SOVIET AIRSTRIKES IN PAKISTAN: OPTIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406240001-0
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 April 1985
Soviet Airstrikes in Pakistan.: Options and Effectiveness
Summary
The Soviets have the capability to increase their air
attacks against Afghan resistance targets in Pakistan. We
believe that intensified airstrikes against insurgent supply
lines across the border or air attacks on guerrilla training
camps and arms depots in the border area would have only a
limited impact on the war in Afghanistan. The destruction
of small arms depots close to the border probably would
result in regional disruptions in supplies for some
insurgent groups in Af ahanistan. but the effect would be
only temporary.
We do not believe Pakistan would be intimidated by
stepped up cross-border airstrikes against resistance
targets so long as it was confident of US support. We do
not expect the Soviets to attack Pakistani military targets
because of the risk of a US response, nor do we believe they
would bomb the refugee camps because of the likely
international outcry.
This memorandum was prepared by the
Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Brancn, outh Asia Division$
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Information as
of 26 April 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, South Asia
Division,
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Background
Soviet military pressure on Pakistan increased significantly following
Moscow's warning to Islamabad last summer to end its support for the Afghan
resistance. Since July 1984 nearly 60 Soviet or
Afghan airstrikes into Pakistani territory--about half of them since January--
as well as a similar number of airspace violations that did not involve
bombing or rocket attacks. The airstrikes have been confined to Pakistan's
border regions, typically our to six aircraft, and have lasted
less than 15 minutes.
We believe nearly all of the air attacks were directly related to Soviet
and Afghan Army attempts to relieve resistance pressure on Afghan border
outposts or to interdict insurgent supply lines across the border. Most of
the reported incidents were around the Pakistani border towns of Arandu, where
the Konar River flows into Afghanistan, and Teri Mangal, in the Parachinar
area. Both towns are opposite Afghan Army border outposts that have long been
besieged by the insurgents and are astride major insurgent infiltration routes
into Afghanistan.
The Soviets probably also hoped to press Islamabad to reduce its support
for the Afghan guerrillas. Pakistan, however, is unlikely to reverse its
Afghanistan policy because of increased Soviet cross-border airstrikes unless
Islamabad believed US support was weakening or the Zia regime was replaced by
a government less sympathetic to the Afghan resistance more willina to
reach a political accommodation with Moscow and Kabul. and
Soviet Capabilities for Increased Cross-Border Airstrikes
The Soviets have the capability to escalate cross-border airstrikes
without strengthening their air forces in Afghanistan. Soviet air forces in
Afghanistan include some 25 SU-25 attack planes, 45 SU-17 fighter-bombers, and
45 MIG-23 fighters. In addition, the Afghan Air Force has some 30 SU-17/22
fighter-bombers and 40 MIG-21 fighters at airbases in eastern and southern
Afghanistan.
Besides intensifying their attacks on guerrilla supply lines across the
border, the Soviets might choose to target insurgent arms depots and training
camps inside Pakistan. They would be less likely to systematically bomb
Afghan refugee camps or Pakistani military targets because of the likely
international outrage and greater risk of a major military confrontation with
Pakistan that could involve the United States. We believe that frequent
Soviet reconnaissance flights along the border have helped the Soviets to
locate insurgent kistan, as well as to monitor Pakistani
forces. 25X1
Prospects for Success
We believe that an escalation of Soviet airstrikes against insurgent
bases and logistics in Pakistan would have little impact on the war in
Afghanistan. The potential targets in Pakistan are small and dispersed and,
in many cases, cannot be distinguished from Pakistani villages or paramilitary
and Army facilities. Air attacks might force the insurgents to use
alternative, less desirable supply routes into Afghanistan and to relocate
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training camps and arms depots in Pakistan. but they could sustain the
resistance with only minor disruptions.
Airstrikes against insurgent arms depots in Pakistan would result in only
temporary regional disruptions in supplies for guerrillas in Afghanistan.
Arms depots for individual insurgent groups that are close to the border are
used principally for the transit of arms into Afghanistan, and their
destruction would not result in appreciable losses of weapons and ammunition
because large supplies are not kept there. Centralized storage depots for the
Afghan resistance--where the bulk of insurgent arms and ammunition are
stockpiled--are much farther from the border, and the Soviets would have to
consider the risk of a Pakistani or US response to an attack.
Pakistani Capabilities
Pakistan has a limited capability to defend against Soviet or Afghan air
incursions in the border area:
-- The Pakistanis have,poor radar coverage of the border, and their air
defense system is poorly integrated, making it difficult for the Air
Force to intercept attacking aircraft.
-- The Pakistan Air Force has only some 65 obsolescent Chinese fighters
based opposite Afghanistan.
-- Pakistan's F-16s are based closer to the border with India and cannot
respond quickly from there to air incursions along the border with
Afghanistan.
-- Pakistani ground forces in the area are not equipped with modern
antiaircraft weapons.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Airstrikes in Pakistan: Options and Effectiveness
NESA M 85-10087
Distribution:
External
1 - The Honorable Richard Murphy (State)
1 - Mr. Robert Peck (State)
1 - Mr. Herbert Hagerty (State)
1 - General John T. Chain (State)
1 - Mr. Philip S. Kaplan (State)
1 - Mr. Peter A. Burlei h (State)
1 - Dr. Leo Rose (State))
1 - Mr. Robert M. Kimmett (NSC)
1 - Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter (NSC)
1 - Ambassador Jack Matlock (NSC)
1 - Mr. Jock Covey (NSC)
1 - Mr. Stephen Rosen (NSC)
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage (DOD)
1 - Mr. Darnell Whitt (DOD)
1 - Mr. Elie Krakowsky (DOD)
1 - Mr. Ron Zwart (DOD)
1 - Lt. Col. David L. Fuller (DOD)
1 - Col. John Yates (DOD)
1-
(DIAL
1 - DIA)
1 (DIA)
4
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406240001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406240001-0
SUBJECT: Soviet Airstrikes in Pakistan: Options and Effectiveness
NESA M 85-10087
Distribution:
Internal
Orig - C/SO/P
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI
1 - ED/DCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NESA/SO/P
1 - NESA/SO/P/Typescript
DDI/NESA/SO/P/
(26 April 1985)
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