will not permit them
to achieve strategic superiority, could encourage a move to-
ward a new relationship. This may be the first chance in nearly
30 years for the Soviets to initiate basic changes. They have the
opportunity to bury the Brezhnev/Andropov policies along
with Andropov. President Reagan has offered dialogue and
cooperation. If the Soviets perceive that his offer is backed by
.
.
p
p
a
ese
agreement on t
ship, and to support the President's call for peaceful compe- /~ strength, unity and constancy of purpose, it could mark a new
ti?ion . ith it,. i 1CCit_ - 54 begtnnini.
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CO-E
With the full House and one-third of the Senate up for re-
election in 1984 the temptation will be great to play politics
with foreign policy issues. No one would suggest that the
administration should have a free hand just because it is an
election year, but an overly contentious debate on the basic
elements of US.-Soviet policy, or a major effort to make sharp
cuts in the defense modernization program, could only encour-
age the Soviets to continue their uncooperative attitude.
Just as the Soviets seek to exploit disagreements between
the United States and its NATO allies, the appearance of
policy differences between the administration and the Con-
gress encourages them to try the same thing here. Addressing
the need for unity in the Western alliance, Henry Kissinger
stated recently in Brussels that "The West need not panic at a
period of deadlock. Its economy for all its shortcomings is
more vital; its governmental structure stabler and its overall
power greater. The alliance can thus face a period of holding
firm with confidence - provided it preserves its unity." An-
other former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
calling the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations "quite nor-
mal" in view of the natural antagonisms of our differing
political systems, added that the Soviets were making some
headway at "pumping up artificially an atmosphere of crisis."
There is a need for Western unity in avoiding, as Brzezinski
puts it "public hysteria," or to use Kissinger's phrase, a
"desperate longing for a negotiating gimmick." Evidence of
desperate longings in the Congress will only further encourage
Soviet intransigence.
On occasion the Congress has pulled together to demon-
strate a united front on issues relating to the Soviet Union.
Recent examples were the 93-0 Senate vote asking the Presi-
dent to report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control
agreements, the unanimous Senate resolution of last November
calling for a ban on imports of Soviet products made by forced
labor, the unanimous House resolution condemning the Soviet
Union for shooting down KAL Flight 007, and the Senate
resolution calling for aid to the Afghan freedom fighters that
passed with 99 co-sponsors in late 1982. These are examples of
congressional actions that send a clear and unambiguous signal
to Moscow.
Unlike the Supreme Soviet, which approves the policies of
the Soviet leadership without dissent, the Congress rarely
achieves unanimity, thereby demonstrating its reflection of the
diverse views of a democratic society. But a greater degree of
support by the Congress for the basic elements of U.S. policy
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would help move the Soviets toward a
more cooperative attitude. The President's January 16 foreign
policy address, setting forth the guiding principles of our
approach to the Soviet Union as realism, strength and dialogue
cannot be very contentious among Americans. It should be
possible for Democrats and Republicans alike to reach general
-Soviet relation-
S
les of the U
rinci
sic
b
h
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resumption of the Vienna talks between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact on the reduction of military forces in
central Europe, the Soviets agreed in January to return
to those talks on March 16.
-The CD. The 40-nation Committee on Disarmament,
which meets in Geneva under UN auspices, is now in
session with U.S. and Soviet representatives actively
participating in the discussions of both the chemical and
radiological weapons working groups.
-Boundary talks. The Soviet Union agreed in January to
resume discussions with the U.S. to define the precise
location of the 1867 boundary between Alaska and
Siberia, to avoid possible friction over oil, mineral and
fishing rights in the Bering Straits.
-The grain agreement. The five-year U.S.-Soviet grain
agreement signed last August shortly before the downing
of KAL Flight 007 has survived the angry rhetoric and
remains in effect.
Thus, there is a continuing dialogue with the Soviets on a
number of issues. There is no shortage of channels for commu-
nication, either bilateral or multilateral, nor is there any lack
of willingness on the part of the United States to engage in
discussions.
SOVIET POSITION DETERIORATING
To the men in the Kremlin, the world posture of the Soviet
Union must appear to be deteriorating. While the U.S.
defense budget has not grown as rapidly as the Reagan
Administration originally intended, there have been major
improvements since the Carter years, when American power
and influence reached its postwar nadir. Despite congressional
reductions in the rate of increase in defense spending, the
Administration is proceeding with the production and devel-
opment of new weapons systems. After years of uncertainty
and on-again, off again appropriations, the B-1 bomber, the
10-warhead MX missile and the Trident II submarine missile
are or soon will be in production, while research and develop-
ment is proceeding on more advanced systems such as the
stealth bomber and a new ballistic missile defense. The
president has issued a report- of Soviet violations of arms
control treaties, which is likely to lead to an acceleration of
our program to develop a strategic defense.
Even more disruptive to Soviet adventurism is the rapid
buildup of the U.S. Navy. With the 600 ship navy moving
toward reality, more than 100 ships are now under construc-
tion; the battleship New Jersey is operating in a combat
environment off the Lebanese coast, three more battleships
are being modernized and three nuclear carriers are under
construction. As the number of deployable carrier battle
groups increases from 12 to 15, together with four surface
action groups centered around battleships, the Navy will be
able to extend major complements of U.S. striking power
around the globe.
The Soviets face this prospect of a significant U.S. military
buildup as they review the shambles of their massive propa-
ganda campaign to prevent the deployment of Pershing II and
cruise missiles to Europe. For months the Soviets had warned
the world of dire consequences if the deployment was not
canceled. But as the missiles enter operational units, the main
result seems to be apprehension on the part of the Russians'
Eastern European allies. The persistent Soviet warnings
followed by the installation of additional missiles of their own 3
in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have caused consider-
able distress in Eastern Europe, posing new problems for the
Soviets in their restive sphere of control.
These are only the most recent in a series of- events that
have put the Soviets on the defensive. Caught in a quagmire
of their own making in Afghanistan, they have failed to
achieve their goals in Africa, the Middle East or Latin
America. Their proxies have been evicted from Jamaica by
free elections, from Grenada by U.S. power and from Suri-
nam and Ethiopia by the local governments. The European
political parties most amenable to Soviet pressure were de-
feated overwhelmingly by the voters of Britain, Germany and
Italy. A strongly pro-Western government in Japan is increas-
ing. its defense spending.
Faced with American resolve, growing U.S. military and
economic strength, and the continued unity of the Western
alliance, the Soviets have realized no foreign policy or mili-
tary successes, unless the continued uneasy subjugation of the
Polish people can be called a success, since the Reagan
Administration came to office.
It is ironic that American success and growing Soviet
failure are seen by some as a problem and a danger. We have
become so inured to Soviet advances that it requires an
adjustment in our thinking to realize that America is nnw
leading the tide of events and the Soviet Union is reacting to
them. Yet a hallmark of the Soviet system has been its
constancy of purpose, while we have all too often wavered in
our resolve. The challenge for the year ahead is for America to
remain steady, to continue the military renewal that has been
started, to reject Soviet threats and efforts at intimidation,
and to devote the necessary resources to the rapid develop-
ment of modern weapons systems such as a strategic defense
for North America, that will assure our security and that of
the free world in the coming decades.
The Soviets are determined to divide the Western alliance.
Their state-controlled propaganda machine has now been
turned from its effort to stop the NATO missile deployments
to a new focus on a greater challenge-to divide Europe from
America. Every statement by the Soviet leadership, and the
outpourings of TASS and Pravda, appear designed for this
purpose. Gromyko's harsh attacks on the U.S. are warnings to
the Europeans. And when Soviet belligerence -brings forth-aft
calls for appeasement, either from Europe or from within
America, our adversaries are encouraged to redouble their
efforts. While no one is attracted to the Soviet system for its
democratic ideals, many fear Soviet power and are tempted to
make concessions to it.
The U.S. stands ready to return at any time to the START
and INF talks, but it must be from a position of tough-minded
reality. The protection of U.S. security interests requires
simpler and less ambiguous agreements, with ironclad veri-
fication provisions and a pre-determined U.S. compliance
policy that is understood and agreed upon within the govern-
ment, as a prerequisite of any new treaty with the Soviets.
Despite the potential divisiveness of the presidential and
congressional election campaigns, we must not permit our
relations with the Soviets, or our basic national security
policies, to become partisan political issues this election year.
Most Americans can agree on that, even though they may
disagree on the details of those policies. Only if we demon-
strate unity and constancy of purpose, both here at home and
within the Western alliance, will the Soviets accept the new
reality of relations with a strong and resolute America.
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