LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301570001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Revievi
Recent policy shifts appear to have met resistance within the
leadership, but it is clear from President Castro's statements and
actions that he will not be deterred from implementing new
economic measures that include improved ties with the West
Cuban Aid Programs in Africa: Incompetent Internationalism
Cuba's civilian and technical aid programs have backfired in several
cases when the assistance has been provided without sufficient
planning or regard for the needs of the recipient country.
The intensification of university student political activities is a blow
to President Pinochet's efforts to maintain controls on academic life
and prevent students from regaining the political influence they had
before the 1983 coup.
Polls show that, despite triple-digit inflation and rising
unemployment, nearly three-quarters of the population feels
President Alfonsin has governed the country well.
The Argentine Navy is continuing an ambitious modernization
program begun in the late 1970s that includes the production of six
submarines, six guided-missile corvettes, and four guided-missile
frigates
i Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
IS February 1985
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 A protracted confront
by the Army near Cor
date to the five-month
ation in which
into has provid
-old cease-fire
M-19 insurg
ed the most
between the
ents were encircled
serious challenge to
government and
the guerrillas.
Paraguay-Latin Ame
rica: The Case of Dr. Mengele
23
The search for Germa
South America, long
n war criminal Josef Mengele
a haven for Nazi fugitives. Par
has centered o
aguay has bee
n
n
a special target for in
vestigators.
Peru: Mirage Payment Doubtful
27
Uruguay: Labor Restivenes~~
27
Colombia: Guerrillas Adopt Riverine Warfare Tactics~~
28
Mexico-Israel: Economic Cooperation ~~
28
Production Staff; Office of ~gfrican and Latin American Analysis
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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~ecrec
the Leadership
Recent policy shifts caused by mounting economic
pressures appear to have encountered resistance
within the Cuban leadership, but it is clear from
President Castro's statements and actions that he will
not be deterred from implementing remedial
economic measures that include improved ties with
the West. An unusual special plenum on 31 January
of the party's Central Committee "fully approved and
gave its highest evaluation to Castro's untiring and
creative activities" in the formulation and execution
of foreign policy, according to the Cuban media. We
believe Castro convoked the plenum, only a month
after the regular semiannual plenum in December, to
obtain institutional backing for his policy shifts and
used the occasion to declaw his opposition. His actions
against ideological hardliners appear to confirm our
belief that pragmatists are once again becoming
predominant in the Cuban leadership.
The plenum announced that staunch hardliner
Antonio Perez Herrero, party Secretary for Ideology
and an alternate member of the ruling Politburo, was
"released" from both positions for unspecified
"deficiencies and repeated mistakes" in his
Secretariat duties. Given the circumstances of his
ouster, we believe that Perez Herrero probably
resisted Cuba's opening to the West on ideological
grounds, presumably arguing that the regime was
turning "soft" on imperialism. One of Perez Herrero's
top aides, Orlando Fundora, chief of the Central
Committee's Revolutionary Orientation Department,
also was removed and given a lesser assignment. Perez
Herrero and his aide controlled virtually all of the
Cuban media, which may now adopt a more
constructive approach in keeping with a new
conciliatory foreign policy line.
The following day, Castro personally chaired a special
plenum of the party provincial committee in the City
of Havana Province, to "relieve" the committee's first
secretary, hardliner Julio E. T. Camacho Aguilera, of
his duties in the capital. Camacho Aguilera was
reassigned to the post of party first secretary in
Santiago de Cuba Province. Unlike Perez Herrero,
Camacho Aguilera apparently retains his seat on the
Politburo. From his post on the other end of the
island, however, it will be difficult for him to attend
regular Politburo sessions in the capital, and his
influence in its deliberations is almost certain to be
diminished.
Reemergence of the Pragmatists
These changes supplement other signs that the
hardliners in the leadership-mostly officers in the
military, and the security and ideological apparatus-
are increasingly being overshadowed by a more
Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
IS February 1985
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pragmatic group of officials whose responsibilities lie
mainly in the economic area. A similar shift away
from the hardliners occurred in 1968, ushering in a
period of pragmatist predominance that lasted almost
a decade. We believe that then, as now, Moscow's
pressure on Castro to put his economic house in order
was a major factor in enhancing the pragmatists'
position. The hardliners reclaimed their predominant
position during the late 1970s as a result of Cuba's
military efforts in Angola and Ethiopia and the
Cuban-assisted victory of the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the pragmatists, headed by
Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, continued to
argue for expanded ties with the West to earn hard
currency, gain access to Western technology, and
increase Cuban political influence in Western
capitals.
To undercut hardliner criticism, Rodriguez in late
1981 resurrected the party's quarterly theoretical
journal Cuba Socialista. Publication of the journal
was halted in February 1967 because its articles
proved to be too divisive. Rodriguez wrote the feature
article-entitled "Strategic Fundamentals of Cuban
Foreign Policy"-in the first issue of the renewed
journal. He used extensive quotes from the works of
Lenin to justify the expansion of Cuban diplomatic,
commercial, and cultural contacts with the West.
Rodriquez asserted that such contacts could be used
to exploit rivalries and differences among Western
nations and ultimately split the United States away
from its allies. The hardliners could hardly find fault
with a policy line that seemed to be drawn from the
mouth of Lenin, especially when it specifically
acknowledged the United States as Cuba's prime
enemy. Moreover, the reappearance of a journal
linked historically to ideological debate was an
indication that not only did policy disagreements exist
within the leadership, but that Castro himself was
ambivalent on certain issues.
Another sign of top-level disagreement appeared in
1983 and seemed to confirm Castro's ambivalence. As
a way of encouraging increased agricultural
production; a "free market" system was established
whereby farmers could sell whatever they produced in
excess of their quota specified by the state. The profit
motive worked too well. Production was indeed
boosted, but middlemen materialized to market the
farmers' surplus produce, prompting the hardliners to
call for a crackdown. While the plan obviously had
Castro's prior approval, he personally took to the
podium to denounce the ideological error and
announce changes in the system to guard against any
further recrudescence of the middleman.
Nevertheless, the pragmatists were able to retain the
material incentive for the farmer.
By the end of 1984, the pragmatists' position within
the leadership apparently had become even stronger.
A law was proposed-and quickly passed by the
National Assembly in December-that sought to
alleviate Cuba's critical housing shortage by allowing
renters to purchase their houses from the state and
permitting homeowners to rent out portions of their
houses to others. This open encouragement of a
landlord class has yet to draw any public criticism
from the hardliners.
Castro's activities during January-his conciliatory
statements in Managua to Contadora foreign
ministers and other foreign representatives, his red-
carpet treatment for three US Congressmen, his
dialogue with three US Catholic bishops, and his
lengthy interview with editors of The Washington
Post-underscore his intention to reduce frictions
with the United States. These contacts may have
taxed the ideological sensitivities of staunch
hardliners such as Perez Herrero. The nature of Perez
Herrero's resistance is not known but it was offensive
enough to Castro to cause him to remove Perez
Herrero from the two most influential elements of the
party. The Central Committee statement of 31
January lauding Castro's efforts apparently was
issued to address directly and give full approval to the
Cuban leader's politicking earlier in the month. This
need to gain institutional backing for his "untiring
and creative" foreign policy activities implies that
Castro's conciliatory attitude was the source of
friction with Perez Herrero.
Outlook
The actions taken against Perez Herrero, Fundora,
and Camacho Aguilera, are certain to be recognized
throughout Cuba as warning to other bureaucrats not
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secret
to oppose Castro's new policy shifts. Those in the
leadership who are of like mind with Perez Herrero
probably will mute their criticism and, at least for the
moment, accept the pragmatists' predominance. They
are aware that a new Central Committee will be
selected at the Third Party Congress in December and
that their behavior during the coming months will
have a major impact on their chances for membership
in the new organ. For the time being, Castro will
continue to promote his opening to the West in hope
of resolving some of Cuba's economic woes.
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Secret
Cuban Aid Programs in Africa:
Incompetent Internationalism ~
Cuba has made a concerted effort since the early
1960s to foster ties with Third World countries-with
a special focus on Africa beginning in the early
1970s-by providing them with a variety of civilian
and technical aid programs. Although Havana claims
that such efforts are examples of selfless commitment
to "international proletarianism," the primary goal is
to strengthen Cuban influence with these countries.
The efforts to promote "revolutionary solidarity" have
backfired in several cases when aid has been provided
without sufficient planning or regard for the needs of
the recipient country. Moreover, some countries have
complained about the quality and cost of Cuban
assistance programs
The Programs
The aid programs-most in the form of civilian
advisory assistance-involve approximately 13,000
Cuban civilians serving in some 20 African countries.
Havana traditionally has gained a foothold in these
countries by providing medical and educational aid, as
well as assistance in construction, agriculture, and
other technical areas. The Castro regime also has
capitalized on the instability of new regimes by
offering military and security advisers and
intelligence training.
In addition to the goal of achieving greater
international influence and enhancing Castro's image
as a Third World leader, the aid programs are
designed to bring other benefits to Cuba. Chief among
these is the regime's intention to maintain a sense of
revolutionary mission among young people who did
not participate in Cuba's guerrilla struggle by sending
them on "internationalist" missions.
The programs provide economic benefits to Cuba.
Exporting workers relieves domestic unemployment
and allows the personnel, particularly military
advisers, to gain experience. Moreover, some of the
assistance programs provide desperately needed hard
currency. Algeria and Libya, for example, are
charged for Cuban assistance-we estimate between
$7,200 and $12,000 per person a year. In some cases,
the host country has reportedly paid for the workers'
equipment, airfare, and lodging as well as personal
spending money
Although the aid programs are generally successful,
there have been problems. Several recipients have
complained about the quality and cost of the
assistance, and have claimed that Cuba fails to
address adequately the real development needs of
their countries. Cuban behavior has also been a source
of friction, with charges of assaults by Cuban
cooperants upon local women and livestock.
sent ill prepared and unequipped personnel to work in
Africa and, at times, has attempted to control the
day-to-day running of the aid programs. Moreover,
host country complaints indicate that the Cubans
often fail to consider cultural differences.
Havana apparently has
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Ill-Prepared Medical Teams
The eagerness to send large numbers of medical
personnel overseas has led to some failures in meeting
the specific needs of the recipient country. Officials in
Mali, for example, have complained about Cuba's
medical personnel-three general practitioners and
eight nurses and technicians-to Mali, but was
unwilling to satisfy Mali's request for badly needed
specialized medical aid in the outlying provinces.
Burundi officials also have been dissatisfied with the
quality of Cuban medical assistance and Havana's
failure to provide needed specialists. When the first
medical team arrived there in 1980, the Cuban
Ambassador insisted that the doctors and nurses be
Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
15 February 1985
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Cuban and Guinea-Bissauan
o.~cials sign cooperation agree-
ment paving the wayJor Cuban
internationalists'presence.~
placed in pairs because they had not served outside
Cuba before. The training and experience of doctors
and nurses were often incompatible, however, which
severely diminished the quality of their work. Burundi
apparently was not satisfied with the program, as the
last medical team left in early 1984 and has not been
replaced.
Castro's emphasis on
increasing the number of medical graduates has
resulted in a government policy in which quantity
takes precedence over quality in medical training.
Havana's emphasis on the mass production of doctors
has led to lower examination standards, and, as of
mid-1984,medical students needed only a 70-percent
average on their tests to raduate as a general
practitioner. at least
one of the medical teams sent to Burun t was made
up solely of students. Moreover, the Cuban Embassy
did not provide the Burundi Government with the
promised curriculum vitae in advance on each of the
workers to verify his qualifications.
Cuban "internationalists" often are handicapped by
their inability to speak the host country's language,
making the advisers' task impossible. In Seychelles
three Cuban doctors were asked to leave within two
months of their arrival because they could speak
neither French nor English
medical personnel stationed in Burundi spoke no
French, according to US Embassy reporting.
just as the
doctors were becoming proficient in the language,
they were replaced by a new group with no capability
in the host country's language.
In another instance, Cuban technical and
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Havana's Pressure Tactics
Havana also has created frictions with African
nations by attempting to use aid programs as a
mechanism for influencing the host country's internal
politics.
while Angolan officials favored priv
ate-
sector involvement in agriculture, Havana pressed
Luanda to assume complete state control of
agricultural production-a concept supported by
Cuban advisers working in the Angolan agricultural
sector. Moreover, Cuban officials pressed the
Angolans to permit them to assume direct
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secret
so that the Malian Government did not have a choice.
Just prior to closing time on a Friday, a Cuban
Embassy officer verbally informed Malian offiicials
that a special Air Cubana flight with the medical
contingent on board would arrive the following
Monday, a Malian holiday. The Government of Mali
was thus denied an opportunity to respond to the
notification and had the Cuban aid forced upon it.
management of the entire Angolan sugar industry.
The Angolans-mindful of the time in the late 1970s
when Cuban workers in the Angolan sugar industry
were asked to leave and stripped two sugar mills of
equipment and fixtures on their way out-firmly
rejected Havana's proposal. The Angolans said they
would accept Cuban technicians only on the condition
that they be supervised by Angolan managers, and the
Cubans eventually agreed to this limitation. The
Cubans were also pushing the Angolans into
accepting their offer to provide paramilitary training
to peasants and arming agricultural workers to
improve security in Angola's agricultural zones
Cuban interference led the Angola Government in
1980 to begin letting specific contracts lapse as they
expired, When this
became obvious to Castro, the Cuban leader sent a
message to President dos Santos announcing that
henceforth all Cuban assistance was to be paid for in
US currency. Castro threatened to remove "all
Cubans" from Angola if this demand was not met.
Apparently, differences were resolved; we have not
observed any significant decline in Cuban economic
assistance to Angola and dos Santos recently publicly
claimed that Cuban civilians are provided free.
Another example of Cuban pressure tactics occurred
Cuban medical contingent, Cuba maneuvered events
Outlook
Despite some failures in its international assistance
programs, Cuba will continue to probe for new
opportunities to gain influence in Africa and
elsewhere in the Third World. Its aid is particularly
appealing to those countries where young, leftist
governments look to Cuba as an example of a
successful revolution and as source of badly needed
free or inexpensive assistance. These nations view
Cuba's experience as a developing country as having
more relevance to their problems than the
sophisticated "high-technology" societies of the West.
Therefore, despite the problems experienced by some
nations, many countries still gladly accept Cuban
offers of aid. In 1984, Burkina, for example,
according to Embassy reporting, planned to utilize
Cuban security advisers in restructuring the internal
security and intelligence collection service and in
training military personnel. Other Cuban inroads in
Africa in the last 18 months included expanded
cooperation with Burkina and Ghana and new
agreements with Zambia and Zimbabwe.~~
Nevertheless, Castro's assistance programs in Africa
probably will continue to encounter problems, in part
because of the wide scope of Havana's efforts. Those
countries such as Burundi and Mali that have
experienced difficulties probably will look elsewhere
for help. Others may limit Cuban aid for fear of
alienating Western sources of financial assistance.
Moreover, some African recipients, wary of Havana's
meddling in their internal politics, will try to limit the
Cuban presence in their country. Angola, however,
will have difficulty controlling Cuban activities
because of its heavy dependence on Cuban military
support. For its part, Havana, confined by its own
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severe economic constraints and unable to provide
substantial:material or economic assistance, will
continue to-rely on sending personnel rather than
giving financial or material aid
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Secret
Chile: Resurgence of University
Student Politics
The intensification of university student political
activities in recent months constitutes a serious blow
to President Pinochet's efforts to maintain controls on
academic life and prevent students from regaining the
political influence they had before the 1973 coup. The
most significant development was the sweeping
victory in October 1984 of acentrist-leftist coalition
in student elections at the University of Chile, the
country's largest and most important university. This
election capped a skillful campaign by opposition
groups to undermine the regime-imposed student
organization, to revive the proscribed Federation of
Chilean Students, and to reinstitute direct university-
wide student elections. This and similar ferment at
other universities demonstrate the staying power of
such political parties as the Christian Democrats, the
Socialists, and the Communists, which historically
have dominated the student movement. Conversely,
these developments underscore the failure of the
regime's "cleansing" operations in universities and the
weak appeal of the far-right groups that had been
foisted on student associations and sustained by
government aid since the coup.
From mid-1983 through last October, the regime
seemingly felt obliged to accept aspeeded-up
transition to democratic rule. The government
tolerated heightened political activity on university
campuses, evidently because it did not expect a major
challenge to its authority. The regime was caught
short by the intensity of the student opposition's
efforts during the second half of 198'. The elections
at the University of Chile triggered a series of
government countermeasures there and at other
institutions. Pinochet publicly characterized student
activists as irresponsible and pointed to the centrist-
leftist victory at the University of Chile as
contributing to his decision to delay the transition
process and to impose the state of siege on
6 November
Opposition student leaders have reacted sharply to the
state of siege and the renewed restrictions on political
activism on campuses. Although antiregime political
demonstrations in recent months were generally
effectual, students were in the forefront and clashed
with security forces on several occasions. During the
current vacation period that began in December,
opposition student leaders have issued statements
denouncing regime actions against students. They
have called for academic liberalization, dismissal of
regime-designated military rectors, and student
participation in university governance.
When the vacation period ends in mid-March, student
agitation probably will increase as part of the political
opposition's campaign against the state of siege and to
achieve an accelerated transition to democratic rule.
Background
The revitalization of the university student movement
is remarkable, considering the sweeping purges
carried out when the military came to power in 1973 25X1
and the regime's actions to maintain tight control over
all universities. According to several scholarly
articles, government measures included wholesale
dismissals of leftist professors and some centrist
Christian Democrats and other nonconformists,
reductions by 10 to 15 percent of nonacademic
personnel and 15 to 18 percent of students,
appointment of military officers as rectors in all
public and private (Catholic) universities, and the
virtual elimination of political science as an academic
discipline and sharp curtailment of other social
sciences. The purges of faculty, students, and others
were pervasive at institutions the military deemed
especially subversive, such as the University of
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ALA LAR 85-005
15 February 1985
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Concepcion, long a hotbed of leftist sympathies and
the birth place of the extremist Movement of the
Revolutionary Left
As part of an apparent plan to modify the class
composition of university student bodies, the regime
decreed sharp tuition hikes, reductions in student
financial aid, and an upgrading of aptitude test scores
required for university admission. Because of
curriculum changes ostensibly geared to anticipated
job market requirements, technological and business
fields predominated among openings for prospective
students, and the humanities and social sciences were
neglected. The effect was to reduce sharply access to
higher education for the lower-middle classes and
drop enrollments from 146,000 in 1973 to about
120,000 in 1984, according to government statistics.
From 1973, the regime insisted on depoliticizing
student movements and discouraging student self-
government. It abolished existing student and teacher
organizations and gradually established essentially
powerless student centers in most universities, whose
officers it appointed while allowing some elected
delegates. In 1977, the regime fostered the creation of
anew student federation at the University of Chile
and placed at its helm student members of the
gremialist movement, a group comprised
predominantly of conservatives, lay Catholics, and
strong nationalists who held many key government
positions. The regime's political strategists evidently
hoped that .these student associations would form the
nucleus for an enduring rightist political party to
which the military eventually could hand over power.
Although gremialists at the University of Chile and
elsewhere attracted minimal student support, their
control over student associations was guaranteed by
periodic indirect elections
Following a reorganization of the university system in
1981, the provincial branches of the University of
Chile became separate institutions and several new
universities were created in more remote areas. The
underlying purpose, according to news commentators
and scholars, was to disperse the concentration of
students away from major urban centers and to
establish conservative, proregime universities.
Name (Location) Enrollment Student Association-Political
Orientation
Total 120,000
University of Chile 26,000 Christian Democratic/
(Santiago) Communist-led coalition
Catholic University of 12,000 Gremialist; elections recently
Chile (Santiago) canceled
University of 15,000
Santiago
University of
Valparaiso
Christian Democratic/
Communist-led coalition
Santa Maria Techni-
cal University of
Valparaiso
University of
Concepcion
University of Biobio
(Concepcion)
University of the
North (Antofagasta)
University of
Antofagasta
University of La
Serena (La Serna)
University of the
Frontier (Temuco)
Austral University
(Valdivia)
University of
Tarapaca (Arica) a
Arturo Prat
University (Iquique) a
University of
Atacama (Copiapo) a
University of
Magallanes a
University of
Talca a
recently canceled
2,000 Communist-led coalition
10,000 Christian Democratic slate;
academic year ended early
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Secret
Developments at the University of Chile
Antiregime student organizers at the University of
Chile worked hard throughout 1983-84 to overcome
the political apathy on campus and to undercut the
regime-imposed student association. Their most
effective tactic was to put up candidates for the at-
large delegate positions on the universitywide student
association. The US Embassy reports that by mid-
1984 opposition groups had won several seats and
were threatening to oust the gremialists from control
of the association.
Elections last October for the reconstituted
Federation of Chilean Students-the first free
University of Chile elections in 12 years-produced a
large turnout. A combined slate representing the
Christian Democratic Party and the Communist-led
Popular Democratic Movement received 66 percent of
the vote and gained full control of the Federation.
About half of the coalition's vote went to the
Christian Democrats, whose top votegetter became
the Federation's president. The Communists received
about a fourth of the slate's votes and elected the
Federation's vice president. Rightist students split
into several groups. Most considered association with
the gremialists a liability because of the Tatter's
identification with the regime, according to the US
Embassy. The combined vote total of the right was
about 27 percent, and because the gremialists
received only about 6 percent they are widely viewed
as likely to disappear from the University of Chile's
political map.
The US Embassy saw the elections as having a
significant impact, largely because for the first time
since 1973 a substantial number of Chileans were
allowed to vote for candidates representing clearly
labeled political parties and under conditions that
were not rigged. The Embassy agreed with several
local commentators that the results constitute the best
rough indicator to date of the relative appeal of the
various political parties.
The reaction of the authorities was speedy and
negative, The
university's military rector questioned the right of the
new Federation to represent students and charged
that portions of its statutes were "unacceptable." He
said the University administration would not officially
recognize the Federation, grant it office space or
funds, or permit its representatives to have any say in
University decisionmaking. The rector's statement
was quickly endorsed by the Minister of Education,
who threatened reprisals if student leaders engaged in
antigovernment protests. In announcing the state of
siege on 6 November, President Pinochet said the
elections demonstrated the students' lack of "political
maturity" and how some groups had taken advantage
"irresponsibly" of the more open political activity the
government had permitted.
University and educational officials had tended to
ignore the growth of student political activism,
according to the US Embassy. They acted only when
the right lost the elections and the new Federation
leaders pledged to increase attacks on the government
and to seek the early ouster of the rector. The
authorities probably were also provoked by the
Federation president's statements that he considered
it legitimate for students to seize university buildings
or campuses to dramatize their protests and that in
1985 he would seek to organize a national
confederation of university students as a means to
increase pressure for an early return to civilian
government.
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Effect on the Christian Democrats
The Federation elections also worsened internal
differences in the Christian Democratic Party,
according to the US Embassy. Moderate and
conservative party leaders wanted the Christian 25X1
Democratic student group to disavow the alliance
with the far left in the contest. The party's left wing,
on the other hand, favored the alliance, evidently
fearing that without it a leftist coalition would defeat
the Christian Democratic student ticket. Christian
Democratic President Gabriel Valdes, who argued for
the alliance and ultimately prevailed, was opposed on
this issue by his rival for the party chairmanship, Juan
Hamilton. The latter told the US Embassy that his
decision to seek to unseat Valdes in forthcoming party
elections was solidified by the split over the student
alliance issue. Hamilton said he feared this
development would provide the regime with additional
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ammunition to argue that the Christian Democrats
are unreliable because they will never forgo alliances
with the Communists at the national level.)
Despite failure by the moderates to prevail on the
University of Chile elections question, they provoked
such a furor that, according to the US Embassy,
student members were prohibited from allying with
the far left in subsequent university student elections.
Nevertheless, the
issue is not dead. Valdes and his wing still believe that
the Communists are a significant political force and
oppose the :regime's demands that the Communists
and other far leftist political parties be formally
proscribed before the transition process will be
permitted to advance.
the continuing acrimony over this issue was a actor in
the party's decision to delay internal elections.
Meanwhile, elections for President of the Christian
Democratic Youth Movement held in mid-December
resulted in a tie vote. The incumbent-a strong critic
of alliances with leftists-reportedly was expected to
win reelection easily before the dispute arose. His
opponent belongs to the party's left wing and is closely
associated with Valdes. The tie vote underscores the
continuing divisiveness among Christian Democrats
regarding alliances in university elections. This
situation is likely to be aggravated once the new
academic year begins in March and student leaders
agitate for elections throughout the university system.
Developments in Other Universities
Elections at the University of Chile stimulated
students at several other universities to try to follow
suit, according to the US Embassy. At the Catholic
University in Santiago, probably the country's second
most important university and a gremialist
stronghold, a plebiscite in September over whether to
permit direct student elections received overwhelming
approval. As a result, elections for a new directorate
for the Federation were scheduled for November. The
US Embassy reports that the contest was shaping up
as a close race between a Christian Democrat-leftist
coalition and acentrist-rightist group led by the
gremialists. On 14 November, however, the military
governor of Santiago banned the elections, citing state
of siege prohibitions
The authorities adopted similar measures to thwart
opposition victories in student elections scheduled at
other institutions. Included were an order on 22
November ending the academic year early at the
University of Concepcion, the cancellation of student
elections at the Catholic University of Valparaiso, and
the refusal of officials at a campus in Osorno to
recognize student elections won by a Christian
Democratic-headed slate over one led by the
Communists. Student elections held in several other
universities before the state of siege prohibitions were
implemented resulted in victories by either
Communist-led tickets or those headed by the
Christian Democrats.
Opposition student groups reacted to the restrictive
measures by calling short protest strikes or class
stoppages at several universities, issuing demands for
replacement of military rectors, and staging a few hit-
and-run provocations against the police near
university campuses. Most of these activities fizzled,
however, and campuses quieted down with the onset
of the summer vacations in December. Nevertheless,
several groups in Santiago mounted a successful
public fund drive to finance what had been a summer
volunteer service by university students in rural areas
but was now prohibited by the government under the
state of siege. In January and February, according to
local radio reports, police arrested several hundred
students engaged in this activity in small towns and
threatened further action if the student Federation of
the University of Chile did not suspend its program.
Outlook
The coming academic year probably will be more
agitated than any in recent memory, leading to
growing polarization between opposition student
groups and the authorities. When university classes
resume next month, student opposition groups will try
to expand on their already appreciable gains. Their
first priority probably will be to renew pressure on
university administrators to permit direct student
elections in those institutions where hardline rectors
have prevented balloting. Two places where this tactic
probably will be tried are at the capital's third
university, the University of Santiago, and at the
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Secret
University of Concepcion. Tight control continues to
be maintained at each institution. In addition, student
groups at the Catholic University of Santiago and
elsewhere will press for an early scheduling of
postponed elections, despite the authorities' reliance
on the prohibitions of the state of siege. The new
president of the Federation at the University of Chile
probably will take the lead in planning a national
confederation of students, perhaps attempting to tie
this campaign to the United Nations' designation of
1985 as the worldwide Year of Youth.
Opposition student groups also probably will continue
pressing for liberalization of university life. Their
demands are likely to include replacement of military
rectors by civilians chosen by the respective academic
communities, increases in student financial aid and
softening of admission requirements, and a return to
the pre-1973 practice of granting student
representatives avoice in university affairs. A theme
likely to permeate the revived student activism will be
the need to return universities to center stage in the
study and debate on major national issues, with
particular emphasis on how to persuade the regime to
speed up the return to a civilian government
The regime's reactions to most, if not all, of this
activity will almost certainly be negative, involving
new repressive measures to forestall opposition gains
through elections or demands for liberalization. In
fact, as long as the state of siege remains in effect,
there is little chance that the regime will tolerate
renewed student activism, such as participation in
antiregime protests or efforts of student groups to play
a role in discussion of the transition process.
Moreover, the outcome of the University of Chile
student elections has reconfirmed Pinochet's
suspicions regarding the Christian Democrats. If
nothing else, this factor probably will provide an
additional pretext to delay the transition dialogue.
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Argentina: Alfonsin's Prospects
in 1985
President Alfonsin's first year in office has been
successful, by Argentine standards. Polls show that,
despite triple-digit inflation and rising unemployment,
nearly three-quarters of the population feels Alfonsin
has governed the country well. We believe he
continues to enjoy broad popular support in part
because of his ability to articulate the democratic
aspirations of a wide swath of the Argentine
electorate; much of the public has apparently come to
equate Alfonsin's political fortunes with the fortunes
of democracy. This, in our judgment, explains the
government's landslide victory in the vote on the
Beagle Channel treaty with Chile last November,
which was widely viewed as a referendum on
Alfonsin's first year in power.
Peronists in Disarray
The President has also been aided by the opposition
Peronist party's failure to oppose his government
effectively. Before 1983 the Peronists, along with the
military, were Argentina's traditional powerbrokers.
Peronism, however, has failed to adapt to the role of
chief opposition party in a democratic system.
Instead, it has been riven by internal disputes and has
split into rival factions, losing considerable popular
support in the process.
Alfonsin has craftily taken advantage of the disarray
in the Peronist camp by allowing disgruntled Peronist
and minor party candidates to run under his Radical
Party's banner in congressional elections scheduled
for next November. He hopes that these elections will
preserve the Radicals' majority in the lower house and
enable the party to gain control of the Senate, thereby
consolidating Radical domination of Argentine
politics.
Foreign Policy Accomplishments
Alfonsin also has some foreign policy successes to his
credit. Foremost, in our view, was the signing of the
Beagle Channel Treaty, which ended acentury-old
dispute that had on several occasions almost provoked
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war between Argentina and Chile. The President has
also worked at repairing relations with the United
States, which had deteriorated as a result of
Washington's support for the United Kingdom in the
1982 Falklands conflict. He has adopted a pragmatic
stance on Central American issues, making clear that
Argentina will not take the lead in opposing US policy
in the region. Under Alfonsin, Argentina is playing a
more active role in the Nonaligned Movement and
may exert a moderating influence in that group. On
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resolving the Falklands dispute. London and Buenos
Aires remain at loggerheads over the issue of the
islands' sovereignty, and we foresee little chance of a
breakthrough in the near future.
Relations With the Military
Alfonsin has attempted to circumvent the issue of
human rights abuses committed by the military
during the "dirty war" against terrorism of the 1970s.
He has delayed prosecution of all but top military 25X1
leaders and kept the trials largely within the military
courts. No officers have been convicted so far, but
hundreds face the prospect of eventually accounting
Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
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for past crimes. This situation has satisfied neither the
government's critics on the left nor the military. We
suspect that Alfonsin is seeking a few token
convictions of top military figures-as well as
balancing convictions of leftist terrorists-as a
prelude to issuing a general amnesty for past political
crimes. Such a course would alienate extremists on
both the right and the left but would probably satisfy
much of the Argentine public, which we believe wants
to put the nation's violent past to rest.
The human rights issue and drastic cuts in the
military budget have strained Alfonsin's relations
with the armed forces, but we see little danger of a
coup in the near future. The services are discredited
and disunited, and there is little civilian support for a
military takeover. Nevertheless, bombings and
kidnapings by small groups of dissident officers and
rightist terrorists are increasing. Violence could
increase and pose a serious problem in the future if
the economy goes into a tailspin or leftist terrorists
become active again.
Labor and the Economy
A more immediate challenge to the government
comes from organized labor. The demise of the
Peronists has converted Argentina's traditionally
assertive trade unions into the main civilian opposition
to Alfonsin. Union leaders have denounced the
President for entering into an agreement with the
IMF and late last year imposing austerity at workers'
expense. The unions have recently reorganized and
probably will test their power by mobilizing to protest
the government's economic policies.
The economy remains Alfonsin's greatest single
problem. The agreement with the IMF has removed,
for the time being, the threat of debt default or
repudiation that loomed during his first months in
office. But Alfonsin will have a tough time
implementing the IMF program, which calls for a
sharp reduction in the current 600-percent inflation
rate through wage restraint and budget cuts. His
willingness to endure the political pressures generated
by austerity will determine to what extent he complies
with the IMF guidelines. He probably calculates that,
provided recovery is under way well before the
November congressional elections, he can withstand
the political fallout from a mild recession.
Outlook
If the economic slowdown proves unexpectedly severe
and if protests from labor and the military become
intense, Alfonsin may try to mollify these and other
interest groups through piecemeal financial
concessions. Such a course would aggravate inflation
and probably cause budget targets to be missed,
thereby jeopardizing the agreement with the IMF. A
full break with the Fund and the international
financial community might give Alfonsin a brief
political boost, but the long-term consequences could
be disastrous for Argentine democracy. Runaway
inflation would almost certainly produce widespread
discontent and give the military-perhaps in alliance
with sectors of labor and the Peronists-a chance to
gain the public support it needs to take power once
again.
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Argentina: Naval Production and
Export Efforts
In the late 1970s, the Argentine Navy launched an
ambitious modernization program calling for
production of six submarines, six guided-missile
corvettes, and four guided-missile frigates with
assistance from West German firms. New shipyards
were built and existing yards were upgraded and
expanded. In addition, the Argentines began
producing an indigenously designed air-to-surface
antiship missile
After the return to civilian rule in 1983, the
modernization program began to experience financial
setbacks as a result of President Alfonsin's budget
cutting and his government's decreased emphasis on
meeting domestic military requirements. In
November 1984, the Navy's Chief of Staff, Admiral
Arosa, announced that financial difficulties compelled
the Navy to try to sell at least some of the new
frigates and possibly the submarines. Two British-
made destroyers and two West German-built
submarines in the Navy's inventory are also to be sold
Argentine Products
Submarines. The Argentine Navy signed a contract in
1977 with the West German firm Thyssen
Nordseewerke for the construction of six TR-1700
submarines. Two of the submarines were subsequently
built at Thyssen's shipyards in Germany. One was
delivered to the Argentine Navy in 1984, and the
other has recently completed sea trials. Construction
of the remaining four began in 1982 at the Manuel
Domecq Garcia Shipyards in Buenos Aires, which are
owned 75 percent by the Argentine Navy and 25
percent by Thyssen, but recent funding cutbacks and
technical difficulties are delaying completion
The `San Juan, "the second q/'six TR-1700 Internateona!
submarines ordered Jrom Thyssen Nordseewerke Defense tzeotew
by the Argentine Navy seen at the company's
Frigates. In 1978, the Navy contracted with the West
German firm Blohm and Voss for the construction of
four Meko 360 frigates. 25X1
three of the frigates, built in West Germany, are
now in the Navy's inventory. They are each armed 25X1
with eight Exocet missile launchers and an Albatross
antiaircraft system that uses Aspide missiles. The
ships also have antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 25X1
capabilities.
Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
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Corvettes. In 1980, Blohm and Voss contracted to
assist Argentina in building six Meko l40 corvettes.
Construction of the first of these ships began in
October 1980 at the Argentine Government's Rio
Santiago shipyards. Four of the six corvettes have
been delivered to the Navy thus far. The Meko 140s
have Exocet missile launchers and an ASW
capability.
lLfissiles. The Kingfisher air-to-surface antiship
missile was developed in the late 1970s by the Armed
Forces Scientific and Technical Research Center
(C(TEFA), the Argentine military's research and
development arm. The missile is a supersonic,
aircraft-launched tactical missile for use over short-
to-medium ranges (2.5 to 15 kilometers). It is powered
by asingle-stage, solid-propellant rocket motor and
carries a conventional high-explosive warhead
weighing 40 kilograms.
Two versions of the Kingfisher are in series
production. One of these, the ASM-1, has a range of
up to 9 kilometers, while the follow-on version, the
ASM-2, has a 15-kilometer range. A third version-
possibly to be called the ASM-3-is a helicopter-
launched model with a 100-kilogram warhead. A
prototype is scheduled for testing in 1985.
Efforts To Export
In recent months, the financially strapped Navy,
looking for ways to offset budget cuts, has been
seeking foreign customers for Argentine naval
equipment. Discussions have been held with Egypt
concerning a possible purchase of TR-1700
submarines, and with several Asian countries
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Secret
An aerial view of the Manuel Domecq Garcia shipyards at the port
of Buenos Aires. /n 1981, the shipyard began construction o,(the
first ojfour TR-1700 submarines to be built in Argentina. Key:
1. A neighboring repair facility
2. Synchro-lift
3. F'lectrical workshops
4. Berths for simultaneous construction of two submarines
5. Hull-section welding shop
6. Plate store
7. Plate-cutting shop
8. Administrative building
Into
sales have been concluded thus far for various reasons.
Argentina's financial situation makes it impossible for
the Navy to offer attractive credit terms. Political
considerations have caused Buenos Aires to reconsider
some sales, and several potential customer countries
apparently are concerned that Argentine ships do not
meet their present naval requirements. In addition,
exports of West German-origin equipment from
Argentina require the approval of the West German
Government. Bonn has previously put restrictions on
selling weapons to areas of tension, especially in the
Middle East
Argentine inventory since the late 1970s.
Negotiations are currently under way with Iran, and
press reports indicate that the government is studying
the possibility of asking a third country-possibly
Portugal or Tunisia-to act as an intermediary in the
sale Portugal has served
in sue a ro e etween ran an other countries in the
past, but Tunisia has not, and we doubt it would be
willing to do so at this time.
outcome of its negotiations with Iran
Iraq has also expressed interest in the destroyers, but
the Argentines have been unresponsive thus far. We
believe Buenos Aires may be stalling to await the
Foreign-Produced Equipment for Sale
]n 1984 Buenos Aires offered for sale two British-
designed Type 42 destroyers that have been in the
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Argentina
recently offered to sell Taiwan the two Type 42
destroyers and two submarines-probably the West
German-made Type 209 diesel submarines now in the
Argentine Navy inventory. The ships would be part of
a barter agreement in which Taiwan would supply
Buenos Aires with turnkey fertilizer plants, electrical
generatorss and an electrolytic aluminum smelter. We
believe the Argentines may be courting Taiwan as a
buyer in an effort to avoid the diplomatic
complications that could arise from selling the ships in
the Middle East.
The Ecuadoreans appear unable to fund such a
purchase, however, and the Argentine financial
situation makes Buenos Aires reluctant to consider a
credit arrangement
Impact of Sales on Capabilities
Sales of foreign or domestically manufactured ships
now in the Navy's inventory-particularly those that
have been recently acquired-could have a severe
impact on naval capabilities. Extensive sales would
undercut the fleet modernization program, which was
designed to redress the Navy's inadequate number of
submarines and surface ships and to strengthen its
limited antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Sales of
more limited scope-the most likely eventuality, in
our view-would mean some loss in capabilities but
would also: yield revenues to help offset the impact of
budget cuts on naval operations
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Secret
at Corinto
A protracted confrontation in which insurgents of the
19th of April Movement (M-19) were encircled by the
Army near the town of Corinto has provided the most
serious challenge to date to the five-month-old cease-
fire between the government and three of the four
major guerrilla groups. The government and the
M-19 negotiated an end to the hostilities in January,
and the group has agreed to withdraw from its
fortified encampments. Nonetheless, the potential for
future clashes remains high.
The confrontation began in mid-December, when
numerically superior Army troops pinned down
approximately 150 M-19 guerrillas with small arms
and mortar fire. The guerrillas were entrenched in
fortified camps surrounded by minefields, creating
what then Acting Defense Minister Vega called
independent republics. Although the Army ostensibly
stumbled upon these fortifications
Government and Guerrilla Motives
Military leaders publicly justified their actions
against the M-19 on grounds that the government
would not permit the establishment of armed
narcotics traffickers to assassinate Colombian
officials and US diplomats probably also contributed
to Betancur's willingness to give the military a green
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from several political leaders, also motivated
Betancur, according to the US Embassy
The President's desire to punish the M-19 was
tempered, however, by a desire to prevent the cease-
fire from unraveling. Moreover, after the initial
mortar attacks against the M-19 fortifications, the
Army discovered that many of the dead insurgents
were only 12 to 14 years old.
against the Corinto fortifications,
We believe that the guerrillas probably misread
government intentions and public opinion and that the
Army's forceful reaction caught them unprepared. A
similar situation last November, in which the
government ordered the Army to withdraw from a
region occupied by the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) as part of the truce with the
guerrillas, may have contributed to the mistaken
assumption that the Army would take no action
In a meeting with
animosity toward the M-19 had been heightened by
threats the group made against him when he was in
London earlier last year.
President
Betancur supported the Army's actions because of his
increasing frustration with the M-19's flagrant
violations of the cease-fire accords. Widely publicized
statements by M-19 leader Ivan Ospina urging local
Government Minister Castro during the Corinto
siege, Antonio Navarro Wolf, the M-19's chief
negotiator with the government, blamed the Army for
singling out his group, since the FARC had been
permitted to maintain fortified camps. M-19 appeals
for mediation by Mexico, Spain, and the Catholic
Church were, in our view, a desperate bid to bring its
plight to international attention and to seek assistance
in the face of near-certain defeat by the Army.
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Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
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Assessing the Conflict
The outcome of the Corinto encounter probably
satisfied all parties. The military, despite its
disappointment with not being allowed to annihilate
the M-19, doubtless is satisfied that it has put the
guerrillas on notice about the armed forces'
willingness to move against insurgent strongholds.
Senior officers probably are also heartened by
Betancur's growing frustration with the guerrillas,
which they believe could spur him to further punitive
action,
Betancur's New Year's Day speech strongly
criticizing the guerrillas and his praise for the military
at the funeral of Defense Minister Matamoros in
January served to bolster his relations with the
military For
his part, Betancur managed to keep the peace process
intact, retained his image as a dedicated peacemaker,
and probably strengthened his position with voters as
a result of his firm position toward the guerrillas.
The Corinto conflict demonstrated that Betancur-
long unwilling to take a hard line against the
guerrillas because of his paramount interest in
preserving the shaky peace negotiations-is capable
of mounting stiff resistance if pushed far enough.
Betancur, however, showed willingness to make
concessions-allowing the M-19 to keep its arms and
withdraw from Corinto to another safehaven when the
Army clearly had the upper hand militarily-in order
to maintain the peace process.
Although the M-19 was forced to evacuate its
stronghold,- the fact that it was able to leave Corinto
with its weapons probably provided some consolation.
M-19 leaders also believe they gained favorable
publicity by holding off the Army for so long,
Nevertheless,
the M-19's effort to project an image as a legitimate
political force has been damaged by the evidence that
it was using its base at Corinto to strengthen its
paramilitary capabilities.
Outlook
The M-19's willingness to maintain the truce will
hinge largely on the outcome of the group's current
leadership struggle.
One faction reportedly favors creating a political
party, terminating armed actions, and gradually
disarming. The other rejects participation in the
political process unless the government undertakes
radical economic and political reforms, and wants to
continue preparing for a resumption of the armed
struggle.
prospects that the truce will unravel.
The M-19's national conference, which is scheduled
for 14-18 February, will be dominated by the
competition between the two Factions. The M-19 also
will review the status of Ivan Ospina, who recently
announced that he had been removed as the group's
senior leader because of his endorsement of the
terrorist threats by narcotics traffickers. The internal
divisions within the M-19 are longstanding, and
guerrilla leaders may be able to paper over differences
as they have in the past. If hardliners decide to break
from the movement, however, they probably will align
with other insurgent groups that have refused to
accept the cease-fire, thereby greatly increasing
In any event, the M-19 is entrenched in its new
location east of Corinto with its forces largely intact
and armed, and the potential for future clashes with
the Army remains high. A recent M-19 charge of
continuing Army harassment at its new camp further
heightens the possibility of renewed hostilities.
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Paraguay-Latin America:_
The Case of Dr. Mengele
The search for German war criminal Josef Mengele
has centered on South America, long a haven for Nazi
fugitives. Paraguay has been a special target for
investigators. Mengele reportedly lived there during
the early 1960s, and some Nazi hunters believe he
still resides in Paraguay under official protection.
Mengele, a physician, is accused of selecting tens of
thousands of inmates at the Auschwitz concentration
camp for medical experiments or extermination in gas
chambers. Most of the information we have on his
postwar activities is unsubstantiated-the last
confirmed sighting was in the late 1960s, according to
press reports-and serves more to document
Mengele's past movements than to provide indications
of whether he is still alive or his current whereabouts.
The Paraguayan Government has been only mildly
responsive to inquiries about Mengele, and President
Stroessner has barred independent investigations,
labeling them as interference in internal affairs. In
our view, if Mengele-who would now be 73 years
old-is alive and residing in Paraguay, the regime's
attitude, combined with the lack of recent information
on his whereabouts, gives him a reasonable chance of
continuing to evade capture.
Past Residence in Paraguay
Last December two sources provided US Embassy
personnel with what appear to be plausible, although
unconfirmed, accounts of Mengele's movements until
the early 1970s. The first source, a lawyer from New
York, was visiting Paraguay to gather information for
a book on Mengele. He met several times there with
Alejandro von Eckstein, a Russian emigre who has
lived in the country for 50 years and claims a long
relationship with the Nazi fugitive. Von Eckstein told
the lawyer that Mengele started visiting Paraguay in
the mid-1950s while residing in Buenos Aires, became
a Paraguayan citizen in 1959, and lived in and around
Asuncion until 1965. Mengele then moved to Brazil,
according to von Eckstein, and visited Paraguay
Reward poster placed by Nazi hunters in a
Paraguayan newspaper last November. The
picture oJ'Mengele was obtained in 1976,
but its date or origin is uncertain. The
reward Jor information is about $25,000 in
several times in the late 1960s. Von Eckstein said
Mengele lived in Brazil until several years ago. The
Russian claimed that he knew the exact location in
Brazil and that he could easily find out if Mengele
were still alive.
Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
IS February 1985
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Fortin i _-
-:- Madraionj
_ San Pedro
I Ros~ario_
San ~
Estanislao
A R G E N T I N
PARAGUAY
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Villa ~ ,~.,]~ ~ ~ Cascavel
Hayes
ASUNCI~N~ ~0 ~ d~ ~,,}I,,,~rEeandarias~F~?
Formos
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ILLEGIB
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Secret
Conrado Pappalardo, ahigh-level official in the
Paraguayan Government, corroborated and added to
this information in a later meeting with US Embassy
personnel. According to Pappalardo, Mengele was a
partner in a large hardware store in Asuncion
between 1959 and 1965, and used his own name
during that period. The store had ties to a farm
implement factory owned by the Mengele family in
Germany, and Mengele allegedly visited Germany
several times. Pappalardo said Mengele left Paraguay
for Brazil in 1965 after Nazi hunters discovered his
whereabouts. Eventually, according to Pappalardo,
the Nazi fugitive went on to Portugal but continued
corresponding with friends in South America until
around 1980. Pappalardo said that Mengele's friends
believe the absence of correspondence since then
indicated that Mengele had died.
served on occasion as Stroessner's personal physician.
Stroessner agreed only under strong international
pressure to revoke Mengele's Paraguayan citizenship
in 1979.
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How Mengele Evaded Capture
Half7rearted Pursuit. The lawyer from New York told
US Embassy personnel he had obtained evidence that
the Israelis had broken off their efforts to capture
Mengele two decades earlier. He said ahigh-level
Israeli intelligence officer assigned to tracking Nazis
had told him that in the early 1960s Israeli operatives
trailed Mengele to a farm near Encarnacion in
southern Paraguay. The farm was heavily fortified
and difficult to storm. The Israelis, according to the
intelligence official, were also inhibited from taking
action by the international uproar over their 1960
kidnaping of Nazi fugitive Adolph Eichmann in
Buenos Aires. The Israeli said that, by the mid-1960s,
Tel Aviv had more pressing concerns elsewhere and
the search for Mengele was shelved.
The West Germans also balked at about the same
time, according to von Eckstein. He claimed that the
West German Ambassador in Asuncion had queried
him about Mengele's whereabouts, but then asked von
Eckstein to withhold the information. Von Eckstein
believed that the Ambassador did not want to be put
in a position in which he would have had to press
Paraguay to extradite the fugitive to West Germany.
Paraguayan Protection. Even more important, in our
view, was the official protection Mengele evidently
enjoyed in Paraguay. Stroessner, who has been in
power since 1954, is of German background, and he
sympathized with the Axis powers during World War
Mengele reportedly also received considerable help
from the network of prosperous people of German
origin living in Paraguay.` For example, his partner in
the Asuncion hardware store, according to
Pappalardo, was of German descent. The fortified
ranch at which Mengele was staying when the Israelis
located him belonged to a family of German
background.
Recent Developments
Although the last confirmed sighting of Mengele was
nearly two decades ago in Paraguay, there have been
numerous unsubstantiated reports in recent years. In
January 1982, longtime Nazi hunter Simon
Wiesenthal claimed that Mengele was alive, although
afllicted with cancer, and was moving between
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Another Nazi
hunter believes Mengele has abandoned Paraguay
and is traveling between Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
Others claim to have spotted him at various times in
Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and the United States.
Last August, Mengele was allegedly seen by
in the Paraguayan cities of Filadelphia, 25X1
uerto troessner, and Pedro Juan Caballero. In mid-
February, aParaguayan exile in Buenos Aires
claimed Mengele was living on a military base in
Laureles, a town to the east of Desmochados in
southwestern Paraguay, where Stroessner has his
summer home.
Stroessner has been only mildly cooperative in
investigating such rumors. Last November, in
response to a request from a delegation led by a
former member of the US Congress, the President
' The German-origin community includes people whose families
began emigrating to Paraguay in the late 19th century and others
who arrived after World War II. According to open sources, some
200,000 Paraguayans out of a total population of 3.6 million are of
German descent.
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ordered a nationwide manhunt for Mengele and
offered to allow outsiders to assist Paraguayan police
investigators. Press reports indicate, however, that the
Paraguayan inquiry was halfhearted-Asuncion
announced within days that it had found nothing-
and Stroessner soon reneged on his offer to allow non-
Paraguayans to assist his investigators. We believe his
initiative was little more than a gambit aimed at
easing international pressure.
Prospects for Capture
If Mengele is still alive, we believe his personal
wealth, his connections among Germans in Paraguay
and elsewhere in South America, the porosity of
borders in the region, and the lack of recent confirmed
sightings will hinder efforts to locate and capture him.
Moreover, we see little indication that Stroessner
currently intends to be cooperative. If Mengele is now
residing in Paraguay, the President would probably
want to avoid the embarrassment of having him found
there. Paraguayan resentment of US human rights
policies will also impede efforts to persuade Asuncion
to help track Mengele down. We expect that only a
combination of intense international pressure and
economic or political incentives would prompt
Stroessner to cooperate.
Secret 26
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Latin America
Briefs
Peru's apparent inability to meet a 14 April deadline for its next scheduled
payment to France for supersonic Mirage 2000 fighters may disrupt scheduled
training and delay delivery of the aircraft, which is slated to begin in May 1986.
Peruvian technicians are scheduled to arrive in France next month for anine-
month maintenance course, and pilots will follow in October for six months of
flight training, Last December Peru
kept the threatened Mirage deal on track by making a $50-60 million
downpayment with funds that had been on deposit since the contract was
originally signed in early 1983. Peruvian Prime Minister Percovich recently stated,
however, that Peru may be forced to renegotiate the financial arrangements
because it lacks funds to make the April payment. The Peruvian Air Force is
pushing hard for the sale, but the deal is also important to France. The Mirage is
entering service in the French Air Force, and Paris hopes to reduce unit costs by
promoting export sales.
The US Embassy reports that labor unrest has increased in Uruguay since the
November elections, creating an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty. Workers
have staged strikes, slowdowns, plant occupations, and walkouts in such areas as
railroads, banking, communications, health, ports, municipalities, chemicals,
textiles, and the government-owned national oil distribution monopoly. The
worker's primary demand has been for wage hikes to compensate for the 60-
percent drop in purchasing power that occurred over the last decade, including a
40-percent decline in real wages during the past three years of economic recession.
Uruguayan Communists-long a dominant force in the organized labor
movement-have played a significant role in the growing unrest.
exiled Communist Party members
have recently been returning to the country and are helping to organize strikes and
other actions. The military government, which appears to be losing interest in
actively addressing the country's problems now that it is in a lameduck status, has
preferred to leave the labor issue for the incoming civilian administration.
President Sanguinetti's new government, however, will have difficulty in meeting
labor demands because they conflict with efforts to limit government deficits,
reduce inflation, and obtain international financial support. Sanguinetti has
advocated legislation to democratize the labor movement through secret balloting,
Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
IS February 1985
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I
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but, according to the US Embassy, he is now backing away from this approach-
probably, in our judgment, because it would involve a fierce political battle and
might fail to end Communist domination of the unions.
The Embassy expects that labor disruptions will increase in scope and significance
in the months ahead. Because a turbulent era of worker unrest in the late 1960s
and early 1970s helped set the stage for the military takeover in 1973, Sanguinetti
is likely to make the labor question one of the highest priorities in his campaign to
consolidate civilian rule.
The recent introduction of riverine warfare by guerrillas on the Magdalena and
Cauca Rivers in Bolivar and Santander Departments has highlighted the Navy's
deficiencies in combating such tactics. Emboldened by their recent successes, the
insurgents probably will intensify use of riverine warfare, thereby adding a new
dimension to the conflict.
On 14 January approximately 60 guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia or one of its splinter groups attacked noncombatant Navy small craft
that were ferrying a squad of Marines across the Magdalena River from their base
at the Mid-Magdalena Naval Command. Using a speedboat and forces onshore,
the guerrillas launched a swift, surprise attack in which three Marines were killed
and three wounded. Four days later, some 100 guerrillas-reportedly drawn from
several insurgent groups-attacked a police station in Achi, Bolivar, on the Cauca
River, killing two policemen. The guerrillas arrived aboard seven boats, briefly
occupied the town, lectured local citizens about their cause, looted the police
armory, and then departed with three hostages, all of whom reportedly remain in
guerrilla custody.
The Mid-Magdalena Naval Command is responsible for patrolling 800 kilometers
of the river with only four armed patrol craft, three of which reportedly were
nonoperational as of December 1984, plus assorted smaller noncombatant boats.
With apparently no formal river command for the Cauca River, patrols probably
are conducted infrequently, thus allowing the guerrillas to operate freely. Because
this year's military budget has been severely cut, it is unlikely that the Navy's river
patrol capability will be enhanced, and the guerrillas will have a major opportunity
to exploit this weakness)
Mexico City and Tel Aviv appear prepared to increase bilateral trade, including
greater sales of Mexican oil and Israeli arms. According to press reports, one of
the purposes of the visit to Mexico City last month of Israel's Energy Minister was
to purchase more Mexican crude. Mexico has been Israel's largest petroleum
supplier since the fall of the Shah of Iran, and it currently supplies approximately
35 percent of Israel's requirements.
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Tel Aviv recently has been trying to sell Mexico City a variety of military
hardware, including mortars, communications gear, and ground support
equipment. Israel reportedly has invited the head of Mexico's Navy to visit later
this year.
In view of the soft international oil market, Mexico City probably will respond
favorably to Israel's request to increase purchases. Moreover, buying small
amounts of military equipment from Israel would be consistent with Mexico's
policy of diversifying sources of arms.
Tel Aviv, for its part, values having a reliable cil supplier and probably views
expanded cooperation with Mexico as furthering its aim of strengthening economic
ties in the region. The Israelis may be promoting the weapons trade as a means of
bolstering their domestic arms industry and reducing their substantial trade deficit
with Mexico. They also may welcome closer economic cooperation with Mexico as
away of reinforcing generally good political relations.
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Cuba Chronology
The United States asks Cuba to return to American custody Ishmael Ali Labeet, a
convicted mass murderer who hijacked an American Airlines flight to Cuba on 31
December.
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe, in a 26th anniversary message to Fidel
Castro, says Cuba's commitment to the ideals of socialism and socialist solidarity
has been an inspiration to his people.
North Korean Vice President Pak Song-chol departs Pyongyang to visit Cuba and
to attend the inaugural of Nicaraguan President Ortega.
The Economic Commission for Latin America reports that Cuba registered a 22.6-
percent increase in per capita gross domestic product-the largest in the region
between 1981 and 1984.
Minister of Basic Industry Portal tours the Rio Yara hydroelectric plant under
construction in Bartolome Mazo municipality. The site will produce 3,000 kW.
Granma reports the total general budget for 1985 is $13.5 billion, slightly higher
than the 1984 budget.
Severo Aguirre del Cristo, President of the Cuban Movement for Peace and
Sovereignty of the Peoples, reports that the World Peace Council will meet in
Havana 7-11 January.
5 January French Minister for Overseas Cooperation Nucci arrives in Cuba heading a
delegation to the sixth meeting of the Cuban-French Commission for Scientific-
Technical Cooperation.
6 January Vice President of the Council of Ministers Jose Ramon Fernandez greets Pak
Song-chol, North Korean Vice President, on his arrival at Jose Marti International
Airport.
7 January Nucci delivers a message to Castro from President Mitterrand urging more
dynamic cooperation between Cuba and France and new thrust to trade relations.
Flavio Bravo, President of the National Assembly, greets Deputy Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, A. Barkauskas, who arrives in
Cuba heading a delegation on its way to Nicaragua.
31 Secret
ALA LAR 85-005
15 February 1985
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8 January Castro discusses matters of mutual interest with Gian Carlo Pajetta, Politburo and
Secretariat member of the Italian Communist Party.
President Flavio Bravo and Vice President Jorge Lezcano of the National
Assembly receive West German Deputy Helmut Schaefer to exchange
experiences.
9 January Politburo member and President of the National Assembly of Congo Jean Ganga
Zanzou arrives in Havana and is greeted by Flavio Bravo.
A bilateral exchange protocol for 1985-86 is signed between Cuba and France.
Scientific-technical cooperation will be extended and the French will provide aid to
the Cuban tropical medicine institute.
Havana TV announces that the thermoelectric plant under construction in
Matanzas Province will save over 100,000 tons of petroleum annually. The 330-
megawatt plant will begin operation in 1986.
Castro arrives in Nicaragua to attend the inauguration of President Ortega.
11 January Minister of Culture Hart receives Argentine Culture Secretary Gorostiza at Jose
Marti International Airport. Gorostiza is visiting at Hart's invitation.
Nicaraguan President Ortega awards the Augusto Cesar Sandino Order, the
Battle of San Jacinto grade to Castro at the ceremony opening the new Victoria de
Julio sugar mill.
Castro meets in Managua with Egon Krenz, East German Council of State deputy
chairman. Castro praises relations between the two countries.
In a meeting with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and J. Bolanos, Helmut Schaefer asks
if Cuba would send MIGs to Nicaragua in the event of invasion. They answer:
"No. Each country must defend itself."
US Congressmen William Alexander, Jim Leach, and Mickey Leland arrive in
Havana to discuss broadening relations, especially in ocean research, and the
extradition of convicted murderer Labeet.
12 January At a meeting with representatives of the Contadora nations in Nicaragua, Castro
says that peace in Central America is possible and that his country is willing to
assist in the effort.
Minister of Health del Valle announces in Geneva that Cuba has withdrawn its
invitation to host the 1986 annual conference of the World Health Organization.
Castro meets in Managua with Argentine Vice President Martinez and discusses
prospects for a trade exchange between the two countries.
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Helmut Schaefer says he received assurances from Havana that all Cuban
military advisers in Nicaragua will be withdrawn if the Contadora peace plan
becomes effective.
Eduardo Viera, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of
Uruguay, says he is optimistic about the resumption of relations with Cuba.
Guyana's Minister of Education Parris says his country will send mathematics
teachers to Cuba to work with English-speaking students in secondary schools on
the Isle of Youth.
I6 January US Congressman Alexander says that "Everything Castro has done in our
presence ...the hospitality and friendship shown to us as US representatives
indicate that he wants better relations."
17 January In his news conference Alexander also says "Castro said he is willing to sit down
and have talks with the United States on a peaceful political solution to the
situation in Nicaragua."
18 January Maritime service between Argentina and Cuba officially opens with the arrival of
the Argentine ship "Rio Abaucan" in the port of Havana. Guillermo Garcia greets
the delegation aboard the ship.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Isidoro Malmierca receive Abdul G. Koroma, who
presents his credentials as Ambassador of the Republic of Sierra Leone.
During a meeting of the Executive Secretariat for Nuclear Affairs, Fidel Castro
Diaz Balart says Cuba will initiate work in the peaceful use of atomic energy
during the next five-year period.
Cuba and Spain sign an agreement at the Second Session of the Cuban-Spanish
Joint Commission of Cultural and Education Cooperation for 1985-87 in Havana.
19 January Minister of Light Industry Millares tells the press in Camaguey that Cuba will
increase its light industry exports this year by almost 4 percent over 1984.
A Cubana jet bound for Nicaragua crashes after takeoff from Havana's
International Airport. All aboard are killed. Alexandra Pollack, a leading
American Communist, is among the dead.
A Soviet naval flotilla that has been in Cuba since 28 December ends its "official
and friendly" visit to Cuba.
In an interview in El Pais, Castro says there are more than 2,000 Cuban doctors
and health technicians in more than 25 Third World countries.
20 January In the El Pais interview, Castro says President Reagan is showing signs he wants
to go down in history as a "President of Peace."
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Politburo member Machado Ventura tells Granma that the emphasis placed this
year on the working goals of the base organizations of the PCC is contained in
Fidel's notions on Cuban economy.
Foreign Minister Malmierca and Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, Peter Hellenber,
sign a protocol in Havana to extend the trade agreement and an accord to
reschedule Cuba's debt with Switzerland.
Soviet-Cuban economic and technical cooperation are discussed at a meeting in
Moscow between M. A. Sergeychik, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations, and Ricardo Cabrizas.
Guyana's Minister of Health van West-Charles and Cuban Agricultural Minister
Diaz sign an economic and technical agreement in Guyana to establish schools of
medicine and language.
The President of the Brazilian National Confederation of Commerce meets in
Brasilia with President-elect Neves to request the reestablishment of commercial
relations with Cuba.
Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Isidoro Malmierca discuss bilateral
relations and exchange views on regional problems with Iranian Prime Minister
Mir Hoseyn Musavi during his stopover en route to Nicaragua.
Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Castillo and his Bulgarian counterpart Marin
Marinov sign a 1985 bilateral trade protocol.
25 January Cuba and Bulgaria sign a trade protocol for 1985 in Havana. Cuba will receive
machines, equipment, foodstuffs, fertilizers, and consumer goods.
Cuba and Czechoslovakia sign a trade protocol in Prague that will increase
commerce between the two countries by more than 5 percent. Ricardo Cabrizas
signs the agreement for Cuba.
In a Havana press conference Bishop Malone, President of the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, says Castro expressed willingness to meet with
Pope John Paul II in Cuba or Rome.
The Boston Herald reports that Castro talked to the delegation from the US
National Conference of Catholic Bishops about Cuba's educational system.
26 January The US Catholic bishops returning from Cuba say they are mildly encouraged by
improvements in church-state relations, but expressed concern over religious
discrimination in Cuba.
29 January NBC news in Washington says that Robert Vesco is smuggling high-technology
computer and communications equipment to Cuba, Nicaragua, and East Bloc
countries in exchange for sanctuary in Cuba.
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Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Isidoro Malmierca receive Lamin Sougouli, who
presents his credentials accrediting him as Ambassador of Guinea.
Leader of Mexico's Chamber of Deputies Humberto Lugo meets with a Cuban
delegation, headed by Luis Mendez Morejon, in Mexico City to discuss bilateral
matters and Central America.
Archbishop Jaime Ortega of Havana tells Reuter that talks with Castro will take
place in a few months about ways of improving relations between the church and
government.
The 11th plenum of the Central Committee is held in Havana. Fidel Castro speaks
on Cuba's foreign policies.The following announcements were made during the
plenum:
? Antonio Perez Herrero is released from the office of alternate Politburo member
and as a member of the Central Committee Secretariat.
? Jose Ramon Balaguer is designated a new Secretariat member responsible for
the departments of Education, Science, and Sports.
? Jorge Risquet is designated to head the Central Committee's Department of
Revolutionary Orientation (DOR) and the Department of Culture.
? Carlos Aldana Escalante is appointed the new director of the Department of
Revolutionary Orientation.
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~ecr~t
Secret
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