OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS: 1947 TO 1985 (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00124R000100020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS: 1947 TO 1985
This brief history of the CIA Office of Communications (OC)
provides a general understanding of the office, where it came
from, why it is necessary, and a sense of the difficult and
important tasks it has performed since World War II. Many of
those tasks supported highly sensitive projects undertaken by the
Central Intelligence Agency, however, the discussion avoids the
use of highly classified and compartmented information in the
interests of a wider readership.
The history of the office of Communications is similar to
that of dynamic private enterprises operating during this
period. It has been marked by initiative, development, growth,
and then divestiture. The office has been the progenitor of key
programs now located in the Directorate of Science and Technology
and other offices in the Directorate of Administration. Agency
activity in communications,
and study of compromising emanations) began as OC programs. In
support of the Agency's domestic communications activities --
recently made a responsibility of the Office of Information
Technology -- OC has adapted a commercial computer to become the
standard terminal for domestic communications, engineered the
largest secure telephone system in government and is designing a
modern local area network information distribution capability.'
The core mission, the provision of telecommunications support for
overseas activities, has remained as the base challenge for the
office.
satellite communications and TEMPEST (the investigation
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In the Beginning
The Office of Strategic Services was demobilized in 1945 in
the great rush to dismantle the machines of war and bring the
boys home. But the vital services provided by the far-flung
network of the OSS Communications Branch, could not be summarily
terminated and many of the OSS communicators remained abroad.
When the remnants of OSS were divided between the departments of
State and War, the Communications Branch was given to the
Department of War, which established a Strategic Services Unit
(SSU) to absorb the transferred OSS elements. The Operational
Auxiliaries Branch -- predecessor of today's Directorate of
Administration -- was formed within the SSU and became the home
of the Communications Branch.
The SSU found itself with a substantial communications
capability. There were facilities and communications people in
Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, the Near East, the
Mediterranean region, China, India-Burma, and in the United
States. In 1946 the Communications Branch had 324 people
operating 63 circuits, 22 radio stations, and 31 radio links. It
is noteworthy that twenty-three of the circuits were operated by
non-communications personnel who performed communications
functions as a collateral duty. This tradition of the
customer-operated circuit supported by communications
professionals is an old and successful one which continues today.
The former OSS Communications Branch thus immediately became
an active member of the larger government community with elements
In 1946, the Washington message center was straining under
the load of 20,000 coded groups per day. An equivalent volume is
now transmitted in under three hours over a 100 words-per-minute
on-line circuit (over which encryption and transmission are
accomplished simultaneously) and would be little more than a blip
on modern high speed data circuits, an indication of how
technology has helped the communicator over the years.
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In January 1946, President Harry S. Truman directed that the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy assign persons and facilities
from their respective departments to collectively form a Central
Intelligence Group (CIG) under a Director of Central
Intelligence. Six months later the SSU and its Communications
Branch, which had various titles but hereafter will be referred
to as OC, were transferred to the CIG.
OC was faced with a number of tasks upon becoming part of an
independent agency. Interestingly, the most demanding were
associated with unanticipated requirements to provide service
where OSS had not. The CIG was directed to assume the
intelligence mission from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
Latin America. This was the beginning of the CIA Latin American
morse network. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover did not particularly
welcome the unsolicited help, and CIG's takeover of the 14 FBI
stations was a somewhat contentious affair. Beyond the turf
struggle, the main problem CIG encountered was recruiting enough
technically qualified people willing to accept assignment to
South America. An analysis of the problem indicated that
recruitment efforts were inefficient and the salary offered for
communicators was too low, especially since the technical and
security standards were so high that only a few qualified people
could meet them. People were eventually found and trained and
communications responsibilities at the sites were assumed by OC.
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The first memorandum of understanding concerning OC
communications support was signed in April 1947 by OC and the
Foreign Broadcast Intercept Branch (FBIB), now the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The memorandum called for
OC to render advice and assistance to meet FBIB communications
needs and allowed FBIB to draw from OC stocks but be responsible
for its own equipment except on cryptographically protected
circuits. Although FBIS no longer draws from OC stocks, that
modus operandi characterizes today's relationship between FBIS
and OC.
The final days of CIG saw the establishment of its own
domestic receiver site at and the move of the
transmitter site to overseas, a facility
was selected as an experimental base
linking the United states and Europe and performing the special
services it continues to provide.
Agency Configuration: 1947 to 1951
The Central Intelligence Agency was established by law on 26
July 1947 and CIG ceased to exist when CIA was officially
activated on 18 September 1947. The CIG Communications Branch
moved to CIA and continued to function in the new organization as
it had under OSS, the SSU and CIG. Almost immediately OC was
again pressed to expand when the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) ask the Associate Director for Special operations to
determine if a communications support station was required in
North Africa. That the question was put to the
operations chief reflected the fact that OC had moved from the
CIG support arm to the CIA operational arm. Over the years, OC
has moved between support and operations and existed as an
independent office, with no lasting agreement regarding where the
function belongs in an intelligence agency. OC saw the expanded
tasking as an opportunity to gain the resources needed to meet a
growing number of requirements which demanded a more extensive
worldwide network. There were ever growing traffic loads; FBIS
was increasin its operations at Headquarters and at eight field
sites; the required secure
communications in and the new CIA Office of
Policy Coordination (OPC) was asking for broadcast services,
communications in support of covert action, and personnel
training. Demand invariably exceeded supply. The office always
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encountered difficulty in generating the enthusiasm and gaining
the resources to fully satisfy such needs. Nonetheless
developed plans calling for people for training and
planning; an operations staff in the Far East for project
support; a technical staff for projects a trams
programs
radio bases in
ore people for
n Europe, and personnel
support a capitalization program.
OC, in what was to become a customarily difficult swim in
the bureaucratic waters, pushed for the resources necessary to
complete the buildup. In this era of clandestine support, OC
leaders looked upon staff communications and support to
non-clandestine customers as a drain of resources away from the
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primary mission. Thus there were suggestions that
established in CIG days, be turned over to save
positions if additional resources were not forthcoming. (This
tactic was a mistake repeated by OC in later years when an hiatus
of CIA activity in Africa was accompanied by a withdrawal of OC
communicators. Faced with the loss of CIA-operated radio
communications, and with no reliable commercial or military
communications to fall back on,
(This persistent understrength would continue to dog the office
in the future.)
The DCI was also forced to intervene between the Directors
of Special Operations and Policy Coordination to prevent
duplication of communication structures and efforts. Because OPC
felt that it was not receiving adequate support from OC for its
covert action programs or in the training of its personnel to
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OPC and OC efforts be combined and that OC do a better job of
serving all customers.
OC then buckled down and following its "can-do" tradition,
compiled an impressive record of achievements over the next few
perform communications tasks, it had started to build an
independent communication capability. The DCI directed that the
years. A training site was purchased in Northern Virginia,
and OC began to meet its training obligations to
OPC. (The training complex was later to serve as the home for
the domestic receiver and transmitter stations.) The first OC
radio operator class enrolled in June 1951. A healthy budget in
1951 allowed for continued work on base stations even though
plans for an West coast or Alaskan base were
canceled. The record of base station accomplishment can best be
recorded by year.
1948 - Thel (base was completed.
1949 - was named as a base.
1950 - was established as a sub-base.
1950 -I was established as a sub-base.
1950 - as the Middle
Eastern base ecause was ju ge too politically
unstable). The Agency a so took on a military project
1950 - A~ base was established at thel site,
a location now used as a repair and logistics facility.
The receiver site was moved to in 1951 and
remained there until local pol ica considerations
force a move in 1976.
1950 - A mobile sleeper base -- a facility with
installed operational equipment which is activated only
during contingency circumstances -- was installed in
and activated in 1951 while permanent
structures were being built. This was one of several
times that OC base operations were conducted in mobile
vans.
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Base complex was activated at
request for cooperative
communications support in the Far East.
1951 -
base.
was activated as a small, special purpose
The sub-bases of the early 50s are the mini-relays of
today. Then as now it was recognized that a network structured
around a single major base is subject to the perturbations of
nature, politics and other forces, much more so than a network
structured around several smaller, geographically dispersed_
sites. Over the years, larger facilities in and
had to be closed before operations were placed in jeopardy
by l political events. Early sleeper type minor relays were
were used to relay morse code
Later
messages
from other South American stations when direct contact with
Headquarters was difficult due to low power and poor north/south
radio paths. Many other stations were used for mini-relay
functions over the years.
This period also saw the beginning of the Area Headquarters
distributed management approach still used by OC. Ten different
sites were used as Area Headquarters at various times during the
1950s. The first meeting of area management personnel, not yet
called Area Chiefs, was held in 1951
Diverse Challenge: 1947 to 1965
This was a dynamic and rewarding period for people in
OC. They became accustomed to ever growing demands and expansion
to meet these demands. They were led by entrepreneurs trained
during World War II when moving ahead was more important than
technical refinements and detailed planning. The period
represents the height of OC influence as an organization. It
operated as
a technical trainer a supporter of covert
action projects, and as a se -su is ent service organization
with integrated communications security, logistics, personnel and
training capabilities.
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The office demanded a great deal from its people to meet its
commitments. Time after time, awards, salary increases, and
medals were turned down on the basis that excellence was expected
of OC people. This management philosophy appeared to motivate
the employee of this era to greater heights of performance and
pride in the office. But, the lack of formal recognition has
left little historical record of the exceptional and often heroic
performance by hundreds of communications personnel in the China
theater after World War II, during the Korean War, the various
wars, coups, and revolutions in the Middle East and Latin
America, during the death of colonialism in Africa, in jungle
if not properly in annals
among the last to leave
officers
. Imbedded in memory,
when relations were broken, of
ever as an employee een
known to abandon his or her post in the face of danger unless
ordered to do so by higher authority, or allow classified
material to fall into the wrong hand due to inaction.
The early OC communicator was both a radio operator and a
technician; thus the job title of Communications Technician,
Radio (CTR). Electronic technicians handled the radio frequency
equipment and the wire technicians worked on the
electro-mechanical teletype and crypto machines. The
cryptographic. systems of the day were either one-time pad or
one-time tape. The cryptographic process required that each
letter of the classified message be combined with a letter of
randomly produced key (used only one time -- hence the name). In
the one-time pad system the key was printed on paper and the
process was done manually with a pencil and paper. In the
one-time tape system the key took the form of perforated tape and
the process was done on a teletype-like device. Those systems,
when used correctly, offer absolute security and are still used
for backup purposes. Specialists retained for this
labor-intensive job were called Communications Technician,
Cryptographic (CTC). These employees staffed the Headquarters
signal center and supplemented high volume overseas posts. There
were a few engineers, most of whom did not hold a degree but
became certified as engineers. Even fewer employees were hired
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family over the years. Finally, OC hired and used many logistics
employees who later moved to the Office of Logistics but forever
as utility specialists to install and maintain large base station
generators. Because the newer cryptographic equipment being
installed resisted working in overheated and inadequately powered
facilities, the utility specialists soon became involved in air
conditioning and no-break power systems. (In OC fashion, the
troops had previously worked in shorts and undershirts in the
tropics; air conditioning was considered too expensive to provide
for mere people.) Several other occupational specialities were
staffed with people seeking a career path out of the operator and
technician ranks. Communications security officers were
initially drawn mainly from the CTC ranks but included those from
the technician and CTR ranks as systems became more technical.
Security officers later included engineers as the communications
security community began to understand TEMPEST and the
seriousness of the threat from compromising emanations.
Operations officers, those who and managed
overseas networks, were drawn principally from CTRs. OC also
employed various other disciplines during this period. The cable
secretariat employee at Headquarters was adept at message
analysis and distribution. A small cadre of telephone
specialists kept the unclassified system running on a shoestring
for years and nurtured an infant secure voice system that grew to
become the largest in government. Secretaries traveled the world
to support OC activities and provided a sense of office
management professionalism and consistency. Many employees with
trade skills were employed at the training installation to
support base station and training needs, and various support
professionals have served with distinction as members of the OC
felt the family tie with OC.
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Important technical progress was made during this period.
In the beginning, OC radio operators used morse code to send
messages encrypted in the one-time pad. The late 1950s saw a
gradual shift to radio teletype and one-time tape operation. The
informal radio teletype network was formalized in 1959 with the
introduction of standardized procedures and routings which define
the CIA network of today. On-line communications were introduced
in 1959 with the establishment of KW-26 links between Washington
and F-----]and Washington and
More Change: 1966 to 1985
This period was ushered in with a technical achievement that
would affect how the office would do business in the future and
which would permit a great increase in the flow of information
without more people. The MAX I message switch was activated-at
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in 1965. Similar switches were
installed at Headquarters and the U.S. Base Station in 1968.
These computer message switches, some of the first to be used by
civilian agencies, meant the end of the base station sweat shop
environment with its ever increasing need for more paper tape
machines and people to process the tape. Technology had allowed
for improved service to the customer, and had improved the
quality of life for the OC communicator.
This success, along with the obvious trends of the future,
spelled the end of the OC entrepreneur manager with little
technical education but a lot.of street sense. This managerial
type was in the main gradually replaced with the technocrat who
was more organized and less inclined to take risks. New
technology also called for new expertise and OC soon developed a
group of automation specialists mainly from the ranks of the
cryptographers to tend to switch software and technicians to
maintain the new line printers and computers. The growth of
automated systems, e.g. the DATEX data switch, and voice systems,
induced the office to create a Domestic Networks Division in the
mid-1960s with the concurrent need for telephone and data
specialists to staff these facilities.
OC still needed to staff overseas positions. The overseas
personnel and their families were faced with demanding and
dangerous missions in
le East,
to name a
few. OC reacted by resisting the specialization trend and
attempting to force all to take their turn serving overseas.
This was the source of some tension between those who wanted to
settle down in one place and specialize, and the managers who had
to relieve personnel serving in ever more hostile overseas
environments. Those who did serve continued the OC tradition of
service with distinction.
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In the early 1970s OC moved to provide more reliable
overseas circuitry with a satellite program based upon the
Defense Satellite Communications System. This program proved to
be extremely successful, if expensive. OC then moved to automate
the manual message distribution process in Headquarters with the
Cable Dissemination System and to install more message switches.
This left the office with a system that provided reliable
circuits when the satellites were working, efficient message
switching systems and a semi-automated message distribution
system. The field station was then looked at as the next logical
step for improvement but the results were mixed. An experimental
automated field terminal (AFT) project drew the attention of
Agency customers who wanted to climb aboard if OC would provide
some data processing support in field stations, e.g. financial
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program to satisfy the need for field station customer automation
assistance.
program and a Directorate of Operations commenced its CRAFT
Except for advances in message switches and satellite
systems the 1970s saw the office fall into a general malaise.
One innovation of note was FASTCAST. Introduced late in the
decade, it was a technique of systematically reallocating reserve
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satellite power and bandwidth from station to station thereby
allowing messages which had queued up in switches overnight to be
transmitted at over 2,000 words-per-minute. Volumes which
previously kept two regular teletype channels running all day
could now be transmitted in less than an hour and messages could
be in the hands of action officers early in the work day.
plan or budget to upgrade. Meanwhile, other elements of the
Agency moved ahead with large, well funded, successful programs
More concern was focused on people problems, but there was
only marginal success in convincing the newer employees that this
was the case. The employee saw a system that did not allow for
pay increases as skill demands grew. He/she did not understand
why OC was always the office saddled with the bulk of position
cuts as two presidents called for a reduction of U.S. presence
abroad, or why OC could not keep up to strength even with the
reduced numbers of positions. The high frequency radio,
cryptographic, and terminal equipment in use in the overseas
network had been installed in the 60s and there seemed to be no
The 1980s saw resurgence for the office. A major
capitalization program was approved and implementation began.
Advances in technology allowed radio teletype circuits to be
operated at rates three to six times faster than previously
possible. OC was carrying an astonishing workload in comparison
with previous years and doing the job well. The number of
messages being handled in the network in the 1980s was
approaching the number words or groups processed in 1946. The
projects. Under the capitalization program the office was
challenged to upgrade almost every system in use. A round of
position upgrades partially satisfied the pleas for equity with
other Agency employees, and an experiment with a new pay system
for communications operators (known as banding) had been
approved. OC finally approached its strength allocation by
becoming directly involved in the recruitment and hiring
process. During 1983 and 1984 OC moved aggressively to improve
relations with both Agency and external customers, and it
protected its budget and personnel gains.
number of overseas and had increased
cally. OC found itself again deeply involved with
communication support and with large contingency
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Looking Back and Ahead
The American public has received an excellent return on
investment from the Office of Communications. After initial
buildups, the office has essentially maintained a flat line in
the number of personnel used to accomplish a substantially more
demanding mission. OC has used technology wisely to satisfy
problems with little waste on blue sky systems.
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opportunities, and challenging career tracks. Nevertheless, OC
personnel have continued to be where the action is and to perform
their mission in exceptional fashion.
The office will continue to face new challenges in the
overseas network. OC must successfully complete the
capitalization program and reinforce the message that
capitalization is a continuing need. New pay and award
mechanisms will make OC a more attractive place to work. Network
modernization must continue to provide an error-free flow of
information at high data rates between the foreign field and
Headquarters with alternative transmission means such as a
satellite terminal combined with a high frequency radio
capability to ensure continued communications during any
contingency. OC personnel as technical intelligence officers, by
whatever organizational name they work, with their tradition of
hard work, loyalty and can-do spirit, must be there ensuring that
the intelligence is quickly communicated to the right reader and
that the DCI has an effective means of command and control.
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