IRAN: STATUS OF OPPOSITION GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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60W
Central Intelligence Agency
1 April 1985
IRAN: STATUS OF OPPOSITION GROUPS
Summary
The Khomeini regime is facing its greatest challenges
since securing control of Iran. Factionalism within the
regime, dwindling oil income, and the recent military
setbacks are causing increased domestic unrest.
Nonetheless, organized opponents of the regime--both within
and outside Iran--appear to lack sufficient strength to
exploit the regime's problems. Opposition groups inside
Iran remain on the defensive because of harsh government
repression. Regime opponents in exile have little support
in Iran and continue to bicker among themselves. Rather
than opposition groups, we believe factions within the
regime have a better chance of gaining control and altering
Iranian policies. Iran's mounting economic problems and war
weariness, however, are creating conditions that could
permit a non-clerical coalition to coalesce and gain popular
support.
Long-running power struggles within the Khomeini regime are intensifying,
because the regime faces 25X1
serious problems with the economy and in the war with Iraq.
is paper was prepare byl (Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis, Persian Gulf Division. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
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Lower oil revenues and low foreign exchange reserves prevent the
government from relying on imports to maintain current consumption
levels and to provide materials for domestic industry.
Economic austerity is adding to domestic unrest and regime spokesmen
are urging the public to lower its expectations.
Iran's latest offensive was a dismal failure despite months of
preparation.
Iraq appears determined to maintain a heightened level of economic
military pressure on Iran to force it to the negotiating table. [
The regime's efforts to deal with these problems are being complicated by
factional infighting. Moderates believe that the best way to preserve an
Islamic regime in Iran is to adopt a less aggressive foreign policy and to
adjust domestic policies in an effort to deal with economic difficulties.
Radicals believe that any relaxation of revolutionary policies will lead Iran
back into subservience to the West--and also end their political careers.
Khomeini, whose support is still critical for any faction's success, recently
seems to have been tilting away from the radicals.
Groups opposed to the Khomeini regime--both inside Iran and abroad--have
been unable to exploit the government's problems, and we believe they are
unlikely to wield significant influence in Iran even after the Ayatollah dies.
-- No leader capable of challenging Khomeini's personal appeal or that of
the Islamic government he symbolizes has emerged within any opposition
group. The role of a strong personality to galvanize popular
opposition--as Khomeini did against the Shah--is considered crucial by
most experts on Iran.
-- Prominent exiles engage in endless bickering and posturing. Although
some maintain limited contacts inside Iran, there is little evidence
of popular support for any of them.
-- Opposition groups active within Iran are subject to repression and
continuous surveillance by the regime. These groups remain an
irritant rather than a significant threat.
Nonetheless, Iran's economic downturn and popular war weariness are
issues that eventually could unite disparate elements in the population
against clerical rule. War policy already is debated within the regime in
terms of how the day-to-day well-being of the regime's lower class supporters
will be affected. Iranian leaders also appear to recognize that economic
problems can cause a broad segment of the populace to turn against the
regime. The government has moved to placate conservative bazaaris and has
beaten and arrested dozens of striking workers in hopes of preventing a
unified opposition labor movement. Although there is little information about
the organization of strikes, one new group--the Solidarity Committee of
Iranian Workers, based in Esfahan where Communist influences have been strong
among workers--claims it coordinated strike actions in several cities late
last year, according to the exile press.
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Opposition Groups in Iran
There are several groups inside Iran in open opposition to the Khomeini
regime.. Although all cooperated in the anti-Shah movement and hoped to play
influential roles in the revolutionary government, they have been excluded by
the clerics and have turned against the regime. Recognizing that these groups
pose a threat, Tehran has brutally suppressed them.
Mujahedin-e Khalq. This Islamic-Marxist nationalist group assassinated
several US advisors in Iran during the revolution. Led by exiled Masud
Rajavi, it posed the most serious challenge to the Khomeini regime until it
was suppressed in 1981. Rajavi fled to France in 1981 and the status of
current Mujahedin leadership in Iran is unknown. The group had a committed
cadre of around 10,000 educated urban youths at its peak in early 1981 and had
penetrated the government and the Revolutionary Guard. It still claims to
have several thousand cadre, although we suspect this figure is exaggerated.
The Mujahedin-e Khalq has an active propaganda program outside Iran and
has been involved in the recent resurgence of scattered terrorist actions in
Iran and abroad. The group maintains an uneasy alliance through the National
Resistance Council with former President Bani-Sadr and the Kurdish Democratic
Party.
Paykar. This group is a leftist offshoot of the Mujahedin-e Khalq. It
has aways been small and its members are regular targets of regime
repression.
Tudeh Communist Party. The pro-Soviet Tudeh had about 5,000 members
before its leaders were arrested for treason and the party was repressed in
1983. Tudeh had cooperated with the Khomeini regime, but it also had
penetrated both the government and military. Some senior members associated
with the military were executed following the crackdown in 1983. Civilian
leaders have not yet been tried. An underground organization may still
function in Iran, but the new party leadership is in exile in Europe.
Fedayen-e Khalq. This small radical leftist group carries out scattered
terrorist activity in Iran and abroad. It split in 1979, one part merging
with the Tudeh Party and the other remaining active in northwestern Iran along
with dissident Kurds. It has been repressed by the Khomeini regime and its
leadership is unknown.
Kurdish Democratic Party. Abdol Rahman Qasemlu, its leader, claims that
the party has 10,000 members, but it probably has far fewer than that under
arms. Repeated regime offensives since 1979 have forced the Kurdish
guerrillas into the mountains, where they continue hit-and-run operations.
Iraq and European socialist groups provide some aid and the Party remains in
an uneasy alliance with the Mujahedin-e Khalq.
Solidarity Committee of Iranian Workers. According to the Iranian exile
press, this group emerge in late 1984 during a period of apparently
coordinated strikes in major urban centers. The exile press claims the group
is modeled on the Polish Solidarity Union. No details are available on its
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leadership, but it may be the nucleus of a coordinated labor movement. If it
exists, this would be the first internal group to challenge the regime since
the suppression of the Mujahedin-e Khalq and it could attract popular support
because of economic austerity and war weariness.
The Opposition Outside Iran
Iranian exiles have been unable either to unite or to maintain strong
links into Iran. Bickering among the groups and competition for resources
have diverted their energies. Exiled oppositionists and their supporters can
be divided into two groups--those who were part of the revolutionary
coalition, but later ran afoul of the Khomeini regime, and those who opposed
the revolution. Prominent among the former are:
-- Former Defense Minister Admiral Ahmad Madani, 56 years old. Madani
fled Iran in 1980 after antagonizing pro-Khomeini radicals. He seems
to retain a positive reputation in Iran, but has only limited
influence among some moderate clerics and laymen as well as among some
military elements. Madani may be the only exile leader with
sufficient support to have a chance of returning to an official
position in an Islamic post-Khomeini regime.
-- Former President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, 52 years old. He fled Iran
with Mujahedin-e Khalq leader RaTjavirin 1981 and retains none of the
popularity he enjoyed when Khomeini seemed to endorse him. A Paris-
educated radical economist, he has no personal appeal to Islamic
radicals or moderates.
-- Muhajedin-e Khalq leader Masud Rajavi, in his late 30s. He was a
charismatic leader of the Mujahedine Khalq, but lost much of his
credibility when he fled Iran in 1981, leaving behind his militant
wife who was subsequently killed by regime security forces. He
remains an articulate spokesman for the Mujahedin's Islamic-Marxist
doctrine which appeals to educated urban youths, but is suspect among
older, less upwardly-mobile Iranians.
-- Tudeh remnants scattered throughout Europe, the USSR, and Afghanistan
after the government cracked down on the Party in 1983. Considered an
appendage of the USSR, its leaders have little personal following in
Iran.
Exiled leaders who opposed the Islamic Revolution from the start have
little support inside Iran.
-- Former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar, in his early 70s, probably
retains a weak following among the Westernized urban population
remaining in Iran, perhaps including some older military men. He may
also be able to run limited anti-Khomeini operations inside Iran. He
has no Islamic appeal, however, and cultivates an image more French
than Iranian--a professional exile par excellence.
-- Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah's 24-year-old elder son, benefits from a
nostalgic popular hindsight triggered by the current hardships in
Iran. Although some elements of the population taunt regime members
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by shouting pro-Pahlavi slogans during demonstrations, the royal
family retains little support in Iran. Royalists may, however, be
able to stage limited operations inside Iran. The "young Shah" has no
well-defined political personality or program, although he recently
named a committee to consider forming a government-in-exile.
Opposition Factions Within the Regime and Other Interest Groups
The following groups accept, in varying degrees, the principal of
clerical influence in the government. They disagree, however, with some
aspects of the current regime and are attempting to reshape clerical rule. We
believe these groups will play key roles in the struggle for control after
Khomeini and are attempting to exploit current difficulties for their own
advantage. (A list of key regime members and their affiliations is attached
to this memorandum.)
Moderates within the Regime. These clerics, laymen, bazaaris, and
government technocrats belie ve t at Iran's interests--and their own--lie in
reducing clerical involvement in government. They would like to scrap radical
proposals for central control of economic activity, land reform, prolonging
the war with Iraq, and limiting foreign contacts to other revolutionary
regimes. We believe the moderates probably are strong enough in the newly
elected Consultative Assembly to sidetrack radical programs. Moreover, they
recently have been strengthened by support from Khomeini in his statements on
domestic legislation and foreign policy.
Conservatives Outside the Regime. This faction is dominated by elderly
senior Shia clerics who are strongly opposed to close identification of the
clergy with the government. They would like to reduce the day-to-day
political role of clerics and rescind radical foreign and domestic policies.
Of the four senior clerics who have most strongly criticized the regime, two
recently died. Two other senior clerics sometimes cooperate with Tehran
because they hope--along with their moderate allies--to affect the succession
to Khomeini.
Military. The regime has repeatedly uncovered coup plots and purged the
armed f rces, but still suspects their loyalty. The ubiquity of clerical
advisors and informers reduces the possibility of effective independent
political activity by the military or action on behalf of an exile leader.
Moderate and conservative clerics have cultivated contacts within the regular
and paramilitary forces and would attempt to use these links to gain military
support if the power struggle among regime factions becomes violent.
Revolutionary Guard Officers and Radical Lay Technocrats. Both groups
play an important role in the Khomeini regime. Regime concern about the
influence of the Guard is reflected in Khomeini's admonitions that it stay out
of politics. Despite these warnings, factions within the regime have sought
support among Revolutionary Guard units in anticipation of future strife.
Many Guard officers and radical lay technocrats are opportunists who are not
deeply Islamic and probably resent the prominence of the clerics. These
elements probably hope eventually to oust the clerics in favor of a government
dominated by "progressive" lay groups.
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The Guard--never a cohesive organization--presently appears to be even
less unified than in the past. Experienced Guard officers are disillusioned
and the Guard is losing men at all
levels. These trends probably will be strengthened by Iran's latest defeat.
Nearly all the forces committed to the attack were Revolutionary Guards and we
believe they comprised over 90 percent of the casualties. There is an
alternative, although less likely, possibility that the recent losses and
other government actions limiting Guard prerogatives could spur Guard unity
against a "common" enemy--the clerical regime. If elements of the Guard
unite, they would become a key player in the Iranian power struggle. Should
the Guard help overthrow clerical rule, it would be unlikely to support
moderate policies that would be more favorable to US interests.
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Personalities in the Khomeini Regime
Prominent Leaders Not Tied to Any Faction
These individuals are sometimes referred to as the pragmatists because
they align with various factions depending on the issue and their own
political stakes.
-- Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent, is a senior cleric in
his 60s who has increasingly taken on duties delegated by Khomeini.
Labelled.a radical in the early years of the regime, he has more
recently become a leading spokesman for more moderate policies.
-- Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, a junior cleric in his 40s, is a skilled
politician, second only to Khomeini in power. A firm believer in
tight clerical control, he has been associated with both radicals and
moderates. He is probably more willing than Montazeri or President
Khameini to deal with the USSR.
-- President Khamenei, a junior cleric in his 40s, is less politically
adept than Rafsanjani, but is known as an excellent speaker. He also
has been associated with both radicals and moderates. Khameini
opposes Montazeri as Khomeini's sole heir. He probably will run for
re-election this fall.
Moderates
We believe the following Iranian leaders are moderates who generally
favor more normal ties with the West.
-- Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, a senior cleric in his 50s, has longstanding
ties to Khomeini. Re --leads an important moderate clerical association
based in Tehran and has strong links to the Revolutionary Guard. He
may be a candidate in the presidential election this fall.
-- Majles Deputy Speakers Yazdi and Rabani-Amlashi are mid-level clerics
in their late 40s or early 50s. They have spo en out strongly against
radical proposals for extensive clerical involvement in government,
far-reaching economic and social changes, and an intransigent foreign
policy. Instead, they favor a government focused on the Assembly and
led by capable laymen under general clerical guidance.
-- Foreign Minister Velayati, a Western trained physician in his 40s, is
typical of the technocrats who are working to create a less radical
Islamic regime. He probably hopes to become Prime Minister.
Conservative Clerics
-- Grand Ayatollahs Marashi-Najafi, Golpayegani, Shariat-Madari, and
abatabai-Qomi, top level clerics in their 80s and 90s, are
theoretically Khomeini's spiritual peers. All have used their wide
popular influence to encourage opposition to many of the regime's
radical programs. Shariat-Madari and Qomi are under house arrest.
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I I
(Two other Grand Ayatollahs opposed to the Khomeini regime have died
of natural causes since last fall.) 25X1
Radicals
The following prominent radicals are typical of those who are not pro-
Soviet, but whom we believe are willing to cooperate with the USSR, especially
if they felt Iran was under increased threat from the US.
-- Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Sheikholeslam, a layman
in his 30s, was a leader of t e hostage-takers at the US Embassy. He
is a strong advocate of radical foreign policy positions and has been
closely linked to terrorist activities.
-- Revolutionary Guard Commander Rezai and Guard Minister Rafiqdust,
laymen in their 30s, who have longstanding links to influent-1-al-
radical clerics and radical Arab states and groups.
-- Heavy Industries Minister Nabavi, a layman in his 40s, has been
labelled a leftist_______________________ According to Rafsanjani, 25X1
Nabavi is an excellent manager. Nabavi has ties to an armed
paramilitary group whose sympathizers hold other influential
positions.
-- Hojat ol-Eslam Khoiniha, a junior cleric in his 40s, was the spiritual
advisor of the osage-takers and a deputy speaker of the Assembly
until mid-1984. Close to Khomeini's son, Ahmad, Khoiniha now holds a
shadowy position as a personal advisor to the Ayatollah and hopes to
win his endorsement for the presidential election later this year. He
has been closely linked to Iranian terrorist activity.
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SUBJECT: Iran: Status of Opposition Groups
NESA M 85-10065
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
1 - DDI
1 - VC/NIC
1?- NIO/NESA
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - C/CSG
1 - C/NID
1 - C/PDB
1 - C/PES
1 - C/CPAS/ISS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
6 - NESA/PG
DDI/NESA/PG/R
(1 April 85)
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