AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Afghanistan Situation Report
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
Despite disruptions and high costs caused by the
war, businessmen involved in foreign trade make
profits because of Soviet and regime tolerance for
business that brings in hard currency.
AFGHANISTAN: NEW EMPHASIS ON OLD MILITARY PROBLEMS
Recent articles in the Soviet Military Herald by
senior officers who have been closely associated
with the Afghan war illuminate Soviet perceptions
for improving troop effectiveness--both in
Afghanistan and forcewide--by addressing the
important topics of troop management, tactical
intelligence and aaaressive approaches to combat
operations. 7 j
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TURKMEY/S.S.R.
unuuuiaiinn a 1.
ALKH
',JOWZJAN kharlt
BALUCHISTAN
Afghanistan
International boundary
-?- Internal administrative boundary
* National capital
O Internal administrative capital
Railroad
Road
UZBEK S SR.;r
~ Kattekurpan~-~
?Asadbiid
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AN AFGHAN BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW OF THE WAR
An Afghan owner of a raisin processing plant in Kabul
recently told a US Embassy official how difficult it
was becoming to run his business. Loss of manpower and
insecure transportation have cut production and
required the businessman to buy his grapes from farms
near(Kabul at about six times the pre-war price. The
source said, however, that the business remains
extremely profitable.
Comment: We believe the Soviets allow, and possibly
encourage, some private entrepreneurs to continue their
operations because of the hard currency they bring into
the country. According to government statistics, dried
fruits are the second largest export, and one of the
largest sources of foreign exchange.
Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul report that on
30 March insurgents attacked a large convoy near
the Salang Tunnel and destroyed 33.vehicles. The
Soviets lost more than 60 vehicles and suffered 40
casualties in an attack along the same stretch of
highway the previous week.
The Chinese will provide paramilitary and f1e.ld._
emergency training in China to..approx-imately 50
Afghan insurgent commanders from the Jami-at-i
Islami and Hizbi Islami - Gulbuddin groups-
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Saudi Arabia awarded Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, leader of
the Afghan Resistance Fundamentalist Alliance, the
King Faisal International Award for Service to
Islam on 2 April. Sayyaf'.s selection constitutes
an endorsement of the Saudi's preferred mujahedin
leader and reaffirms their su ort for the Afghan
freedom fighters. E 7
The Pakistani foreign ministry told US officials
on 3 April that no airstrikes from Afghanistan on
Pakistani territory have taken place since 19
March. Two overflights were observed,.according
to the ministry.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: NEW EMPHASIS ON OLD MILITARY PROBLEMS
Recent articles in Military Herald--professional
journal of Soviet Ground Forces--provide insight into
problems the Soviets are experiencing and lessons they
are learning in Afghanistan. In particular, several
articles by senior officers who have been closely
associated with the Afghan war illuminate Soviet
perceptions on the important topics of troop .
management, tactical intelligence, and an aggres.s-ive
approach to combat operations. These issues have
relevance to Soviet forces as a whole, but are
particularly acute in Afghanistan where shortcomings
are less easily concealed and have more serious
consequences. Among the solutions the senior officers
propose are closer ties between officers and their men,
more reconnaissance at the battalion level and below,
and more aggressiveness on the part of unit
commanders.
Background
Over the past several years, articles on combat
operations in mountainous regions have appeared more
frequently in Military Herald, with many specifically
referring to problems experienced and lessons learned
during "training" in Afghanistan. Most of the articles
that refer specifically to Soviet forces in Afghanistan
have dealt with Soviet airborne troops, but other
articles also appear to draw on Soviet experience
gained in the war.
Problems of Troop Management*
the Soviet military press--
have noted problems in troop management in Afghanistan
which are also typical of those experienced by Soviet
units elsewhere: dereliction of duty and lack of
*Troop management encompasses all activities of commanders and
staffs directed toward the accomplishment of a unit's mission
both in combat and in the development and maintenance of training
standards, readiness, discipline, and morale.
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professional competence by officers; black marketeering
by officers and soldiers; poor and sometimes brutal
relationships between officers and soldiers, between
sergeants and soldiers, and between senior and junior
enlisted men; alcoholism in all ranks; and ethnic
tensions.
Soviet efforts to solve such problems concentrate. on
the officer corps, both because the commander is held
accountable for the actions of his subordinates and
because, to a considerable extent, the officer corps is
a major part of the problem. The Soviets emphasize the
importance of individual work by commanders with 25X1
subordinates.
An article by Army General D. Sukhorukhov, Commanding
General of the Airborne Forces (VDV), in the October
1984 issue of Military Herald emphasized the need for
commanders to "mix" with t eir troops--in the field and
in garrison-.-in order to develop personal
relationships. The article, directed specifically at
junior officers, cites three VDV officers who served
with distinction in Afghanistan and who had excellent
relations with their troops. Successful leadership
principles which Sukhorukhov recommends to others
include leading by example; paying attention to'
strengths, weaknesses, problems, personal background,
and interests of each soldier; and supporting
subordinates and considering their suggestions.
Sukhorukhov's views reflect longstanding
"prescriptions," but his emphasis on Afghansitan is
significant. Reality--both in Afghanistan and
elsewhere--indicates that not all VDV officers (let
al-one all Soviet army officers) measure up to
Sukhorukhov's precepts. Combat experience in
Afghanistan probably has highlighted-weaknesses in
Soviet junior and mid-level leadership and given
impetus to efforts to improve the Soviet officer corps
forcewide.
Problems in,Tactical Intelligence
One of the most serious and persistent problems for the
Soviets in Afghanistan has been tactical
intelligence. They repeatedly have been frustrated in
attempts to locate elusive insurgent forces in a
sufficiently accurate and timely manner to engage the
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Articles in the October and December 1984 issues of
Military Herald by Colonel General F. Gredasov and Army
General A. Majorov addressed tactical intelligence from
the perspective of their considerable experience in
Afghanistan. Gredasov, associated with the
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Ground Forces,
was a frequent visitor to Afghanistan in the entourage
of then-First Deputy Minister of Defense Sokolov during
the 1979 to 1984 period when Sokolov oversaw the
direction of the war. General Majorov, the First
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces,
formerly was Chief of the Soviet Military Assistance
Group in Kabul.
Gredasov's article deals with the necessity for units
at battalion level and below to conduct reconnaissance
effectively. He emphasizes the commander's (and
staff's) responsibility to organize reconnaissance
using all resources available. Specific suggestions
include:" establishing specific tasks for
reconnaissance as far in advance as possible;
conducting reconnaissance by foot patrols in
mountainous regions in advance of units in vehicles;
and maintaining constant communication with
reconnaissance elements.
General Majorov touches on some of the same themes in
his article discussing factors which contribute to
combat effectiveness. Majorov, citing Gredasov's
article, notes.that reconnaissance is the most complex
and most important type of combat support. Majorov
charges, howev-er, that many Soviet battalion commanders
tend to rely too heavily on intelligence support from
other units rather than fully utilizing organic
reconnaissance assets. Majorov criticizes commanders
who complain of inadequate resources to conduct
effective reconnaissance, and says that battalions
should be able to accomplish their intelligence
missions if commanders use their assets wisely.
Inefficiencies of current Soviet tactical intelligence
operations in Afghanistan may reinforce calls
throughout the Soviet military for improved
reconnaissance and provide some valuable--though
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painful--lessons on how to do so. Soviet commanders
probably recognize that tactical intelligence must be
improved to cope with targeting problems in a more
conventional war as well as in Afghanistan. Majorov
specifically notes, for example, that developments in
foreign armies, such as the use of precision-guided
munitions and advanced fire-control and target
acquisition systems,, will demand more effective
reconnaissance on the part of Soviet forces.
Aggressiveness in Combat
The ultimate measure of effectiveness of a military
unit, its ability to close with and defeat an opposing
force, depends to a considerable extent on the unit's
aggressiveness and ability to react in a quickly
changing combat situation. Aggressiveness and quick
reaction, in turn, are largely functions of commander
initiative and decisiveness at critical junctures in.
The Soviet.combat record in Afghanistan to date has
been mixed. A recurring comment on Soviet forces in
Afghanistan--both by the insurgents as well as by
senior Soviet officers--has'.been the lack of.
aggressiveness by Soviet units in combat.
Lieutenant General V. Kostylev, the First Deputy
Commander in Chief of the VDV, in a January 1985
Military Herald article, addresses the importance of
combat activeness, decisiveness, and initiative on the
part of units and commanders. His article is based, at
least in part, on his experiences in Afghanistan in
Kostylev sees the goal of officer training to be the
development of tactical maturity--a maturity that will
enable commanders at a given moment to cast aside a
previous plan to deal with a new situation.
Commanders, he argues, must at all times be unafraid to
take calculated risks to conduct aggressive combat
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operations Kostylev notes the achievements of some
VDV units and commanders in Afghanistan and elsewhere,
but also admits that not all commanders and units
measure up.
Displ.:ay of initiative and aggressiveness by commanders
in Afghanistan may be hindered by two factors. First,
the Soviets have pursued an economy of-force approach.
to the war to keep down personnel and material costs..
Commanders may, therefore, be more concerned with
limiting losses than with inflicting maximum casualties
on the insurgents. Second, the high-level direction of
the war--evident, for example, in repeated and
prolonged'v-isits to Afghanistan by senior Soviet
military officers--would suggest that commanders' at all
levels' probably perceive themselves to be-on a "tight =
rein."
Implications
The war in Afghanistan has highlighted longstanding
problems and weaknesses in the Soviet military..' Most
of the problems are not unique -to Soviet units in
Afghanista-n, to guerrilla war., or to wars in general,
but the Afghan combat situation increases the penalties
for failure. By exposing these deficiencies, the
Soviet experience in Afghanistan will more clearly
focus the attention of -military leaders on the need for
corrective action -in the short term--to improve force
effectiveness in Afghanistan--and in the long term--to
improve forcewide preparations for all types of
combat.
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