AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405830001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
7-.$9 INC'CB
Top Secret
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN IN JANUARY
Soviet and Afghan forces launched multibattalion
operations and initiated small-unit actions in the
Herat, Qandahar, and Bagram areas and along the
Afghan-Pakistani border in one of the most active
Januaries in recent years.
MARSHAL PETROV'S PROMOTION AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
Marshal Vasiliy Petrov, promoted to Defense Minister
Sokolov's former position as First Deputy Minister of
Defense, may be willing to experiment with military
tactics and pay more attention to the political side
of the war in Afghanistan, but probably will not
significantly deviate from the current Soviet path.
12 February 1985
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in this publication should be directed
PUBLICATION NOTE
Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we will not publish the
Afghanistan Situation Report next week. The next report will appear
26 February 1985.
12 February 1985
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12 February 1985
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IN BRIEF
major
elements--including armored personnel carriers and
loaded pallets--of the 104th Guards Airborne Division in
convoy outside their barracks at Kirovabad in the
USSR. The division probably is involved in a training
exercise. Elements of the 104th temporarily deployed to
Afghanistan last spring for the seventh Panjsher Valley
offensive.
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The Soviets are also scheduled to train 700 new Afghan
police officers. We believe approximately 8,000
Afghans--2,000 of them military personnel--train in the
Soviet Union each year.
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he new UNDP country
program for Afghanistan includes projects only in
Kabul. Soviet advisers wanted to include several
projects outside the city, but UN officials refused,
probably because of poor security.
contrary to widespread rumors, no grand assembly
will be held in Italy because of Rome's sensitivities to
Arab countries which oppose the ex-King. Zahir is
unlikely to be active in the months ahead in pursuing
his initiative to develop resistance unity.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN IN JANUARY
January 1985 was one of the most active Januaries in recent
years in the war in Afghanistan. The Soviets and Afghans
launched multibattalion operations and initiated small-unit
actions in the Herat, Qandahar, and Bagram areas and in
Konarha and Paktia Provinces. The insurgents maintained
pressure on regime garrisons in the east and Qandahar.
Fighting continued in the Panjsher Valley,, and the Soviets
may again be planning to assault insurgent strongholds
there. Meanwhile, Tehran plans to send two F-4 aircraft to
Mashhad following Soviet and Afghan violations of Iranian
airspace.
Military Activity
Bad weather failed to significantly suppress combat in
January. The Soviets continued to rely on multibattalion
operations but also increased small unit actions and
ambushes--some conducted by special purpose forces
(Spetznaz) in support of other troops. The insurgents were
active in several areas.
US Embassy sources report heavy fighting in the Herat
area in early January, and Soviet and Afghan forces were
again preparing for combat there late in the month.
Activity remained high in the Qandahar area with insur-
gent attacks against the airport, Soviet and Afghan
posts, and a Soviet military convoy, and daily skir-
mishes in the bazaar. The Soviets responded by bombing
insurgent pressure in
early January prevented Soviet and Afghan troops from
establishing a series of posts on main supply lines
between Ali Khel and Khowst in Paktia Province. A
regimental-size Afghan force arrived near All Khel by
late January. The insurgents, however, had moved large
supplies of arms into the eastern provinces from
Pakistan and continued their attempts to attack as many
regime garrisons as possible.
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-- US Embassy sources report that the insurgents attacked
Bagram Airbase on about 16 January, taking advantage of
a snowstorm that grounded Soviet aircraft and damaging
some helicopters. The Soviets--most likely in response
to the attack and to counter intense insurgent pressure
in the Shomali area--launched a multibattalion operation
which continued through late January.
The Panjsher Valley
Soviet and Afghan forces continued to experience diffi-
culties in maintaining forces in the Panjsher Valley.
Guerrilla assaults on Soviet posts at Golbahar and Kohestan
resulted in substantial Soviet casualties, accordin to US
Embassy sources. the
insurgents repeatedly overran small outposts in the valley,
plundering arms but occupying them only briefly; the guer-
rillas allow the Soviets and Afghans to recapture the posts
then repeat the cycle. In mid-January, the guerrillas
ignored bad weather and attacked an Afahan outpost at
Khenj.
evidence of heavy air or artillery strikes--most likely the
Soviet response to the insurgent attack--near Khen.i. but
guerrilla activity continued.
The performance of Afghan regime troops did not improve in
January. shortly after their
arrival in the Panjsher, a large number of Afghan soldiers
and a high-ranking officer defected to the insurgents. F
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Embassy sources reported that large Soviet and Afghan con-
voys were moving north on the road from Kabul toward the
Panjsher in late January.
Kabul
The regime tightened security in Kabul during the first
weeks of January and were able to maintain relative quiet
during the celebration of the 20th anniversay of the
Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The increased
security and bad weather probably reduced the insurgents'
willingness to stage many attacks on the capital. Guerrilla
activity increased slightly late in the month, according to
US Embassy sources, with sporadic rocket attacks on the
city, the assassination of Babrak Karmal's barber, and the
bombing of the Afghan military hospital.
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Tehran--apparently in response to the increased incursions
and the bombing--decided to deploy two F-4 aircraft and one
air-to-air refueling tanker to Mashhad Air Force Base in
early February.
aircraft at Mashhad.
no Iranian - fighter or tan-l(e-r
We believe most of the Soviet and Afghan aircraft probably
overflew Iranian territory in the context of operations
close to the Afghan border. The Soviets and Afghans are
concerned that the guerrillas are receiving arms via routes
through Iran and using Iran as a sanctuary after operations
in western Afghanistan. The incursions--which may have been
in pursuit of insurgent forces--also underscore Soviet
frustration with their inability to suppress the insurgents
in the Herat area more than temporarily.
Outlook
We expect the level of combat to increase in spring. Insur-
gents who left Afghanistan last fall for camps in Pakistan
are likely to return when travel becomes easier. The
Soviets probably will continue their efforts to interdict
insurgents and supplies from Pakistan and may increase the
number of operations in the eastern provinces in expectation
of renewed arms flows from Pakistan. The Soviets also
appear to be preparing for increased small-unit operations
and ambushes, using Spetznaz forces garrisoned at Jalalabad,
Ghazni, Qandahar, and Bagram. Multibattalion operations in
the eastern provinces will also continue.
Bad weather in February may slow a new Soviet assault
against insurgents in the Panjsher Valley. The Soviets,
however, probably will be willing to put up with logistic
problems in the interest of what they hope will be a sur-
prise attack. Because they already garrison several areas
in the valley, they may decide to send a smaller number of
motorized rifle troops to the area than in the spring 1984
offensive while relying more heavily on medium- to low-level
bombing and artillery to suppress the insurgents. We be-
lieve the Soviets--learning from small successes last
spring--will also conduct a large number of heliborne
assaults in hopes of finding Masood.
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Marshal Vasiliy Petrov, formerly Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Ground Forces, has assumed Defense Minister Sokolov's
old job as First Deputy Minister of Defense and may assume
some of his responsibilities for the oversight of the war in
Afghanistan. Petrov seems more a troop leader than Sokolov,
more results-oriented, and more sensitive to the political
side of the conflict.
Petrov and Afghanistan
Petrov has been involved with Afghanistan since he became
Ground Forces chief in late 1980.
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Petrov has visited Afghanistan twi
80 and has had
ce since 19
,
at least some impact on Soviet policy there.
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operations to small-unit operations that was approved in
MARSHAL PETROV'S PROMOTION AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
The switch from large-scale planned
June 1981 also came not long after Petrov's return to the
USSR. Petrov's second trip to Afghanistan in April 1983 may
have prompted the leadership to review Moscow's tactical
approach to the conflict. Two months later Marshal Sokolov
returned to Afghanistan and the Soviets began setting in
train some of the improvements in their forces and opera-
tions that have become apparent in the last year.
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Counterinsurgency Background
Petrov directed the successful Cuban campaign to expel the
Somali invaders of Ethiopia during 1977-78 and has made
repeated lengthy visits to Ethiopia to oversee preparations
for Ethiopian counterinsurgency operations against the
Eritrean guerrillas. The terrain in Eritrea is almost as
rugged as in Afghanistan and the problems the Ethiopians
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face are similar--albeit on a smaller scale--to the problems
the Soviets face in Afghanistan.
Outlook ,
It is too soon to tell whether Petrov will be allowed to
have the same kind of impact on the war as his predeces-
sor. In any event, Petrov is unlikely to deviate signifi-
cantly from the current Soviet path in Afghanistan which he
may.have.helped establish. His background in Afghanistan
and Ethiopia, however suggest that he may be willing to
experiment with military tactics and pay more attention to
the political side of the conflict.
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Top Secret ,
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