AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405940001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of w(~ it ? ecf'ei
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
79-81,, IMC/CB
Top Secret
Copy f 0 1
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
INSURGENT SQUABBLING AND COOPERATION 1
Insurgents from Pushtun tribes are bickering in
Qandahar while two feuding insurgent groups in
Helmand Province are staging Joint attacks on
Soviet and regime convoys.
DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN TAKHAR PROVINCE 2
and Afghan Government programs have little
influence on the population.
Panjsher Valley commander Masood may be the
insurgent leader most capable of developing
widespread cooperation among the guerrilla
factions in Afghanistan. Masood's uneven success
in building alliances, however, indicates that
achieving major gains in insurgent cooperation
will be a long-term process.
12 March 1985
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This document is . prepared weeklly by 'the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
directed
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12 March 1985
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12 March 1985
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INSURGENT SQUABBLING AND COOPERATION
divisions arose among Pushtun insurgents in the
Qandahar area in late February. The rival Durrani and
Gh.ilzai groups, which have operated in a loose
confederation for the past five years, split over
accusations. of thievery and extortion
The groups have agreed to convene a court-to
resolve the differences.
in Helmand Province insurgents allied with Nabi's
Harakat-i-Ingilab-i-Islami and Gulbuddin's faction of
the Hizbi Islami have ended three years of fighting
with each other. and have begun cooperating in staging
attacks on Soviet and regime convoys on the highway
from Qandahar to Herat.
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Comment: Insurgents in the Qandahar area have
generally been successful in maintaining cooperation
and have remained active in attacking Soviet and regime
positions despite frequent sweep operations against
them. An increase in attacks on convoys in Helmand
Province probably will draw some pressure off the
Qandahar insurgents and would enable them to operate
more effectively once their current differences are
resolved.
DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN TAKHAR PROVINCE
A US Embassy source in Kabul reports conditions in
Takhar Province have deteriorated over the past three
years. fighting, fear
of air attacks,.and conscription drives by the regime
and the insurgents have driven many farmers from their
land, and canals and cropland have fallen into
disuse. The food situation, however, was reported to
be adequate in Taloqan, the provincial capital, because
resupplies were trucked in, probably from Kabul.
the regime's land reform program is
nonexistent and few people attend literacy courses.
KHAD personnel--who are greatly feared and often feud
with local militia--enforce the government's
authority.
IN BRIEF
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Interior
Ministry officials believe that the Soviets have
ceased interfering in disputes between the
Parch.am and Khalq factions of the PDPA. The
Soviets continue to insist, however, that both
factions attend all party meetings.
-- Tehran radio has reported the merger of four
Afghan insurgent organizations that espouse the
principle of "neither East nor West" in
advancing the Islamic cause. Sazman-i Nasr is
the only one of the groups with significant
influence. The others are Goruh-i Pasdaran-i
Jahad-i Islami, Nehzat-i Islami-i Afghanistan
and Jabhe-i Mottahed-i Inqilab-i Islami.
-- UN Negotiator Cordovez told a senior US official
he is very pessimistic about the May round of
Afghan peace talks. He believes neither the
Afghans nor the Pakistanis are enthusiastic
about continuing the process and speculates the
next round might never take place.
-- Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan Dixit, whose
sympathies have been with the Soviets, will be
leaving Kabul in April or early May to become
Ambassador to Sri Lanka, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul.
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12 March 1985
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AHMAD SHAH MASOOD: A LEADER FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE?
Panjsher~Valley-insurgent commander Ahmad-Shah Masood--
head of the Jamiat-i-Islami party insurgents in Kapisa
Province--may be the insurgent leader most capab:le of
developing widespread. cooperation-among the guerrilla
factions inside Afghanistan. Masood has made
extraordinary efforts to expand his organization and
build alliances. The unevenness of his success,
however, clearly shows that achieving major gains in
ins,ijraent cooperation will be a long-term process.
Building Cooperation
Masood's plans for developing cooperation cover the
non-Pushtun areas of the northeastern provinces--Balkh,
Samangan, Konduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kapisa,
Laghman, and Konarha--and he has concentrated on areas
adjacent to the Panjsher Valley..
Masood offers military training, weaponry,
and organizational expertise to induce cooperation,
although h.e'has also used military force on occasion.
Masood observed that the Soviet offensive, last spring,
had interrupted his efforts to strengthen ties; but he
claimed to have-gained control of several groups--
mainly Jamiat--in Takhar and Badakhshan Provi.nces.
We believe Soviet military pressure has helped Masood
expand cooperation and overcome some of the
longstanding enmity between the Jamiat and various
Hizbi Islami groups. (Hizbi Islami, like the Jamiat
party, belongs to the fundamentalist alliance but is
more rigid and uncompromising than the Jamiat. Of the
two Hizbi factions, the more rigid is led by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, the less rigid by Yunus Khalis.)
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A senior Hizbi Islami official of the Gulbuddin faction
said last May that Panjsher VII caused nine groups to
gather near the P?anjsher Valley to cooperate in the
fight against the Soviet and Afghan regime forces. A
Obstacles to Effective Alliances
In our view, Masood's difficulties in extending ties
with other insurgent groups arise from several
factors.
Masood considers his differences with Gulbuddin to be
the main impediment to an expansion of alliances.
Although Masood has good relations with Hizbi Islami
groups in the Gulbuddin faction, others have continued
to disrupt his supply lines and attack his men.
Cultural and Ethnic Differences
The cultural isolation and low social status of.
Panjsheris, who are Tajiks, probably inhibit non-
Panjsheris from accepting Masood's leadership and may
impede others' willingness to form alliances with
him. the
Panjsheris' social status is only slightly above that
of the Hazaras, who serve in the most menial
occupations and are discriminated against because of
their Mongoloid features and Shiite religion.
According to an Afghan academician, Pushtuns are
willing to intermingle with all Central Tajik groups
except the Panjsheris. Though Tajiks are detribalized,
their local loyalties may be as strong as Pushtun
tribesmens' and their outlooks as parochial, according
12 March 1985
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Religious. differences with fundamentalists have also.
impeded Masood's. efforts to extend his power.
conservative mullahs have opposed Masood
because of his willingness to negotiate with the
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Political Competition, Rivalry
We believe that because most areas of Afghanistan have
become organized by or affiliated with one group of
insurgents or another, Masood's goal of establishing
new bases has grown more difficult to fulfill. Even
among Tajiks and Uzbeks--the ethnic groups most likely,
to ally with Panjsher Tajiks--Masood faces
difficulties.. In Faryab Province in 1982 and 1983, for
example, fighting broke out after organizers from one
group tried to establish bases of support in villages
where other groups were already established,
One group soon devotedits.
efforts to intimidating groups that were less..well
armed and to frustrating their attacks on government
positions.
Rivalries--including some that were aggravated by-
Masood's truce with the Soviets during 1983--have also
hampered Masood's efforts. Abdul Haq, the infl.uential
commander of the Hizbi Islami faction of Khalis in
Kabol Province, said that he viewed the truce as
collusion with the Soviets.
the.Jamiat commander in Laghman Province
unhelpful. to Masood because last summer he was
preoccupied.with a_stru le against a Hizbi Isl.ami
rival..
In Kapisa Province civilians.were;
withholding cooperation with insurgents until they
could,see awinner emerge in the Panjsher insurgents'
struggle'agai.nst local Hizbe Islami commanders.,.
the Soviets and theAfghan
regime attempt to exploit rivalries by bribery and-..
spreading falsehoods.
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Poor Tactics: The Andarab Valley
Masood as having
grown more aware of the need for civilian support and
more careful in his diplomacy, earlier er-ro'rs of'-
judgment may still be costing him support and hampering
his efforts, especially in the Andarab Valley.
Strategically one of the most important areas adjoining
the Panjsher Valley, the Andarab offers access to the'
Panjsher insurgents' rear base at Khost-e Fereng as
well as an abundant source of food.
Masood first soug t -control
of passes into the region and provided arms to poor
farmers and villagers in the tributary valleys to
obtain their support. These tactics aroused the
suspicions of the ruling landowners, who believed
Masood planned to subdue the valley by force. Masood
next tried to recruit a local insurgent whom the
landowners believed to have ties to the Soviets,
causing the traditional leaders to perceive Masood as a
leftist and fear losing their property and influence.
Their subsequent support for the Hizbi Gulbuddin
faction has continued to plague Masood. Last fall
Kabul media reported that the Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin
commander in the Andarab had defected to the regime.
Even if Masood had used better judgment, he would have
faced several obstacles to winning the support of the
Andarab Valley inhabitants.
a wide valley floor and low mountain
crests leave the Andarab--unlike the Panjsher--highly
vulnerable to air and ground attacks, and fear of
retaliation has made the inhabitants reluctant to
participate actively in the insurgency.
Andarab Valley residents
include few former urban dwe ers, and the residents
have maintained their traditional suspicion of
outsiders. Another obstacle for Masood was that the
valley had already been organized by Hizbi Islami
insurgents of the Gulbuddin faction and a moderate
group before he began his efforts.
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Outlook
Cooperation among insurgents inside Afghanistan--even
in areas with a strong leader such as Masood and even
with an increased Soviet military presence--will
probably continue to evolve only gradually. Masood's
efforts to achieve a coordinated, interregional
insurgency will continue to be hampered by personal,
ideological, religious, cultural, and ethnic
differences. Soviet and Afghan regime attempts to
exploit those differences will also slow the
development of alliances. If Masood were to die, the
alliances he has established would probably have to be
renegotiated by his successor.
12 March 1985
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