AFGHANISTAN: OPIUM PRODUCTION AND TRADE
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030057-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 18, 2011
Sequence Number:
57
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 1, 1972
Content Type:
IM
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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
International Narcotics Series No, 10
Afghanistan: Opium Production and Trade
Confidential
ER IM 72-57
April 1972
Copy No.
3' 1
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the naticnal
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate if Intelligence
April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
AFGHANISTAN: OPIUM PRODUCTION AND TRADE
Summary
1. Opium poppy cultivation and opium trade, although illegal, are
deeply entrenched in Afghanistan. Poppy is grown in various parts of the
country, but cultivation is concentrated in the south-central region and in
the eastern tribal areas bordering on Pakistan. Opium output probably was
about 100 metric tons or more in 1971. Addiction is not a serious problem
and domestic consumption is small. Local tribesmen smuggle most of the
opium into Iran. There is no evidence that significant amounts of Afghan
opium currently are smuggled beyond Iran.
2. Afghai 'stan is a signatory to the 1961 UN Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and prohibits opium production and trafficking. There is,
however, little enforcement of existing statutes. Kabul recently has indicated
its, willingness to cooperate with other nations on narcotics matters and
has taken limited steps toward improving enforcement procedures. Progress
probably will be slow, however, if only because of.Kabul's limited funds
and ability to enforce production and trafficking laws. Moreover, the King
regards the Pushtun tribes, which grow much of Afghanistan's opium, as
important pillars of his political support and is therefore reluctant to move
against them.
Discussion
Production
3. Based on the fragmentary and incomplete information available,
Afghan opium production was about 100 tons in 1971 and possibly higher.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
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There is no licit production of poppies or opium derivatives in Afghanistan,
nor any indication of illicit processing into morphine base or heroin.
Afghanistan is a signatory to the 1961 UN Single Convention, and
production and trafficking are proscribed by statute, but Kabul is simply
unable to provide adequate enforcement.
4. Poppy is grown in various parts of the country, on small plots -
one-quarter hectare or less - almost entirely by Pushtun farmers, and in
a variety of soils and climates, ranging from the dryer and lower elevations
characteristic of the Helmand valley to the mountainous tribal areas ir the
nog theast. Afghan poppy farmers generally broadcast poppy seed in October
and November. Plants mature in 4 to 5 months, including a brief dormani
stage, and lancing the capsule begins in April. In the higher mountain regions
where elevations exceed 5,000 feet, poppy growers often delay planting
until March. Poppy capsules normally are incised vertically as many as five
times during the harvest. In general, lanced capsules are not marketed, but
the seeds are collected from the pods and processed into cooking oil.
5. Three principal growing areas account for virtually all opium
produced in Afghanistan; the south-central region encompassing Helmand
and Qandahar; the region immediately south and east of Kabul (centering
on Jalalabad); and the northeast border area (see the map). A small amount
of poppy is also cultivated in Herat. Much of the growing area is inaccessible,
par'licularly the more remote northeast tribal areas. Consequently, almost
all available data such as yields, area planted, and price's are based on'
observations made in the Helmand valley and parts of Nangarhar Province.
6. Excluding the Badakhshan area in the tribal northeast, an
estimated 1,600 hectares were sown for the 1971 poppy crop. About half
the planted area was in the south-central Helmand region, more than
two-fifths near Kabul and the Pakistan border, and the remainder in Herat
Province. Opium production from these areas was at least 50 tons in 1971.
.This implies an average yield of about 30 kilograms (kgs) per hectare,
somewhat higher than the average in Indio and considerably higher than
reported yields in Turkey and Iran. The reason for such unusually high
yields is not known, but it probably results from considerably more moisture
and impurities included in the Afghan opium production. Output in
Badakhshan Province, the largest of the principal growing areas, probably
accounted for an additional 50 tons. The quality of much Afghan opium
is poor compared with that of nearby countries. In Afghanistan's settled
areas, the morphine content averages only around 8%, with some better
quality up to 10%. Morphine content in the more remote tribal areas may
average 4% or less, similar to illicit opium produced in Pakistan's Northwest
Frontier Province.
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Helmand Valley Landscape
7. Except for hashish, opium earnings per hectare in Afghanistan
exceed those from all other cash crops by a wide margin. Poppy fields
yield an average of about 30 :cgs of opium latex per hectare and prices
average $10-$12 per kg, giving the farmer about $300-$360 per hectare.
This contrasts sharply with gross earnings per hectare from fruit, which
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Opium Poppy Growing Areas in Afghanistan
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average about $175. Hashish, on the other hand, brings as much as $600
per hectare. Earnings from wheat, the primary food crop, range between
S40 and $110 per hectare. Most farmers grow wheat despite its lower yield
because it requires far less labor time than does poppy and because of
the need to produce food for their own consumption in the largely
subsistence-oriented economy.
8. Data are not available on consumption or the size of the addict
population, but opium addiction apparently is not a problem. Consumption
is confined largely to medical and quasi-medical uses by peasants in the
growing areas and to some addicts, largely foreigners, in the cities. Cultural
and cost factors have precluded the development of a significant addict
population in Afghanistan. Both Islamic and civil law in Afghanistan forbids
the use of intoxicants or mind-influencing drugs, a prohibition enforceable
by the court system. Moreover, relatively low-priced licitly imported
morphine, codeine, and cocaine are readily available in the cities and
preferred to the high-priced opium.
9. Illicit opium sales are almost exclusively to Iran, where the large
addict population provides a ready market for Afghan opium. The sparsely
settled mountain and desert areas in Afghanistan are well suited for
smuggling operations. Indeed, smuggling is a way of life in Afghanistan.
The population along the Afghan-Iranian border is basically nomadic.
Families usually have relatives living on both sides of the border and
routinely crocs back and forth without official sanction. Moreover,
sheep-raising is the tribesmen's main occupation, and they often cross the
border with their flocks in search of grazing land. Traffickers have built
close relationships with these smugglers over the decades. In addition to
paying for lodging, they also bring goods to trade in local markets.
Improvements in the road network in the 1960s probably increased
trafficking by truck, but tribal caravans still dominate the trade.
10. Growers turn their opium stocks over to, clan leaders or landlords
who arrange for shipment to Iran. In some areas, however, farmers sell
their opium to middlemen - local businessmen and merchants - who
contract with tribesmen to deliver the opium to the border area. The tribes
most heavily involved in the traffic through Afghanistan to the Iranian
border are the Ghilzai (Pushtun), S-hinwari (Pushtun), Baluchis, and
Turkmen. The Ghilzai carry opium from east-central Afghanistan. Shinwaris
operate mainly near the Pakistani border, but probably carry opium into
Iran as well. Western portions of the Baluchistan desert are the usual areas
of operation for Baluchi caravans, while the Turkmen route is across
northern Afghanistan. The major border-crossing area is in the vicinity of
the road from Herat, Afghanistan, to Meshed, Iran.
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Mountain Area Near Herat
11. Lack of an adequate narcotics enforcement effort in Afghanistan
has facilitated opium trafficking to Iran over the years. Afghan customs
operate only two checkpoints along the 550-mile border. Local officials
(mainly poorly paid police and other civil servants susceptible to bribes)
actively aid and abet such trafficking. In recent years, however, Iran has
tightened border surveillance. Opium seized by Iranian authorities near the
Afghan border in 1970 amounted to 12.5 tons, compared with an average
of only 7.2 tons in the six previous years. Iran's moves have reportedly
led to a shift in border-crossing patterns away from the major routes. Also,
caravans are larger and more heavily armed, and the tribesmen, aware that
they are likely to be executed if they are caught in Iran, are prepared
to offer resistance. Middlemen often hold smugglers' families as hostages
to insure they do not surrender to Iranian border forces or fail to return
with proceeds from the opium sale. Most of the opium smuggled into Iran
from the South Asia region almost certainly originates in Afghanistan, and
some probably also transits Afghanistan from northwest Pakistan.
12. Poppy cultivation was banned in 1957, and narcotics enforcement
activities since then have been vested in the Ministry of Interior in Kabul.
A special national enforcement agency was created within the ministry by
a 1970 anti-smuggling statute to oversee narcotics violations, but this agency
is not yet functioning effectively. Neither the police nor the gendarmerie
have been seriously concerned with narcoticF matters, and only occasional
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arrests have been made, all for trafficking. Both groups are preoccupied
with national security and lack qualified narcotics personnel and adequate
facilities. The gendarmerie operate primarily in border areas, but are
'concentrated at Afghanistan's few border checkpoints. The Customs
Department under the Ministry of Finance also has enforcement
responsibility in opium matters, but its participation is limited to search
and discovery of contraband at border customs stations.
13. Kabul in recent months has indicated a willingness to cooperate
with other nations on the opium problem. Two ministerial-level committees
were set up in January 1972 to formulate narcotics control programs. One
of the committees is charged with supervising social and economic aspects
:;f narcotics control (including cultivation and crop substitution) while the
other is responsible for combating illicit traffic and strengthening the police
and gendarmerie by upgrading equipment inventories and customs con'uols.
These committees also are to provide liaison with foreign governments and
advisers on specific control programs. In February 1972, after a year of
negotiations, Kabul acceded to a US request and allowed the establishment
of an office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs within the
US Embassy to cooperate with the Afghan police on narcotics matters.
14. Afghanistan faces economic and political constraints in instituting
an effective opium control or eradication program. In some areas, opium
provides virtually the only cash income to the farmer. There is no substitute
crop - except for hashish - that can be grown under existing agricultural'
conditions that would at least equal earnings from opium. If cash subsidies
are required to induce farmers to cease illicit poppy cultivation, most of
the funding for such a program would have to come from outside sources,
given Afghanistan's limited resources. Furthermore, with the government's
strained resources currently focused on relief of. the 1970 and 1971
droughts, it is unlikely that narcotics control will be given much of a
priority, especially since Afghanistan does not have a serious addiction
problem.
15. The relationships between the King, the parliament, and the tribes
present an even greater obstacle to narcotics control. The Pushtun tribal
areas in Afghanistan are only nominally administered by the central
government. Afghan tribes enjoy special privileges, such as exemption from
taxes and conscription, and deal directly with the royal family. The King
regards the Pushtun tribes as important pillars of support and would be
reluctant to incur their hostility by prohibiting poppy cultivation and opium
trade.
16. In any event, Kabul certainly lacks the resources and probably
the resolve to combat the opium problem alone. Some aspects of the
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problem such as border enforcement can be resolved most effectively
through an international or at least a regional approach. Afghanistan is not
a member of INTERPOL and is not actively participating in intcrnational
'groups currently concerned with narcotics matters. In March 1972, Kabul
sent an official participant to the Geneva conferences on amending the 1961
Single Convention, but the delegate served largely in an observer capacity
and showed little real interest in cooperating on narcotics problems. Until
some meaningful agreement is achieved with its neighbors, there probably
is little Afghanistan can do to improve the situation.
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