AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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~sf^ff - Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
79-81 INC/w8
607
Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
RESUPPLYING THE INSURGENTS
Insurgent supplies are increasing and the
Pakistani Government probably is distributing
goods directly to some commanders.
NARCOTICS ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghan and Soviet officials are doing little to
halt the opium trade and may be promoting drug
production, trafficking, and use.
THE IRANIAN-AFGHAN BORDER: A HISTORY OF DISPUTES
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian
Revolution during 1979 added a new dimension to
the historically troublesome Iranian-Afghan border
area. Ongoing quarrels over water rights are now
complicated by Afghan insurgents operating along
the border, Afghan refugees. in Iran, and insurgent
supply routes from Iran.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
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RESUPPLYING THE INSURGENTSI 25X1
"Arabs" and distributed by the Pakistani Government.
increased. He claims that the aid is provided by
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Peshawar-based leader of the
Jamiat-i-Islami insurgent organization, claimed in
early March that his supplies of military and support
equipment--including boots and clothing--have recently
infiltration.
Improvement in the insurgents' military supplies and
training probably will enable the guerrillas to
intensify attacks against Soviet and regime targets
this spring. Direct supply of selected insurgent
groups by the Pakistani Government will assuage the
feelings of some resistance commanders who have become
irritated with delays experienced in dealing through
Peshawar resistance organizations. The insurgents,
however, probably will find resupplying their forces in
Afghanistan more difficult this spring as the Soviets
increase their efforts to stop insurgent
Afghan and Soviet officials continue to make little
effort to halt the opium trade and may even be
promoting drug production, trafficking, and use,
despite Moscow's expressed concern over drug use and
trafficking by Soviet conscripts. Although there have
been sporadic Afghan regime attempts to organize
enforcement efforts--a year ago rumors circulated in
Kabul that the Government was offering opium growers 10
percent more than the market price
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Comment: Given the regime's lack of control in the
countryside and preoccupation with fighting the
mujahedin, Afghan and Soviet officials are unlikely to
move against opium cultivation and traffick ing in a
serious way any time soon.
Kabul radio announced on 31 March that insurgents
had killed former Andarab Valley guerrilla
commander Juma Khan. A one-time member of Hizbi
Islami--Gulbuddin faction, Juma Khan defected with
his band to the government in fall 1984 and was
instrumental in blocking Panjsher Valley
insurgents' supply lines and access to their rear
base at Khost-e Fereng.
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian
Revolution during 1979 added a new dimension to the
problems in the historically troublesome Iranian-Afghan
border area. More than 300,000 Afghan refugees, many
of them ethnically similar to peoples living in the
Iranian border area, probably have fled to Iran. Some
reportedly return to Afghanistan periodically to
fight--or farm. Afghan resistance groups are active in
western Afghanistan, with some using Iran as a
sanctuary, and some maintaining offices in Iran.
Supply routes for groups fighting in western
Afghanistan traverse Iran. Insurgent caravans most
frequently cross the border in the south in the Sistan
Basin area or in the north, to the west of Herat
City.
Border Basics
The 900-kilometer-long Iranian-Afghan border, extending
roughly along a north-south axis between the Soviet
Union and Pakistan, is easily crossed. Border terrain
varies from relatively low hills and mountains to huge
salt flats, brackish lakes and marshes, and sandy or
rocky plains. No dominant physical feature marks the
border area; the boundary is defined by small streams,
minor water divides, and ridges interspersed with
straight-line segments. Access to water, the primary
cause of past disputes, was a key factor used to
determine the boundary alignment. The border area is
sparsely populated by Persians, Pushtuns, Tajiks,
Baluchis, and smaller ethnic groups.
Establishing the Border
The Iranian-Afghan border was the subject of
deliberations by four arbitration commissions between
1872 and 1935, with the southern section of the
boundary the first to be addressed. Both Persian and
Afghan groups pressed claims for use of the Helmand
River waters that empty into a large basin of semi-
permanent lakes and marshes. Disputes over the
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territory served by the waters where grazing and
agriculture flourished eventually led to a request for
arbitration. In 1872, British Major General Goldsmid
headed a commission that divided the basin, known in
Iran as the Sistan. The commission award allocated
access to irrigation points and canals and included a
key provision that neither side should construct
"works" to interfere with the other's water supplies.
The commission, however, did not survey and neither
delimited nor demarcated the border between the
countries. Both sides were displeased with the award,
but the British forced them to accept it.
A short stretch of the northern section of the boundary
was settled by terms of an award in 1890 drawn by
another British officer, Major General MacLean. Both
Iran and Afghanistan claimed a small basin that had
once been cultivated but had been abandoned. A
compromise solution was accepted by both sides and a
detailed description of the placement of 39 boundary
markers was made. The remainder of the northern
section of the boundary follows the Hari Rud, a major
Afahan river that flows north into the Soviet Union.
The dispute over water use in the southern section of
the boundary arose again in the early 1900s because of
a change in a channel of the Helmand River's delta and
a severe drought. The British responded to a call for
arbitration in 1902 by sending a large commission
headed by Colonel McMahon. The commission was
instructed to follow the earlier rulings of the
Goldsmid commission with McMahon to interpret the
language of the agreement compared to more recent,
detailed topographic maps of the area. Boundary
markers were then described in text and placed in the
ground. The award also clarified and refined language
used to define the amount of water to be made legally
available to Iran.
The central section of the boundary was defined in 1935
after a minor dispute had arisen over an area adjoining
a section of boundary demarcated earlier. A commission
headed by a Turkish officer, General Altai,. produced a
compromise calling for some 38 pillars to be erected to
demarcate the remaining 400 km of the border.
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Geographer, Department of State
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Construction
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IRAN-AFGHANISTAN
BOUNDARY.
Present boundary
? Selected boundary pillar
Other international boundary
0 25 50 - ' 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
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Recent Water Concerns
A bilateral water-sharing treaty, signed in 1973 and
ratified in 1977, was intended to end decades of
bickering. But in 1979 when the Afghans announced
development plans calling for a new dam 70 km upstream
from the border, the Iranians objected. Preliminary
work was halted in 1980 shortly after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
A resumption of construction would likely again cause
political reverberations in Iran because a completed
dam would significantly disrupt downstream hydrology.
Though water supplies guaranteed by the treaty signed
in 1977 would not be affected, the possibility of Iran
gaining additional water supplies would be
foreclosed.
2 April 1985
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