LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301600002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 29, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASItK t~Lt eurr~~
~~ ~~i~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~
Review
Latin America
ALA LAR 85-008
29 March 1985
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Latin America
Review 0 25X1
Since 1980, Cuba has been trying to reduce its dependence on
Soviet-supplied oil by investing heavily in domestic energy
exploration, petroleum refining projects, and energy conservation
measures. Progress is unlikely until the 1990s, however, when the
country's first nuclear power station is scheduled to open.
Western Europe: Changing Perspectives on Central America
Most West European political leaders are viewing the Salvadoran
Government in a more positive light, and they are becoming
increasingly disillusioned with Nicaragua's failure to move toward
democracy
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Haiti: Legalization of Political Parties 13 25X1
The Duvalier regime appears ready to allow political parties to
operate openly for the first time in the 39-year history of the
dictatorship, but a genuine opening of the political system is unlikely
any time soon.
i Secret
ALA LAR 85-008
29 March 1985
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Uruguay: Sanguinetti's First Few Weeks 15
Most opposition leaders and the military are cooperating with the
new President, but there are signs that this may change.
Communist-instigated labor unrest is emerging as Sanguinetti's
most intractable near-term problem.
Cuba has supported the Algerian-backed Polisario Front since the
mid-1970s, but it generally has viewed the insurgency as having less
inportance than other regional policy objectives.
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other o,~ces within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief;
Production StctfJ; Office of ~rican and Latin American Analysis,
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Cuba: Gloomy Energy
Prospects
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In an apparent effort to reduce dependence on Soviet-
supplied petroleum, Cuba has been investing heavily
in domestic energy exploration, petroleum refining
and production projects, and energy conservation
measures. Although this campaign has been under
way since 1980, it is unlikely that Cuba will achieve
any progress until the 1990s, when its first nuclear
power station is scheduled to open. In the meantime,
Cuban consumers are likely to suffer additional
hardships if oil shortages occur as a result of the
higher priority now being given to Cuba's export
Moscow promised to supply Cuba during 1986 to
1990 with the same volume of petroleum delivered
under the current five-year plan.
Domestic Production Alternatives
Cuba has spent considerable resources, with
assistance from CEMA countries as well as Western
nations, on energy projects to alleviate its dependence
on Soviet energy. Only the nuclear program appears
to offer hope for some degree of energy independence.
industries.
Dependence on Soviet Petroleum
The USSR supplies nearly all of Cuba's petroleum
needs, including crude oil and refined products, which
accounts for almost two-thirds of the country's energy
consumption. About 10 percent of Cuba's oil imports
is provided indirectly through a swap arrangement
with Venezuela-Caracas ships oil to Havana in
exchange for Soviet shipments to a Venezuelan
refinery in West Germany. The price of the Soviet oil
is based on a moving average of the world price during
the previous five years. This pricing policy has
resulted in an implicit subsidy for Havana amounting
to some $6.6 billion since 1971. The five-year moving
average is probably now near the world price,
however, eliminating the subsidy.
Cuban officials have stated publicly that the Soviets
"guaranteed" to supply Havana with 220,000 to
240,000 barrels of oil per day during the 1980 to 1985
five-year plan. We believe, however, that Soviet oil
shipments have steadily declined since 1982, possibly
by as much as 25 percent. Vice President Rodriguez
told foreign diplomats at the CEMA heads of
government meeting in Havana last October, that
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Domestic oil production accounts for less than 10
percent of Cuba's energy needs, and is likely to
remain marginal. Studies .made 25X1
before the revolution as well as geological surveys
from the 1960s show little hope for the discovery of
large oil reserves either onshore or in littoral areas. A
study in 1981
concluded that the offshore region is the only area
from which a moderate volume of oil and gas might
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Cuba contracted with the Mexican oil company 25X1
PEMEX in 1980 to assist in oil exploration. PEMEX
shipped US-manufactured drilling rigs and other 25X1
drilling equipment to Cuba
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Cuban Foreign Minister 25X1
Marta m~ last summer that drillings were being
conducted by British, Spanish, and Canadian firms.
In addition, the Cuban press reports that the Soviets
have been drilling a deep well off the northern coast
since last September,
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137,000 barrels per day of refined products.
the first stage of the
With the exception of nuclear energy, Cuba's other
sources of energy are generally unpromising. Cuba
has no anthracite or bituminous coal deposits, and its
small deposits of lignite coal would be uneconomical
to mine. The Cubans manufacture ethanol from the
residual syrup obtained during sugarcane processing
to produce gasahol, used as a cooking fuel and as a
raw material for the chemical industry. Gasahol
production probably is limited, however, by the
significant investment of hard currency needed to
expand ethanol output. Cuba's thermal electric power
plants could be converted to burn an oil-coal mixture,
but these renovations would take three to five years to
complete and cost several hundred million dollars.
Such an expenditure may be cost effective because the
renovations could cut Cuban oil consumption by as
much as 8 to 10 percent.
south coast near Cienfuegos that,
will contain four Soviet-built 417-megawatt
reactors. After numerous delays-the facility
originally was to be operational in 1985--construction
now seems to be in full swing. The Cuban press
reports that, as of last November, there were 188
Soviet advisers and 5,500 Cubans at the Cienfuegos
site. Two of the reactors are scheduled to be
operational by 1990, and Havana claims that each
reactor will cut Cuba's oil consumption by 12,000
barrels per day-equivalent to 7 percent of annual
At a press conference last October, Cuban
Vice President Rodriguez discussed plans for two.
more nuclear power stations, one to be located in
western Cuba and the other near Holguin in eastern
Cuba.
Improvements to Refining and
Distribution Capabilities
The Cubans, with Soviet assistance, are building a
new oil refinery near Cienfuegos that should add
significantly to the island's current capacity of
new refinery, estimated to cost $365 million, will be
completed by 1987. The three existing refineries-two
in Havana and one in Santiago de Cuba-are being
modernized and expanded.
Improvements to the oil distribution network also
reportedly are under way. According to the Cuban
press, a supertanker base east of Havana in Matanzas
Province is scheduled for completion this year.
Pipelines reportedly are being constructed to link the
supertanker base with oil refineries in Havana and
Cienfuegos, and between the Cienfuegos refinery and
a large thermoelectric plant under construction in
Matanzas. In addition, the West German
Government recently informed the United States that
the firm Mannesmann AG is considering a joint
project with the USSR to build an oil
loading/unloading facility in Cuba.
Conservation Initiatives
The regime's efforts include a campaign to encourage
energy savings. A National Energy Commission was
created in 1983 to write annual energy use plans and
to develop sanctions and incentives that would
stimulate increased energy conservation. Several
other conservation measures have been enacted,
including bonuses to enterprises that lower oil
consumption, use of flourescent lighting, and an
increase in electricity rates during the hours of peak
40 percent in January.
rations for personal and business use were cut about
The chief incentive for conserving energy has been an
arrangement since 1982 with Moscow that permits
Havana to resell the Soviet oil it saves on the world
market for hard currency. In 1983, oil resales
exceeded even sugar sales as Cuba's leading earner of
foreign exchange. Cuban statistics, however, show
that income from the sale of surplus Soviet oil was
lower during the first nine months of 1984 than
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during the comparable period of 1983. The Soviets
have allowed Cuba to continue this arrangement
through at least 1991
Outlook
Havana's ability to save on energy consumption is
limited. There is little potential for additional energy
savings by Cuban households. Residential energy
users own few appliances and automobiles, and
account for only a small share of the island's total
energy consumption. Moreover, the prospects for
conservation in industry and agriculture are not much
better, especially when Cuba's new nickel and
thermoelectric plants become operational. Two nickel
plants currently under construction-one is scheduled
for completion this year-will increase the country's
oil use by about 25,000 barrels per day. New
thermoelectric plants, including the largest one ever
built in Cuba, will demand another 14,000 barrels per
day by the late 1980s and 18,000 barrels per day more
by the late 1990s.
The energy situation is unlikely to improve
substantially until early in the next century, when the
second and third nuclear power stations are expected
to be completed. Even after these facilities are
completed, Havana will be dependent on the USSR
for uranium to fuel the nuclear reactors. Although
Havana could attempt to secure uranium from other
suppliers, this option would be costly because of the
low number of other uranium-producing countries.
The expected sharp increase in oil demand from the
expanding industrial sector, combined with stagnating
Soviet petroleum deliveries, is likely to create
shortages later in this decade. The beleaguered Cuban
consumer will take the first blow, but industry and
agriculture will also have to bite the bullet. If oil
shortages occur, labor motivation and productivity
probably will decline as consumers are forced to
endure even greater burdens. Moreover, it will be
especially difficult for Havana to meet President
Castro's recently announced goal to increase hard
currency export earnings by at least $500 million a
year.
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secret
Western Europe: Changing
Perspectives on
Central America
Most West European political leaders are viewing the
Salvadoran Government in a more positive light, and
they are becoming increasingly disillusioned with
Managua's failure to move toward democracy.
Despite their disenchantment with the Sandinistas,
however, leftist governments and the Socialist
International (SI) continue to criticize US policy
toward Nicaragua severely, arguing that
Washington's support of the Nicaraguan rebels is
partially responsible for the Sandinistas' reluctance to
undertake democratic reforms and for their growing
dependence on the Soviet Union. They also have
charged that US pressure on Nicaragua has
contributed to the current stagnation in the
Contadora negotiations. Although some West
European leaders-particularly the more conservative
ones-admit that Soviet interference has aggravated
the political turmoil in Central America, the vast
majority believe that tensions in the region are
primarily the result of social and economic
imbalances. To promote stability and democracy in
the region, the European Community (EC) is
preparing a political and economic cooperation
agreement with Central America, but we believe that
increases in EC development assistance for the region
will be small because of continuing budget problems.
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Changing Government Views on EI Salvador .. .
West European governments are looking much more
favorably on El Salvador since the election last year of
Napoleon Duarte. West Germany has assigned an
ambassador to El Salvador and has resumed its
development assistance, which had been discontinued
in 1979. Bonn has authorized a $16 million credit, but
it is not extending grants, partly because of continuing
opposition among some Social Democrats, the Greens,
and large segments of the population to the
Salvadoran regime.
The Italian Prime Minister has called the election of
Duarte "a victory of democracy," and his
government, according to US Embassy reports, plans
to send food and medical aid to El Salvador
amounting to about $3 million. Italy also has
indicated that it wants to develop a bilateral
development program and that it is awaiting project
proposals from the Salvadoran Government-
particularly in the areas of energy, agriculture, and
public health. Italian Foreign Ministry officials have
suggested that the program may be similar to a recent
$25 million technical cooperation agreement with
Costa Rica.
France, which had been one of the harshest critics of
the Salvadoran Government, has decided to name an
ambassador to El Salvador and has publicly expressed
its support for the dialogue between President Duarte
and the insurgents. According to US Embassy
reports, however, Quai officials are skeptical about
the prospects for a national reconciliation as long as
the Duarte government refuses the insurgents'
demand for power sharing. They believe, moreover,
that the failure by insurgent leader Villalobos to
participate in the dialogue may indicate that the
Democratic Revolutionary Front-the political arm
of the insurgent movement-cannot speak for the
guerrillas.
The Netherland's nonresident ambassador to El
Salvador, in conversations with US officials, has
emphasized the positive political and economic
changes that have taken place under the new
government. He also has acknowledged that
insurgents, rather than rightist groups, are responsible
for the recent surge in political killings. The
ambassador noted, however, that the Dutch media
and the general public continue to believe that the
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Salvadoran Government has made no progress on the
human rights front-a view that is shared by other
West European publics.
...and Nicaragua
Disappointment among West European governments
over the Sandinistas' failure to build a pluralistic
political system has grown steadily over the past two
years. The election last November was widely
perceived as undemocratic because of the lack of
participation by the principal opposition parties.
According to US Embassy reports, the suspension of
the dialogue between the Sandinistas and all the
opposition parties and increasing press censorship
after the election have strengthened the impression
among many West European leaders that Nicaragua
is sliding toward totalitarianism. The low-level
representation of West European governments-even
Socialist ones-at President Ortega's inauguration in
January is a good indicator of the growing
disenchantment with the Sandinistas.
Declining West European support for Managua is
also reflected in aid cuts. West Germany last year
froze $40 million in export credits, and Spain, which
has a sizable assistance program in Nicaragua,
reportedly told the Sandinistas shortly after the
election that it may not extend new aid. Although
these decisions were partially prompted by Managua's
default on debt-service payments, West German and
Spanish officials also cited the Sandinistas' failure to
move toward democracy. The Netherlands-
Managua's principal source of Western assistance-
will allow its five-year program to lapse at the end of
1985, but plans significant aid increases for
democratic Costa Rica.
France's position toward the Sandinistas has been
ambiguous. Although French officials have privately
voiced their disillusionment with political
developments in Nicaragua, then Foreign Minister
Cheysson publicy praised the technical correctness of
the Nicaraguan election and former presidential
adviser Debray maintained that there is a relative
democratization in both Nicaragua and El Salvador.
French public and private assistance for Nicaragua
declined from $27 million in 1982 to $18 million in
1984, but there are press reports that Paris negotiated
development projects in telecommunications and
agriculture with Managua during the visit of
Nicaraguan Vice President Ramirez in January.
Italy, France, and Canada last January agreed to
finance a $50 million expansion of a geothermal
facility northeast of Managua. Italy and Canada
probably see their assistance as multilateral
development aid and not as an endorsement of the
Sandinistas. Prime Minister Craxi's dismay over
Nicaragua's protection of Italian terrorists may yet
cause Italy to distance itself from the project. The EC
also agreed last September to fund regional
development projects that include Nicaragua, but
more out of concern for balanced economic
development in the Central American region than
from a desire to bolster the Sandinista regime.
The Socialist International
The SI perceptions of political developments in El
Salvador and Nicaragua are similar to those of West
European governments. Secretary General Vaananen
recently said that the SI is prepared to cooperate with
Duarte and that his leadership has created a
promising climate for progress in El Salvador. He
indicated, however, that the SI still supports a
political role for Guillermo Ungo as the best
representative of the democratic left.
Regarding Nicaragua, Vaananen admitted SI
recognition of the "non-social-democratic" character
of the Sandinista regime. Growing SI disapproval of
the Sandinistas was reflected in the absence of
important Socialist leaders at President Ortega's
inauguration and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez's
reception of opposition leader Arturo Cruz at his
private residence. According to US Embassy reports,
many participants in the SI Congress last October in
Rio de Janeiro said the Sandinistas were at fault in
the failed negotiations with Cruz on conditions for the
Democratic Coordinating Board's participation in the
Nicaraguan election. Despite the evident disaffection
with the Sandinistas, however, the SI's official report
on the Nicaraguan election was fairly positive and
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even recommended increased aid for Managua-
partly, we believe, to strengthen the position of the
Ortega brothers, who are perceived to be more open to
democratic reform, against Marxist-Leninist
hardliners.
Criticism of US Policy
A more important explanation for the SI's continuing
public support of the Sandinistas, in our opinion, can
be found in its strong condemnation of US policy
toward Nicaragua. Many West European Socialists
believe that US support of the Nicaraguan rebels and
Nicaraguan fear of an invasion have made it very
difficult for the Sandinista government to build
democratic institutions. Swedish Prime Minister
Palme, prominent West German Social Democrat
Wischnewski, and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez
have all spoken out against US policy, charging that it
is in violation of international law and comparable to
Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
The Socialists' disapproval of US policy is also shared
by some more conservative politicians. The Dutch
Foreign Minister, while conceding Sandinista
shortcomings, has condemned perceived US efforts to
drive them from office. West German State Minister
Moellemann, during a recent visit to Managua,
reportedly also repudiated US support of the
Nicaraguan rebels. British Prime Minister Thatcher
and West German Chancellor Kohl, however, have
shown greater understanding of US policy.
Concern About Contadora
According to US Embassy reports, West European
political leaders are becoming increasingly concerned
about the growing stagnation in the Contadora
negotiations, which they have strongly supported as
the only viable means for achieving lasting peace and
democracy in Central America. Many concede that
differences in interests and perspectives among the
Central American countries and the four Contadora
mediator states are partially to blame for the stalling
of the peace talks. Many West European leaders,
however, also believe that US policy toward
Nicaragua is delaying the signing of the Contadora
draft treaty. The Dutch Foreign Minister, for
example, has charged that the lack of serious
negotiations within Contadora partially stems from
US pressure on Nicaragua's neighbors to make harsh
with the Sandinistas.
demands on the Sandinistas. According to press
reports, a number of West European governments-
including those in Paris, Madrid, The Hague, and
Dublin-are urging Washington to resume the
suspended bilateral talks to achieve a reconciliation
Questions About a San Jose Followup
The slowdown in the Contadora negotiations has
raised questions in the EC about the desirability of
holding a followup meeting to the conference last
September in San Jose between EC Foreign Ministers
and their Central American counterparts. The
purpose of that meeting was to strengthen the
Contadora process and achieve peace and stability
through regional economic development. Italian
Foreign Ministry officials have stated that the
cancellation of the Contadora meeting in Panama
embarrassed the EC and that a continuation of the
EC-Central American dialogue would depend on
progress in the Contadora negotiations. EC members
reportedly also are divided over whether future
conferences should be conducted at a ministerial or a
lower political level.
Meanwhile, EC Commissioner Cheysson's plan to
conclude an economic and political cooperation
agreement with the five Central American states and
Panama by June is also running into difficulties.
There is a divergence of opinion within the
Commission about the content of the document to be
presented to the Council of Ministers, particularly the
section on political cooperation. Cheysson believes
that political aspects should be emphasized in the
cooperation agreement, and he has proposed annual
political meetings similar to those that have evolved
with the ASEAN countries. Some of his fellow
commissioners, however, fear that a strong political
focus would cause EC member states to interfere too
much in the implementation of the agreement.
Cheysson has promised to redraft the political section
of the document, but the framework proposal is likely
to face difficult passage in the Council.
Outlook
Most West European governments are unlikely to
condemn Managua publicly, fearing the political
backlash from their publics who hold considerable
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sympathies for the Sandinistas. Leftist governments
and the SI also will continue to regard US policy
toward Nicaragua as a partial excuse for the
Sandinistas' failure to implement democratic reforms.
Even more conservative governments probably would
criticize US military action against Managua in the
absence of a clear provocation. Moreover, many West
European leaders are likely to blame Washington if
the Contadora negotiations fail. If, on the other hand,
a treaty is signed, West European governments
probably will support it regardless of its contents.
France and Spain, which have shown the greatest
interest in Central America, may assume a lower
profile in the region. Prime Minister Gonzalez faces
strong domestic opposition to Spain's membership in
NATO and reportedly does not want to complicate his
position with controversial Central American issues.
France's foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere,
particularly in Europe and Africa.
Completion of an EC cooperation agreement with
Central America probably will take longer than
originally envisioned, and its economic provisions are
likely to be disappointing for the Central Americans.
As yet, no financial protocol or trade concessions have
been worked out. Because increases in EC
development assistance are likely to be small, the EC
probably will ask member states to increase their
bilateral assistance for the region
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Haiti: Legalization of
Political Parties
President for Life Jean Claude Duvalier appears
ready to allow political parties to begin operating
openly in Haiti, according to US Embassy officials.
Despite this unprecedented step, we doubt that the
Duvalier regime is committed to a genuine opening of
the political system, and the chances are slim that a
strong domestic opposition will develop any time soon.
Nevertheless, the move is likely to intensify infighting
among Haiti's political elites. If Duvalier perceives
that fledgling opposition groups are gaining strength,
we believe he would not hesitate to clamp down.
According to US Embassy reports, Duvalier will
present a "Law on Political Parties" to the National
Assembly when it convenes in late April. The law,
drafted by a presidential commission, will lay out the
guidelines under which political parties will be
permitted to organize. Haitian officials indicate
Communist parties will not be allowed to register, but
there will be no formal restrictions on the number of
parties that can be formed. No legally recognized
political party currently operates in Haiti.~~
The law has been the focus of intense debate within
the regime during recent months. Hardliners, led by
Defense Minister LaFontant as well as the President's
influential wife, argue that even limited reform could
jeopardize the country's political peace and hurt the
popularity of the President among old-guard
Duvalierists. Last year, LaFontant and other
hardliners capitalized on fears that food riots in two
major northern cities would spark serious social unrest
to persuade the President to delay implementing a
political parties law. Similiar arguments this year and
the President's concern over the increasing activism of
the Catholic Church, nonetheless, were outweighed by
Duvalier's determination to push ahead with the
gradual liberalization program he has pursued since
the early 1980s. Reforms to date include a relaxation
of press controls and the holding of local elections-in
1983 and 1984-for the first time in the regime's 39-
Some structural changes in the government also are
possible after the law is implemented by the National
Assembly. Embassy sources indicate that Duvalier is
considering the establishment of a prime ministerial
system. The Embassy also speculates that elections
for a new National Assembly, a rubber stamp
organization, will be held later this year.
is trying to revitalize his nascent political
organization, the National Committee for Jean
Claudist Action, lends credence to the Embassy's
analysis and suggests that an official government
party may be established in the coming months.
Reflecting in part the seriousness the public gives
Duvalier's promises to permit political parties, one
potential challenger has already tossed his hat into the
ring. Clovis Desinor, a former government minister
and presidential adviser, announced in February that
he would form his own party. Desinor, although
politically inactive in recent years, has some support
among those old-guard Duvalierists unhappy with the
President's policies-particulary his liberalization
efforts-according to US Embassy officials. Based on
reporting from the Embassy over the past year, we
believe at least several other organizers, including
Hubert de Ronceray, a human rights activist, also will
step forward.
Despite the President's determination to reverse
Haiti's reputation as a primitive and repressive nation,
there are clear limits to his willingness to make
meaningful changes. Underscoring our belief that the
modest reform program is designed primarily to
enhance the regime's international image, US
Embassy reports indicate that Haitian officials are
looking fora "formula" to limit the influence of
year history.
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even if a prime ministerial system w
important decisions.
Duvalier's unwillingness to share power is, in our
view, the major obstacle facing party organizers, but
Haiti's lack of organized interest groups-such as
labor unions-also will severely restrict the ability of
opposition groups to generate mass support.
Moreover, most Haitians, particularly the peasants,
show little interest in politics. US Embassy officials
say the vast majority of the bureaucracy and the
military remain loyal to Duvalier, and they doubt that
sympathy for Desinor among Duvalierists will
translate into open opposition against the President in
the foreseeable future.
Because Duvalier intends to stack the cards against
fledgling opposition parties, we see little immediate
internal threat to the country's political peace.
Hardliners in the regime, however, are likely to
continue looking for excuses to clamp down on regime
critics and to slow the pace of the political
liberalization process even further. Signs that the
opposition is establishing links with the Catholic
Church-the only domestic institution in recent
months to display any organizational capabilities-
would prompt a quick crackdown.
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Uruguay: Sanguinetti's
First Few Weeks~~
President Sanguinetti, who took office when Uruguay
returned to civilian rule on 1 March, has skillfully
handled several sensitive issues facing his
administration. Most opposition leaders and the
military have been cooperating thus far with the
President. There are signs that this may change,
however. Communist-instigated labor unrest is
already posing a major problem for the new
government.
Strong Cabinet
The 10 members of Sanguinetti's cabinet are qualified
and respected professionals, according to US Embassy
reporting. Ricardo Zerbino, the Minister of Finance,
is described by the Embassy as a moderate who favors
an open economy and orthodox policies. Foreign
Minister Enrique Iglesias is a veteran economist and
former official of the Economic Commission for Latin
America. Defense Minister Juan Chiarino, the 83-
year-old leader of the small Civic Union Party, is
widel res ected amon olitical and military leaders,
nterior
Minister Carlos Manini Rios also reportedly enjoys
the confidence of the military establishment.
Amnesty Issue
The new government was immediately confronted by
the sensitive question of amnesty for political
prisoners. The opposition parties-the center-left
Blancos and the leftist Broad Front-proposed
legislation calling for an unconditional amnesty for all
of the 300 to 350 persons who were in prison for
political reasons when civilian rule was restored.
Sanguinetti, however, submitted to Congress a
separate bill that would have blocked immediate
release of the approximately 60 prisoners who had
been convicted of terrorist violence. The President and
opposition leaders finally worked out a compromise
providing for the release of all political prisoners, but
requiring the courts to reexamine the cases of those
charged with murder.
Relations With the Military
In opposing an unconditional amnesty for political
prisoners convicted of homicide, Sanguinetti was
honoring a commitment he had made to leaders of the
outgoing military regime. He complemented this by
accepting one of the military's nominees for
promotion to general, thus adhering to his pledge to
grant the armed forces a voice in appointments of
senior officers.
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The armed forces also have been particularly
concerned about the question of punishment of
military officers for human rights abuses committed
during the era of military rule. The Blancos and the
Broad Front have demanded that civilian courts
prosecute officers accused of such abuses.
Sanguinetti's policy is to leave the question of trials to
the military courts-the approach favored by leaders
of the armed forces. He recently decreed that 11
officers who had been subpoenaed to appear before
civilian courts were not required to do so, and he
assured Army Commander in Chief Medina that 25X1 ~
these cases would remain under the jurisdiction of the
military justice system.
Some middle-level officers nonetheless are concerned
that Sanguinetti's guarantees may not hold up in the
event of strong political pressure over the issue.
Communist-Inspired Labor Trouble
As expected, labor unrest appears to be emerging as
Sanguinetti's most intractable near-term problem. In
recent months workers have been staging strikes,
slowdowns, and plant takeovers in many sectors of the
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ALA LAR 85-008
29 March 1985
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economy, including the key textile industry. The
workers' primary demand has been for wage hikes to
compensate for the 60-percent drop in purchasing
power over the last decade, including a 40-percent
decline during the past three years. Significant wage
increases, however, would undercut the President's
efforts to stabilize the economy and reduce inflation.
the Communist Party-
legalized by Sanguinetti along with other outlawed
political groups in early March-is playing a major
role in instigating the unrest.
a sizable number of workers are
opposed to Communist domination of the labor
movement, but they receive no support from the other
political parties and are ignored by the Uruguayan
press.
Other Potential Challenges From the Left
The freed political prisoners include members of the
far-left Tupamaro movement, the main sponsor of the
leftwing guerrilla violence that helped trigger the
military coup in 1973. Many of the released
Tupamaros say they intend to pursue their goals
through peaceful means, but one faction is preparing
Cuba might emerge as another source of trouble for
the new government. Sanguinetti reportedly plans to
restore diplomatic ties with Havana, at least in part to
appease his domestic leftist opposition. The Cubans,
however, appear to be laying the groundwork for
developing influence in Uruguay over the long term
by supporting-and possibly funding-leftwing
Senator Juan Raul Ferreira, a prominent Blanco
Party member
Ferreira, who is seeking the chairmanship
of the Senate's foreign relations committee, is a
leading activist in the Blanco Party's largest faction,
headed by his father, Wilson Ferreira. Cuba's
strategy suggests that, for the time being, it will not
risk alienating the new Colorado government by
supporting leftist elements advocating antigovernment
tactics. Neither do we expect, however, Havana to cut
ties to its longtime Tupamaro allies, which give
Castro the option of turning to a revolutionary
strategy.
Outlook
We believe Sanguinetti will be able to maintain
cooperative relations with the military and most of the
opposition-which holds a majority in the Congress-
over the near term.
Wilson Ferreira may begin
obstructing the government's legislative proposals
later in the year. Meanwhile, Communist-led labor
unrest is likely to remain a major source of trouble.
Sanguinetti will have great difficulty meeting
workers' wage demands, and continued labor protests
may eventually force him to impose limitations on
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~ecrec
Cuba: Support for the
Polisario Front
Cuba has supported the Polisario Front, the Algerian-
backed insurgent group attempting to win control of
the former Spanish Sahara from Morocco, since the
mid-1970s, but Havana generally has viewed the
insurgency as having less importance than other
regional policy objectives. Concern over Algerian
sensitivities has been the principal factor restraining
Cuba's activities, along with other considerations.
Although Havana recently has renewed its offers of
military assistance to the insurgents, Algeria's fear of
internationalizing the conflict makes acceptance of
Cuba's offer unlikely.
Background
Since the early 1970s, Cuban support for the Polisario
has emphasized medical assistance. There was
tenuous evidence of possible weapons shipments
during the 1970s, and Havana reportedly has
provided paramilitary training for Polisario military
officers in Cuba for several years. Today there are
about 50 Cuban medical personnel serving in
Algerian hospitals and in Polisario troop camps in the
addition, approximately 700 Polisario youngsters are
presently studying in Cuba.
Tentative Support
Judging from Havana's actions over the years,
support for the Polisario Front always has been
secondary to other objectives. For example, although
Cuba gave strong propaganda support to the Polisario
during the 1970s, it delayed recognizing the Front's
political entity, the Sahara Democratic Arab
Republic (SDAR), until 1980. Havana's ambivalent
attitude probably reflected an effort to balance its
need to avoid criticism of its revolutionary credentials
and its fear of losing some $60 million in sugar sales
to Morocco. Its decision to formalize ties with the
SDAR probably was part of Castro's overall effort to
recover from his loss of prestige in the Nonaligned
Fidel Castro greeting the general secretar
of the Polisario Front, May 1982.
Movement caused by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Through this move, Havana also hoped
to improve bilateral ties with radical Arab countries
such as Algeria and Libya, the principal backers of
the insurgents.
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In recent years, Havana has repeatedly offered to 25X1
provide the Polisario military equipment and Cuban
advisers to assist the insurgent effort, but the Castro 25X1
regime has taken care not to alienate more important
allies in the region. 25X1
advisers have been sent to help the insurgents
Cuban medical
personnel in Algeria are becoming more involved in
the Polisario's guerrilla war against Morocco,
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ALA LAR 85-008
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medical teams often accompany the guerrillas to the
front during heavy fighting as Polisario medical
support in forward battle areas is very weak.
Qutlook
In our judgment, Cuba's support for the Polisario will
continue to rank below what Havana views as more
important foreign policy objectives. Castro is unlikely
to act without Algerian approval and endanger one of
its strongest ties with the Arab world. Cuba's renewed
offers of assistance to the Polisario probably are
intended primarily to demonstrate Havana's support
for the Polisario cause. However, because of Algeria's
fear of internationalization of the conflict and desire
to maintain control over the insurgency, Cuban offers
of military aid will probably not be accepted.
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