THAILAND: TROUBLE AHEAD FOR CAMBODIAN POLICY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000101410001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 May 1985
Thailand: Trouble Ahead for Cambodian Policy?
Summary
Central Intelligence Agency 141
AdMil
washinmx .. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Vietnam's strong offensive this past dry season
against Cambodian resistance forces and ASEAN's
appeal for arms from other countries for the
resistance dramatically raised the stakes for
Thailand's Cambodian policy. Aggressive Vietnamese
cross-border attacks, the elimination of all major
resistance bases along the Thai-Cambodian border,
and banditry by Cambodian guerrillas have prompted
serious debate for the first time in Bangkok--both
in official and nongovernment circles--about the
EA M 85-10093
furure of Thailand's policy.
Hardline Thai policymakers--in particular
Foreign Minister Siddhi--will probably retain
control of policy toward Cambodia for the short-
term. We believe that in the longer term, however,
as the present policy grows increasingly costly for
Bangkok, a shift toward compromise with Hanoi is
probable. A change in government, possibly in 1987
when Prime Minister Prem's term ends, or the
departure of a key official such as Foreign Minister
Siddhi might provide 'ty for Bangkok to "-T7
change its policy.
State Dept. review completed
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East
Asian Analysis, and coordinated within the irectorate of
Intelligence. Information available as of 26 April 1985 was used
in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
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Turning Point
The last dry season offensive by Vietnamese troops against
the Cambodian resistance marked a turning point, in our view,
that has serious implications for Thailand's security. PAVN
forces overran every major guerrilla base along the Thai-
Cambodian border, and in doing so, forced more than 00 Khmer
into Thai territory. contrary
to previous years, Vietnamese forces will not withdraw from the
border when the rainy season begins this month. The Khmer
displaced by the offensive thus seem likely to remain on Thai
soil for an extended period. Furthermore, Vietnamese troops are
crossing into Thai territory deeper and more frequently than ever
before in seeking to prevent recently uprooted resistance forces
from regrouping effectively.
Bangkok's response thus far has been to dig in its heels,
issue harsh public denunciations of Vietnam, and refuse to
consider negotiations with Hanoi as long as Vietnamese forces
remain on Thai soil. After providing limited military support to
Cambodian resistance areas during most of the offensive, Thai
aircraft and artillery were heavily involved in responding to
Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory during the attack on Ta
Tum in March--and the Thai Army took greater casualties this year
than before. For its part, ASEAN, in a break with past strategy,
appealed for political and military support for the Cambodian
resistance from "third rni,ntriPc~-implicitly including the
The Hard Core
We believe Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda has delegated
Cambodian policy primarily to three officials--Foreign Minister
Siddhi Savetsila, Secretary-General Prasong Sunsiri of the
National Security Council, and Army Deputy Chief of Staff
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. While Siddhi directs efforts on the
diplomatic front, Prasong is in charge of Bangkok's policy toward
ll
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Indochinese refugees. It. General Chavalit coordinates
Chinese and ASEAN military aid to the resistance and is the
principal architect of non-Communist resistance strategy.
These three policymakers take a hardline on Cambodia. Their
stated goal is to increase military and diplomatic pressure on
Vietnam until Hanoi agrees to a favorable political settlement--
from the Thai perspective. In his diplomatic activities, Siddhi
has also attempted to keep ASEAN's position on Cambodia as close
to his own uncompromising views as possible; he has several times
dampened initiatives by the Indonesian and Australian Foreign
Ministers, whom he considers sympathetic toward Hanoi.
Other Voices
Until recently, the costs to Thailand of its Cambodian
policy were low, and there was no serious challenge to the
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policymaking monopoly held by Siddhi, Prasong, and Chavalit.
Because decisionmaking was so tightly held, unity was not a
problem until recent border events. But the shocks of the recent
Vietnamese offensive and differing perspectives have resulted in
what the US Embassy terms a new mood of anxiety within and
outside the government about the situation in Cambodia. Some
recently voiced concerns about Thailand's hardline policy
include:
-- Potential for polarization of the region and increasing
risk of war because of intensified clashes between Thai
and Vietnamese forces.
-- The possibility of eventual victory by Vietnam, whether
or not Thailand accepts the Heng Samrin regime.
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-- The fragility of the Cambodian anti-Vietnamese coalition.
-- Possible sell-out by the ASEAN allies and/or China.
The new mood of anxiety is reflected in varying degrees in
key sectors of Thai society: policymakers, the military.
politicians, and the press and intellectuals.
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An underlying element in the debate seems to be heightened
concern that China will subordinate its support for Thailand to
its interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the fact that intense
fighting between Thai and Vietnamese forces occurred during the
Chinese president's trip to Bangkok in March probably underscored
Thai worries about China's effectiveness as a check on Hanoi. 25X1
confrontation with Vietnam over Cambodia by using it to justify
the purchase of sophisticated weaponry, including US F-16s.
Segments of the military, however--such as field commanders--have
Military foot-dragging. The upper echelons of the Thai
military have benefited to a limited extent from the
all along undercut official policy by not resoondina viaorously
to Vietnamese action along the border.
o icers simply want to avoid con rontations with Vietnamese
forces. In our view, several factors account for this:
Army
-- Concern that the costs--in casualties and materiel--of
engaging a superior force would be too high. US military
officials in Bangkok believe that the Thai military
cannot hope to secure the border against Vietnamese
incursions because of inadequate money, manpower,
training, and equipment.
-- Fear of provoking additional Vietnamese attacks.
-- Assumptions that Vietnamese incursions will continue to
be limited in time and scope--as they were before the
most recent dry season campaign.
In addition, the US Embassy notes that, for many officers in
the field, the resistance forces represent a nuisance rather than
a needed foreign Policy tool.
-- Belief that the United States would aid Thailand in the
event of an actual Vietnamese invasion. 25X1
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(despite Bangkok's policy 25X1
of supporting anti-Vietnamese guerrillas, the influential
commander of the First Army Area even publicly stated that
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Cambodia should be partitioned. and half of the country given to
Input from the politicians. Thailand's involvement in
Cambodia has never been a major domestic issue, but former Prime
Minister Kriangsak Chomanan has long been a vocal, if
opportunistic, critic of the present policy. Kriangsak--now a
member of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and leader of
one of the ruling parties--originated the present policy, but the
US Embassy reports that he is convinced that Siddhi has taken it
too far. He argues that this escalation has led to a dangerous
"loss of balance" in Thai diplomacy, while failing to force Hanoi
to bargain. Since this year's Vietnamese offensive, other
parliamentarians have expressed similar misgivings about
Cambodian policy, including some rank-and-file politicians from
Prem's coalition, according to the press. In addition, the US
Embassy reports that leaders of the opposition party may use the
issue to attack the government during the upcoming session of
Press and academic comment. Press commentary on Cambodia
has been mixed--with some journalists emphasizing the need to be
"strong" with Vietnam and others urging ASEAN to consider the
dangers of open confrontation. In particular, the ASEAN appeal
for military assistance to the Cambodian resistance prompted a
spate of editorials questioning the wisdom of the step, according
to the US Embassy. Despite mixed opinions about the present
policy, however, media commentators have tended to stress
Thailand's vulnerability and the human and material costs of the
war along the border. Stories of assaults on Thai villagers by
Vietnamese intruders or armed Cambodian guerrillas have appeared
more frequently, amid complaints that Thailand is serving the
policy interest of ASEAN, China, and the United States while
bearing the costs all alone. Other themes in press coverage have
been the ineffectiveness of the resistance as a military force
and worries about a residual Khmer refugee population in
In intellectual circles, Professor Sukhumphan Baripatra of
Chulalongkorn University stands out as the most prominent critic,
according to the US Embassy. Dr. Sukhumphan fears that
increasing military confrontation between Vietnam and Thailand
could eventually lead to the return of military dictatorship. He
argues that Thailand should recognize Vietnamese influence in
Indochina, while seeking a Vietnamese military withdrawal and the
establishment of a government of national reconciliation in Phnom
Penh. Although the US Embassy notes that Sukhumphan's views are
generally unpopular with his peers, student leaders in Bangkok
told a US diplomat that they oppose the present policy as well.
They believed Thailand should distance itself from ASEAN and the
United States and adopt a more neutral stand on the iscup Thav
saia tney doubted that Vietnam intended to invade Thailand.) 25X1
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Will Bangkok Hang On?
Muddling through in the short term. Over the next year, we
believe Foreign Minister Siddhi and the other hardliners will
succeed in bolstering their stand against critics, who generally
seem to have no clear alternatives in mind. In our opinion,
Vietnamese incursions in the short term could solidify support
for the hardliners by provoking a nationalistic backlash. Once
the rainy season begins, the usual lull in fighting may give the
shocks of the recent offensive several months to fade, while
Siddhi, Chavalit, and Prasong work to solidify their position.
Furthermore, domestic concerns--economic reforms, party
factionalism, the Prime Minister's continuing rivalry with Army
Commander Arthit--seem likely to divert attention from Cambodia
Long-range changes likely. Over the next three to five
years, however, we are much less certain that the Thai will
choose to continue their present policy. Based on our analysis,
we do not expect major improvements in the Cambodian military
situation soon. Furthermore, in our opinion, Vietnam is unlikely
to relent in its apparent decision to overpower the resistance
militarily. The cost of Thailand's Cambodia policy is therefore
likely to become both higher and more noticeable to the Thai
public, which probably will lead to increased debate:
-- Logistics bases and command headquarters of the
resistance forces will be in Thai territory for the
foreseeable future, compromising Bangkok's claim to be
the victim of Vietnamese aggression.
-- Vietnamese operations against guerrilla activities on
Thai soil will probably increase in number and intensity,
as the Vietnamese try to prevent the resistance from
regrouping militarily, with more Thai troops and
civilians being killed. Rhetoric from some Thai
officials about the right to preemptive action against
Vietnamese troops increases the probability of such
attacks.
-- Thailand may be forced to allow more than 200,000 Khmer
guerrillas and civilians to remain on an
indefinite period. there
is growing concern within the Army over the potential for
disruptive activities in Thailand by Khmer Rouge and the
non-Communist guerrillas.
We cannot be sure at what point these costs and diplomatic
pressures will prove too much for Thai policymakers; however,
given previous diplomatic realignments, we believe that Bangkok
will eventually compromise with Hanoi. Possible junctures at
which the Thai might shift toward a compromise include:
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-- A change in government. If Prem steps down in 1987 when
his present term ends, the transition might allow Bangkok
a chance to reassess Cambodian policy or retreat as
gracefully as possible.
-- A change in personnel. Deputy Chief of Staff Chavalit
has said he will retire from the Army in two years.
Because Chavalit has been the brains behind Thai military
aid to the resistance, his departure or transfer to
another position less involved with supporting the
resistance (neither of which are certain) might lead to a
winding down of Thailand's covert support program.
-- Another possibility is that Foreign Minister Siddhi might
leave office, although we believe this is unlikely
because Siddhi is so close to the Prime Minister.
Nonetheless, should he be replaced, his successor might
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Appendix A
Motivating Factors
In our judgment, the three key decisionmakers on Cambodia
are deeply distrustful of Hanoi and, to a lesser extent, the
Soviet Union. Like many Thai, Siddhi, Chavalit, and Prasong are
suspicious of Vietnamese intentions toward Thailand,* and they
see Vietnam's goal in Indochina as the creation of Vietnamese
"satellites" in place of traditional buffer states. In
conversations with US officials, Thai officials emphasize their
concern about the potential for Hanoi-backed subversion using
Thai Communists or the Vietnamese minority in Thailand--fears we
find exagerrated. A secondary concern is the increasing Soviet
influence in Indochina, particularly the expansion of Soviet
military activity at Cam Ranh Bay, and the presence of Soviet
military advisers in Indochina.
*A USIA survey of 1,327 Thai adults in Bangkok and
provincial cities in November 1984 found that Vietnam was viewed
as the country "most likely" to attack Thailand. Respondents
chose Vietnam over Cambodia by a margin of 31 percent to 13
percent. In the same poll, about half the respondents said they
believed an attack on Thailand was either "very likely" or
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Appendix B
What Does Bangkok Really Want?
In addition to their stated goal of obtaining a negotiated
settlement in Cambodia, we believe the Thai have a hidden agenda
as well:
-- Weakening a traditional enemy and diverting Vietnamese
resources from possible use against Thailand.
-- Preserving Cambodia's traditional role as a buffer state
between Thailand and Vietnam for as long as possible.
-- Preventing a permanent residual refugee population in
Thailand. Since 1980, the Thai government has allowed Khmer
to cross the border only temporarily to avoid Vietnamese
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7w Editorial Cartoons On Cambodian Policy
~~'?i~::%~1~-Lei!.~iaRir~ws~~~':~~1.?'`~r2H~14'~~1~1r.dtJr~.iit?:rt~S~~~f ~cit.::.a.. ?aw:r.:~- ?r
-=.?.5... aST3i,~
si
It
"A terrifying game." Daily Niu cartoon pictures Prime Minister Prem carry-
ing in a time bomb, la a ed- The three Khmer factions"--ANS, DK, KPNLF.
Daily Niu is a Thai-language daily paper that generally takes a moderate,
pro-government editorial line, although it can be outspoken in criticizing
the government.
Doubts about ASEAN. Bangkok Post cartoon shows foreign Minister Siddhi as an
ASE puppet being lowered into a mob of fighting Indochinese. The Bangkok
Post is an unabashedly pro-government English-language daily.
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~GQ~A
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SUBJECT
Th
il
:
a
and: Trouble Ahead for Cambodian Policy?
Distribution: (EA M 85-10093)
Original - ITM/SEA/OEA
1 - Richard Childrpcg_ Ncr
1 -
1 -
1 -'Nicholas Mauger, State/Thailand Desk
1 - Alan Kitchens, State/INR
1 - Alice Straub, State/INR
1 - John Ney, State/INR
1 -
1 -
FBIS/NEA
FBIS/AG
1 - Paul Heer, OCR/EA
1 - Nancy Simons, SOVA/TWAD
1 - Ch/SEA/OEA
1 - DCh/SEA/OEA
1 - SEA/IB/OEA
1 - Ch/NEA/OEA
1 - Ch/CH/OEA
1 - D/OEA
1 - Research Director/OEA
1 - PDB Staff
1 - Ch/NIC
1 - NIO/EA
1 - DDO/EA
1 - DDI
1 - xecutive Director
1 ILS/CPAS
- IMC/ICB/CPAS
1 - OCR/EA/A
1 - Ch/PES/DDI
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - Ch/EA
1 - NIC/Ana y is Group
1 - A/NIO Economics
1 -
1 -
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