INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE PACIFIC BASIN: CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE Of
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Pacific Basin: Changing Economic Patterns
Confidential
ER IM 72-73
May 1972
copy N2 94
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WARNING
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defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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E,,cludcd from aulor,ia
dawngrodinp and
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE PACIFIC BASIN:
CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNS
Summary
1. The Pacific Basin(1) since 1960 has been the world's most
dynamic trading region. Underlying this trade boom has been the pulling
effect of the US and Japanese economies. The United States has been the
fastest growing major market for manufactured goods coming from Japan
and the other northern-tier countries - Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South
Korea. Japan has become the largest market for the raw materials of
southern-tier countries, such as Australia and Indonesia. The United States
is the leading supplier of Japan for both raw materials and sophisticated
manufactures. The other Pacific Basin countries look mainly to Japan and
the United States for imports of manufactures.(2)
2. Japan's initial export surge was based on inexpensive
manufactured goods, but its momentum has been maintained by
continuously developing new product lines. As Japan moved up the
industrial scale and shifted to more technically advanced products, the less
developed countries (LDCs) in the area followed in the same path. The
Japanese economic surge, meanwhile, resulted in a sharp boost in raw
material purchases from Australia and Indonesia. But although Japanese
growth has been the area's most dynamic force, it has in turn depended
greatly on access to the US markets.
3. These growing trade ties have increasingly given the Basin the
look of an economic unit. Indeed, almost two-thirds of Western Pacific(3)
1. For the purposes of t;iis memorandum, the Pacific Basin is defined to include
all countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, Oceania, and the South Pacific islands.
Economic relations among American countries are excluded from the discussion.
2. For detailed data on Pacific Basin trade, see the Appendix.
3. For the purposes of this memorandum, the Western Pacific is defined to include
all Asian countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, Oceania, and the South Pacific islands.
For trade calculations, the USSR is excluded because it is mainly a European country.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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exports go to other countries in that region or to the tJnited States. The
entire process has been the result of natural market forces, as there are
no monetary or customs unions and the few preferential trade arrangements
that do exist are riot expecially important.
4. While the United States is largely behind the trend tOWard
economic integration, it is also being increasingly drawl, into the region
itself. indeed, US trans-Pacific trade is already substantially greater than
US trade with the present European Community (EC) and closely matches
trade with the expanded EC.(4) These trans-Pacific ties are being
strengthened by the growing movement of US-owned productive facilities
to the LDCs in tine Western Pacific. US businessmen originally moved
overseas to compete with Japanese domestic producers and later With
Japanese plants established in LDCs of the region. Unlike US investment
activity in Western Europe, these operations sell most of their output back
to the United States.
5. During at least the next half decade the economic momentum
generated during the 1960s and new developments will ensure continued
rapid growth of economic ties within the region. Japan will Probably become
a major foreign investor in the area. With its enormous foreign exchange
reserves, Tokyo has greatly lessened its controls over direct investment
outflows. At the same time, Japanese businessmen are interested in
establishing more production facilities abroad, both because Japan's
domestic labor is becoming more expensive and as a means of circurliVenting
actual or anticipated trade barriers of other countries. For tine latter reason,
the United States will be an important target area for this investment. US
manufacturers, realizing the Western Pacific's market potential, will
increasingly establish facilities there to produce items for sale in that region
as well as for shipment back to the United States.
6. There will be few opportunities for Western Pacific countries to
shift their economic orientation away from the Basin. The only other major
market, the EC, will probably continue its policies of Preventing a mass
influx of Western Pacific manufactures, especially as it sorts out its
expansionary problems during the next several years. Japan especially is
being pressed to hold down it sales to the EC. For the LDC producers
of manufactures, there are few alternatives to the US market, Even Japan,
like the EC, is unlikely to give them easy access to domestic markets fk,~
sonme time.
4. The expanded EC includes the EC as presently constituted plus the United
Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and Ireland, whose applications for r"emnibersh p have been
accepted.
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7. The Basin's growth process will mean both problems and gains
for the United States. With much of the Western Pacific's continued growth
depending on access to the US market, US imports from the region will
swell further, as the Western Pacific countries move into new product lines.
The LDCs, for example, can be e:cpected to move up the industrial scale
as they shift away from such products as textiles. Within the next few
years, Taiwan will be supplying many of the same types of consumer
electronics equipment now being sold by Japan. Japan, for its part, will
be moving into higher quality, technology-intensive product markets. The
result of this intensifying competition will probably be a further movement
of US-owned productive facilities into the Western Pacific.
8. The Western Pacific will also remain a major export growth market
for the United States during the 1970s. But to take full advantage of this,
the United States will have to compete strongly with Japan. In many
Western Pacific countries, the US position is slipping because of inroads
made by the Japanese, who see the region as a natural outlet for their
products. Because of this and because of the continual upgrading of product
lines in the Western Pacific, the United States' trade position will depend
largely on its ability to maintain a lead in high-technology types of products.
Should the United States lag behind in this field, its trade deficit with
the Western Pacific will likely grow. In any event, both Japanese and US
economic influence in the region will remain strong, and competition
between the two for regional markets can be expected to intensify in the
coming years.
9. Although trade within the region will grow faster than total Basin
trade, the formation of an economic bloc with strong institutional ties is
not a likely development in the foreseeable future. From the US point
of view, a common market type of arrangement with free movement of
capital, labor, and goods would create too many problems because of the
large wage differential between the United States and others in the Basin.
And, by itself, Japan does not have the pulling strength to turn the Western
Pacific into a closely knit economic bloc centered on Japan. This partly
reflects Tokyo's unwillingness to open up its market to nearby producers
of manufactured goods, and, at least through the mid 1970s, Japan will
remain essentially a purchaser of raw materials in the region. In short, Japan
is not likely to usurp the critical role played by the United States in the
Western Pacific. Nor is it likely to reduce its own heavy reliance on the
United States as an export market or as a source of raw materials and
sophisticated goods. Even the emergence of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) into this trade area will have little impact on Japan's economic
orientation toward the United States or economic trends in the Pacific Basin
generally. China's role in the Basin is constrained by its emphasis on
economic self-sufficiency and balanced trade and will hardly compare with
the position of the United States or Japan for many years.
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Discussion
Historical Perspective
10. The seeds of Pacific Basin economic cohesion are deeply
implanted. Trans-Pacific trade ties have been important for the United States
from its inception and they developed rapidly during the first quarter of
this century. At their pre-World War II peak, just before the Great
Depression and the Sino-Japanese War, the Western Pacific countries were
accounting for up to one-fifth of US imports and one-sixth of our exports.
Almost one-half this trade was with Japan and China, and these countries
ranked as high as fourth and fifth, respectively, as foreign suppliers to the
US market. Japan, meanwhile, was emerging on the world scene and during
the 1930s, through its co-prosperity sphere, was trying to pull the Western
Pacific into its own economic orbit. But the British, French, and Dutch
colonial presence tended to divert much of the region's trade toward Europe..
The Americas too had a strong European orientation that detracted from
participation in Basin trade, and the Basin remained fragmented.
11. After World War II the Western Pacific was slow in regaining its
former position. Japan managed a remarkable economic recovery but not
until the late 1950s did it reach its once prominent status as a trading
country. Japanese exports to the United States in 1955, for example, were
still only at their 1929 level. Many other Western Pacific countries were
also recovering from World War II, but their post-war progress was hampered
by a variety of factors, including the Korean War, large inflows of Chinese
refugees, and, in many cases, the adjustment to independence after years
of colonial rule. Some remained little more than economic ba"kwaters. The
-Communist takeover of China also lessened the Western Pacific's role in
the world economy since it virtually removed China from non-Communist
world trade.
12. During this period, Western Europe was rapidly developing into
a major economic power bloc. The traditionally large trade between
European countries was further stimulated by the formation of the EC in
the late 1950s. At the same time, the United States was focusing its
attention on trans-Atlantic economic links. Washington encouraged
formation of the EC, and US businessmen moved rapidly to establish plants
and other facilities in the new community. Between 1951 and :960, US
trade with Western Europe grew more than 50% faster than trade with
the Western Pacific.
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The Emerging Western Pacific
13. Since the start of the 1960s the Western Pacific's economic status
has changed dramatically. Indeed, the Far Eastern region(s) now makes
up the world's most rapidly growing economic area, and its international
importance is expanding steadily. Japan made rapid progress. Its real gross
national product (GNP) expanded 10% annually during the 1960s, and Japan
now ranks third in world GNP behind only the United States and the USSR.
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, meanwhile, lead the way
among LDCs with real growth rates of 1010 a year or more. Australia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and the South Pacific islands all exceeded the world
average growth during the 1960s of about 5.510 annually, while the
Philippines and New Zealand came close. Even tiny Macau and Brunei have
done well.
14. Only a few Western Pacific countries did poorly. During the early
and mid-] 960s, Indonesia's economy was disrupted by Sukarno's devastating
policies, but since his ouster conditions have improved, and some modest
growth is now being registered. War-ravaged Indochina also fell far behind
other countries in the region. The PRC, for its part, failed to make any
significant economic gains during the 1960s, partly because of the turmoil
of the Cultural Revolution and retention of its inward looking economic
policies. This isolation, however, undoubtedly benefited other Western
Pacific countries. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, on the basis of
exports of inexpensive manufactures, were able to develop rapidly and to
some extent filled the vacuum left by the PRC. Had China remained a
trading nation, the other countries probably would not have grown as they
did.
15. Almost without exception, exports have been the engine of
growth in the region. Between 1960 and 1965, Far Eastern exports grew
10% annually, and in 1966-71 the pace increased to 15% a year (see
Figure 1). Since 1960, exports have grown nearly 60% faster than those
of the rest of the world, and by 1971 the region was accounting for about
one-seventh of total world exports.(6) Sales in 1971 amounted to some
US $42 billion, compared with about $1 1 billion in 1960 and $18 billion
in 1965. Most countries in the area are participating in this export boom,
and all but Singapore, Thailand, the Indochina countries, and the small
South Pacific islands now sell more than $1 billion worth of goods overseas
each year. Japan, of course, leads the way, with exports amounting to more
than $24 billion last year, up from only $4 billion in 1960.
5. That is, the non-Communist Western Pacific regions.
6. Throughout this memorandum, world trade data exclude intra-EC trade.
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World Exports
(1960=100)
Figure 1
European Community*
Rest of World
United States
1961 62 63
'Excluding Intra-EC trade,
513470 4.72
CONFIDENTIAL
16. Even these impressive statistics, however, do not adequately
portray the nature or impact on world trade of the region's development.
In contrast to earlier periods, the great bulk of the increase in Far Eastern
exports since 1960 has consisted of manufactured goods coming out of
the Far East's northern-tier of countries - Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
and Hong Kong, Together these countries now sell about as much
manufactured products abroad as the United States (see Figure 2). Indeed,
since 1960 the Far East region as a whole has accounted for close to
one-fifth of the increase in world exports of manufactured products.
17. All of these countries have demonstrated great flexibility as they
moved quickly into new product lines. Early in the 1960s, Japan's expansion
centered primarily around the sale of inexpensive light manufactures such
as textiles, but since the mid-1960s a steady shift to more sophisticated
products, including television sets, steel, and automobiles, has occurred. With
the Japanese shifting into higher technology areas, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and South Korea have moved into the market for less complicated products.
Underlying their export boom, for example, has been increasing sales of
textiles, wigs, assorted plastic consumer goods, and more recently electronic
component parts. Indeed, these three plus Singapore, which is following
the same route, are among the few LDCs able to get into the export market
for manufacturers. During the 1960s, they accounted for almost one-half
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Trends in Exports of Manufactured Goods*
(1960= 100)
Exports of Manufactured Goods,
Billion US $
Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and South Korea 4.7
Japan 22.9
European Community" 44.4
United Kingdom 18.7
United States 30.5
01 1
'1971 data estimated.
"Excluding lntra?EC trade.
Figure 2
Hong Kong , Taiwan
and South Korea
European
Community"
United Kingdom
United States
the increase in manufactured goods exported by LDCs (see Figure 3), and
now their total sales exceed $6 billion annually, compared with only
$750 million in 1960.
18. While the northern tier of countries export manufactures,
countries to the south are becoming increasingly important sources of raw
materials. Australia is undergoing a remarkable mining boom and within
the past five years has developed into a major world supplier of such key
minerals as iron ore and bauxite. In fact, Australia is now attracting more
private foreign capital -- more than $1.5 billion in 1971 - than almost
any other country in the world, and much of this is directed to expanding
1
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Figure 3
Less Developed Countries: Exports of Manufactured Goods*
Mexico Portugal
1960
mining output. A somewhat similar situation exists in Indonesia, where vast
petroleum deposits and other mineral deposits have already been located.
The South Pacific islands are also attracting relatively large amounts of
foreign capital to develop mineral deposits such as nickel and copper.
Developing Pacific Basin Economic Ties
19. At the core of the export boom is the pulling effect of the US
and Japanese economies on one another and the other Basin countries. The
United States has been the fastest growing major overseas market for Japan
and also for the other northern tier of countries, which in turn get the
lion's share of their growing import requirements from Japan and the United
States. The United States is also a major supplier of raw materials and
sophisticated manufactures to Japan. But at the same time, to support its
rapidly expanding industrial output, mineral-poor Japan has bought growing
amounts of raw materials from the southern ticr of Pacific Basin countries.
These countries, in turn, have become major export growth markets for
goods sold by Japan and the United States. Because of this interaction,
roughly two-thirds of the growth in Western Pacific trade since 1960 has
involved countries in the region and the United States, and almost 65%
of Western Pacific exports now go to countries in the region and the United
States (see Figures 4, 5, and 6). Ever Canada and F:.:4c Latin American
countries, already closely linked to the United States, are increasingly being
drawn into trade with the Western Pacific.
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(Million US $)
Major Pacific Basin Trada Flows, 1970
i
''
o`a s 4e
A~e
c
e
,~
~a .E ~a ~?j ryry Pa
Q
'Hong Kong. Taiwan, aid South Korea.
''Australia. New Zealand. Philippines. Indochina. Indonusiu. Malaysia, Thailand.
Singapole. Ryusyus. Macau. Brunei. and South Pacific islands.
a
Sao ? q' `~,yaa1 ~c~
Q'a ~ !e:'~rLO
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Figure 4
United States
Z, ryb
\ \ry r rr. ?`J~ey
0 a Q
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Western Pacific: Direction of Exports
(Million US $)
Other
Other Pacific'
United States
Other Pacific*
Japan
United States
Northern Tier
Japan Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea
4,055 8,458 19,333 674 1,463 4,455
33%
36%
33%
27%
37%
37%.
20%
23%
36%
34%
36%
27%
;ae v
@
zr,
,.~?ArsC
?? T1rLf
l~ i~.
Japan
Y r
27l
X21 1
31%
?Jr~ 71
x
+
t
30%
+
~r
r
(
,
2'h
i15
~rRl
S ~j ~K
ir
,
;
Figure 5
Southern Tierra People's Republic of China
6,276 8,066 11,883 1,960 2,035 2,050
17%
0
17%,
No
`Negi.
1960 65 70
'Including Canada. People's Republic of China. and Latin American countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean.
''Australia, New Zealand. Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia. Thailand. Singapore, Ryukyus,
Mace U. Brunel. and South Pacific islands.
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'29%
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Western Pacific: Direction of Imports Figure 6
(Million US $)
Northern Tier
Japan Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea
4,491 8,176 18,896 1,605 2,572 6,309
22% 21'K 26% 28% 24% 2.
Other
Q
V
14%
'12%
23%
29%
29%
36%
1
38%
34%
w"
All
4
}
N
Japan
K(0.
1.
~'
~Mr
y'
I44 i
fi ~
r
Southern Tier**
6,923 8,962 14,117
People's Republic of China
2,030 1,845 2,170
1960 65 Negl. 70
.Including Canada, People's Republic of China, and Latin American countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean,
-Australia. New Zealand. Philippines, Indochina. Indonesia. Malaysia, Thailand. Singapore. Ryuhyus. Mocdu.
Brunel, and South Pacific Islands.
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20. By and large, this process has occurred because of natural market
forces rather than preferential or institutional arrangements. There are no
monetary or customs unions, and the few bilateral preferential trade
arrangements that do exist have been of little importance in terms of export
growth. The Philippines and a few other Far Eastern countries have sugar
quotas in the normally high-priced US market, but the amount shipped
rises very slowly. The Philippines, under the Laurel-Langley Agreement, is
granted reduced US tariffs on manufactures, but local producers take little
advantage of this, in part because economic policies stress import
substitution rather than export growth. A somewhat more important
exception is the preferential Commonwealth treaties between Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada. To a large extent, however, trade and capital flows
have developed along lines determined by the natural resources and
economic status of each country.
21. Perhaps the key market factor influencing the region was the
change in the US domestic market. Until the 1960s, the United States
produced inexpensive manufactures with only limited competition from
abroad. In fact, through 1958 the United States had a favorable trade
balance on these items. But by 1960 the US minimum wage coverage was
sufficiently broad and rates relatively high enough to encourage large
amounts of imports. At the same time, the spread of mass marketing in
the United States was concentrating buying power in large-scale retailers,
making price a more important competitive factor. Major retailers turned
toward foreign sources to obtain inexpensive goods. US producers, to remain
competitive, began moving their production facilities abroad or had
contracted with foreign producers to manufacture goods for them.
Moreover, these trends were encouraged by improved worldwide
transportation and communication links.
22. The Far East countries were in an especially good position to
capitalize on these changes. The northern tier of countrics benefited from
a well-disciplined, skilled, energetic, and low-wage labor force which gave
them a marked advantage in producing labor-intensive goods. Wage rates
in Japan, for example, are still only one-third of those in the United States,
and wages in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are well below those
in Japan. Moreover, the region's high degree of political stability has made
it a secure place to invest, and over the years Far Eastern business men
have established their ability to meet contract commitments. Manufacturers
in the region also have proved to be an extremely dynamic group, able
to adapt readily to changing world conditions. One example of this is the
dramatic shift in the Far East textile industry from cottons to synthetics
in just a few years' time.
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The ''United States and the Western Pacific(7)
23. Without easy access to the US market. the Far East's growth
would have been very much slower. The United States has been the only
developed market relatively open for the types of' sophisticated consumer
manufactures and industrial products Japan has to offer and for the
inexpensive manufactured goods produced by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea. Over the years, this group's access to such major markets
as the EC and the United Kingdom has been restricted by a vast array
of formal and informal controls. The United States is also a major market
for the southern tier of countries - second only to Japan. Of perhaps equal
importance to the southern tier of countries is US investment in the region
to develop raw material resources.
24. The importance of the US market ?s demonstrated by the fact
that it accounted for nearly one-third of the growth in Far Eastern exports
since 1960. Total sales to the United States went from $2.3 billion in 1960
to about $11.7 billion in 1971 - an increase of more than 400'/.x. This
is about double the growth in total US imports during the period, and
the Far East now accounts for more than one-fourth of all US purchases
from abroad compared with 15% in 1960. In fact, the United States now
buys more goods from the Far East than it does from the EC, even when
trade with the United Kingdom and other applicants is included (see
Figures 7 and 8). Practically all the Far East countries participated in this
growth in sales to the United States, but most of the increase - nearly
90% -- was attributable to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.
25. The most striking percentage gains were made by Taiwan and
South Korea. Their combined exports to the United States in 1960 were
only $25 million, but by 1971 reached almost $1.3 billion - tip an
extraordinary 5000%. Hong Kong i.,"vv sells almost $1 billion annually in
the US market, compared with only $125 million in 1960. Japan, the
second largest supplier to the United States after Canada, increased its US
sales by more than six-fold since 1960 to $7.5 billion last year. About
31% of the total Japanese exports were sold to the United States in 1971,
while the combined share for Taiwan, I-long Kong, and South Korea is 41;~.
1 he United States takes about one-sixth of the exports of the southern
tier of countries, whose sales to the United States have about doubled since
1960.
26. From the US point of view, Far Eastern suppliers have had a
dramatic impact on import patterns because of the heavy concentration
7. All trade data in this section exclude the PRC because US-Chinese trade has been
virtually non-existent.
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Trends in US Imports
US Imports, 1971
Billion US $
Total 45 6
of which:
Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and South Koran 2.3
Japan 7,3
Othor Woslorn Pacillc' 2.1
Figure 7
Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and South Koran
0 1 I I I I I I I I 1 I
1961 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
'AUAlraha N.. lnalnn,l. I'h1.11rlrin n, Inllnrhlnn Inrll,nn,ln Mnlay.'a rh, lanrl
Sin Ualrnln IIYUAYu, Marau. 111IInn1 nail Snulh I nrrrlr I ,Inn,),
on manufactured goods coming I'ronn the region, Since 1960 the Far East
has accounted for about 35'k of the growth in imports of these items,
and last year the figure was close to 40:1', (see Figure 9). Moreover, in many
cases Far Eastern countries now dominate the US import market. Within
the past decade, for example, Japan hcs captured about one-half the US
import market for steel and electronic products. and within four years has
taken over about 40';,' of the import market for automobiles (excluding
Canada). The Far Eastern LIX's also have made dramatic gains in the US
market for inexpensive manufactures such as textiles, toys, and other light
consumer goods. For example, while total US imports of Ilia Ilk! fact tired
textiles rose by 90"1( between 1960 and 1970, imports from Ilong Kong.
Taiwan, and South Korea jumped by about 300'
27. The Far East also has become an increasingly important market
for US products. Inulced the Far East has been our most dynamic export
market over the past decade with purchases of S8.3 billion in 1971
14 CONFIDENTIAL
Total
Other
Woetorn Pacific'
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Direction of US Trade
1080
$20.4 Billion
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 8
11ong Kong, Tnlwnn,
and fioulh Kornn
40%
v'
01hnr
11010 Kono, Inlwnn,
mid South Kotan
Unllnd
Kingdorn
(long Kong, Taiwan.
and routh Koran
1071
$45,0 Billion
1971
$43.5 Billion
(long Kona laiw4n.
and Snulh Koraa
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Figure 9
US Imports of Manufactured Goods from the Northern Tier
Million US $
10,000
In Ien11, Inp,e n:un"te, ecenunIed lot In% W Infel 119 tntIOtl,
it the nuletalue,, in 108k 24%; in 1010, 2n%, and in 101,. 311%
0 1 1 I I 1 r I I I I I t 1
1960 61 02 63 84 oG 06 67 68 69 70 71
representing 19% of total US exports, compared with 14It in 1960 (see
Figure 10). Sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Australia .lave grown especially fast in line with their own
rapid economic growth. US sales to Singapore expanded almost seven-fold,
from $41 million in 1960 to $315 million in 1971. US sales to Australia,
which grew .jbout 50,0 faster than total US exports, now exceed $1 billion
annually, and Taiwan and South Korea together bought almost $1.2 billion
from the United States last year, compared with $260 million in 1960.
Japan, our second largest customer after Canada, purchased $4.1 billion
1971, about 91,1, of total US exports. About one-half of these purchases
were agricultural commodities and other raw materials. Japan is our largest
single country market, while the Far East is our largest regional market
for agricultural goods, but ranks behind Canada and the "expanded" EC
as a market for US manufactures.
28. While sales to the Far East have grown rapidly, the United States
has just about maintained its share of the region's market. The US position
un the Japanese markc~ has declined slightly since 1960, although the United
States still accounted for better than one-fourth of total Japanese imports
in recent years. The US position in other northern-tier countries also has
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Trends In US Exports Figure 10
(1000-100)
600 -
US Exports, 1071
Hutton US $ Hong Kong, Tnlwnn,
Tale) 43 r, and South Korea
400 Of which
Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and South Koren 1.0
300 Japan 4,1 Japan
other Western Pnclllc' 21 Other
Western Pnclltc
200''...._..._...~_~- Total
100 _
1901 02 03 04 05 00 07 00 09 70 71
'4uI I1.h. New l..I.n4 Phhppin.. I n nor n,n. Ind on.w Molar. u, rhabnn 6mp.rnr. It ry.y u..
Mae.,, nlun.I and A ouIn r.rnir I.I.n,.
91J47P 4 72
declined somewhat since 1960 because of growing competition with Japan.
For the salve reason the US market sl-iare in the Philippines has been greatly
eroded. The United States has made major gains, howe:er, in Indonesia,
Indochina, and Australia. In the case of Indonesia and Indochina, this
primarily reflects the large amounts of US economic assistance. In Australia,
where the United States accounts for about 25% of total exports, the gains
have come primarily at the expense of the United Kingdom and at least
partially reflect the large inflow of US investment capital. Altogether the
United States accounted for about one-fourth of total Far lvastcrn imports
in 1970, about the same as in 1960.
29. US investment in the Far Fast also is increasing rapidly.
Cumulative direct investment in the region reached more than S7 billion
at the end of 1970 and has been growing by almost $1 billion annually.
US investment in Australia alone, much of which has been in the booming
mining industry. accounts for almost one-half the total and about two-fifths
of the total increase in the region. As a result. Australia is now the fourth
largest recipient of US investments on a worldwide basis, ranking only
behind Canada, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Large US
investments also are going into mining industries in Indonesia and the South
Pacific islards. Countries in the area generally welcome US investments with
only a few exceptions. Recently, nationalism has been eroding the level
of US investment in the Philippines. which now stands at about
S700 million.
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30, After Australia, the largest concentration of US investment in the
Far East is in Japan. However, the $1.5 billion direct US investment there,
which includes re-invested earnings, is minuscule relative to 0t.1, country's
economy. This largely reflects the fact that the insular Japanese are fe;irl'ul
of' greater foreign involvein nt in their economy. Nonetheless, the (Milled
States earns considerable sums from Japan from means other Ilan direct
investment. Japan is by I'm- the largest borrower in the US banker's
acceptance market and one of the major purchasers of' US corporation
royalty and patent rights.
31, Ilong Kong, Taiw; it, ;aid South Korea combined have attracted
less than $1 billion in US direct investment capital, but the impact of this
investment is fill. greater than its relatively small size suggests. This is partly
because most direct investments there are relatively small since they involve
mainly labor-intensive assembly operations. In some cases, while the US
share of total ownership is small, its total economic involvement is large.
US companies frequently agree to provide Large aniounts of loan capital
to finance operations of foreign firms and purchase all or most of the
output. For example, net private capital inflows from the United States
to South Korea in 1969 amounted to about $200 million, of which only
$15 million consisted of direct investment capital.
Japan and the Western Pacific
32. Japan vies with the United States for first place as a trading
partner to Western Pacific countries. Indeed, excluding sales to Japan. trade
between other Western Pacific countries is not very extensive. Many of these
transactions represent Australia's trade with New Zealand and the South
Pacific islands, among whom strong economic ties exist. liven for the PRC,
which shifted its trade away from other Communist countries during the
1900%. Japan is the major trading particr, providing, 28''; of' tile PRC's
imports and buying 12';; of its exports. The largest purchaser -- 20',; of C'hina's goods. however, is Ilong Kong. which relies heavily on the
mainland for food and water. C'hina's trade with other Far Eastern countries
is relatively small.
33. The Western Pacific has become a major outlet for Japan's
exports. Since 1900. Japan has supplied almost 40'; of the increased imports
of Western Pacific countries and raised its. share of this market from I I';
in 1900 to almost 30`;; last year. In all but a few cases. Japan is the chief
foreign supplier. Sales to Ilic region have been growing I7"; annually since
1960. and 1wy 1971 they amounted to S6,8 billion, or 28': of Japan s total
exports. Thus the region ranks with the United States as the largest overseas
market for Japan
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34. Nearly one-half the increase In Japan's sales to the Western Pacific
has gone to [long Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Underlying this spurt
is the movement abroad of' Japanese indtr,,stry, which is taking place because
rapidly rising wage rates are eroding Its once strong competitive edge in
labor-intensive industries, Rather than bringing in cheap labor I'roct abroad,
as has West Germany, the Japa'?;se have established export-oriented
industries elsewhere in the region. Typically, the Japanese take a minority
interest in a first; provide ;t with managencnt skills, technology, and loans
to buy capital equipment and industrial materials from Japan; and market
its output mainly in the United States. In the case of' textiles, for example,
[long Kong, Taiw.k.n, and South Korea purchase their synthetic fiber and
fabric needs and textille machinery from Japan and all sell clothing to the
United States, Japanese sales to the three rose by 6001/ between 1960 and
1971, while total exports from these countries rose by 700%.
35. Despite close ties, firms in Ilong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea
have made only small inroads into the Japanese market. 'T'his is largely
because Tokyo protects its own industries against competition from low-cost
producers. Thus japan exports four times more to those countries than
it buys and has a $2 billion trade surplus. Japan does take about one-fifth
of the combined exports of Taiwan and South Korea, but many of these
purchases consist of foodstuffs and some raw materials.
36. Japan has become an increasingly important market for the raw
materials producers in the southern tier of the Western Pacific. Over the
past decade, mineral-poor Japan's purchases of raw materials hove grown
faster than those of' any major industrial country, and a large share of its
requirements for such key products as iron ore. coal, bauxite, copper, crude
oil, and timber is coming from the southern tier of countries. With few
exceptions. .3apan is now the major overseas market for these countries
and since 1960 has accounted for about two-fifths of their export growth.
In 1970, Japan took more than $ 3 billion worth of' products from this
group or about 27,', of their total exports. Stimulated by rapidly rising
raw materials sales to Japan, their demand for the types of goods the
Japanese can supply has grown, and Japanese exports to the southern tier
of countries have increased almost twice as fast as their sales to Japan.
The southern tier of countries, however, still have a favorable trade balance
with Japan.
37. Japanese capital flows to Western Pacific countries jumped nearly
ten-fold since 1960 and now amount to almost S I billion annually. About
one-half of these flows consi? t of export credits used to finance purchases
of capital equipment and intermediate goods from Japan. Although Japanese
direct investment abroad is increasing, it still amounts to no more than
one-half the level of export credits. Even in Australia, most or the direct
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investment in mining is either from the United States or the United
Kingdom, although Japan takes most of the output from these operations.
Official aid flows going mainly to Indonesia, the Philippines, and South
Korea amounted to $278 million. About 65'%, of Japan's bilateral financial
flows to LDCs went to Western Pacific countries.
Canada, Latin America, and the Western Pacific
38. Trans-11.%cilic economic ties are also becoming increasingly
important to Canada. About 81/, of Canada's foreign trade now crosses the
Pacific, Illost to Japan. Canadian exports to Japan, mainly raw materials,
have been increasing by more than 201%0 annually since 1965, making Japan
Canada's most important export growth market. Moreover, current plans
call for greatly increasing exports of Canadian raw materials to Japan which
will very likely enable Japan to replace the United Kingdom as Canada's
second largest trading partner. In act, Japan nearly passed the United
Kingdom as Canada's number two foreign supplier in 1971 as a result of'
a whopping 56% increase in Japanese exports, mainly consumer
manul'csttires. to Canada. From the Japanese side, Canada is now the fourth
largest supplier of imports after the United Stt!tes, Australia, and Iran and
the largest export market outside the Western Pacific and the United States.
39. Canadian trade with South Korea, 'Taiwan, Ilong Kong, and
Singapore is also rising rapidly, but is still relatively shall. Australia-Canada
trade is also becoming increasingly important to both countries, each ranks
about fifth as the other's trading partner. Indeed. Australia now sells more
to Canada than it does to any West European country except the United
Kingdom.
40. Economic links between Pacific coast countries of' Latin America
and the Western Pacific in general are minimal. The only exception is trade
with Japan. Japanese purchases of raw materials from Peru and Chile have
been an important factor in the growth of these countries' exports, and
in 1970 Japan's imports from each totaled about $200 million. The two
combined provided 17i%- of Japan's iron ore imports, 121,1. of' its copper
imports, and 30,x% of its zinc. About 331%%, of Japan's raw cotton is purchased
from Mexico and the other Central American countries. For these countries,
Japan is the only major export outlet or this fiber. Although the Japanese
have made inroads into import markets of these Latin countries, they remain
relatively small from Japan's point of view. Exports to Mexico and Peru
were the highest, and they were only $94 million and $53 million,
respectively, in 1970. While Japan has doubled its share of the import
market of Latin American Pacific countries, it still accounts for only about
6',41, of their total foreign purchases.
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Wester;: Europe's Role
41. In contrast to those of the United States, Western Pacific
economic ties with Western Europe are not very extensive or important.
Although Japanese exports to the area have increased sharply in recent years,
the West European countries keep a careful watch on Jal.an's sales and
have prevented any major market penetration. In 1970, for example, even
though Jap?mesc sales to the EC jumped by 35%, they still accounted for
only about s'% of total EC imports and less than 7% of overall Japanese
sales. Similarly, EC exports to Japan make up only a small part of foreign
sales - about 2% in 1970. Moreover, these proportions have not changed
much since the early 1960s.
42. Western Europe's importance as a trading partner with the rest
of the region has tended to cikcline over the years. Most of this loss has
been between European powers and their former colonies. In contrast with
its former territories in Africa, France has lost most of its trade with
Indochina. In the early 1950s, for example, 757 of Indochina's imports
came from France, but by 1970 France was an insignificant buyer or seller
in the region. Indonesian purchases from the Netherlands declined from
12% of total imports in the early 1950s to less than 51,1o in 1970, and
the Dutch market takes about the same proportion of Indonesian exports.
43. Even more striking is the declining position of the United
Kingdom's trade with its former colonies and with Commonwealth countries
in the region. Excluding Japanese exports, as recently as 1960 the United
Kingdom was the Western Pacific's number one overseas market, largely
on the basis of its purchases from Australia, New. Zealand, Malaysia, 1-Iong
Kong, and Singapore. Since then, however, its purchases from these
countries have stagnated in absolute terms, and its relative importance has
dwindled as these nations increasingly turned to the United States and Japan
for their export growtf , Because of the slow growth in UK demand, for
example, Australian exports to that market actually declined between 1960
and 1970, and during that time Japan replaced the United Kingdom as
Australia's leading export market, while the United States replaced it as
the leading import supplier.
44. Direct investment by Western Europe in the Western Pacific is
another matter. The United Kingdom is still investing very large nuns in
Australia -- almost $400 million in 1970 - and is second only to the United
States as a foreign investor there. The French, for their part, are developing
nickel mines on New Caledonia where total investments will amount to
some $800 million between 1970 and 1976, and Paris has spent large stuns
in establishing a nuclear test site in French Polynesia. In addition, the West
Europeans, facing increasing competition from Hong Kong. Taiwanese, and
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South Korean manufacturers in world markets, are now following the lead
of the United States and Japan in moving some of their production facilities
to the region.
45. In recent years, Singapore has been a favorite spot for the
development of overseas production facilities by West Europeans. In 1970,
for example, large firms such as Phillips of Holland and Plessey of the United
Kingdom decided to set up new factories there to produce various electronic
components, while Rollci Werke of West Germany is moving its entire
production of 35-mm cameras to Singapore to be in a more favorable
position to compete with the Japanese in third country markets. In addition
to Singapore, West European firms are also moving into Taiwan at a fast
pace. Indeed, about one-half of Taipei's new investment approvals in 1971
represented West European capital. Although there is little European
investment in South Korea, countries such as West Germany, France, and
Italy are providing increasing amounts of commercial loans to
export-oriented firms there.
The Future
46. From the US point of view, trans-Pacific economic ties are likely
to become increasingly important during the 1970s. Japan will 1nake further
inroads into the US domestic market as new product lines are developed,
but at the same time will remain one of out most rapidly growing export
markets. Direct capital investment flows are likely to be a much more
important feature of US-Japanese relations than in the past. A gradual
increase in US investment in Japan is expected because Tokyo is easing
restrictions on capital inflows. Probably more dynamic will be Japanese
investment in the United States. The recent removal of Japanese controls
on capital outflows coincides with a growing interest in investment in the
United States.. More and more of this activity will be in productive facilities,
47. The Western Pacific LDCs will continue making strong inroads
in the US market. As wage rates in the United States go up, competition
from abroad, especially in industries requiring a large labor input, will
intensify, and the number of US firms moving abroad can be expected
to grow. The wage gap is expected to increase even with wages in the Pacific
Basin LDCs growing more than three times faster than those in the United
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States. The recent currency realignment will not reverse this trend, because
many Pacific LDCs devalued their currencies along with dollar. The Mexican
border region, because of its nearness to the US market, will probably also
attract more US firms planning to produce for the American market. Spain
and southern Europe may also become more important, but few other LDCs
enjoy the combination of factors that make the Western Pacific so attractive
to US businessmen. US firms are also likely to open tin more plants in
the region to produce goods for the Far East market.
This type of activity is likely to become even
more important in the 1970s.
48. Like the United States, Japan will continue to experience a
growing shift to overseas operations, especially in nearby countries. Japan
is already losing its competitive position to others in the area because of
its rapidly rising wages, and Tokyo's recent revaluation will tend to speed
.tile process. As Japan continues to concentrate on more sophisticated
products, the LDCs will move up the industrial scale. Taiwan, for example,
is already moving into production of fairly sophisticated electronic
equipment. Nevertheless, Tokyo can be expected to continue protecting
its domestic industries from low-cost producers, and, for Japan, the shift
of industry overseas will be geared principally to maintaining sales in third
countries, especially the United States. As for the southern tier of countries,
Japan will continue to import a large share of its raw material needs from
them. Although Tokyo has shown some interest in developing raw materials
resources in Soviet Siberia, Tokyo is moving slowly in this direction, and
no shift away from traditional Pacific Basin suppliers can be expected for
at least five years and probably much longer.
49. A new development in Basin activity will be growing economic
ties among the LDCs in the Western Pacific. Essentially, this will involve
trade between the export-oriented manufacturing countries on the one hand
and the raw materials suppliers on the other. Taiwan and South Korea,
for example, are beginning to draw more heavily on countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines for needed raw materials and at the same
time are supplying more of the types of manufactured goods wanted by
the LDCs in the area. While these trade links will no doubt grow fairly
rapidly in the coming years, the amounts involved will remain relatively
small. Taiwan's exports to Indonesia, for example, jumped 165% in 1970
buL still accounted for only 2% of Taiwan's total foreign sales and 3% of
Indonesia's imports.
50. Western Europe will also play a more important economic role
in the Western Pacific but still a minor one. Some West European countries
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are already beginning to invest in export-oriented industries in the Western
Pacific, and the process is likely to accelerate. As with the Japanese,
however, most of this activity will probably be aimed at selling in third
country markets. For their own markets, the West Europeans are looking
more and more toward countries such as Spain and Greece as sources of
inexpensive manufactured goods. Because of their special ties with the EC,
these countries have a strong advantage over the Far East in EC markets.
In addition, Western Europe is also looking to stable countries such as
Australia for a growing share of its mineral needs.
51. The re-emergence of the PRC on the world scene is unlikely to
affect economic trends already developing in the Pacific Basin for many
years. China's foreign trade will continue to be constrained by emphasis
on economic self-sufficiency and balanced trade. In addition, Peking's efforts
to minimize foreign indebtedness probably will continue to preclude the
use of large-scale credits as a means of boosting trade. Undoubtedly an
initial spurt will occur in US-PRC trade from the present insignificant base,
but overall trade will still be unimportant. Trade with other Pacific Basin
countries will likely continue to expand slowly as in the past. For Australia
and Canada, trade with the PRC has already stagnated and is still based
largely on wheat sales.
52. In short, the United States and Japan will remain the keystones
of economic prosperity in the Pacific Basin. The region's dependence on
both countries for markets and capital is likely to continue growing, and
the trend toward economic integration will probably continue and may
accelerate. Japan will remain the chief growth market for raw materials
coming from the United States and the southern tier, while the US market
will remain the chief one for Western Pacific exports of manufactured goods.
This will bring both problems and benefits to the United States. So long
as other Pacific Basin countries register rapid economic growth, they will
remain major growth markets for US exports of agricultural and
manufactured goods, but their future economic performance in large part
depends on their access to the US market. This will mean a continuing
growth in US imports from the region and a further shift in production
facilities from the United States to overseas areas.
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
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Million US $
1960
19E1
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Japan
4,055
4,236
4,917
5,453
6,674
8,458
9,784
10,450
12,982
16,003
19,333
24,085
Australia
1,962
2,324
2,345
2,804
2,941
3,006
3,171
3,478
3,527
4,217
4,764
5,227
China
1,960
1,530
1,525
1,570
1,750
2,035
2,210
1,945
1,945
2,030
2,050
2,400
Malaysia
1,187
1,060
1,168
1,096
1,105
1,236
1,256
1,216
1,347
1,651
1,687
1,630
New Zealand
847
794
798
910
1,074
1,007
1,076
933
1,010
1,212
1,225
1,359
Indonesia
841
788
682
696
724
708
714
770
872
995
1,187
1,307
Philippines a/
560
500
556
727
742
768
828
821
857
855
1,062
1,118
Hong Kong
477
490
552
639
738
838
955
1,117
1,405
1,753
2,058
2,291
Thailand
408
477
458
466
593
622
678
681
658
708
697
779
Taiwan
164
196
218
332
433
450
536
641
802
1,049
1,562
2,020
Indochina b/
157
135
112
167
137
141
93
103
107
94
77
N.A.
South Pacific
Islands
121
131
108
139
165
158
172
182
241
287
372
N.A.
Singapore
71
73
138
147
168
241
314
362
455
546
595
N.A.
South Korea
33
41
55
87
119
175
250
320
455
622
835
1,068
Others c/
122
128
129
149
145
179
174
184
206
218
217
N.A.
TOTAL 12.965 12,903 13.751 15.382 17.508 20.022 22,211 23.203 26,969 32,240 37.721 44,500_d/
a. Based-o-n-Tina trade data whit in some years substantially understate exports that exclude smuggling.
b. Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam.
c. Brunei. Macau, and the Ryu'syus.
d. Estimated.
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71ble 2
)esters Pacific It;orts
M`11icr. C5 5
1960
19,51
1952
1953
1964
1965
1365
1357
1563
1969
1372
T37T
Japan
4,491
5.911
5,637
6.741
7,344
3,175
3,53,3
Tt,S72
12,333
45,235
13,333
13,-27
+wstralii
2,704
2,393
2.551
2,742
3.31)
1.757
3.53:
1.?T3
4.331,0
4.337
3,,;1-
-,::3
China
2.030
1,495
1,153
1.21.l
1.473
1,345
2.'}}5
1,33
,323
t,3}
2,, ,,
Malaysia
9111,
927
933
t,043
1,:35
t,t,4
T.,3:
T,TiT
T,177
1,412
,44:
New Zealand
793
374
745
3Ce
96^.
1,34}
t,(-435
954
393
C".3
7,_44
3i:
Indonesia
574
7)4
641,
322
6)1
633
5e7
333
331
33
1.T15
::
Philippines
653
673
655
637
351
3)4
957
1.172
1.23:
1.254
,23,
Hong Kong b/
713
11x7
731
1,741
1,1)3
1.243
T.37'
1.335
,122
2,C}5
2.455
,3,7
Thailand
453
435
546
613
i3
733
3'}t
T^,a7
, TS,;
1,2-42
'.2)
'.235
Taivan
237
32e
314
3!42
424
555
622
3:i
333
.213
1.3:1
Indochina c/
343
:53
3?T
422
i
5.3
Sty
533
319
323
South 7acLftc
Islands
71,24
112
?16
133
T7}
19)
T3
235
23)
237
32'
`t..X.
Singapore b/
Ii}
439
453
554
421
576
73')
):;
7,173
1.43
1.353
s..~_
South Korea
344
115
422
55,
4114
443
7T,
335
1,45)
11321
1,334
e.33i
Others d/
134
13)
239
257
Z'Y
}25
422
432
152
325
3 3i
n.:k
TOTAL
15. 137
t5?
1 5 , D7
'372 3
2'J'.5.
2-2 -221
7>.5:..
2
) L . 1 L )
3
.253
a. C.I.T. baste.
b. Rscatas4 1s7atts.
c. Cssbodta. Laos. a.3 Sc,41.a 7tatasa
4 3rdast. Macsv, sa: %ZS Krtsi7u0.
s. tscisatad.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
Swath X~:ea
Host; Rarrj
:atwan
China
9htl1Pptn+It
irs.2arAsta
Dlalay%la
StngapArs
Australis
X+w E4aland
t rv3r~ch t r.a r r
:R.at:art
se.-4th 9act'tr
tsland#
Ot:wr W'astera
Pacific d'
tr,
aPaM.
t:nited 71tatas
% -AL
TOTAL TO 'tM:ttL?^
R a
u u
a 4 w )
l ?- 21 Ili J
a -- . J
w ? w
u a n
e
S - o a
w u
> X a ! <
> 21 A ?r a 14 Df - e ;4 ; ; w Y
.14 44 44
a 1# w Lt
L ;2 SC ; -- ;:J e )
K i . w E a t . +~ -i 'i i
.U2
a . A a w A . w t t
20 ?2 1291 ?t i til 1i 1L)
4 124 11 2S1 235 14Aw 1'! : o i 12t#
< ?" .. W
ti :5t 1 lil
t J ~3 It;. .. .
?. Aa ^ am ttl' atsa.4 t.? 1q 4, t4t'f? .Jets, t. r' traetft 0,0
t. T'a wet -r e,aq ..tt 'tis 't.t Novi
-. Ratatf .114.141 tt?t?
c. Caala4ta. Lai*. .Zt ";.t% 7t.4n6s.
A. araaat. ma ;r?. IN! IN? A,44440.
. ? t^.~ at ante a7 t 11.l 't.)tt! I.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
'Y.e i : w C'^? v' ,h; .. q:ta: - .s . C actor M.a ..t
?E-~F i,
3
C
S+uth Xacaa
Hr~r.. Rana
TaIVan
D
a # h
A `? A
v a a y
e e.
344 1; :l
Chltta x 5 x -- S
Philirpi:.at 2 S :i : '-
Indronartia
ltalaytia x 1:~ ?t: 'i'S
SLn p.orq 11 i7 H] v. a.
Astt[alia
New Zealand if
< x
IrAl"htna C/ tl Si iS a x t
Thailand 3 ES :S x
Sout-'t Pact: tc
Ialands
x .. x a It V
Other 11.7tt4Pn
Pacific d/ x i E: :i F <
S1:b::!.al
Japan 2:11 2I5 2S3 tars S7C
t: n i t l ; t a t.n t ilia 443 S47 471 102
TOTAL
TOTAL TO IYC?E' 31) 2.'t54 1 .7r2 :..~, ?._iF: _ ..~?
a
St
i.
.;'I
t
<
N
t
<
?if
s;
i
<
<
t?t
-
? '; _
i
EdF -
--
r
N
tl
<
'
t:
:t,F
)i
t
t
SaP
SI'i
\Ih
N
_
-?
<
<
:t
.
33
N
N
N
v
;{t
;n:
<
--
N
<
all
s.t
A
.1.4 .1
c
:1
Y
t
Y
11~C1
Z'1
Lx
~;~
- .
1.1.5
274
B11
?`i
6 2
all
9F3
..
S.!14iI
..
:.",+~.''
a. AS a aattl 'last ta. 3.91t4tl:1 ,tats. 'a:'.o. *1 t"a.ttnt. ~ma ~a~a;? ..a. 1, s.t.i ~? tl~. -.a;s aso?.?i.
1. )lately aatt.3e1 Itad..
c. Cas'Sod la. .ae', aid 1aats 7t.tn aa.
4. Items l. Mac am. 4134 S.
I-F414
S. salad oa tia3. 44% 41 al txdctttit totatttr0.
? ti:j of mite r? - - -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
1960
1961
1962
1363
1364
1465
4)54
T)h'
')i3
T939
13',
T)''
Japan
1.325
1,731
1.479
1,637
1,3)t
42
2.312
2.i);
2.334
}.1),
1,i;.
1.:53
Philippines
294
331
265
32')
356
333
139
43.
4)6
3't
}?3
;t,3
Indonesia
95
134
1?^
1)9
69
42
5,
53
14'
:~'
244
33}
Malaysia
13
23
32
24
3t
4)
4a
43
3t
3:
5'
't
Australia
336
316
139
437
6.5
694
63
3)3
3'2
433
)3i
t
Hong Kong
121
127
13C
143
135
199
23
253
3:4
Sot
1,5
t:4
1
New Zealand
75
63
57
72
37
126
TT-
TT4
1)
'3;
Thailand
62
62
96
34
53
523
Tit
Tai
T43
'3,
Tot
Taiwan
110
136
129
t33
'ti
172
T37
333
33'
3)3
3':
z
Singapore
41
47
51
52
46
5:)
~'
33
1)5
532
243
3',
South Korea
153
152
215
232
t'}x
2))
223
Ott
311,
3))
i3'
i9'
Indochina a/
61
80
119
137
144
2^.1
}22
3 3
23t
294
3.43
3))
South Pacific
Islands
13
14
1:
14
23
26
25
35
4d
t3
others b/
23
25
;'4
37
41
42
45
31
4i
41
43
32
Subtotal
2,763
3.255
3.^:?3
3.437
3.335
4.217
4.-'&
3.343
4.452
T3
3.3)4
3 .1,t
TOTAL TO ',k-RU
2x.375
21.74
2 5,
23.1?2
Lh 6
27 1 127
: _
2
z'
... _
3'.;+,
a. Cambodia. Laos, and South 7:eC?^.an.
b. Brunei, Macau. and the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
1960
1961
1962
1963
1364
1365
1365
1};'
'313
114)
'i';
?)"
Japan
1,127
1,016
1.351
1,494
1.763
2,411
2.364
1,.33}
t.3t
4,31)
5.3'
',:i'
Philippines
307
321
321
344
336
335
393
331
432
3)2
t':
t)d
Indonesia
216
163
135
113
17,
165
173
132
`-i
t}t
3:
Malayaia
156
149
133
173
147
173
177
136
2.i
3u'
:',;
26)
Australia
144
181
233
314
274
305
393
471
430
5.33
3.r
1t)
Hong Kong
125
169
183
249
342
416
433
633
9J}
itt
)}1
New Zealand
117
131
141
172
443
133
13?
156
T35
Tt
Thailand
Taiwan
56
20
37
42
31
5"
33
53
24
77
41
33
71'
3
15i
3T
233
):
316
3&
} -
Singapore
19
14
1
t~
12
11
13
16
:)
53
3
;
South Korea
5
6
1!
22
3'
53
33
t'.
tat
:3'
ti:
Indochina b/
South Pacific
Islands
Others c;
3
6
V,'
10
3
1 t
12
T'
T1
':
'3
w
Subtotal
2.313
2.266
2.741
2.364
3.316
4.26
5.:33
5.24'
6.313
9
i
).
;'
X51
TOTAL FROM WORLD
15.018
14.714
16.3 '
17.133
73 E34
21.36"
25.5 2
75.i 2
a. F.O.B.
b. Cambodia. Laos, and South 71,taaa.
c. Brunet, Macau. and the Sty yus.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
1960
1961
1952
!1363
1364
1353 1'Ii56
135
1959
t"53
13
1}7t
United States
1,083
1,067
1.410
1,507
1,342
2,1173 2.370
3.')12
4.136
4.353
5.3t;
,51t
Hong Kong
156
154
1.32
246
232
239
343
ti-3
615
731
Philippines
154
123
123
350
131
2411 273
3^3
41
t'6
t t
t5
Australia
144
100
133
153
234
313 2)3
351
46
t"5
t3'1
Pacific Latin
America a/
134
134
123
172
219
253 236
249
333
421
t
573
Canada
119
117
125
125
167
214 234
174
3t6
31
543
373
Thailand
118
134
143
131
213
219 3.31
341
345
43t
44)
Est
Indonesia
110
154
115
93
122
217 123
135
117
tic
31c
t31
7.
Taiwan
102
95
113
107
133
213 255
323
t72
,y ,J ,;
)25
South Korea
100
126
133
167
149
130 333
4,17
5:}
757
313
3-s
7
Other Western
Pacific b/
95
114
134
136
139
178 232
263
271
313
373
5t1
Singapore
87
102
105
112
1 1 4
124 14 3
16
2 :'3
31 3
t2 3
3,:
Indochina c/
78
82
73
51
45
51 153
134
224
255
143
Malaysia
34
35
44
56
59
75 39
as
104
133
166
2.'4
New Zealand
24
22
27
44
47
61 59
64
63
30
1T4
12.3
South Pacific
Islands
6
7
7
11
17
19 23
25
23
42
62
74
China
3
17
33
62
153
243 313
233
325
331
3c)
513
Subtotal
2,547
2,539
3,057
3,377
4.102
5,364 6.433
5 3"4
3-333
TOTAL TO "WORLI3
4.055
4.23E
4.917
5.'45.'
8.57.
;.~:5.? n;
:h. 03
_3.3;
..;5
a. Mexico. Central America. Ecuador. Columbia. Peru. Chtte. and Panama.
b. Brunei. Macau. and the Ryufvus.
c. Caabodia. Laos, and South Vietnam.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7
1960
1961
1962
1953
1354
1365
19 5
1367
*963
1353
7;
United States
1,545
2,079
1,909
2,977
2,336
2,355
2,633
3,212
3,52'
4.13
5.56;
4.35"
Kong Kong
23
24
19
23
2)
35
47
53
54
63
3:
-3
Philippines
Australia
159
344
156
452
134
435
230
514
224
532
254
532
326
630
37i
742
333
321
43.3
T,213
3 U
,563
513 15
1,' ?
Pacific Latin
America b/
194
308
347
4C6
476
523
379
6T;
723
732
Canada
204
266
255
319
379
65':
659
32}
1. :i
Thailand
72
73
72
91
131
in
1 .~~
1):;
23'2
Indonesia
70
85
91
105
131
149
176
147
252
Taiwan
64
68
61
123
141
157
'47
137
T51
13J
231
234
South Korea
18
22
28
27
42
41
72
42
122
Other Western
Pacific c/
26
33
44
64
63
32
7'9
76
33
Singapore
14
25
23
22
27
33
3
3`
62
66
36
115
Indochina d/
13
6
7
10
12
14
14
.2
;
11
Malaysia
271
274
233
293
236
262
307
334
343
4;'
New Zealand
32
50
34
55
57
61
113
112
122
Ti4
'33
162
South Pacific
26
25
21
23
44
39
39
47
74
33
1;'
140
21
31
47
75
153
225
306
259
224
234
254
322
Subtotal
3,096
3,982
3.758
4,468
5,038
5,281
6,176
7,150
7,935
9._3J
1,353
12 ? l6
TOTAL FROM WORLD
4,491
5,811
5.637
6,741
7,9!4
8.176
9.53'3
IT .6 2
12..'?3
15.36
3.i 6
L .r"_~
a. C.I.F.
b. Mexico, Central America. =cuador, Coluabia, ?eru. Chile, and ?j=4:4.4-
C. Brunei. Macau. and r!,e RTI.XC4us.
d. Cambodia, Laos. and South +ietnsa.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030073-7