NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301310001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
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Near East and
South Asia Review
-Seeger-
NESA NESAR 85-004
1 February 1985
Copy 4 2 5
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Near East and
South Asia Review
The Congress Party's landslide victory in late December reflected
voter support for Rajiv Gandhi's leadership and dynastic continuity,
but the unprecedented win masks weaknesses in Rajiv's political
position and the underrepresentation of the opposition in Parliament
could encourage political activism outside itF--]
India's new leaders have been schooled in scientific and technical
subjects and trained in India's private business houses or state
enterprises before being drawn to public service, and this new
leadership has the backing of the postindependence generation of
Indians in its attempts to accelerate the pace of economic and social
change. 71
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Economic policy under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi will emphasize
improvement in industrial productivity through assimilation of
modern technology and decentralization of decisionmaking in the
public sector, but Rajiv must still address the domestic and
international financial problems that could limit his policy options.
Hindu revivalism will increasingly inflame communal tensions and
undermine the official secularism that has helped maintain the unity
of Indian society, but, because of its rigid ideology, revivalism is
unlikely to gain acceptance among most Hindus.n
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Israel's Unity Government: How Long Will It Survive?
Recent developments indicate that Labor and its allies are strong
enough to form a coalition government without Likud, and the odds
are better than even that Labor will orchestrate a coalition crisis
later this year to dissolve the unity government if Israel completes
its withdrawal from Lebanon without serious problems.n
Israel's progam to build a multirole strike fighter comparable to the
F-16 by 1990 may be economically unfeasible, as the aircraft will
eventually cost more than the F-16, be less capable, and thus
probably unable to compete in the world aircraft market of the
1990s. F_~
Kuwait will hold an election on 20 February for its 50-man National
Assembly, the only elected political institution on the Arabian
Peninusla, and the ruling family, while relieved that the country is
stable enough to permit such an election, hopes that this will help
avert the polarizing influence of religious and political extremism.
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Iran's Diplomatic Corps: Bewhiskered, Bothered, and Bewildered) 127
The Khomeini regime has not fully revamped Iran's diplomatic
service despite its nearly six years in power, and competing power
centers within the Foreign Ministry-combined with cronyism in
staffing Iranian embassies-have led to policy about-faces,
duplication of effort, and rampant disharmony among Iranian
diplomats.F_~
Shia activism, especially in Iran and Lebanon, may not yet have
reached its peak, and not enough time has passed for a confident
evaluation of its internal and external impactF__1
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President Zia's referendum last December was neither the great
victory he proclaimed nor the disaster claimed by the opposition, for
Zia still retains the initiative but will have to broaden his
constituency if he is to gain a workable result in the coming
electionsF
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Bangladesh: Soviet Subversive Efforts) 39
Soviet subversion in Bangladesh takes the form of financing
opposition parties and politicians, sponsoring antigovernment
strikes, and spreading disinformation about US policy, but, while
this contributes to Bangladesh's present political stalemate,
President Ershad is not seriously threatened by Soviet meddling.
Sudan: Disjointed Justice 43
Sudan's legal system-buffeted by President Nimeiri's frequent
restructuring of the courts and reshuffling of judges during the past
year-is in disarray, and, if Nimeiri continues to meddle in the
judicial process, disgruntled legal professionals may spark civil
disorder and increase the President's political vulnerability.F_~
Egypt's overcrowded prisons have long been a subject of foreign and
domestic criticism, and the Mubarak government has undertaken
some limited reforms, but further reforms will face resistance from
the entrenched police-prison bureaucracy that finds the current
system both convenient and personally rewardin
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
authors,
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India: National Election in
Perspective
The Congress Party's landslide victory in late
December reflected voter support for Rajiv Gandhi's
leadership and dynastic continuity and the winner-
takes-all Indian political system. Opposition disunity
has once more permitted the Congress Party to return
to power with less than a majority of the popular vote,
albeit with a larger plurality than ever before. The
party's large majority in the lower house of
Parliament will give Gandhi a free hand to pass new
legislation, but the unprecedented win masks
weaknesses in his political position. Gandhi will still
have to rely on faction-ridden state units of his party
to implement his policies. In the longer term, the
underrepresentation of the opposition in Parliament
could encourage political activism outside it.
What the Congress Party Won
A surge of support for the Congress Party coupled
with opposition disunity won the ruling party 49
percent of the popular vote and three-fourths of the
seats in the lower house of Parliament. The party
increased its share of the popular vote by 6.3 percent
over 1980, when it returned to power after a two-year
hiatus, and gained 49 seats in the 542-seat Parliament
for a total of 401. The government's decision to
postpone elections in violence-prone Punjab and
Assam states and in several other constituencies
meant that only 508 seats were actually contested, but
the balance of power in Parliament will be at most
marginally affected even when voting does take place
in these states.
As in past elections, India's single-member
constituency system favored the Congress Party. The
winner-takes-all system means that the proportion of
seats won by the leading party is always larger than
the proportion of votes cast for it. The failure of the
disparate opposition parties to pool their support
permitted many Congress Party candidates to win
seats with only a plurality of votes, according to
Indian press analysis.
The "Rajiv wave" swept almost the entire nation. It
was pronounced in the north and west, relied on
support from alliance partners in the southern states
of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, but was absent in Andhra
Pradesh and in Communist-ruled West Bengal.
Opinion polls conducted by a prominent magazine
before the election showed that urban voters favored
the Congress Party more than did rural voters.
Why Rajiv Won Big
We believe Indira Gandhi's abrupt exit from the
Indian political scene allowed the Congress Party to
recoup dwindling support. Before her death, most
observers questioned the factionalized Congress
Party's ability to win more than a bare majority in
Parliament in the national election, even against a
divided opposition. Popular dissatisfaction with New
Delhi's failure to control sectarian and regional strife
and to provide effective state government permitted
opposition parties to make significant inroads into
Congress Party control of the states. Public opinion
polls sponsored by a respected Indian institute
suggested that the party would lose ground even in
traditional strongholds and among longtime allies
such as the Muslims and untouchables.
In our view, the assassination restored some of the
Congress Party's traditional electoral advantages and
conferred new ones on Rajiv. His mother's death
deprived the opposition of its sole unifying goal, her
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NESA NESAR 85-004
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electoral defeat, and ensured yet another Congress
Party victory. Embassy reporting indicated that the
circumstances of Rajiv's succession aroused popular
sympathy and lent new credibility to his claim-and
his mother's-that India's beleaguered unity and
security could not be entrusted to a splintered
opposition. Indian analysts suggest that concern over
Sikh unrest in Punjab helped stimulate a high turnout
in favor of the Congress Party, particularly in the
Hindi-speaking northern states. In the past, a high
turnout has favored the opposition.
We believe the timing of the election-less than eight
weeks after Rajiv succeeded his mother-was a
significant factor in the landslide, with Rajiv's image
prevailing over questions about the substance of his
leadership. Indian analysts note that voters
disregarded Rajiv's political inexperience and
projected diverse hopes onto a nearly unknown leader.
We speculate that older voters responded favorably to
the dynastic continuity implied by Rajiv's leadership,
and younger voters responded to his youthfulness and
promises of change. Further analysis of electoral data
may reveal that identification with Rajiv sparked an
Congress Party poster implied that Indira Gandhi died for India's
salvation) I
unusually high turnout among new young voters and
accounted in part for the surge of support for his
party. Indian commentators note that the newly
elected lower house of Parliament is the youngest
ever.
Unchanging Indian Electorate
We judge that the election results reaffirmed
longstanding characteristics of the Indian electorate.
According to Indian press analysis, the election
confirmed that:
? The image of the national party and leadership
remains a more important determinant of voting
behavior in a parliamentary election than the
performance of Congress Party-led state
governments or the political track records of
individual candidates. In December the "Rajiv
wave" carried even unknown and unpopular
Congress Party candidates.
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? A plurality of voters will support the Congress Party
as the most viable national option in the absence of
strong popular disapproval of specific policies. This
year general satisfaction with the economy probably
offset dissatisfaction with the Congress Party's
management of law-and-order issues and state
administration.
? Many Muslim and untouchable voters still support
the Congress Party by default, despite their publicly
voiced dissatisfaction with the government's failure
to protect their interests adequately. This conclusion
remains tentative because early estimates of voting
among untouchables and religious minorities are
based on "ecological analysis"-in which a voting
trend in a district where either group comprises a
majority is ascribed to that group.
The familiar voting patterns in this election defied
predictions by Indian as well as US scholars that the
Congress Party would rely more heavily than ever on
support from conservative Hindus, to whose interests
the party would then be beholden. In our judgment,
the breadth of popular support for Rajiv, including
Muslims and untouchables as well as higher caste
Hindus, suggests that he-like his mother in 1980-
will be free of obligation to any single religious,
regional, or ethnic group for his victory.
Domestic Political Implications and Prospects
The national election results are likely to spill over
into next month's state elections. Historically, state
elections immediately following national contests have
tended to duplicate their results, regardless of local
issues. We expect the demoralization of opposition
leaders over their decimation in the December
election and their tendency toward mutual
recriminations will prevent them from uniting
effectively against Congress candidates in the contests
for 10 state legislatures.
The strain of defeat could precipitate splits and
leadership changes in some opposition parties. The
Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party, formed in September
from several small parties, in our view, will be
particularly susceptible to fragmentation. The leaders
of the Janata and Bharatiya Janata Parties-who lost
their parliamentary seats to Congress Party
candidates-are likely to face challenges by
dissatisfied younger partymen. In contrast, the
victorious Telugu Desam party, whose leader, N. T.
Rama Rao, holds a seat in the Andhra Pradesh state
legislature but not in Parliament, has emerged as the
largest opposition party in Parliament. Rao has
responded to his new national role by forming a sister
party designed to address national rather than
regional issues, according to press reports.
The absence of an effective opposition in Parliament
could encourage some opposition politicians to join the
Congress Party and lobby for favorite causes from
within. In the months preceding Indira Gandhi's
death, Indian observers noted that several erstwhile
Congress politicians returned to the fold, certainly
with her blessing. Rajiv probably will continue to
welcome if not encourage such returnees until
Parliament legislates an end to the venerable Indian
practice of party switching, in keeping with his
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campaign promise. A large flow of opposition
politicians into the Congress Party might restore the
ideological diversity that characterized the party until
the late 1960s.
In our view, Rajiv's victory on the strength of his own
image rather than the Congress Party machine will
give him a relatively free hand to choose his associates
in the national Congress Party organization. Still, at
least in the near term, he will have to rely on
established partymen to govern Congress Party-led
states and implement his programs. Longtime
rivalries among state-level politicians will almost
certainly continue to weaken government
performance.
In our judgment, the imbalance between the
opposition's parliamentary presence the smallest
since independence-and its 51-percent share of the
popular vote could portend unrest in the coming years.
Opposition politicians as well as religious, ethnic, and
regional leaders in search of a following will be
tempted to mobilize impatient citizens who believe
their concerns are not represented in Parliament. The
result could be an upsurge of protests and
demonstrations such as those that characterized the
mid- I970s.
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India: A New Generation
Takes Charge F-1
Thirty-eight years of rule in New Delhi by those who
came of political age during India's independence
struggle in the 1930s and 1940s ended with Indira
Gandhi's assassination and Rajiv Gandhi's victory in
the parliamentary election last December. Tales of
British rule, Hindu-Muslim violence at partition, and
famines-life-shaping realities for those of Indira
Gandhi's generation-are simply stories to those born
since 1947.
India's new leaders have been schooled in scientific
and technical subjects and trained in India's private
business houses or state enterprises before being
drawn to public service. We expect this new
leadership to have the backing of the
postindependence generation of Indians-nurtured on
India's Green Revolution, mass communications, and
military victories-in its attempts to accelerate the
pace of economic and social changes
Age and the Election
Rajiv Gandhi explained his election victory to the
press by saying, "There is a new generation taking
over, not just in the government but in the country.
Sixty percent of the electorate is below 40, and
mood of this electorate is reflected in the vote."
The opposition also attributed the Congress Party
landslide to demographic shifts, with Rajiv
representing the forces of change and a break with the
past, according to US Embassy officials. An
opposition spokesman told the Embassy that the
opposition parties were placed at a great disadvantage
because they did not appeal to the younger
generation's yearning for change.
Young Faces in the Inner Circle
Gandhi has named several friends from the younger
generation to be his Cabinet officers, personal
advisers, and new standard bearers in the Congress
Party. These men share a personal history that
probably makes Rajiv particularly at ease with their
style and advice. They belong to India's elite
families-some even to the Nehru dynasty-and are
comfortable with their place in both Indian and
Western society. As young men many were classmates
at the exclusive Doon School outside New Delhi
traditionally a training ground for Indian politicians
and officials. Later, several acquired technically
oriented educations at home and in the West. Most of
Rajiv's handpicked confidants launched their careers
in private business and profited personally from
India's industrial growth before entering politics.F_
Arun Nehru and Arun Singh have been closely
associated with Prime Minister Gandhi's early forays
into Indian political life and with his recent election
campaign.
November 1984 until shortly after the election.
as one of seven general secretaries of the Congress
Party-filling a position vacated by Rajiv-from
In 1980 Nehru left a successful career as an executive
at Jenson and Nicholson, a Calcutta-based
multinational paint manufacturer, to enter politics.
The Indian press described Nehru as the chief
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NESA NESAR 85-004
1 February 1985
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architect of an aggressive and productive marketing
strategy at Jenson and Nicholson in the late 1970s. At
Indira Gandhi's bidding, he ran for and won the
traditional Nehru family seat in Parliament in Uttar
Pradesh, a seat Indira had held in the 1970sJ
Rajiv's appointment of Nehru to the post of Minister
of State for Power-a lesser Cabinet portfolio-
probably reflects his ambivalence toward his
ambitious cousin. Gandhi probably is concerned by
Nehru's haughty style and
eputation for corruption.
Nehru made a fortune on arms
deals from his close association with retired military
officers. Gandhi's dispatch of Nehru to Punjab to
investigate the attempted assassination of the leading
Sikh clergyman in mid-January suggests, however,
that he may continue to use Nehru for sensitive
assignment
Arun Singh, also about 40, is one of Rajiv's three
parliamentary secretaries. He may be a leading
candidate to fill the position of principal secretary, the
post vacated by longtime Gandhi family loyalist, P. C.
Alexander, following the arrest of several of his staff
on espionage charges. The Indian press has said that
Rajiv has put Singh in charge of the cleanup
operation following the spy scandal
"cleanest" of the Prime Minister's close friends,
having acquired his personal wealth from investments
in India and abroad. The Indian press describes Singh
as Gandhi's second-closest adviser.
Singh is credited in the Indian press with successfully
selling Rajiv and the Congress Party to the voters
with the same earnestness he exhibited as a senior
marketing manager at the multinational chemical
manufacturing firm of Reckitt and Colman before
entering politics. Singh is a member of India's upper
house of parliament, the Rajya Sabha.)
Vincent George is typical of the younger technocrats
Gandhi is bringing into his secretariat to modernize
and increase office efficiency. He is a south Indian
Christian in his thirties who coordinates Gandhi's
appointments and provides Gandhi with information
on the personalities and voting patterns in
parliamentary constituencies. George became Rajiv
Gandhi's personal aide and resident computer whiz in
1981 after working as a stenographer for Indira
Gandhi)
Younger Legislators To Alter Congress Party's Image
Indira Gandhi groomed her sons to assume the prime-
ministership in part by charging them with recruiting
youth to the Congress Party. Sanjay first revitalized
the Congress Party Youth organization to involve
young activists in party work. Rajiv was given
responsibility for Congress Party recruiting and
organizational activities in 1983. He served as
chairman of the Congress Party Youth until he
became Prime Minister.-
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Amitabh
Bachchan
In what appears to be a party image-building coup,
Rajiv and his close advisers convinced two prominent
younger Indians, Amitabh Bachchan and Madhavrao
Scindia, to run under the Congress Party banner.
Both men soundly defeated senior opposition
politicians in the recent parliamentary election on the
promise of a youthful, clean style of politics. Amitabh
Bachchan is India's leading film idol and a childhood
friend of the Prime Minister. Scindia is the son of a
former maharaja with a successful career in Indian
business. F7
Amitabh Bachchan's campaign was given great
prominence by the national media and was of great
advantage to the Congress Party. According to the
Indian press, Bachchan appealed to women of all ages
and younger voters. Bachchan is a Doon School
classmate of Rajiv whose parents knew the Gandhi
family. Rajiv Gandhi cut short his trip accompanying
his mother to the United States in 1982 to visit
Bachchan, who faced death following an accident.
The attention Bachchan received while in the hospital
apparently helped spark his interest in politics. He
spent much of his time after the accident in New
Delhi's political circles
Gandhi is likely to ask Bachchan to help revitalize the
Congress Party. Bachchan's media appeal probably
will attract new young members to the party.
According to the Indian press, Bachchan's election
battle and victory will be retold in popular comic book
format for the next generation of voters
The youthful Madhavrao Scindia defeated A. B.
Vajpayee, national leader of the opposition Bharatiya
Janata Party, in an electoral contest that included
family feuding and high-technology campaigning.
Scindia traveled in his private helicopter between
remote villages where he used his family's 300-year-
old ties to the area to win voter support. In the towns
he reminded his listeners that only he and the
Congress Party could deliver economic progress,
according to Indian observers. The Indian press
detailed the family split between Scindia and his
mother, who supported Vajpayee.n
Scindia, who has spoken on foreign policy issues for
the Congress Party, lacks the aristocratic title but not
the wealth of the preindependence Indian maharajas.
He completed secondary school in England,
graduated from Oxford University, and was first
elected to the lower house of parliament, the Lok
Sabha in 1971)
Change and Continuity
Gandhi's own background and personal inclination
reinforced by those of his closest advisers-are likely
to lead to significant attempts to change New Delhi's
image and tone. We expect these men with their
Western educations and business experience to follow
up on their pledge to cut government redtape and
bring greater efficiency to the Indian economy. We
also expect this generation of leaders may be
somewhat more willing than their parents to risk
improved relations with PakistanF - - - ]
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Gandhi feels comfortable with the risk-taking, future-
oriented style and advice of his younger confidants,
but we believe he will slow the momentum for change
with decisions that reinforce continuity with the past.
To date, for example, Gandhi has reappointed all but
a few of his mother's personal advisers, kept the
Congress Party hierarchy intact up to the election,
and named more seasoned politicians than neophytes
to his postelection Cabinet. He must enlist the
political good will of those in his mother's generation
who occupy key positions in government, industry,
and agriculture if he is to alter either the tone or
substance of New Delhi's foreign and economic
policies
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India: Rajiv Gandhi's Economic
Policies-Early Signposts
Economic policy under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
will emphasize improvement in industrial productivity
through assimilation of modern technology and
decentralization of decisionmaking in the public
sector. The new Prime Minister has already begun
pushing the bureaucracy to simplify controls on
private-sector production and to stimulate exports. So
far, however, Gandhi has not commented on the
domestic and international financial problems that we
believe may limit his policy options. F-1
Increased Attention to Economic Policy
Rajiv's interest in economic policy, in our judgment, is
second only to his interest in national unity such as in
the problems in Punjab and Assam. A comprehensive
policy address, broadcast shortly after the Congress
Party victory in the December national election, not
only featured economic topics but also implied that
specific proposals for change would be announced in
the near future. Rajiv has retained direct
responsibility for the Ministries of Industry and
Commerce. During meetings with senior officials, he
has emphasized the themes of more efficiency and less
bureaucratic interference. Even before the
assassination of his mother, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, according to press reports, Rajiv's personal
interest spurred revisions in New Delhi's policy for the
electronics and telecommunications industries. F_
Productivity and Technology
Technology will clearly be a major component of
Rajiv's drive for improved industrial productivity:
? His major policy speech of 5 January noted that
improvements in productivity, absorption of modern
technology, and fuller use of capacity must acquire
the status of a national campaign.
? In recent press interviews he has noted that India
must improve its ability to transform competence in
basic research into production.
? Earlier he emphasized that India must not be left
behind in the continuing scientific revolution in
electronics.
Forthcoming Policy Decisions
Gandhi directed in early January that concrete steps
to improve exports be taken within the next few
weeks. F
Policies and programs for the Seventh Five- Year
Plan, which begins in April and is already overdue,
will be reviewed during the "weeks ahead. "F-]
Proposals for reform o the public sector are already
under consideration.
Two ministries have been asked to prepare specific
proposals to improve productivity, absorb technology,
and use capacity more fully. El
The central government budget is usually presented
at the end of February. This could provide
information about tariff protection for domestic
industries and subsidies for the public sector.F7
The annual trade policy, usually presented in April,
would reflect any changes in import licensing controls
and in export promotion efforts not already evident in
the government budget.F_-]
The Congress Party platform also stressed these
themes, and Rajiv has asked the bureaucracy for
specific proposals
The longstanding Indian goal of self-reliance will still
present some obstacles to the acquisition of imported
high technology. Recent press reports indicate
continuing efforts to protect and stimulate fledgling
domestic industries, even computers and oil
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exploration. Rajiv's focus will be on absorbing not
simply acquiring-technology.
So far, Rajiv seems to have a relatively narrow view of
what must be done to improve productivity. Although
in his public statements and initial meetings with
officials he has gone beyond technology to emphasize
improved management in the public sector and, in the
longer run, revisions in education, he has stopped
short of addressing the critical problems of prices,
financial resources, labor relations, and
infrastructure. Some of Rajiv's advisers-for
instance, Manmohan Singh, who recently moved from
the Reserve Bank to head the Planning Commission-
have a comprehensive view that may eventually be
reflected in the new government's policies. Rajiv's
approach, in any case, is more sophisticated than his
mother's. She seemed to believe technological gains
were possible without major institutional change.n
Public Versus Private Sector
In Rajiv's speech on 5 January, he reaffirmed that the
public sector will continue to be a major tool of
economic development. The Congress Party election
manifesto notes that it remains the main instrument
for stepping up industrialization.
At the same time, Rajiv has said that the public sector
is active where it should not be and noted that it
cannot indefinitely support sick industries. Press
reports note that an official review of the public
sector commissioned before the assassination and
probably now being studied by Rajiv or his advisers-
considered the closing of nonviable units. We have
seen, however, no hints of plans to denationalize any
heavy industry
In a campaign speech in a major textile center, Rajiv
promised a radically new textile policy. We speculate
that this may involve closing or denationalizing some
unprofitable publicly owned textile factories. Barring
a major textile order from abroad-the Soviet Union
is the only likely candidate-the private sector may
not want the factories.
Rajiv has stressed the need to improve management in
the public sector and may be planning to free public-
sector corporations to operate as commercial entities
on 5 January called for far-reaching administrative
reform, including decentralization of decisionmaking
with enforcement of accountability, and Rajiv has
repeated this theme when discussing industrial policy
with senior officials.
In our view, Rajiv's comments on the need to
decentralize decisionmaking apply solely to the
central government bureaucracy and public-sector
corporations. He has not indicated any intention to
transfer economic authority from the central
government to the states, and the Congress Party
platform contends that there is no contradiction
between a strong center and strong states. If Rajiv
moves to change center-state economic relations, it
will probably be a result of efforts to ease tensions in
Punjab and Assam, not a result of his economic policy
views
Rajiv may reinstate the Planning Commission as a
major policy advisory group but nevertheless seek a
less ambitious five-year plan. He recently appointed
two leading government advocates of economic
liberalization to the Planning Commission-Abid
Hussain, whose term as secretary at the Commerce
Ministry has just expired, and Manmohan Singh.
Although Rajiv has reaffirmed the government's
commitment to planning, he may follow Manmohan
Singh's advice to drop efforts to develop detailed
economic targets and instead concentrate planning
efforts on vital sectors and nontradeable goods such as
power, transport, and irrigation. F-1
As for the private sector, last November Rajiv said
that it has adequate scope to enhance its production.
During an interview in January with a US magazine,
he noted with apparent approval that new areas had
been opened to private investment-probably a
reference to the new telecommunications policy-but
did not hint at further moves
Industrial Controls
We expect Rajiv to loosen government restrictions on
private industry, mainly to spur output, but also, as he
said in an interview in January, to reduce
opportunities for corruption. One of his first moves
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was to shift the government department that
supervises private corporations to the Ministry of
Industries, whose bureaucratic bias favors production
rather than restraint. He has told officials to simplify
industrial control procedures by licensing a range of
products rather than specific items and allowing
certain industries to expand without prior government
permission. Rajiv also wants to ease restrictions on the
use of foreign technicians and brand names. Some of
these proposals have been under consideration since
before Rajiv became Prime Minister7
Rajiv apparently intends to retain the industrial
licensing system, perhaps in modified form. It will be
used to implement new pollution controls that were
imposed on 18 industries after the Bhopal disaster. In
addition, press reports indicate that Rajiv still intends
to favor small-scale industries and backward areas. In
the past this had been done through licensing controls
as well as credit policies and subsidies.
Rajiv may rely more on tariffs and less on licenses to
regulate imports. Although he has not commented on
import licensing controls recently, the new computer
policy, which is still not fully formulated, seems to be
a step in this direction.
Export Promotion
Rajiv has called for concrete steps to promote exports.
He is probably considering a recently completed
official review of foreign trade policy, which,
according to the US Embassy, recommends further
tax concessions and import privileges for exporters.
Rajiv wants to move within the next few weeks.n
Rajiv apparently sees export promotion as part of his
program to improve economic efficiency rather than
part of a strategy to ease balance-of-payments
problems. He has said nothing so far about growing
Indian debt service obligations or falling receipts of
concessional foreign aid.
Agriculture
Central government support for agriculture through
research programs, procurement policies, and
financial help to state governments will probably
continue. Agriculture was a key theme of the
Congress Party manifesto, and Rajiv's enthusiasm for
industrial efficiency may carry over to agriculture and
lead to additional efforts to promote agricultural
exports and improve irrigation. Rajiv's lack of
comment on agricultural policy, however, suggests
that he is not contemplating major policy changes
beyond those already under way and summarized in
the guidelines for the Seventh Five-Year Plan.
Rajiv is interested in ecology. The published text of
his January speech called for two new government
organizations to deal with the problems of
deforestation and of Ganges river pollution. These
topics are not yet a major focus of government policy
but may become more important in the future
Constraints on Policy Options
Congress Party dominance of Parliament does not
give Rajiv a free hand in modernizing the economy.
Shortages of government revenue and forthcoming
balance-of-payments strains, even if not in the
forefront of his thinking, limit his ability to promote
productivity through tax concessions and increased
imports. He must still consider the views of
businessmen, many of whom benefit from economic
controls. Rajiv must also be cautious about trying to
reduce public-sector losses through an increase in
administered prices or closing unprofitable units that
employ many people lest he add to the social unrest
already caused by communal tensions. Furthermore,
bureaucrats have traditionally resisted efforts to
reduce their authority.n
Private Businessmen Enthusiastic
Indian industrialists and traders are enthusiastic
about the new government's pragmatism and sense of
urgency, according to press and Embassy reports.
Some highlight Rajiv's drive to make the bureaucracy
more efficient. Others look for a relaxation of import
and licensing procedures and restrictions on foreign
and large domestic corporations. In the absence of
specific government proposals, many businessmen
apparently believe Rajiv will make whatever policy
changes they would recommend. The general air of
optimism is tempered, however, by concern that Rajiv
may attempt too much too soon and that bureaucratic
resistance and political expediency will curtail
Gandhi's drive for efficiency.
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Implications for the United States
Rajiv's fascination with high technology will probably
sustain the recent trend toward increased cooperation
between Indian and foreign business firms and may
open new opportunities for business links with US
firms. If Indian access to desired technology is
frustrated by US export controls, however, the push
for technology will add to strains in bilateral relations.
Moreover, the emphasis on improving the technical
competence of Indian firms-on absorbing, not just
importing, technology-probably means that some
restrictions on imports of sophisticated equipment will
continueF I
So far, Rajiv has not complained about US policies
toward Indian borrowing from the Asian
Development Bank and other multilateral lending
institutions. He, however, has retained in different
positions key officials who in the past have
complained about the politicization of foreign aid.
When advising Rajiv, they will probably emphasize
the relationship of reduced foreign lending to
forthcoming balance-of-payments strains]
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Revivalism
We believe that Hindu revivalism will increasingly
inflame communal tensions and undermine the
official secularism that has helped maintain the unity
of Indian society. The revival has been sparked by
fear that changing conditions-principally the erosion
of the caste system, the expanding Muslim
population, and Sikh militancy-will cost Hindus
their preeminent position in India and on the
subcontinent. Mainstream Indian politicians
searching for electoral gains have played on Hindu
fears. Because of its rigid ideology, however,
revivalism is unlikely to gain acceptance among most
Hindus.
Origins of the Revival
Hindu revivalists have a xenophobic world view,
according to Indian scholars. They interpret the
country's past as a battle between natives (Hindus)
and foreigners (Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians) and
see the present as an opportunity to settle the wrongs
of history by reasserting Hindu dominance. They
resent the subjugation of Hindus by the Mughal and
British empires and the use of English as the language
of business, government, and education. Hindu beliefs
have also contributed to the xenophobia because the
religion is linked to the holy rivers and mountains of
India. Indian scholars believe that the religion's
connection with the land has led to a desire for
undisputed control of the land and Hindu resentment
over sharing holy ground with nonbelievers.
Although Hindus account for about 85 percent of
India's population, the revivalists frequently exhibit
behavior typical of a minority group. Much
contemporary Hindu aggressiveness, according to
Indian social scientists, should be ascribed to a fear
psychosis or persecution complex. Hindu revivalists
fear that:
? Government education and job programs for low
castes and Harijans (untouchables) discriminate
against Hindus and will contribute to the erosion of
the traditional Hindu caste system.
? The rapidly expanding Muslim population soon will
threaten Hindu dominance. Indeed, Hindus see
India as a Hindu island in an Islamic sea. (The
Muslim population is growing slightly faster than
the Hindu, but growth rates are approaching parity,
according to Indian data.)
? Christians and Communists-both foreign and
domestic-are conspiring with Muslims to disrupt
Hindu society by recruiting untouchables as a first
step in dragging India into a Christian-Islamic-
Communist orbit.
? An Arab-funded conspiracy to restore Muslim rule
to India is reflected in efforts to convert Harijans to
Islam.
? The Sikh militants' goal of an independent
homeland-Khalistan-will weaken Hindu India.
? Pakistan's US-supported military buildup will lead
to a shift of power in favor of Muslims over Hindus
in the subcontinent.
Revivalist Goals
Hindu revivalist groups (see box) advocate ideas
designed to calm fears and boost self-esteem. To
overcome Hinduism's lack of dogma and a revealed
document such as the Koran or Bible, for example,
the Hindu Vishwa Parishad has tried to give
Hinduism for the first time an immutable doctrine,
including belief in karma, the transmigration of souls,
and reverence to the cow. The revivalists demand that
India become a confessional state-renamed
Bharat-committed to the defense of the Hindu
religion.
Hindu revivalist groups have many simplistic answers
to complex social issues:
? Troubles in Assam would be solved by expelling the
Muslims who have lived there for hundreds of years.
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Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS). An extremist
group that espouses Aryan racial superiority and
traces its past to the conquerors of ancient India.
They claim a membership of about a million. They
believe that Hindu culture is in danger of being
destroyed through the proselytizing efforts of
Christians and Muslims. They argue that the Sikhs,
Christians, and Muslims are `foreign nationals" who
should not be allowed to vote. They fear that Hindus
will become a minority in India and oppose special
privileges granted by the Congress Party to
minorities. The government banned the RSS from
1975 to 19771
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. An India-based
international organization loosely connected to the
RSS that claims members in 50 nations, including
the United States. It advocates that India be declared
a Hindu state and be renamed "Bharat" to reflect its
ancient Hindu civilization. Its members believe that
Hindus have suffered economically and politically
because of the Muslims' alleged "religious
fanaticism " and loyalty to Pakistan.
Shiv Sena. A militant anti-Muslim group formed by
its leader Bal Thackery in 1966. Several hundred
Shiv Sena members were arrested in the aftermath of
communal riots near the Bombay airport in mid-
1984. The party was charged with fomenting a 10-day
riot in Bombay in 1969. In an interview in the Indian
press last year, Thackery said that he would give
Muslims 48 hours to prove their loyalty before
banishing them to Pakistan.
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was formed in 1980 as
a breakaway faction of the Janata Party. Although
not as extreme as other revivalist groups, the BJP
still supports some of the ideals of the militant Hindu
revivalists. Recently, the BJP has been trying to
break its link to the RSS and appeal to non-Hindus.
? Sikhs should be assimilated, creating a bond
between Hindus and Sikhs on the basis of common
hostility toward Muslims.
? All Indian Muslims should be absorbed into existing
Hindu castes.
Revivalism and Politics
We believe that the Hindu revival has benefited from
the reluctance of most political leaders to openly
oppose the movement for fear of losing popular
support, especially among conservative Hindus. Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi frequently used a favorite
revivalist theme when she told Indians that their
nation was "encircled by distant foreign powers
colluding with antinational elements to dismember
it." In an interview with a US journalist, the leader of
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) charged that before
her death Gandhi had been trying to appeal to
orthodox Hindu voters by floating the rumor that she
had held secret meetings with Rashtriya Swayam
Sevak Sangh (RSS) leaders. At the same time, Indira
also raised Hindu apprehensions by trying to build
greater political popularity with Muslim voters.
Political opponents argue that the landslide election of
her son Rajiv Gandhi benefited greatly from the
switch of Hindu revivalist votes from the Hindu
chauvinist parties.
We believe that the Congress Party-the standard
bearer of Indian secularism-does not perceive the
Hindu revival as a threat to India's officially secular
character. In our view, however, tacit government
support of Hinduism has led to an increasing Hindu
content-in education and in religious rituals at
government functions-of the Indian state.
Prospects
We believe that Rajiv Gandhi will continue to exploit
Hindu revivalism, although in a lower key than his
mother. Even a policy of benign neglect could
encourage Hindu chauvinists, risk widening the
schism with non-Hindu India, and create a challenge
to the authority of the Congress Party.
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We believe, however, that Hindu revivalism's long-
term appeal is limited by its rigid ideology. Its
dogmatic definition of Hinduism, which embraces an
inflexible creed and the traditional caste system, is
unlikely to become acceptable to the wide spectrum of
Hindu faithful.
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Israel's Unity Government:
How Long Will It Survive?
When Labor and Likud agreed to serve in the
national unity government last September, most
Israeli political observers predicted its demise within a
year and doubted that Prime Minister Peres could
demonstrate strong leadership or improve Labor's
chances to form its own government. Recent
developments, however, indicate that Labor and its
allies could form a coalition government without
Likud. These developments include the dramatic rise
in Peres's standing in the polls, broad Cabinet
endorsement for Labor's plan to withdraw Israeli
forces from Lebanon, and Labor's defeat of a Likud-
supported proposal on the controversial "Who is a
Jew" issue. We believe the odds are better than even
that Labor will orchestrate a coalition crisis in the
latter half of this year to dissolve the unity
government and form its own coalition if Israel has
completed its withdrawal from Lebanon without
serious problems.
Likud: Down and Out?
Likud's political standing has declined significantly
during the unity government's first four months. The
most recent polls indicate that Likud would win only
29 Knesset seats in a new election, down from the 41
it currently holds.
Most of the blame for Likud's inability to retain its
electoral support has been placed on Foreign Minister
Shamir. Shamir failed to maintain Likud unity in two
recent Cabinet and parliamentary votes on the
Lebanese withdrawal plan and the "Who is a Jew"
issue. He is also perceived as having little influence in
Israeli foreign policy-despite his Foreign Ministry
portfolio-or in protecting the economic interests of
his Likud bloc's bedrock constituency of Sephardi
voters.
In a recent interview published in an Israeli
newspaper, Shamir was grilled about his apparent
lack of power in the unity government. The reporter
pointed out that, while in recent weeks Peres had met
with French President Mitterrand and Defense
Minister Rabin had held discussions in London,
Shamir had been touring Panama and Venezuela.
Shamir's responses-that he did not "have to be a
party to everything that is done" and that he did not
"suffer from a lack of things to do"-must not have
been comforting to his disappointed Likud supporters.
The pressure on Shamir's leadership will increase now
that Commerce Minister Ariel Sharon has returned to
Israel, armed with his self-proclaimed vindication in
his recent libel trial in New York. In addition, Deputy
Prime Minister David Levi, Shamir's other major
rival in Likud, is planning to challenge Labor member
Israel Kessar's leadership of the Histadrut labor
federation in elections scheduled for this spring. A
strong showing by Levi among Sephardi and other
working-class Jews, even if he does not win, probably
will boost his standing in the Shamir succession race.
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Labor on a Roll
After years of being vilified for his clumsy and
uninspired leadership of the Labor Alignment, Prime
Minister Peres now is hailed as the man primarily
responsible for Labor's resurgence. Not the least of
Peres's achievements has been his establishment of a
good working relationship with Defense Minister
Rabin. The two men's dominance of the unity
government was underscored by their success in
commanding broad Cabinet support for the Lebanese
withdrawal plan over the opposition of Shamir and
other Likud ministers.
The fact that Cabinet members representing the
religious parties supported withdrawal must have
been reassuring for Peres, who needs their votes to
form a coalition government without Likud. Although
Labor's solid vote against the "Who is a Jew" bill last
month disappointed religious party leaders, the
religious parties were most critical of Shamir, who
failed to maintain Likud unity during the vote. Some
of the religious parties, in our view, may begin to
reconsider their alliance with a divided Likud Party
that cannot deliver on its promises.
Labor's successes have led to a significant increase in
its popularity. According to a poll released last month,
Labor, its coalition ally Shinui, and the Citizens'
Rights Movement would together win 62 Knesset
seats in a new election. Peres's approval rating now
stands at 77 percent, and 42 percent of the electorate
pick him as their first choice to be prime minister,
compared to only 9 percent who choose Shamir.
Engineering a Government Crisis
We believe that Peres and other Labor strategists
realize that they would risk losing much of this new
support if Peres held to the coalition agreement and
turned over the prime-ministership to Shamir in 1986.
Israeli voters, like electorates in most countries, tend
to favor the incumbent. In addition, given a chance to
govern, Shamir probably could restore some degree of
unity in Likud, and he could better court the religious
parties. Finally, Israel's economic picture conceivably
could improve during the last two years of the unity
government, and a situation could develop where
Labor was remembered only for having imposed
economic austerity, while Likud received credit for
economic growth.
We believe that Labor leaders will seek a way to
dissolve the unity government if Israel's withdrawal
from Lebanon is accomplished without serious
problems. Defense Minister Rabin has stated publicly
that withdrawal could be completed as early as July.
Labor's voter popularity probably would peak after a
successful withdrawal. Labor would want to move
before potentially damaging consequences of the
withdrawal, such as an increase in terrorist incidents
and rocket attacks in the Galilee, gave Likud leaders
new ammunition for partisan attacks.
There are other reasons why Labor may view the
second half of this year as a propitious moment to
dissolve the government:
? Israel by then may have negotiated a large increase
in financial aid from the United States, and Labor
could claim credit for the aid package.
? Likud would probably still be suffering from its
leadership dispute.
? Labor supporters by then probably will have
retained control of Histadrut, which Labor leaders
have always dominated.
The most difficult element in such a Labor strategy
will be finding a suitable issue around which to
engineer a government crisis. Most Labor members
probably hope that the disunity within Likud and an
overt attempt to remove Shamir from his leadership
position will lead to a dissolution of the coalition
agreement. According to press reports, a secret
understanding between Labor and Likud stipulates
that only Shamir can succeed Peres as prime minister.
Although all the signs are pointing up for Labor now,
the Israeli political system is notorious for its
volatility. For example, if the Israeli withdrawal plan
does not proceed on schedule and if security in the
north deteriorates significantly, Peres's and Rabin's
strong identification with the withdrawal plan could
backfire on them politically. Likud could then attack
Labor for endangering Israel's security, an issue that
could regain Likud much of its lost support. Labor
mismanagement of economic reform would also
undermine its current popularity.
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Israel's Lavi:
Today's Fighter Tomorrow
Israel's program to build a multirole strike fighter
comparable to the F-16 by 1990 may be economically
unfeasible. Research and development costs for the
Lavi fighter-attack aircraft are already over budget
and climbing, and test flights for the first prototype
have slipped by six months. Most US aerospace
industry analysts agree the aircraft will eventually
cost more than the F-16, be less capable, and thus
probably unable to compete in the world aircraft
market of the 1990s. Because of domestic funding
constraints and high costs, Israel probably will want
to use US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) money to
procure the plane for its air force
Background
The Lavi is intended as a follow-on to the Kfir and
A-4 Skyhawk fighter-attack aircraft. Israeli air force
(IAF) modernization plans call for replacement
beginning in 1990 of older Kfir, A-4 Skyhawk, and
some F-4E Phantoms currently in the active
inventory. Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) hopes to fill
most of this requirement with the Lavi, which is
programed for a production run of 300 aircraft. If IAI
can secure foreign orders, it will attempt to increase
production to 350 to 400 aircraft.F_~
The Israeli air force originally wanted to coproduce in
Israel or purchase directly F-16s or F/A-18s as
replacements for older aircraft. When the Israeli
Government could not interest the US aerospace
industry in coproduction agreements, it decided in
early 1980 to proceed with plans to manufacture by
1990 an aircraft theoretically as versatile and capable
as the F-16
Economics played the major role in the government's
decision to proceed with the Lavi. Efforts to market
the Kfir outside of Israel had failed dismally, and
production was scheduled to begin winding down in
1982. IAI had over 12,000 employees working on the
Kfir and other production lines, and a major layoff
would entail paying one- to five-years' severance pay
and losing a large percentage of the engineering,
design, and managerial force made up primarily of
expatriates from the United States and Western
Europe. IAI falsely contended that it could
manufacture the Lavi entirely in Israel without
outside support. This led the government to believe
the Lavi would be cost effective and that outside sales
would not be subject to the same licensing restrictions
that prevented Israel from selling the Kfir to
prospective customers.
Israel's never-ending quest for military self-
sufficiency and desire to avoid reliance on a single
source for major weapons also were important factors
in this decision. Israel has purchased all of its major
weapons or their subsystems and support equipment
from the United States or Western Europe, but
military self-sufficiency remains an important goal
that drives to a considerable extent Israeli
decisionmaking on defense
After several false starts, the Lavi project began in
earnest in 1981. When Moshe Arens became Minister
of Defense in February 1983, the program found a
champion. Arens had been the driving force behind
the Lavi at IAI, and, as Defense Minister, he assigned
it a top funding priority. Arens personally negotiated
the release of sensitive US aircraft manufacturing
technology to IAI and secured congressional approval
to use $250 million in FMS funds for research and
development in Israel on the Lavi. He also obtained
permission to spend an additional $300 million in
FMS monies in the United States for research and
development rather than for finished products. With
Arens's assistance, IAI reached agreement with
Grumman to act as principal subcontractor for the
wing and tail composite assemblies-something it had
been unable to do previously-and with Pratt and
Whitney to manufacture the engines in Israel.
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Despite rapid progress in the last two years in
developing a prototype, the Lavi still faces formidable
economic and engineering problems. Minister of
Defense Rabin has said the program could be
canceled if additional US funding is not forthcoming
or further cuts are required in the defense budget.
The Israeli air force-never an enthusiastic supporter
of the Lavi-is using the opportunity to lobby for
purchase of advanced US multirole strike aircraft
with the funds allocated for the Lavi. Arens, who is
still a potent force in the Cabinet, however, continues
to support the Lavi and thus far has kept funding for
the program on track.F_~
Rising Costs
One of the Lavi's major problems is rapidly rising
costs. IAI sold the Lavi to the Israeli Government and
air force as a multirole strike fighter incorporating
state-of-the-art technology at one-third the flyaway
cost of an F-16. In early 1980, IAI estimated its
research and development costs at $700 million with
an additional $350 million to be invested in the Bet
Shemesh engine facility near Jerusalem to
manufacture the engine for the Lavi. Flyaway costs at
that time were projected at $5.6-7 million per aircraft
as compared with $5 million for the Kfir and
approximately $15 million for the F-16, $19-20
million for the FAA-18, and $21-22 million for the
F- 15~
By mid-1984, IAI was quoting total research and
development costs for the program at $1.52 billion, of
which $600 million had already been spent.
IAI currently is
spending $700,000 to $800,000 per day on the Lavi
and still has not completed design specifications. We
believe flyaway costs will be at least $20 million per
aircraft
IAI's budget process is
primarily to blame for the underestimates of research
and development and flyaway costs. IAI used current
value dollar rates instead of projected dollar rates in
estimating costs for the duration of the project. No
cost overrun projections were used, nor was there a
cost-time formula employed as is common in the US
projections has never been a priority until now when
the Israeli defense budget for the first time is a target
for large cuts.
' Cost-time formulas employ three curves. One curve uses a
pessimistic budget figure, assuming extensive reengineering and
other delays are encountered. A second curve reflects a more
optimistic ahead-of-schedule cost. The third curve reflects probable
real-term development costs given reasonable delays and problems.
Budget managers use these curves to figure a realistic range of costs
and identify potential problem areas that warrant special attention.
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Pratt and Whitney
turbine blades.
will have to manufacture engines in the United States
for at least the first 50 aircraft if the overall
production schedule is to be met. Bet Shemesh has a
history of poor management, and its ability to
manufacture the fairly complex PW 1 120 engine is
questionable. Last year General Electric closed for
several months the J-79 engine production line at Bet
Shemesh-the engine for the Kfir that the company
manufactures under license in Israel-because of
serious quality control problems in the manufacture of
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Prime Minister Peres has said the Lavi program is too
far advanced to be canceled, and Israel would lose
$100-200 million in cancellation penalties alone if
work were stopped. Peres believes expenditures can be
reduced by relying more on US firms for the basic
aircraft design and construction. He believes IAI
should focus on manufacturing electronic components
and assembling the final product.
initial prototype flight of the Lavi has slipped by six
months to midsummer 1986. The first prototype is
basically just an airframe to test flight systems and
aerodynamics. The third prototype, scheduled for
testing in early 1988, is the most important because it
will incorporate the production avionics. Most
knowledgeable observers believe the probability of
major slippage in the production schedule at that
point is high, and most agree the US aerospace
industry will have to become more involved to keep
the program going
Outlook
Peres is probably more sympathetic to the Lavi
program than Rabin because of his background as the
architect of Israel's defense industries. Peres believes
the push for self-reliance will eventually pay dividends
in offset agreements with foreign firms to buy Israeli
products and give Israel access to technology that will
enhance its position in the high-technology export
market, which is one of the fastest growing sectors of
the Israeli economy. A large project like the Lavi can
provide lucrative spinoffs for dozens of small Israeli
firms even though the project itself will lose money.
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in Israel also have run into problems.
Israel nevertheless lacks the resources to achieve self-
sufficiency, and the Lavi will be another
manifestation of previous projects that ended up
foreign funded and controlled. Like the Kfir, the Lavi
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will be at least 70-percent US manufactured or
licensed and thus subject to US export controls.
Furthermore, design and performance trade-offs will
make it less than state of the art and unable to
compete in the 1990s with export versions of the F- 16,
F/A-18, or Mirage 2000. The ability of US and
European aircraft manufacturers to offer customers
substantial discounts and reliable long-term service
contracts will undercut Israel's ability to find foreign
buyers for the Lavi
Without foreign sales, the flyaway cost for the Lavi
probably will increase between 50 and 100 percent by
the time series production begins in 1992. Because the
Israeli air force probably will be the only customer for
the Lavi, the Israeli Government is likely to use the
precedent set this year allowing Israel to use US FMS
funds for offshore procurement to press for using
these funds to buy the Lavi. If IAI completes its
projected production run of 300 aircraft by 1999, Lavi
purchases alone could total over $7 billion in current
FMS dollars. Added to this figure would be Israeli air
force purchases of additional US-manufactured
multirole strike fighters because the Lavi probabl
will not meet IAF performance expectations
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Kuwait's National Assembly
Election: Diwaniyya Democracy
Kuwait will hold an election on 20 February for its
50-man National Assembly, the only elected political
institution on the Arabian Peninsula. The ruling
Sabah family appears to be taking a neutral stance
toward most candidates in the election. We share the
Embassy's view that the ruling family is relieved that
the country is stable enough to permit such an
election, thus demonstrating Kuwait's commitment to
democracy, and hopes that this will help avert the
polarizing influence of religious and political
extremism.)
The Vanguard of Democracy
Kuwaitis like to boast that the National Assembly-
which was first elected in 1963-makes their country
a showplace of democracy on the Arabian Peninsula.
They see the Assembly as a form of enlightened
democracy that blends the best of Western political
institutions with Kuwaiti tradition-a tribal council
of elders in modern guise. According to the Embassy,
Kuwaitis believe their Assembly should function like
a public conscience, debating major social and
economic issues.n
Known for its lively and rancorous debate, the
Assembly was dissolved in 1976 by then Prime
Minister Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah to silence leftist
critics. Government leaders argued that attacks by
Arab nationalist Assemblymen on Kuwait's foreign
and domestic policies and their criticism of other
Arab heads of state threatened state security. Five
years later, Jabir al-Ahmad-now ruler-and Crown
Prince Sa'd al-Abdallah allowed election of a new
assembly to fulfill their promise to restore the
institution and to bolster domestic political support in
the wake of the Iranian revolution.
The National Assembly has the potential, we believe,
to be an influential body, but it is mindful of its past
suspension and has been fairly cautious in testing its
powers. The Assembly reviews government policies
Groups and Issues in the National Assembly
The representatives in the National Assembly are a
reflection of Kuwaiti society-Sunni and Shia, town
merchants and tribal Bedouin, religious moderates
and fundamentalists, academics and civil servants.
There are no Sabah family members in the Assembly.
Because political parties are banned, members tend
to form informal blocs that lobby for certain agendas.
Observers occasionally differ on the composition of 25X1
the blocs, but most would agree on the following
breakdown and on their agendas:
Bloc Size in Current Issues
Assembly
Sunni 6 Most active and vocal faction;
Fundamentalist (12 percent) hold important committee
assignments; promote Islamic
law as the basis of all law; limit
naturalization to Muslims only;
oppose giving aid to Syria;
oppose female suffrage.
Shia 4 Embassy reports they are
Fundamentalist (8 percent) distrusted by Sunni colleagues 25X1
but tolerated because of large
Shia population; hold no
committee posts; oppose aid to
Iraq; quietly pro-Iran; support
Islamization of constitution.
Bedouin 20 Support government on most
(40 percent) issues; urge extension of public
services to outlying areas;
oppose female suffrage.
Arab 8 to 10 Favor Pan-Arab and
Nationalists (16 to 20 Palestinian causes; critical of
percent) ties to United States.
Merchants 10 to 12 Usually support government
(20 to 24 positions on social and security
percent) issues; press for Arab solidarity
as long as issues do not conflict
with internal security.
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and programs and can recommend changes to reflect
"popular" views. It does not make laws, but it has the
right to review budgets and interrogate ministers. It
must approve laws proposed by the executive branch
of the government, and it can reject treaties and
recommend against foreign aid proposals
Campaigning Kuwaiti Style
Embassy reporting suggests that Kuwaitis judge
candidates for the National Assembly primarily on
their ability to protect parochial interests. Kuwaitis
view the role of Assemblyman, according to the
Embassy, in the traditional tribal framework. He uses
wasta (influence) and acts as an intermediary to fix
tickets, obtain special exemptions from regulations,
and look for inside information on commercial and
government transactions. Most important, he protects
the special interests of his family, friends, tribe, and
clients.
Few Kuwaitis can participate in the electoral process.
Kuwaiti sources estimate that 57,000 Kuwaitis-or 8
percent of the native population of 700,000-are
eligible to vote in this year's election. The right to vote
and hold office is restricted to males who are 21 and
whose families lived in Kuwait before 1920. Women
and Kuwaitis who are naturalized citizens cannot
vote.
Politicking also has a distinctive Kuwaiti style. Most
campaigning takes place in neighborhood and family
diwaniyyas. These are gatherings held in large tents
where Kuwaiti voters gather before the election to
drink coffee and gossip, listen to campaign rhetoric,
debate issues with the candidate, and perhaps seek
favors in exchange for their vote. Political parties are
banned by law, and there are no media broadcasts, no
political pollsters, and no exit polling. n
The Embassy estimates that 300 to 500 Kuwaitis will
run as candidates in the 25 electoral districts, with
two representatives elected from each district. In
some of the outlying districts populated by Bedouin
tribes, unofficial primaries have apparently already
been held to whittle down the number of candidates
and increase the chances of a tribe's nominees,
according to the Embassy. Sources of the Embassy
also claim that the religious societies and social clubs
to which many Kuwaitis belong are restricting the
number of candidates they are sponsoring, and we
believe they may be willing in some cases to support
each other's candidates in select districts to ensure the
election of suitable delegates.ss
Campaign Issues
Issues do not play a direct or decisive role in
determining the outcome of Kuwaiti elections. Voting
patterns in past elections, including the 1984
municipal elections-the most recent held in
Kuwait-indicate that tribal and sectarian concerns
tend to influence how a Kuwaiti votes more than a
specific issue. Nevertheless, Kuwaiti press coverage of
the candidates' speeches and US Embassy reporting
have identified several themes that, in our judgment,
reflect Kuwaitis' worries and will shape the tone of
debate in the newly elected Assembly. F__1
Three issues appear to be particularly prominent-
internal security, the economy, and sectarianism. The
first one, internal security, is a worry shared by both
the Sabah family and the voters. Last year began in
the shadow of the bombings in December 1983 of the
US and French Embassies and several Kuwaiti
installations. It ended with the hijacking of a Kuwaiti
airliner by Lebanese Shia extremists intent on gaining
the release of the 21 persons sentenced for the
bombings. In between, Kuwait saw its tankers become
targets in the war between Iran and Iraq.
We believe most Kuwaitis supported the government
in its refusal to negotiate with the hijackers in
December. Like the Sabah family, however, they
worry about the threat to their security from Iranian-
backed terrorist factions and believe they are also
vulnerable to military attack if the shipping war in the
Gulf heats up again. An upsurge in subversion-
especially if traced to Iranian-sponsored elements
among Kuwait's Shia community-could unravel the
delicate political calm that Kuwait appears to be
enjoying.
The second issue-the stagnant economy-is eroding
relations between the Sabah family and the prominent
merchant families that have been the Sabahs'
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historical base of support. Increasingly, the merchant
families, who own Kuwait's banks and principal daily
papers and are represented in the National Assembly
by family members, have come to believe that the
Sabah government is mismanaging the economy.
They are particularly concerned about the settlement
of debts and bad loans resulting from the crash of the
unofficial stock market, the Suq al-Manakh, more
than two years ago. The merchant families have
charged that the government has failed to protect
their interests, and they have focused their criticism
on Finance Minister Ali al-Khalifa Al Sabah and the
Governor of the Central Bank. The Embassy reports
that the Prime Minister and even the Amir himself
are at least privately accused of poor judgment. Some
Assembly members accuse Ali al-Khalifa Al Sabah of
dipping into the Reserve Fund for Future Generations
to bail out the government.F_~
Even hotter than the ever-present stock market
debate, the Embassy claims, is a new crisis in Kuwaiti
banking circles that has political as well as religious
overtones. According to the Embassy, Kuwaitis are
disturbed by the announcement in mid-January that
Kuwait's Islamic bank-Kuwait Finance House-will
not pay a dividend despite making $83 million in
profits last year. The reason given by the bank is its
dwindling assets, but the issue is bound to raise a
political furor. Kuwait Finance House attempted to
apply Islamic principles to banking and ordinarily
would pay dividends to shareholders and depositors in
lieu of interest, which is forbidden by the Koran. The
Finance House was backed by the government, and
many state institutions (such as social security and the
Shuwaykh Port Authority) maintain significant
deposits there under pressure from the National
AssemblyF__1
Finally, Kuwaitis-in particular the Sabah family-
are worried about sectarianism. Sectarianism in
Kuwait covers a variety of social concerns ranging
from pro-Iranian sentiment among the Shia
community-more than 30 percent of Kuwait's native
population-to a rise in religious fundamentalism in
both Sunni and Shia religious circles.
Assembly election, the government gerrymandered
the electoral districts, increasing their number from
10 to 25 and thereby reducing Shia voting strength.
Kuwait's Shias then and in the 1984 municipal
elections complained that their poor showing was due
to redistricting, vote fraud, and even stealing of ballot
boxes, but divisions within the Shia community also
contributed to their defeat. In some predominantly
Shia districts, Sunni fundamentalists teamed up with
other factions to defeat Shia candidates)
some Shias are beginning
to put distance between themselves and the pro-
Khomeini factions because they fear election rhetoric
and government efforts to contain pro-Iranian
elements will hurt their careers
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2bAl
Kuwait's merchant families-who are predominantly
Sunni-have been outspoken about the drift toward a 25X1
more conservative social and religious
fundamentalism and are trying to get the government
to take a stand against it. The government has, we
believe, encouraged press criticism of Sunni
fundamentalists' efforts to segregate the sexes in
Kuwaiti schools and change the country's
Constitution to make Sharia (Islamic law) the sole
basis of civil law. The press criticism also raised
questions about the fitness of the Sunni
fundamentalists for public office.)
Forecasting the Election
The Embassy doubts-and we concur-that the
government or the Sabah family will attempt to rig
the election in any thoroughgoing fashion. The
Embassy reports that individual members of the
family may be advancing the interests of favored
candidates, but we believe they will try to avoid the
appearance of interfering in the "democratic process." 25X1
Kuwaiti leaders in general appear to be primarily
concerned that the election takes place and that it be
perceived as being free of meddling. Previous
attempts at intervention have not helped the family.
The dissolution of the National Assembly in 1976
diminished the Sabah family's standing with their 25X1
Kuwaiti subjects, while gerrymandering in 1981
brought fundamentalists into the Assembly.F____1 25X1
Kuwait's Shia community had four deputies in the
last Assembly, three of whom were identified as pro-
Khomeini. Shortly before the 1981 National
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Embassy contacts have cautioned against trying to
forecast the outcome of the election. They point out
that Kuwaitis are an independent lot who cannot be
counted on to follow their announced preferences once
they enter the polling booth. Still, we believe that
tribal and family allegiances will play a major role in
determining who wins the Kuwaiti election:
? Of the 25 electoral districts, 14 are populated
primarily by Kuwaiti Bedouin, according to the
Embassy, with one or two tribes controlling entire
districts. These will stay in Bedouin hands, although
the older, more malleable types may be replaced by
younger, better educated cousins who are more
ready to question the government.
? Sunni fundamentalists will remain an influential
voice in the Assembly even if their numbers do not
increase. Their insistence on Islamic themes will
dominate political rhetoric and be used even by
moderates who may not support the
fundamentalists' program but want to avoid being
tarred as anti-Islamic.
? The impact of the Shia vote is uncertain. Shia
moderates may be able to win several seats, but they
will need the backing of the broader Shia
community. It is not clear that the Shias have
decided on a coordinated strategy to ensure their
candidates' success.
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secret
Iran's Diplomatic Corps:
Bewhiskered, Bothered,
and Bewildered
The Khomeini regime has not fully revamped Iran's
diplomatic service despite its nearly six years in
power. Purges in the Foreign Ministry and among
Tehran's diplomatic representatives abroad have
lessened since the high point reached between 1979
and 1981. The continuing demands made by the
Islamic fundamentalists running the government,
however, clearly remain unpalatable to many Iranian
career diplomats. Competing power centers within the
Foreign Ministry-combined with cronyism in
staffing Iranian embassies-have led to policy about-
faces, duplication of effort, and rampant disharmony
among Iranian diplomats.
Cutting Back on Purges
Purges of the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic
service after the Islamic revolution in 1979 eliminated
many experienced diplomatic personnel suspected of
supporting the Shah. The dismissals created an
atmosphere of insecurity and provoked much
resentment between old and new staffers. By 1982,
perhaps
only 120 experienced diplomats remained from the
prerevolutionary corps of approximately 580. Of that
number, only one or two held ambassadorial-level
posts
Prime Minister Musavi-Khomeini began to curtail the
purges while serving as acting Foreign Minister in
late 1981. Foreign Minister Velayati-who assumed
that post in December 1981-has advocated a more
professional, efficient approach to making and
implementing policy. It has been reported that during
the past year Velayati has created a special staff with
an authorized strength of 29 positions under his direct
supervision to provide advice on policy matters. Half
of that staff have di lomatic experience r dating the
Iranian revolution.______________________
Velayati also is intent on sprucing 25X1
up Foreign Ministry employees in Tehran, many of
whom wear provincial clothing and sandals and give 25X1
off a "notable" body odor.F__1 25X1
Continuing Problems
Although Foreign Minister Velayati has become more
convinced of the need for a professional diplomatic
corps, career diplomats are still suspect, in the eyes of
many of Velayati's more radical subordinates.
Careerists appear to have fared especially poorly
under Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikh-ol-Eslam, who
has general charge of the political aspects of Iranian
policy worldwide. Sheikh-ol-Eslam was a key leader
of the militants who seized the US Embassy in
Tehran on 4 November 1979. He has removed all
Velayati, who was a physician, is considerably less
xenophobic than many of his colleagues at senior
levels of the regime. He has impressed foreign
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-004
1 February 1985
Velayati
observers with his relative moderation-in the Iranian
context-and emphasis on proper diplomatic conduct.
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instructed all Iranian diplomats in May 1983 to dress
in modified Western-style attire to promote a better 25X1
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career personnel from the Foreign Ministry
department handling Iranian relations with the USSR
and its allies,
Sheikh-ol-Eslam's peers in the Foreign Ministry,
deputy foreign minister for economic and
international affairs Hosein Kazempur-Ardabili and
deputy foreign minister for cultural and consular
affairs Javad Ali Mansuri, appear intent on carving
out power bases that, in many respects, resist
Velayati's emphasis on professionalism in the ranks.
The key subordinates around Kazempur-Ardabili
apparently reflect his strong ties to influential clerics,
and Mansuri, a former Revolutionary Guard member,
has made several fellow Guardsmen his chief aides. In
a move that has worsened relations between the two
officials, Kazempur-Ardabili has taken on several
men dropped by Sheikh-ol-Eslam. They in turn have
given the former's staff a more professional quality. In
many of Iran's overseas posts, each of the three
deputy foreign ministers is said to have one or more
favorites who correspond directly with a mentor in
Tehran outside of official channels. Our latest
estimate indicates there are only 80 to 100 career
diplomats still in the Foreign Ministry.
With so many "diplomats" whose qualifications
consist only of previous experience in the
Revolutionary Guard, endorsement by a prominent
cleric, and/or ties of kinship to a key official, the
lower and middle levels of the Iranian diplomatic
corps are only marginally effective. These
uneducated, inexperienced individuals bring to their
posts so much radical zealotry that the functioning of
an embassy can virtually halt while issues of proper
Islamic standards are debated and-all too
frequently-referred to Tehran for decision.
Diplomatic conduct is still crude at times. A well-
connected Iranian serving at The Hague caused a
considerable delay in proceedings of the US-Iranian
claims tribunal when he publicly assaulted a Swedish
judge last September. Foreign governments
frequently complain, correctly, that Iranian officials
arrange trips to their countries on short notice and
with little or no advance word on the prospective
agenda.F__1
Conflicts over policy in both the Foreign Ministry and
the government as a whole have left many
professional diplomats perplexed and reluctant to
display much initiative.
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Outlook
There is little prospect of an early end to the disarray
in Iran's foreign policy apparatus. Velayati has
generally supported professional careerists within the
Foreign Ministry, but available evidence suggests that
he has made little headway in reducing the power of
nominal subordinates-for example, Sheikh-ol-
Eslam-favored by more senior figures in the regime.
The impact of this chaos on Iranian foreign relations
will continue to hamper Iran's efforts to expand ties
and secure support in the Third World. Last fall, for
example, a major Iranian effort in the UN General
Assembly to expel Israel from the United Nations
proved counterproductive. The draft resolution lost by
a wider margin than did a similar resolution a year
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International Conference
Examines Shia Activism I
Participants at a symposium on "Shiism: Resistance
and Revolution" sponsored by the Dayan Center of
Tel Aviv University on 19-21 December 1984
expressed widely differing views on Shia activism, but
some key points emerged:
? The Shia revival, beginning in the late 1970s,
crossed national boundaries in the Near East and
South Asia because many Shia leaders have
traveled or resided in other countries in the area and
have been in increasing contact with each other.
? Shia activism, especially in Iran and Lebanon, may
not yet have reached its peak. More violence
directed at internal and external opponents may lie
ahead.
? Shiism has laid claim to Islam's moral high ground.
Shia leaders historically have fought for change and
the underdog, while Sunni Islam has been the
religion of the status quo.
? Iran's revolution is a powerful inspiration to all
Muslims, but not enough time has passed for a
confident evaluation of its internal and external
impact.
The Current Revival and Response
One scholar outlined four factors as driving the recent
Shia revival:
? The inspirational impact of events in Iran, the main
catalyst.
? Grievances stemming from the Shias' second-class
status in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf states.
? The impact of modernization, accelerated by the oil
boom.
? Shia history with its ebb and flow of activism and
quietism.
Other participants noted that the carrot-and-stick
responses of Sunni regimes have been fairly successful
in limiting Shia successes. According to one scholar,
Secret
Iranian-backed subversion in the Gulf states has upset
established ground rules for coexistence between
Sunni and Shia communities, presenting old regimes
with new security problems. The Gulf Cooperation
Council was described as an unprecedented example
of regional coordination-a direct military response to
a perceived threat. Saudi Arabia has also used
generous welfare programs to quiet its sizable Shia
population. Meanwhile, Iraq has skillfully played on
Arab-versus-Persian animosities and stressed national
unity to its own Shias during the war with Iran.
Interconnectedness: Everywhere You Look
An underlying and recurrent theme in the discussion
of Shia Islam was its "interconnectedness." Shia
leaders have often been active in nations other than
those where they were raised or studied:
? The famous charismatic Shia leader, Imam Musa
Sadr of Lebanon, was born and raised in Iran.
? Mustafa Chamran, Iran's late, fiery Defense
Minister, spent more years with the Amal in
Lebanon than with his own country's revolution.
? The publisher of The Muslim, Pakistan's
inflammatory and widely read newspaper, is a Shia
from Iran.
? Although Ayatollah Khomeini had his greatest
success in Iran, he spent 13 years teaching in Iraq's
holy cities, where he composed his most famous
doctrinal works.
The conferees noted that the Shia world is small and
that members of the Shia elite have many shared
experiences and are in increasing communication with
each other. They meet at the sacred cities of Karbala
in Iraq and Qom in Iran and in some cases have
established links with militant Sunnis-especially in
the Gulf and possibly in Syria. Lebanese Shia links
with Iran are long standing. Other participants
argued that no matter how "interconnected" Shias
may be, their response to Sunni or secular rule has
more commonly been one of passivity and withdrawal
into their own communities.
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The Iranian Revolution-External Ramifications
Although the scholars agreed on the disruptive impact
of the Iranian revolution in the Middle East, they
differed in interpreting its longer term influence.
Some believed that Khomeini's leadership had:
? Reached its peak in 1979-8 1.
? Failed to take adequate account of local Shia
grievances outside of Iran.
? Triggered middle-class resistance by its example of
the devastating impact of clerical rule on existing
institutions.
? Pitted Iranians against Iraqis in a debilitating Arab-
Persian war.
? Led to a reduction in Iran's attraction as a
revolutionary model because of demonstrated
Iranian weakness.
charismatic leader, single-party government, police-
state atmosphere, expansionist foreign policy, anti-
intellectualism, and anti-Semitism. Both this speaker
and several others said there was a good chance that,
authoritarian or not, Iran was heading for an even
bloodier internal conflict, with the possibility that a
"Napoleon or Stalin" was waiting in the wings.
The participants concluded that, both domestically
and externally, it is too soon to determine the long-
term impact of Iran's revolution. A consensus
emerged, however, that more unconventional warfare
was likely-assassinations, bombings, and hijackings.
Iran may provoke these acts out of a belief in its own
inability to affect regional politics and because terror
and tyrannicide are acceptable elements of Shia
belief.
On the other side, some scholars argued that the
Iranian revolution still serves as a vibrant model. It
showed that a popular uprising could topple an
authoritarian regime. Furthermore, it has the
potential to be an exemplar in the future, proving that
Islam, after centuries of decline, can be an attractive
alternative to capitalism and Communism. One
scholar even argued that Khomeini's revolution is the
most important ideological event in world history
since the teachings of Karl Marx.
Iran's Revolution: Internal Implications
Some discussants on Iran viewed the revolution in
terms of social transformation. They believe that,
although Shia doctrine was the core of the revolution,
Khomeini's political acumen had broadened its appeal
to professionals and youth. One scholar noted that
Khomeini has used coercion-purges, spying on
family members, public punishments-as well as
messianic doctrine to reshape society along Islamic
lines. Consolidation of power by the clerics, according
to another scholar, may eventually lead to more
flexibility by the regime; for example, emphasis on the
unity of Islamic sects or attempts to attract more of
the middle class for economic reconstruction-
without constant reference to the Shia element.
Another discussant had a different version of events in
Iran, arguing that contemporary Iran is a classic
fascist, authoritarian regime characterized by the
traditional phenomena of rightwing governments: a
Lebanon: Protest of the Disinherited
The interconnectedness theme reemerged in
discussions on Lebanon. From a "marginal people
locked in enclaves" in the 19th century, the Shias in
Lebanon have become increasingly assertive. Imam
Musa Sadr radicalized Shia communities through
hortatory condemnation of their economic deprivation
and lack of political rights under minority rule. The
Shia movement in Lebanon turned from passivity to
militance, even forming a militia. Funding has been
received from expatriate Lebanese Shias.
The participants gave the Shia Amal credit for being
a moderate, centrist force in the midst of Christian
Maronite fanaticism, Syrian interference, Israeli
occupation, and Shia fanatic groups. One speaker
argued that Israeli withdrawal from southern
Lebanon would leave the Amal preeminent in the
area, committed to confessional sharing of power in
Beirut, and loyal to a Lebanese state that would give
Shias a greater part of the economic and political pie.
Another participant argued that Shia radicalism
would overtake Amal in a violent revolution, leaving
new clerical leaders to set the agenda for a bloodbath
against Syrians, Christian communities, and the
ubiquitous Palestinians.
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The Subcontinent-The Frontier of Shiism
The discussion of Shia activism in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and India was consistent with one
participant's observation that "the further away from
Khomeini, the more diluted the message of Shiism."
The Shia minority there remains unassimilated,
content to contain their grievances except during
sporadic outbursts at Muharram ceremonies
reenacting the martyrdom of Husayn in 680. Where
there has been a significant escalation in violence in
both Pakistan and India, the scholars suspected, but
could not prove, that Iran was involved.
In Afghanistan's heavily Shia Hazarajat region,
Khomeini's new Revolutionary Guard representatives
have ousted the older, traditional resistance groups,
reflecting what one scholar described as Iran's
intention to use the Hazarajat region as a base for
future activities in Afghanistan. He claimed that
Hazara nationalism is declining and Islamic
fundamentalism growing.
In Pakistan, President Zia is faced with Shia clerical
demands for greater representation in the legislature
and the Federal Council. Pakistani Sunnis claim the
Shias are "blackmailing the government." Pakistani
Shias have ominously designated Khomeini as their
marja, or supreme religious leader.
A Historical Footnote
The symposium chairman noted that the only other
academic colloquium on the Shias he could document
was held in Strasbourg in 1968, where a fiery young
Shia cleric named Musa Sadr delivered an
extemporaneous speech. Musa Sadr was viewed as an
odd, although authentic, Shia voice from an
insignificant country, Lebanon. The chairman
lamented that his words were lost to history. No
official notes were taken, and Musa Sadr failed to
provide a monograph.
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Pakistan: Reflection
Zia's Referendum
The referendum of 19 December 1984 was neither the
great victory Zia proclaimed nor the disaster claimed
by the opposition. The opposition can take heart from
the low turnout in Pakistan's cities, but, by simply
holding the poll, gaining what is barely an acceptable
result, and removing his own future as a subject for
political bargaining, Zia has reinforced his position as
the dominant player in Pakistani politics and opened
the way for controlled elections in late February.
With the Army behind him, Zia still retains the
initiative. He will have to broaden his constituency if
he is to gain a workable result in the coming elections.
The Turnout
Although Zia has concentrated on the 97.7-percent
"yes" vote in claiming a mandate, we doubt that Zia
has really enhanced his political legitimacy as a result
of this referendum. We find the government's official
figure of a 60.7-percent turnout not credible.
Independent reports from Pakistan suggest the overall
participation rate probably was closer to 30 percent,
with rural areas voting around 25 to 35 percent and
urban areas around 15 to 25 percent. A 30-percent
participation rate would be about 5 percent below
average for Pakistani elections and, at least in terms
of numbers, cannot be considered a defeat for Zia.
Referendums generally attract fewer voters, and
clearly this exercise generated little public
enthusiasm. There is no indication of the high rates of
participation-65 to 75 percent-that occurred in
parts of Punjab and Sind in the benchmark 1970
Bhutto election.
Support from several groups undercut the formal
opposition of the Islamic political parties and gave Zia
at least a minimum result in key cities like Lahore
and Karachi. The participants included strong Zia
supporters and people brought to the polls through the
efforts of the local bureaucracy and, especially in
rural areas, pro-Zia landlords and tribal leaders. In
the cities, particularly in Punjab, Zia was aided by the
support of the bazaar merchants and most local
clerics, according to media reports.
The official data and media reports indicate regional
variations in voting participation:
? Returns suggest only non-Sindhis (muhajirs and
Punjabis) voted in significant numbers in the rural
Sind districts most affected by the 1983
disturbances.
? Participation was low (10 percent) in the North-
West Frontier Province, except around Peshawar,
where some Afghan refugees may have voted.
? More than 40 percent of the voters participated in
the more backward and conservative districts of
western Punjab, where landlords retain considerable
local authority. Rates were lower in the more
developed and politically conscious canal colony
districts.
? Voting in the cities varied according to
neighborhoods. We suspect a higher turnout in inner
city bazaar areas and middle-class neighborhoods
and a lower turnout in the factory estates, industrial
suburbs, and the rural migrant fringes known as
kachhi abadis.
The most disquieting feature of the election was the
barely adequate showing in urban Punjab, the
prosperous rural areas around Lahore and Multan,
and the canal colony districts of Faisalabad and
Sahuiwal, areas traditionally in the forefront of
political change in Pakistan. The results in the key
city of Lahore show that, despite bazaar merchant
and clergy support, Zia has an even narrower base
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than some experts suspected. According to the BBC,
independent observers in Lahore put the turnout there
at 10 percent.
The Noori Masjid Incident
The unimpressive showing in urban Punjab
encouraged the opposition to try demonstrations in
Lahore. According to press accounts, a violent
demonstration on 20 December was the largest
protest in Punjab in five years. Clerics used the Noori
Masjid-an important mosque near the railway
station-to gather a crowd of from 5,000 to 10,000.
Their allies in the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD) probably hoped to bring out the
students from the nearby Islamia College and workers
from the railway yards. We suspect that the clerics
belonged to the pro-MRD Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam.
Although the police contained the protest with a
minimum of force and have had little difficulty with
subsequent, smaller demonstrations, Lahore has
always been a center of opposition to Zia among
lawyers, journalists, activist women, and Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) leaders. These groups so far have
failed to gain broad public support, but any indication
that student coalitions, labor unions, and urban lower-
class elements are joining protests would spell trouble
for Zia.
Zia's Position
Zia and the senior generals are committed to pressing
on with the elections. Zia, in our view, continues to
benefit from underlying public concern about the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Indian intentions,
from a still buoyant-if somewhat slowing-
economy, and from the political apathy of most
Pakistanis. The referendum probably has not
seriously damaged his standing with the upper
echelons of the Army, although the low turnout will
cause concern and probably would limit Zia's staying
power if disturbances break out in Punjab.
The low turnout in the cities is an indication that
President Zia now must concentrate on expanding his
political base and finding ways to divide the
opposition. He is faced with three relatively discrete
political groupings:
the Pakistan National Party (PNP) in Baluchistan,
the Sind Awami Tehrik, pro-Sind elements in the
PPP, and assorted small pro-Moscow leftist groups.
The left wing of the Punjab PPP will be a swing
group but could end up in an alliance with this
group, bringing with it a considerable part of the
PPP's street strength. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Islam, which has pockets of strength in the NWFP
and Baluchistan, is also a part of this general
grouping.
? The moderates/centrists, comprising PPP landlords
(Sindhi and Punjabi), pro-PPP professionals and
technocrats, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, and smaller
nationalist groups like the Pakistan Democratic
Party (Nawab Nasrullah Khan), and elements of the
Muslim League.
? The pro-Zia group, including so far the Jama'at-i-
Islami and the Pagaro Muslim League, and
potentially the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan. Many
of the Ahl-e-Sunnat (JUP) clerics in Punjab
supported Zia in the referendum, according to press
reports. The JUP leadership (Noorani) will have to
decide whether it wants to follow the mosque-level
clerics into a virtual alliance with Zia.
Outlook
Zia, in our view, will probably try to split the
moderates from the regionalists in the Movement for
the Restoration of Democracy and then seek to divide
the moderate and leftist wings of the PPP. We believe
Zia's recent announcement that political leaders can
run in the elections is a step in this direction. Zia
probably will gain new allies, but we doubt that
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, the key player in the PPP
scenario, will break with PPP Chairman Benazir
Bhutto if she maintains the party's boycott of the
elections.
The opposition still needs an issue that can galvanize
diverse groups into active opposition. It still must
convince most Pakistanis that it constitutes an
acceptable alternative to the current regime.
? Regionalists, including the National Democratic
Party in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP),
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The overthrow of an Army-backed government
probably cannot yet occur in Pakistan. The opposition
has to convince the Army that Zia can no longer rule
effectively or maintain law and order and must be
replaced. It will seek to broaden the unrest in Punjab,
but, to be successful, it must galvanize urban groups
that so far have remained politically apathetic.
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Bangladesh:
Soviet Subversive Efforts
Soviet subversion in Bangladesh takes the form of
financing opposition parties and politicians,
sponsoring antigovernment strikes, and spreading
disinformation about US policy. Although Soviet
support of leftist movements contributes to
Bangladesh's present political stalemate, we do not
believe that Ershad's regime is seriously threatened
by Soviet meddling.n
The CPB: Conduits for the Soviets
The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) is the
main vehicle for Soviet subversion. Headed by
Mohammad Farhad, the CPB claimed to have 5 700
members in 1972
embership has since declined
Farhad has been under pressure from a rival
ac ion in the CPB that is accusing him of poor
leadership and "deviation from the revolutionary
control of the CPB by tarnishing Farhad's reputation
and ultimately replacing him with their own
Farhad contributes Soviet-supplied money to other
leftist parties and often coordinates strategy with
them, These other
parties include the Bangladesh Krishak-Sramik
Awami League (BKSAL-Bangladesh Farmers-
Workers Awami League) and Jatiya Samajtantrik
Dal (JSD-National Socialist Party). The CPB,
BKSAL, and JSD all belong to the 15-Party Alliance,
a left-of-center political coalition opposed to Ershad's
martial law regime. The alliance is led by Sheikh
Hasina of the pro-Indian Awami League,l
Pivotal Role of Soviet Embassy
uses the Soviet Embassy in Dhaka to manage
subversive activities and distribute funds. The
Embassy has a diplomatic staff of over 60, making it
the largest mission in Dhaka. Approximately 100
Bangladeshi nationals work for the Soviet Embassy,
and the Soviets select the nationals who work for
Subversion Follows Several Paths
Most efforts at Soviet meddling are devoted to
supporting labor and student agitation. The CPB has
been able to infiltrate and control many of
Bangladesh's labor unions
The CPB's own labor front, the
Trade Union Center (TUC), has close ties with the
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
The TU dominates such
key unions as t e Transport Workers Labor Union,
Revolutionary Road Transport Workers Federation,
These labor organizations conduct periodic "hartels,"
or general strikes. The most recent hartel, on 22-23
December 1984, lasted 48 hours and brought most
business activity in the urban areas to a standstill,
according to US Embassy reports
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Shortly afterward, leftist newspapers used a meeting
between the Ambassador and a conservative
Bangladeshi politician as an excuse to accuse the
Ambassador of trying to form a rightwing alliance to
prop up President Ershad. In a similar vein,
,
alleged that the ship visit indicated future US use of
Chittagong as a regular port of call.
The Soviets have also sought to use their assets in
Bangladesh to prolong the current political stalemate
and prevent Ershad from strengthening his position.
In December 1984,
protest against the visit of a US Navy
to the port of Chittagong in January 1985. The
protests which were echoed in the leftist press,
he CPB to
organize protest activities throughout the country
with the aim of disrupting private talks between
d and opposition leader Sheikh Hasina Wazed.
he CPB to refuse to participate in the
6 April 1985.
parliamentary election that Ershad has announced for
rshad and his advisers have so far reacted
coolly to the Soviet overtures
arrived in November 1984
their Deputy Foreign Minister. Moscow has also
offered to enter into joint projects with Bangladesh,
such as building a nuclear power reactor, and
appointed a new ambassador, Vladimir Beliaev, who
Dhaka's Unhappiness
Soviet support for the left has, not surprisingly, had a
negative impact on Dhaka's view of Moscow. Rising
leftist activity in 1983 led Ershad to expel 15 Soviet
diplomats in December of that year. Since then, the
Soviets have tried to arrange a visit to Bangladesh by
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Another form of Soviet-inspired meddlin is
disinformation against the United States
the CPB decided in
early December 1984 to conduct a vilification
campaign against the US Ambassador in Dhaka.
Ershad and his advisers a so
decided to further reduce the size of the Soviet
Embassy by refusing to issue visas to Embassy
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personnel and to select the Bangladeshi nationals who
work in the Embassy. To date, however, Ershad has
failed to follow through on these decisions. He has
demonstrated a capacity for procrastination and also
wants to maintain an image of evenhandedness in
relations with the superpowers
Outlook
Bangladesh, with a weak, pro-West government and
major social and economic problems, will remain a
tempting target for Soviet subversive efforts.
Accordingly, the Soviets are likely to continue to
encourage agitation by sponsoring civil disobedience
in the hope that this might prompt Ershad to postpone
elections again. This would buy time for the CPB and
other leftist parties to increase their influence within
the 15-Party Alliance. The Soviets know that the pro-
Soviet parties are weak and unlikely to seize power
except in coy alition with the larger, non-Communist
Realistically, the Soviets' best hope is for the pro-
Indian Awami League, which heads the Alliance, to
come to power. Dhaka, under Awami leadership,
would be more favorably disposed toward both
Moscow and New Delhi.
Popular distrust of the Soviets, as a result of the
invasion of Afghanistan and their ties to India, will
remain high. The Bangladeshi military, in particular,
is strongly anti-Communist
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Sudan: Disjointed Justice
Sudan's legal system-buffeted by President
Nimeiri's frequent restructuring of the courts and
reshuffling of judges during the past year-is in
disarray. Nimeiri's application of Islamic justice has
split public opinion in the north, helped to unify his
opponents in the south, and stimulated foreign
protests. If moderate sentences are handed down over
the next several months, the contentious issue may be
defused somewhat and Nimeiri's judicial alterations
would remain in place. If Nimeiri revives harsh
punishments, however, and continues to meddle in the
judicial process later in the year-when economic
hardships are expected to increase in the northern
provinces-disgruntled legal professionals may help
spark civil disorder and increase dramatically the
President's political vulnerability.
Sudanese Law: The Constitutional Framework
The Permanent Constitution of 1973 distinguished
civil justice from criminal justice. Civil justice was to
be administered by the Supreme Court, provincial
courts of appeal, and other courts. Criminal justice
was to be administered by major courts and
magistrate's courts. Major courts convened by
provincial judges tried serious crimes, and magistrates
had jurisdiction in lesser offenses.)
Sudan's legal customs further distinguished secular
law-applied to all citizens-from Sharia, or Islamic
law. Sharia courts handled such matters as marriage,
divorce, inheritance, and family disputes of Sudan's
Muslims. F-1
Nimeiri Overhauls the System
Nimeiri has taken increasingly bold steps to alter the
legal framework since he declared a state of
emergency in April 1984. He first undercut the role of
major and magistrate's courts by empowering
"emergency" courts to try cases that range from
alleged crimes against individuals to corruption and
offenses against the state. Nimeiri then created
emergency civil courts and courts of appeal
The nominal change of emergency courts into
"decisive justice" courts in early July underscored
Nimeiri's efforts to make the new arrangements
permanent. Moreover, Nimeiri made all decisive
justice courts directly accountable to him and thereby
stripped Sudan's provincial governors of their judicial
authority. Decisive justice courts-initially composed
of a jurist and two other members from the armed
forces, the prison system, or Sudanese state security-
evolved into one-man tribunals in which the jurist has
nearly absolute power. Members of the Supreme
Court and the regular lower courts were gradually
edged out of the judicial process.
The activities of Nimeiri's decisive justice courts have
disrupted the judicial system by blurring the
distinction between secular law and the Sharia.
"Decisive" court jurists, appointed by Nimeiri on the
recommendation of his fundamentalist advisers, have
convicted both Muslims and non-Muslims for such
offenses under the Sharia as adultery and the use of
alcohols
The severity of decisive justice varies. The key factors,
in our view, are the degree of Nimeiri's religious
fervor at any given time, the influence of his Islamic
advisers, and the reaction of foreign governments.
Decisive courts ordered amputations, hangings,
crucifixions, and floggings on a weekly basis through
last fall. The punishments declined, however, when
Muslim Brotherhood leader Hasan al-Turabi lost
favor with Nimeiri and when Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Western donors of aid expressed concern over
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Although Nimeiri relaxed his Islamization policies by
lifting the state of emergency in late September, he
continues to spread confusion in the legal community.
His Judicial Act of 1984 revamped the judiciary into
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"a Supreme Court, a Supreme Administrative Court,
and various judicial bodies" but did not specify their
roles. At the same time, the act established a separate
criminal court system with its own court of appeals.
These courts are the decisive justice court
Many jurists noted for issuing harsh sentences hold
key positions in the judiciary. The US Embassy in
Khartoum reports that they control the Supreme
Court and the new criminal courts. Fuad al-Amin
Rahman, who replaced an opponent of Nimeiri's
Islamization policies as chief justice of the Supreme
Court, substituted jurists schooled in the Sharia for
secular judges
Nimeiri's Motives
A major reason for Nimeiri's assault on the legal
system is, in our view, his desire to weaken Sudan's
traditional judges and lawyers as a potential
organized opposition. The judiciary and Sudan's
"advocates" have defied Nimeiri in the past, the latest
instance being a strike in late 1983. Presidential
decrees that usurped the power of the traditional
courts allow Nimeiri to punish the legal professionals
without arresting them and risking a wave of popular
support on their behalf. Nimeiri probably has directed
his attack primarily against the judges because, unlike
the lawyers, they lack a union.
Nimeiri also appears to believe that widespread and
strict adherence to Islamic practices will help solve
Sudan's problems. To the extent he sees the Sharia as
a vehicle to "purify" his countrymen, Nimeiri may
feel driven to turn Islamic courts into a comprehensive
network capable of serving permanently as Sudan's
only judicial system. A recent reduction in the crime
rate in Khartoum probably helps to confirm for
Nimeiri the wisdom of harsh Islamic justice. 0
Domestic Reactions
Sudan's traditional judges are embittered by
Nimeiri's policies, but their response so far has been
feeble. Civil court judges have complained that their
professional careers are ruined
in active opposition to the government
over half the judges in Khartoum
Province last month charged Chief Justice Rahman
with corruption and incompetence and threatened to
resign or strike, but they backed down when Nimeiri's
legal advisers promised modest concessions.=
We believe the judges have mounted little resistance
to Nimeiri's judicial alterations partly because they
fear this might only worsen their situation and partly
because they are uncertain whether other groups
would support their cause. Nimeiri has withheld
promotions and other benefits from civil judges since
last summer and could continue to do so
Lawyers in Khartoum's highest courts have issued a
declaration that Nimeiri's appointees are unfamiliar
with judicial procedures and the rules of evidence and,
therefore, are unqualified to preside, but they have
not coordinated their moves with the judges. Lower-
class Muslim northerners-the group that has
received most of the floggings and amputations-
appear either cowed by or resigned to Islamic justice.
The military also lacks incentives to support the
judges. With few exceptions, Nimeiri has carefully
avoided subjecting soldiers to charges or punishments
under the Sharia. In addition, we believe the officer
corps views the traditional judiciary as a rival in
Sudanese politics and may welcome a policy that
weakens the judges' standing.F-~
Military men are concerned, nonetheless, that a
renewal of harsh punishments may trigger civil
disorder in the north.
What Happens Next?
The judicial actions Nimeiri takes over the next
several months will significantly affect his political
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position because he is already vulnerable as a result of
the southern insurgency and staggering economic
problems. Barring a negotiated settlement or a severe
cutback in arms available to Nimeiri's enemies in the
south, we believe the insurgents will score victories
that will progressively weaken morale in the Army
and deepen the military's disenchantment with
Nimeiri's policies. At the same time, economic
observers forecast food and water shortages for the
northern provinces that will increase in severity
through 1985. Given these hardships, the political
climate in the north will be volatile and provide an
opening for Nimeiri's opponents.
Under these circumstances, if Nimeiri shows restraint
in approving Islamic punishments, Sudan's traditional
judges are likely to remain powerless against his
efforts to institutionalize his new court system. If
Nimeiri, on the other hand, approves more harsh
sentences while he continues to concentrate judicial
power in the hands of Islamic jurists, a judges'
strike-alone or perhaps with lawyers-could serve as
a catalyst or reinforcement for wider disturbances in
Khartoum. In such an event, the military may be
unwilling to back the President.
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Egypt: Prospe m
r
Prison Refor
Egypt's overcrowded prisons have long been a subject
of foreign and domestic criticism. The Mubarak
government has been spurred by prison riots, public
criticism of police abuses, and embarrassing stories in
the opposition press throughout 1984 to undertake
some limited reforms. Further reforms are likely to
face resistance, however, from the entrenched police-
prison bureaucracy that finds the current system both
convenient and personally rewardingF_~
The Prison Systems
Egypt has two separate prison systems. The Defense
Ministry operates a military prison system, while a
civil system is under the administrative control of the
Ministry of Justice. Actual control of the civil system
Military Prisons
Although details on the military prison system are
sketchy, we believe it probably is less harsh than the
civil system he
morale of military prisoners seems good despite the
expected complaints about substandard food, poorly
ventilated cells, and inadequate family visiting
privileges. Officers and enlisted men are segregated
from each other. In addition to receiving better
treatment than enlisted men, officers are held in one
prison and never transferred to the civil prison system
enlisted men with sentences longer than a
year are usually transferred to the civil system. This
adds to the overcrowding in civil prisons, but we
believe the space and resources it frees in the military
system are used to rehabilitate less serious offenders
to facilitate their return to duty
The Civil Prison System
Egypt's civil prison system includes local police
station holding cells, women's prisons, children's
prisons, and large metropolitan or city prisons.F_
The holding cell in a local police station is the first
prison encountered by a person arrested, detained, or
held for questioning by the Egyptian police.
ese cells are equipped only with the barest
essentials because they are not intend for long-term
housing. only average
Egyptians without "influence" and foreigners believed
to be "subversive" are held in these cells while
awaiting a hearing or a trial. For example, the civil
police can only detain, and not arrest, military
personnel, so soldiers are held only briefly until
released to the custody of the military police or their
commanding officer. Western tourists and "friendly"
foreign businessmen are turned over to officials from
their respective embassies rather than arrested, unless
they are picked up for espionage or subversion.
Children under age seven arrested for criminal
activity are returned to their parents, while those age
eight to 18 are held at the discretion of the local
police. Persons over age 18 are treated as adults and
usually detained.
-foreign diplomats, VIPs, and persons with
political influence are arrested and detained only on
the orders of higher police officials. No local record is
kept of their arrest, and only the police chief knows
the disposition of these cases
The Egyptian police's search for quick solutions to
criminal cases usually begins in the holding cells of
the local police stations, where suspects undergo the
first of many interrogations. Although we do not
believe the Egyptian police engage in an officially
sanctioned pattern of torture and physical abuse,
press accounts
re ect an ingrained police preference for
physical means to obtain a confession from a
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local police also have been known
not to list a suspect's arrest on the official police
blotter to permit more time to "question" him. Once
the police interrogation is complete, however, the
arrest record is properly annotated.
Egypt maintains separate prisons for each sex.
Although we lack detailed information about women's
prisons, available open sources indicate their facilities
suffer from similar, though less severe, problems as
the men's prisons. Sexual abuse of prisoners and the
prisoners' use of sex to gain favors from guards,
however, may be more widespread in the women's
prisons.
the best way to prevent this kind of
abuse is to provide the womens' prisons with more
female staff. as late as 1981
over 90 percent of the guards in the womens' prisons
were men.F___1
Children's prisons are actually reform schools for
children aged eight to 18,
Conditions are reported to be hard but not harsh, with
an emphasis on discipline and on providing the
children with both an education and some type of
trade or craft to preclude return visits
Egypt's largest and most trouble-plagued prisons are
those for adult men located in the major metropolitan
areas. Many of these are old, overcrowded, and
without adequate medical and sanitary facilities.
Although the press has highlighted "model" prisons,
where living conditions are acceptable and some
limited vocational training is offered, these conditions
do not exist in the older, larger institutions.
a major problem
is the perception by both the police and public that
duty on a prison staff is undesirable, fit only for the
Torture is illegal in Egypt, and any confession obtained under
duress is inadmissible in court. Although Egyptian courts often
dismiss police cases based on forced confessions, old police habits
appear hard to break. In any event, the police prefer to present their
cases before law-and-order judges who are willing to overlook
'Egyptian law permits a pretrial detention period of up to 90 days
to facilitate police investigations. Sometimes, however, a longer
period is required to gather evidence and obtain a confession.
least capable personnel. Poor quality facilities staffed
by poor quality personnel thus appear to have
produced a penal system characterized all too
frequently by physical abuse of prisoners, inmate
violence, internal drug dealing, and official
corruption.
Egyptian
prisons often become "schools for crime" because
first-term minor offenders are not separated from
hardened criminals. the lack of
separate minimum and maximum security prisons
also facilitates continued criminal control of prison
life. At Al-Hadara prison in Alexandria, for example,
wealthy drug smugglers and
their associates enjoyed luxury cells with color
televisions, videotape recorders, and meals catered
from home. Drug and alcohol abuse were widespread,
and many prisoners were armed with knives and even
For the majority of the prisoners,
however, overcrowding, poor sanitation, bad food, and
inadequate medical care are the nornl
Impetus for Reform
We believe the Mubarak government's concern over
substandard prison conditions has produced at least
some marginal improvements over the last several
years. We believe reform efforts, however, probably
have been driven more by security concerns, internal
police power struggles, and embarrassing press
accounts-which could jeopardize Egypt's chances to
obtain more foreign aid-than by concern over
prisoners' welfare
Prison riots-at least five of which have been reported
since mid-1983-appear to have been the greatest
single impetus for change. Probably the most
significant improvement has been in the handling of
prison disturbances: water cannon, tear gas, and
minimum armed force are now generally used instead
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of having the Central Security Forces storm the
prison under a volley of automatic weapons fire. The
government also has demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate with prisoners holding hostages and to
discuss prisoner grievances seriously. In addition, both
the previous and current Interior Minister have
appointed senior police officials to investigate prison
Reform, Corruption, and Internal Power Struggles
Long-established and frequently corrupt relationships
among police, prison officials, and local criminals are
important obstacles to prison reform because any
effort to change the existing system threatens these
Position and longevity are the keys to power as a
police or penal officer in Egypt
Although a local police
chief occupies a more prestigious and potentially
lucrative position than a prison warden, a warden who
has worked his way up in the prison system in his city
or governorate often has more local influence than a
newly appointed police chief who was transferred to
the job from outside the region. Stability brings
power, influence, and the commensurate opportunity
to receive what a former Egyptian police officer
described as "gifts from a grateful people who
Outlook
Prison reform does not appear to be a high priority for
the financially strapped Egyptian Government.
Moreover, public support for prison reform is highly
variable. We believe most Egyptians probably expect
the worst from their prison system and, in any event,
probably believe prisons should not be made too
comfortable for inmates. We believe the combination
of public apathy, corrupt officials, internal police
power struggles, and low funding will continue to
preclude substantial improvement in prison
conditions. Continued US and Western expressions of
concern about human rights in Egypt, however,
remain important. We believe at least modest
progress is likely as long as the Interior Minister can
use the cause of prison reform-as justified by these
and other pressures-to strengthen his position within
his ministry and the government
recognize the importance of your work.1
Under these circumstances, however, prison reform
and patronage also can work together. Prison
disturbances, press accounts of prisoner abuse, and
judicial inquiries into police conduct offer an interior
minister the opportunity not only to initiate prison
reforms but also to remove entrenched or corrupt
police and prison officials and replace them with
officers he considers more loyal.
former Interior
Minister u Basha and current Minister Rushdi
responded to major prison disturbances by replacing
wardens and staff and publicly initiating criminal
investigations of the treatment of inmates.
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