AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPOT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 27, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 18, 1985
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP85T01058R000406500001-1.pdf | 442.06 KB |
Body:
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Directorate of / ~~ Top Secret
Intelligence (~
Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
SOVIETS TAILOR SPETSNAZ UNITS FOR AFGHANISTAN
Soviet special-purpose forces (Spetsnaz) in
Afghanistan are trained for, and perform,
different tasks than other Spetsnaz units
AFGHANISTAN IN MAY
The Soviets launched their spring offensive in May.
The laraest operation occurred in the Konar Valley
Soviet and Afghan troops,
supported by large numbers of aircraft, relieved the
besei ged Afghan garrison at Bari kowt (in early June)
and disrupted insurgent resupply efforts.
25X1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues 25X1
raised in the publication should be directed to
18 June 1985
NESA M 85-10130JX
SOVA M 85-10113JX
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25X1
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SOVIETS TAILOR SPETSNAZ UNITS FOR AFGHANISTAN
Soviet special-purpose forces (Spetsnaz) in Afghanistan
perform different tasks than other Spetsnaz units.
Instead of concentrating on reconnaissance and sabotage
behind enemy lines--classic Spetsnaz missions--Spetsnaz
units in Afghanistan are used primarily as elite ground
unit combat troops.
in Afghanistan Spetsnaz are used to interdict
insurgent supply lines and support sweep operations
conducted by regular ground troops and also conduct
typical Spetsnaz missions such as extended patrols and
ambushes.
25X1
Comment: The Soviets clearly have found that the
Afghan conflict requires both Spetsnaz and traditional
ground combat skills. We believe the Soviets are man-
ning the battalions in Afghanistan with conscripts
specially trained for Afghan missions and that these
troops may lack some capabilities, such as intelligence
collection and sabotage, characteristic of Spetsnaz
troops opposite NATO.
25X1
18 June 1985
NESA M 85-1O130JX
SOYA M 85-10113JX
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Boundary representation:ia r d
not necesearity authoritative.}
Railroad
Road
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2 SOYA M 85-1011'3JX
-'- Province boundary
* National capital
Province capital
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- The Afghan Government plans to merge Bakhtar
Airlines--the Afghan domestic airline--and Ariana
Airlines--the international carrier--later this
month
operations.
The Afghan Government hopes both to
improve t e efficiency of the domestic airline--
which reportedly lost almost $200,000 last year--
and increase government control over commercial air
25X1
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Pravda' s Kabul correspondent
had seen security improve inithe capital
but elsewhere during the last two and one-half
years. Travel outside Kabul was tense and required
elaborate and burdensome logistical and security
preparations, he said.
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PERSPECTIVE
by NESA
AFGHANISTAN IN MAY
The Soviets launched their spring offensive in May with
simultaneous operations in the Konar River Valley near
the Pakistani border; in Ghazni, Lowgar,.? and Paktia
Provinces also in the east; and in several locations in
the south, west, and north as well. The Konar campaign
probably involved the largest number of heliborne
troops and aircraft of any Soviet operation to date and
succeeded, in early June, in opening a supply road to
the Afghan Army garrison at Barikowt, which had been
besieged by insurgents during the past year. The
operation also probably disrupted insurgent resupply
efforts temporarily. It resulted in relatively high
casualties for both sides. The Konar area's rough 25X1
terrain and its proximity to Pakistan provide advan-
tages for the insurgents, however, and should enal
them to resume their activities in the near term.
25X1
The Konar Valley Campaign
The Konar operation was the largest ground operation
since the April 1984 Panjsher campaign.
Soviet and Afghan
troops--most of them Soviet--supported by
tanks, artiller
multiple rocket launchers too part.
nearly all Soviet aircra in
Afghanistan were involved.
the Soviets
reached Asmar by the end of May and that units con
ducted a major sweep in the adjacent Pich. River Valley,
which insurgents use as a supply route to the Panjsher
Valley.
25X1
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25X1
mo st of an
estimated 5,000 to 8,000 insurgents in the valley
initially withdrew from the valley to avoid the
intensive aerial bombardment. They subsequently
returned to ambush convoys, raid small outposts, and
fire rockets and mortars at the larger garrisons.
Konar insurgents are
better armed than any other insurgent arouns because of
their proximity to Pakistan.
Soviet Operations in Other Areas
The Soviets mounted smaller operations elsewhere in
Afghanistan. Diplomatic sources indicate that the
Soviets cleared the Kabul-to-Gardeyz road and attacked
insurgent positions in Lowgar, Raktia, and Nangarhar
Provinces. We believe the Soviets are continuing to
emphasize operations in these provinces in order to
block the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistan.
The Soviets also expanded their presence in Ghazni City
and conducted several heliborne assaults among the
surrounding villages, according to diplomatic
motorized ri a division at Shindand was involved in
multibattalion operations in western Afghanistan from
early to mid-May and that Soviet ground forces were
active around Kholm in Samangan Province in northern
Afghanistan.
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Cross-Border Airstrikes
Afghanistan bombed Aran du on the Pakistani- border,
across from the Afghan Army garrison at Barikowt, three
times and that a fourth attack occurred near on the
border in Baluchistan.. None of these attacks caused,
casualties
Insurgent Initiatives
An airstrike deeper inside Pakistani territory on 31
May, however, caused the largest number of casualties
since January 1984. Eight aircraft killed 11 civilians
and wounded 30 others near Drosh approximately 14 miles
into Pakistani territor at the northern end of the 25X1
Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul report
that insurgents bombed Jalalabad airport in early May
as tribal leaders returned fr a meeting with regime
officials.
25X1
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NESA M.85-10130JX
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The insurgents were active in Herat and Qandahar.
insurgents set the
governor's house on tire and harassed the Soviet and
Afghan Army outposts that ring the city.
the insurgents harassed
Afghan Army outposts and stripped a tank given to them
by Afghan Army defectors.
Untested Embassy sources say that one helicopter
crashed near Feyzabad in Badakhshan, two others crashed
near Kabul, and a MIG-17 was downed in Nangarhar
Province. The sources do not know if these planes were
shot down or crashed because of malfunctions.
Outlook
We believe the Konar operation will disrupt temporarily
insurgent resupply efforts and force the guerrillas to
find alternative and perhaps less accessible infiltra-
tion routes. But the Soviets are likely to find long-
term success difficult to secure. Even if the Soviets
establish permanent garrisons between Asadabad and
Barikowt, however, they will be vulnerable to insurgent
harassment. The Konar's difficult terrain will also
make Soviet resupply difficult.
The next phase of the Soviets' campaign may be a summer
offensive against strategic areas in which the
resistance is strong, such as the Panjsher Valley and
Qandahar and Herat cities. Unless they add to their
forces, Soviet large-scale operations against these
areas would reduce significantly the forces available
to block insurgent infiltration routes in the border
areas.
18 June 1985
MESA M 85-10130JX
SOYA M 85-10113JX
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Top secret ;
Top Secret
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