CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION TO GORBACHEV?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000508020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review
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ipoe A g ncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 October 1985
Conservative Opposition to Gorbachev?
S mmmary
By any measure, since becoming party leader In March
Mail Gorbachev has moved with impressive speed to
consolidate power by advancing allies and removing
opponents. He has also been able to push through tough
decisions in the economic sphere. Despite these notable
successes, there is evidence that conservatives are fighting a
rear guard action to limit Gorbachev's options in key policy
areas and resist his consolidation of power. While its impact
is limited for nor, the opposition's existence serves as a
reminder that there are forces in the Soviet system waiting
for Gorbachev to miscalulate In implementing controversial
political and economic reforms. Although this memorandum
addresses Gorbachev's political prospects, it does not attempt
to provide a net assessment of his strength, but to lay out
the signs of resistance and establish indicators of
Gorbachev's success in overcoming It.
the Chief, Domestic Policy Division,
Analysis. Comments and questions may be directed to the author F for 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Soviet
SOYA M 85-10188
STAT
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The signs of possible resistance to Gorbachev include:
points in their regimes.
Airing of charges by conservative spokesmen that some
of the more far-reaching economic reforms new under
consideration are Ideologically unacceptable.
The continued presence of key Brezhnev-era officials
and leading members of the conservative camp who are
reported to be on Gorbachev's hit list.
A slowdown in the rate of personnel changes in the
regional party apparatus since early August.
Gorbachev's failure to receive some of the symbols of
office given to Andropov and Chernenko at comparable
While this opposition does not pose a serious political
threat to the new party leader, it may already be causing him
to temporize on some contentious issues. During the past
several months he has toned down his public rhetoric in
support of the ambitious agenda he set early in his regime and
taken a more cautious stance on economic reform. Gorbachev
can afford to temporize on some issues while he guages the
Impact of cadre renewal and ongoing economic initiatives, but
he undoubtedly would like to remove remaining drezhnev
holdovers from key positions and achieve a decisive turnover
in the Central Committee by the party congress in February.
Failure to do so would signal that conservatives are in a
stronger position to impede change than now appears to be the
case and that the political consensus in the coalition that
Gorbachev has brow ht to over is not as broad or firm as it
currently appears.
Despite the signs of resistance to Gorbachev, overall he
appears to be in a strong political position and continuing to
gain strength. Although conservatives may be putting
obstacles in the %my of Gorbachev's agenda and slowing it
down, there are few indications that they are getting It off
track.
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Gorbachev's Gameplan
Although he has been short on specifics, Gorbachev appears to have an
ambitious gameplan for bringing the Soviet Union into the 21st century. He
has called for a major overhaul of the economy and revitalizing Soviet
society, and encouraged expectations that far-reaching changes are in the
offing. He has spoken in terms of carrying out "revolutionary' changes and
has challenged the pattern of leadership politics that discouraged major
innovations for the past 20 years.
Gorbachev, however, has implemented only relatively noncontroversial
measures for revitalizing the economy. The discipline, anticorruption, and
antialcholism campaigns have already produced marginal improvements in
economic perfomance. Gorbachev also clearly hopes that his efforts to install
a new generation of more effective and innovative managers combined with the
drive to accelerate the iptroduction of the latest science and technology
achievements into Soviet industry will produce more substantial results.
These measures, however, amount to little more than tinkering with the current
system and are unlikely to'produce more than a short term improvement in
Soviet economic performance. -
In the meantime, Gorbachev is also taking steps to build political
support for more fundamental reforms. He is making extensive personnel
changes aimed at undermining bureaucratic resistance; building up popular
expectations in favor of reform; and encouraging a broad rethinking of the
ideological tenets of the regime in order to undermine conservative arguments
against reform.
While Gorbachev has not committed himself to a specific agenda for
economic reform, he appears to be willing to consider measures that are
radical by Soviet standards.
-- Shortly before he became party leader,
Gorbachev was fascinated by the nese
economic reforms and believed that cautious experiments will always
be devoured by the system.
-- Gorbachev is reportedly taking the counsel of reform economists Abel
Aganbegyan and Tatyana Zaslavskaya, both of whom have proposed far-
reaching changes in the economy, including an expansion of the
private sector.
-- Long an enthusiastic supporter of private agriculture, Gorbachev has
hinted since becoming party leader that he favors an expansion of
private enterprise in agriculture and its introduction In other
sectors.
-- He has publicly endorsed an expanded role for "commodity money
relations" and economic levers such as prices, costs, profit, and
credit--measures that would expand the role of the market.
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a as orce was created In AU us o vise the top
political leadership on economic reform, the group agrees
that a legalization of the private, sector and the introduction of
some market mechanisms are needed.
Sources of Opposition
The continued influence of this group is suggested by the fact that other
anticipated top-level personnel changes did not take place at the October
plenum. Despite numerous reports that one or more additional Brezhnev-era
holdovers would be removed at the plenum--Gr rev,
Rusakov, and Ziwtyanin--they all survived.
There have been numerous indications that lower levels of the party and
economic bureaucracies are unenthusiastic about Gorbachev's economic agenda:
leader uinmukhamed Kunayev.
The replacement of Premier Tikhonov, and his retirement from the
Politburo at the 15 October party plenum, removed a principal rallying point
for bureacratic resistance to Gorbachev's economic gameplan. The new premier,
Nikolay Ryzhkov, is an ally,: of Gorbachev and appears to be more favorably
disposed toward the general secretary's agenda than Tikhonov. Gorbachev and
Ryzhkov quickly followed up on the removal of Tikhonov by replacing 74-year-
old Gosplan chief Nikolay Baybakov, whom many Soviet officials have identified
as a major impediment to reform, and replacing two veteran ministers (Foreign_
Trade, and Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry). Without Tikhonov
to protect them, other ministers resisti hange are now in a much more
vulnerable position.
Despite his success in reshaping the top economic leadership, Gorbachev
still faces other Brezhnev holdovers in the Politburo who are unenthusiastic
about his agenda. Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy has long been
an outspoken defender of conservative Interests and has spoken out explicitly
against some of the more far-reaching economic reforms currently under
discussion (see below). Other Brezhnev-era leaders who are reported to be
resistant to change include Moscow party boss Viktor Grishin and Kazakh party
by party conservatives and entrenched government bureaucrats.
Gorbachev's plans for economic reform and cadre renewal are being opposed
meeting resistance in the bureaucracy since he is trying to do too
much too soon.
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-- Continuing bureacratic resistance to change was highlighted in a
politically charged poem in Pravda by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko in early
September that lashed out at 'nay-sayers' who oppose innovations,
always questioning 'what if it doesn't work?'
-- At the October plenum Gorbachev referred to conservative foot
dragging on his economic agenda, stating that it had not been easy to
wamrh snwaamaw? ww ?L..
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The continued influence of party conservatives is also evident in the
prominence of two of their leading spokesmen in the Gorbachev regime:
Richard Kosol a ov, the chief editor of the main party journal KOMMUN IST,
has been a leading critic of reformers over the past several years. While
Kosolapov has acknowledged' the need for changes in the economy in
conversations with Embassy officials, he favors limited tinkering rather than
fundamental reform. He has publicly differed with Gorbachev on questions of
economic reform and has continued to take a conservative
dit
i
l
e
or
a
line on subject in KOMMUNIST since Gorbachev became party leader. 25X1
Boris Rakhmanin, the first deputy head of the CPSU bloc
l
ti
re
a
ons
department, is a ong-time defender of ideological orthodoxy. In a highly
controversial June PRAVDA article he sharply criticized diversity within the
Soviet bloc, and denounced economic reforms currently under discussion in the
Soviet Union. Apparently not yet ready to move decisively against the
conservatives, Gorbachev has allowed Rakhmanin to continue to play a prominent
role in bloc relations. His influence was evident when he was shown on the
front page of PRAVDA sitting next to Gorbachev at meetings with Laotian and
meeting with Hungarian leader Kadar InoSeptember.+ Y 25X1
Conservative Concerns
Members of the bureaucracy have historically been a formidable roadblock
to reform--most notably decentralization efforts introduced by Premier Aleksey
Kosygin in 1965--and many must feel personally threatened by Gorbachev's
aggressive personnel policies. Party ideologues fear that relinquishing some
of the levers of tight central control could eventually lead to a lessening of
political control as well such as occurred owing economic reforms in
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
25X1
In addition to fearing for their own positions, political conservatives
in the Soviet Union oppose Gorbachev's agenda on ideological grounds. They do 25X1
not argue that proposals for market reforms and the expansion of the private
sector will not be effective, but claim instead that, they a
reversion to capitalism
conservatives are accusing r ac ev o focusing on economic expediennceyat the
expense of ideolo
i
l
g
ca
principles. The Influence of the conservatives is
evident in the continued appearance of articles arguing against
reform from
th
d
or
o
ox ideological positions in the Soviet press. 25X1
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Judging from the prominence of the issue in high-level public statements,
there were sharp differences within the leadership over the ideological
acceptability of economic reform shortly before Gorbachev's election as party
leader. At a major ideology conference in December 1984, Gorbachev stressed
the importance of making better use of the market-- "commodity-money
relations"--specifically arguing.for the increased use of economic levers such
as "price, production costs, profit, and credit." Gorbachev's remarks
immediately drew an apparent direct retort from Kosolapov, speaking at the
same conference. Kosolapov cautioned that the expansion of commodity-money
relations should not be viewed as a "panacea" for all disorders in the Soviet
economy and warned against placing too much reliance on economic levers.
Kosolapov also spoke out against expanding private enter rise claimin that
it raised the "danger of-the restoration of capitalism."
At about the same time Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy aired similar
concerns. Writing in KOMMUNIST, he warned that if "trust is put in
spontaneous-market regulation" instead of "systematically sustaining" basic
proportions the threat of the restoration of capitalism" is created. He
indicated that strong cents.alized management of the econom ed in order
for the leadership to have.its goals carried out.
Fundamental differences within the party on economic reform have been
openly reflected in the Soviet press since the ideology conference. Articles
calling for a "socialist market" and flexible prices and an expansion of the
private sector have been answered by a steady drumbeat of conservative
criticism.
The director of the leading Soviet institute on prices took a rigidly
Stalinist approach in a February TRUD article, claiming that flexible
prices are "fundamentally wrong" and run counter to the basic
principles of socialist economics.
A March SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by conservative sociologist
Rutkevich warned that the private plots perpetuate economic
inequalities in society.
A rigidly doctrinaire June PRAVDA article by Boris Rakhmanin, under
the pseudonym 00. Vladimirov," called proposals to increase the role
of the market and expand the private sector "revisionist," and
fraught with "serious economic, social, and ideological consequences"
that could lead to an increase in "social tension." He denounced
ideological flexibility, complaining that under the "camouflage" of
"creative interpretation," some people are suggesting that
traditional interpretations of Marxist theory have become outdated,
and called for a return of "purity of political positions."
Subsequent efforts by Soviet officials to assure East Europeans that
the article did not represent official thinking suggest that there
are high-level differences over these issues in Moscow.
An editorial comment in a June issue of KOMMUNIST--presumably
reflecting the views of Kosolapov--warned against giving the market a
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large role in regulating the economy. Although it acknowledged that
a greater emphasis on profit would stimulate production, it argued
that traditional socialist values would suffer, stating that
"commodity-money relations under socialist conditions should be
subordinate to strengthening" centrally planned production.
An August PRAVDA article argued that economic reforms in the
direction of a market econanv_ wam "ei,1.e*rlr,ly opposed" by Marx,
C-nal ~ ft-.1 1__4_
Political Indicators
More traditional political indicators also suggest that Gorbachev is
meeting high level resistance. So far, Gorbachev has not received the same
formal symbols of personal, status that his predecessors took for granted.
Some Soviet officials claim that Gorbachev has spurned such symbols, and their
absence may simply reflect his unique leadership style. Similar reports
appeared when Andro ov became p W.#" der, although he was soon accorded "I't-7 these symbols.
25X1
Recognition as head of Politburo. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev has
not been widely ac'orded the encomium "head of the Politburo." Before
Gorbachev became party leader it appeared that the use of this term was
becoming institutionalized. Although Brezhnev was not widely recognized as
head of the Politburo until 1973, the term began to be used widely for
Andropov by other Politburo members and in the press after six months, and
took hold for Chernenko in even less time. So far, however, this honorific
title has only been used for Gorbachev on isolated occasions--primarily in the
republic press--and after the first weeks of his regime has been avoided by
other Politburo members. Gorbachev has been referred to as head of t
Politburo on only one day in Pravda--29 June--when it was used twice.
Presidency. Unlike Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Andropov, Gorbachev was not
given the larg ly honorific position of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme et (President). Although Gorbachev 's explanation, that he needs
to devote his time to domestic affairs, and the political expedience of moving
Gromyko into the post, indicate that Gorbachev may have not sought the post
even though it would have given a clear signal of additional political
clout. When Gorbachev nominated Chernenko as president in 1984 he argued that
the offices of general secretary and president should be held by one person.
Head of the Defense Council. Gorbachev has not been identified as the
head o the Defense Colkncil to -the Soviet public--an honor publically given to
Andropov and Chernenko by this point in their regimes. In the case of
Andropov, the term began to be used in the Soviet media after six months. The
title was applied to Chernenko more quickly, with General Staff Chief Ogarkov
using it in private within days of his election, and Ustinov using it in
public three months later. Gorbachev's interest in being publicly recognized
in this position was evident during a September meeting with US congressmen
when he drew the attention to the fact that he is speaking in his dual
capacity as party leader and head of the council. The only time the term has
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August press conference, but it was not replayed by the Soviet media. 25X1
Treatment of Speeches. Since he became party leader, lersisting
anomalies have appeared in the media treatment of Gorbachev s speeches. While
these appear to be due in part to his extemporaneous style and his efforts to
exploit television, on occasion some controversial passages appear to have
been intentionally dropped from some versions of his speeches. In a sharp
departure from past practice, a speech he delivered in Kiev in June was
published only in pamphlet form and was not broadly publicized by the media.
There have also been unusual, unexplained delays in releasing several of his
speeches--most recently a three day la of a speech he gave in Kazakhstan in
early September. 25X1
been used in public by a Soviet official was by Leonid Zamyatin at an earl
Tactical Retreat?
Gorbachev has alluded"to high-level resistance to his program on more
than one occasion. He hinted at differences within the Politburo during a
June visit to the Ukraine ?stating that the question had come up in the
Politburo "more than once"-whether the leadership is "turning too sharply" in
its efforts to reshape domestic policy. He referred again to opposition the-
following day, stating that "several comrades" had questioned his use of the
experience in one plant to draw broad conclusions for the entire economy. It
may be no coincidence that both of these speeches were given in the presence
This resistance may be causing Gorbachev to temporize on some
controversial issues. In sharp contrast to his early statements as party
leader, in which he actively pressed for change and appeared to be trying to
build up popular expectations. Gorbachev has recently struck a more cautious
of conservative spokesman Shcherbitskiy.
Gorbachev's shift in rhetoric was first evident during his trip to the
Ukraine, when he drew attention to the negative consequences of mistakes in
policy, stressing the need for decisions to be carefully thought out. He
sounded even more hesitant in his TIME interview, stating that while many in
the party want to act "still faster" in introducing deep changes, "caution" is
needed. He indicated that he was resisting pressure to go further in pressing
for deep reforms in a 10 September conversation with SPD leader Johannes
Rau. This new found caution was also evident in Gorbachev's latest speeches
which have been missing the standard formulations about the need for bold
public note.
policy initiatives that had characterized his early remarks as party leader.
Gorbachev has also adopted a more cautious tone in terms of substance,
suggesting that he is sensitive to conservative concerns. Speaking on
agriculture in Kazakhstan in early September, he boosted the 1982 Brezhnev
food program as the solution to the country's food shortages rather than more
innovative measures such as collective contracts or private plots. He also
took a traditional approach in a 21 September speech in which he stressed the
need for harder work to improve economic performance.
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Conservative resistance may have led to a slowdown in the pace of
personnel changes in the regional party apparatus. Soviet officials had said
that Gorbachev intended to make broad personnel changes following his return
from vacation in late August, but in fact, turnover has slowed dramatically.
If Gorbachev does not resume a rapid pace of personnel turnover soon, he will
have difficulty making the kinds of changes Soviet officials have suggested
are on his agenda before the congress.
--By the first week in August, four months after assuming office, he had
replaced 20 obkom first secretaries, during the following three months he has
replaced only. This slowdown is particularly notable since Gorbachev
clearly wanted to bring about a major renewal of the provincial party
leadership before the pre-congress provincial party conferences which begin in
December.
--Notably, not a single regional party leader in the Ukraine has been replaced
under Gorbachev and rumors in Moscow attribute this to Ukrainian party boss
Shcherbitskiy s successful resistance of pressure from Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's concern over conservative resistance is also evident in the
defensive tone he has adopted on the subject of economic reform. Speaking in_
Kiev in June, he reiterated his interest in expanding use of economic levers,
but hastened to offer assurances that the market would not come to dominate
the economy: not the market, not the elemental forces of competition," he
said, " but primarily the plan should determine the fundamental development of
the national economy." The following day ideology secretary Yegor Ligachev
spoke in similar terms, stating that economic reforms under consideration
would not lead to a market economy, but would make use of coam odity-money
relations in accordance with socialist principles.
There have been signs that Gorbachev may be putting the expansion of the
private sector on the back burner as well. Although he has had several
opportunities, he has not addressed the subject since May. In recent meetings
with Westerners, officials who have been sympathetic to an expansion of the
private sector have not been encouraging about its immediate prospects.
In an August conversation with our Embassy, the head of Moscow's
leading agricultural institute and a protege of Gorbachev gave a
positive assessment of the role of private agriculture in the
economy, but indicated there was little room for its further
expansion.
Oleg Bogomolov, head of the leading Soviet institute on East Europe,
told a U.S. Congressman in late August that an expansion of the
private sector involves a "risk" to the socialist s stem and instead
promoted agricultural reforms at the kolkhoz level.
At the same time, Gorbachev continues to hint that major initiatives are
forthcoming in other areas, particularly ministerial reform, and it may be
that he has decided to focus his efforts rather than pressing simultaneously
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on all fronts. He may plan to postpone more controversial steps until after
the party congress.
-- Soviet officials have recently begun telling Westerners that major
economic reforms are still several years off.
-- At about the same time a knowledgeable Soviet official told our
Embassy that no long-range game plan for economic fo had
drawn up, but work is underway on such a program
Gorbachev's Prospects
At this point In his tenure Gorbachev has had more success in
consolidating power than any of his predecessors at a similar stage. While
resistance to Gorbachev may prompt him to scale back the pace of economic
reform and cadre renewal, he is unlikely to abandon his agenda. The forces
for change are Gorbachev's main base of support and he can ill afford to
alienate them. There is nd need for him to press for closure on major changes
until he has had a chance to guage the impact of cadre renewal and the
The opposition to Gorbachev appears to be disorganized and put off
balance by his fast start in building his political machine, evidence of
popular support for his approach, and the removal of Grigoriy Romanov and
Nikolay Tikhonov. In addition, the conservatives appear to be largely
negative in their criticism and do not appear to be offering any alternative
solutions to what are widely recognized problems that must be addressed. As a
result they do not pose a short-term political threat to Gorbachev, although
they could cause him long-term political problems if he cannot fulfill the
expectations he is creating.
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On many big questions Gorbachev is getting his way. He has moved
agressively on top-level personnel appointments and the five year plan. If he
can continue to reshape the leadership in the months ahead, fewer compromises
will be necessary after the congress, when a new Central Committee should be
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Political Indicators
Signs that conservatives are continuing to restrain Gorbachev would
include:
-- Continued tenure of Moscow party boss Grishin or Kazakh party leader
Kunayev beyond the party congress.
- The advancement of conservative spokesmen Kosolapov or Rakhmanin.
-- A continued slump in pace of regional personnel changes.
-- Failure of the new party statutes to give the leadership additional
means of encouraging turnover in key party posts.
Indicators that Gorbachev is making headway in implementing his program
would include
:
Promotions for Oleg Bogomolov, who heads leading Soviet research
institute on East Europe, or reform economist Abel Aganbegyan.
Stress on importance of 'cameodity-money relations` and other symbols
of economic reform in new party program.
A major ministerial reorganization.
Removal of KONMUNIST editor Kosolapov or first deputy head of the
bloc relations department Rakhmanin.
Removal of Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy from the leadership or
the purge of some of his proteges in the republic.
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12.
13.
14,
15 Col Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member NSC
Rm 373, EOB
16 Don Graves
INt/SEE/ST
Department of State
Rm 4844
17. John Danylyk
Chief INR/EC/USSR
Department of State
Rm 8662 New State
18. Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of Under Secretary
of State
Rm 7240 New State
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/21 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000508020001-1