SOVIET MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY IN THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700020037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy In The Third World
Secret
ER IM 71-183
September 1971
Copy. No. , m
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 753 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transinissijn or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized p:.son is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1971
SOVIET MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY
IN THE THIRD WORLD
Introduction
1. For the past decade and a half, the Soviet Union has employed
military aid as a primary instrument for expanding its influence in Third
World countries. Although a relative newcomer to the international arms
trade, the USSR has extended an estimated $6.7 billion in arms aid to
these countries since the mid-1950s. As the program has grown, Moscow
has provided increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to many recipients.
This, in turn, has required the employment in these countries of growing
numbers of Soviet advisory personnel. Early in 1970, Moscow departed
sharply from its role solely as a purveyor of arms and becaiie a direct
participant in Egypt's conflict with Israel. This memorandum analyzes the
characteristics of the Soviet arms aid program and assesses its effectiveness
in relation to Soviet objectives in the Third World.
Discussion
OriLln and Motivations of the Soviet Arms Aid Program
2. The radical change in Soviet policy toward the less developed
countries (LDCs) that followed Stalin's death in 1953 placed emphasis on
extending Soviet influence through the overt channels of bilateral state
relations. In contrast to the traditional Soviet policy of fostering militant
local Communist parties, the post-Stalin leadership moved to cultivate good
relations with the legitimate governments of these countries. This tactical
shift presumably reflected Moscow's assessment that the most effective
strategy for establishing and expanding its influence and for eroding that
of the West in Third World countries lay in, associating itself with the strong
nationalist and anti-Western sentiment in many of these states. The Soviet
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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leadership thus gave priority to gaining entree in the LDCs by establishing
diplomatic relations with them and by offering political and material support
for their national objectives. Simultaneously, local Communist organizations
subservien' to Moscow's directives were restrained from overt revolutionary
activity that would offend these countries.
3. The leaders of many Third World countries, motivated by their
own political and economic aspirations, were receptive to the post-Stalin
changes in Moscow's policies and generally were prepared to accept Soviet
foreign assistance. This receptivity was enhanced by the unwillingness of
many LDCs to associate their newly won independence with the foreign
policy objectives of the West. The USSR needed only to present itself as
an additional source of political, economic, and military support to find
a number of willing recipients.
4. In this milieu, foreign aid immediately became an important
foreign policy tool for expanding Soviet influence in Third World countries.
The USSR has extended more than $14.5 billion in military and economic
aid to these countries since 1954, of which about 45% ($6.7 billion) has
consisted of military assistance. Moscow has used the two programs either
jointly or separately to pursue its objectives in recipient countries.
5. Military aid generally has been an effective Soviet instrument for
establishing a position of influence in the Third World, usually providing
an immediate and lasting impact on the recipient country. By providing
such assistance, Moscow became an advocate of a recipient's national
aspirations, able to exploit this position to the detriment of Western
interests. Arab-Israeli tensions, Yemen's conflict with the United Kingdom
over Aden, Pakistan's disputes with Afghanistan and India, and Indonesia's
territorial conflicts are examples of opportunities initially exploited by the
Soviet Union. The LDCs generally have sought Soviet arms for use against
their neighbors and only occasionally, as in Ceylon in 1971, have they
procured Soviet weapons primarily to maintain internal security.
6. In addition to the broader objective of undermining Western
influence in recipient countries, Moscow has used its military aid program
in an effort to weaken Western strategic interests and to eliminate Western
military bases and alliances adjacent to Soviet borders. The USSR has sought
as a minimum to neutralize the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO) and SEATO
and thus disrupt the West's "northern tier" of defenses against the USSR.
Moscow provided arms (as well as economic aid) to Afghanistan to ensure
that Kabul remained neutral and well-disposed toward the USSR. Soviet
aid to India was intended to diminish India's reliance on the West and
to extend the Soviet presence into the subcontinent.
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7. Soviet arms aid to Southeast Asian countries was designed to
strengthen Soviet influence at the expense not only of Western but also
of Chinese Communist interests. This was true of aid to Indonesia, the
Pathet Lao, and, to some extent, the Viet Cong.
Magnitude and Character of the Program
Pattern and Distribution of Soviet Arms Aid
8. The Soviet Union launched its military program in 1955 -
initially using Czechoslovakia as an intermediary - when it began arms
shipments to Egypt. Since then, the USSR alone has extended some $6.7
billion in military aid to 29 countries of the Third World (see Table 1).( 1
The UAR and Indonesia account for nearly 50% of total extensions. Six
other countries - India, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Iran, and Afghanistan - have
received most of the rest. By mid-1971, an estimated 85% of Soviet military
aid commitments had been delivered. Drawings in the late 1960s averaged
about $400 million annually, then reached a record high of over $900
million in 1970 as Moscow completed massive deliveries of SAM equipment
to Egypt.
9. Because the Soviet program is in part a response to available
opportunities, and is influenced by the absorptive capacity of the recipients,
the annual magnitude and direction of aid has been highly variable (see
the chart). During 1956-58, agreements were largely with Middle Eastern
countries. A decline in new agreements during 1959 was followed by two
years of sizable commitments, principally to Indonesia, as that country's
dispute with the Netherlands intensified. Agreements concluded during
1962-64 were influenced by Sino-Indian tensions, civil war in Yemen, and
Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia. Most of the commitments since
1966 reflect the continuing arms buildup in the Arab countries in the wake
of the 1967 war with Israel and new extensions to India and Iran.
10. Another important factor influencing the level of new military
aid extensions has beer, the replacement of obsolete equipment. The most
obvious examples have been the periodic replacement of the various
generations of fighter aircraft (MIG15s and 17s with 19s and 21s),
procurement of the TU-16 jet medium bomber and SU-7 fighter bomber
after initial purchases of the IL-28 light bomber, and more widespread use
of the T-54/155 medium tanks, compared with the earlier model T-34 tanks.
Such cycles will continue as an important feature in the Soviet program,
not only because recipient countries continually clamor for more advanced
arms, but also because, as each generation of weapons becomes obsolete
1. Detailed tables on the Soviet military aid program are included in the
Appendix.
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Soviet Military Aid Extended
to Less Developed Countries
1956 - June 1971
Million
Percent
US $
of Total
6,690
100
United Arab Republic
2,135
32
Indonesia
1,092
16
India
768
11
Iraq
722
11
Syria
527
8
Algeria
395
6
Iran
310
5
Afghanistan
280
4
Libya
113
2
Yemen
77
1
Sudan
66
1
Somalia
Others a/
45
1
a. Including Burma, Burundi, Cambodia-,
Ceylon, Congo (B), Cyprus, Equatorial
Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Maldive Islands,
Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Southern
Yemen, Tanzania, and Uganda.
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Soviet Military Aid to Less Developed Countries
Million US S
Cumulative Extensions and Drawings
1 1
1965
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for Scviet requirements, the USSR discontinues its manufacture. In time,
replacement parts become scarce and a country that has a large and varied
inventory of Soviet arms usually has to accept more advanced equipment
coming off Soviet production lines if it is to maintain an up-to-date military
capability.
11. Perhaps the most significant development in the Soviet military
aid program in recent years has been its concentration. In contrast to
Khrushchev's almost indiscriminate extensions to all takers, the
post-Khrushchev regime has tended to place emphasis on the countries
comprising an arc running from the eastern Mediterranean, through the Red
Sea, to the Arabian Sea. In this arc are countries which either control the
strategic Suez waterway, contain the bi lk of the Free World's oil reserves,
or are adjacent to the southern borders of the USSR. These countries
account for about 90% of total Soviet military aid and practically all of
the aid committed in recent years.
Equipment (See the photographs)
12. At least two-thirds of the equipment provided Linder Soviet
military aid agreements is of types that still are in standard use in the
Soviet armed forces. Perhaps half of that equipment is still in current
production in the USSR. These proportions should rise as more advanced
weapon systems are exported.
13. Egypt, moreover, has been provided air defense and other
equipment on a par with the best that is provided the regular Soviet forces.
In 1970, besides being the first non-Communist state to receive the new
SA-3 missile system, as well as improved SA-2 missile equipment, Cairo
received, for the first time, the FROG-7 s' tort range tactical rocket, the
Strela handcarried air defense missile, and the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled
radar-controlled antiaircraft gun. In 1971, the mobile SA-6 missile systen,
and late model Foxbat interceptors were introduced into the country,
although remaining under Soviet contol. In an effort to tighten up the
Egyptian air defense system, the Soviets also have brought into Egypt some
of their latest electronic command and control equipment, Most noteworthy
of this gear are the SWAMP and 'MARKHAM systems which integrate
airborne interceptors, air defense command centers, radar sites, and
antiaircraft gun and missile positions.
14. Soviet military equipment exported to the LDCs is usually unused
and in good condition, although much of- it is classified as used because
it comes from stocks rather than current production. What problems do
arise with Soviet equipment usually occur after the recipients receive it.
During the early years of the program, mistakes occurred frequently - for
example, Arctic gear was sent to the Middle East or weapons were sent
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T-55 MEDIUM TANK
SA-3 (GOA) MISSILE
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FREE ROCKET OVER GROUND (FROG)
SA-6 (GAINFUL) MISSILE
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23-MM SELF-PROPELLED ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN ZSU-23-4
without spare parts - but as the program has matured such problems have
been largely eliminated. Spare parts r^main the major problem. The Soviets
seek to providh spares in the original agreement adequate for anticipated
maintenance over a specified period. The insistent demand by recipients
for additional spare parts probably is attributable to deficient storage and
accounting procedures and abuse of equipment.
Terms of Aid
1 Moscow generally sells its arms at comparatively low prices and
on favorable terms. Repayment usually is made over ten years, after a grace
period of one to three years, at 2% interest. Moreover, the USSR generally
accepts payment in commodities or local currency and frequently has
reduced or postponed payment when the recipient was unable to meet an
annual payment.
16. Discounts from list prices have become an intrinsic feature of
Soviet arms aid to Third World countries, averaging perhaps 40% of the
value of Soviet arms deliveries. Even without the discounts, the list prices
of most types of Soviet arms have been substantially below those charged
for comparable Western equipment.(2) Although discounting probably is
premised on Moscow's assessment of a recipient's ability to pay, political
favoritism also is seen in the variations evident in Soviet practice.
Afghanistan, for example, has received discounts approximating 75%.
2. Soviet prices, for example, range 40% lower for a medium tank to
roughly 50% lower for an advanced fighter aircraft.
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Discounts to Indonesia averaged about 25%, while, arms aid to India has
been conducted largely on a no-discount basis.
The Role of the Est European Countries
17. The military aid programs of the East European countries have
been most modest and are likely to remain so. Of the $800 million in
East European arms extended to the LDCs, nearly 60% was provided during
1955-58 when they were acting primarily as intermediaries for the USSR.
East European arms commitments subsequently dropped sharply and since
1964 have averaged some $50 million annually. The major East European
suppliers have been Czechoslovakia and Poland and the primary recipients
have been Moscow's major clients - the Arab countries, India, and
Indonesia. Their credit terms have been more stringent than those offered
by the USSR; they have insisted on shorter repayment periods and payment
in hard currency, and have given no discount from list prices.
Military Technical Assistance
18. The rapid influx of large quantities of modern military equipment
poses serious problems for the recipients because most of them are short
of trained manpower and skilled technicians. Consequently, the USSR has
had to provide complementary programs of technical assistance embracing
two activities: ? the training in the USSR of military personnel from LDCs
and the sending of military technicians and advisers to countries receiving
military aid. The cumulative cost of such assistance to all recipients since
1956 is estimated to be at least $600 million - adding another 10% or
so to the arms aid program. Most of this expense has been paid on current
account, as only $40 million is known to be coverad by long-term credits.
Trainees
19. Some 26,000 military trainees from LDCs, largely middle-grade
officers, have gone to the USSR for training. About 85% of the trainees
have been from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, and the Arab countries.
Trainees generally are brought to the USSR before delivery of the weapons
and equipment on which they are to be trained. These training programs
range from six weeks to five years, with most of the trainees engaged in
programs lasting less than a year. The longer programs generally include
training at Soviet higher military schools, such as the Frunze Military
Academy of the General Staff.
Advisers
20. Beginning with some 350 Soviet military advisers in the LDCs
in 1956, the number has grown steadily and since 1961 has averaged over
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4,500 annually. Nearly 10,000 Soviet military advisory personnel were
present in recipient countries in mid-1971. Although some of these
personnel serve as technicians to deliver, assemble, and service equipment,
their most important functions are to train local personnel in the operation,
maintenance, and tactical use of equipment. For the larger aid recipients,
courses generally are established in the use of the entire range of armaments
received. Soviet officer,; also serve as instructors in the major military
academies of these countries. In their advisory capacities, Soviet military
officers have played key roles in modernizing and reorganizing the military
establishment of the major recipients.
The Egyptian Aberration
21. Moscow's technical assistance to the UAR after the June 1967
War differed substantially from its standard programs in the rate of
implementation and in the extent of Soviet commitment. This program has
come to resemble the program in Cuba in 1962 and shows that Moscow
is prepared to accept considerable risks in Third World countries where
the stakes are high enough. Along with the rapid replacement of equipment
lost in 1967 came large numbers of Soviet technicians to assemble the.
equipment and to gain Egyptians in its use. These technicians and advisers
penetrated the UAR's military establishment to a depth not previously
experienced in other recipients in an effort to correct operational
deficiencies ^xposed by the June conflict.
22. Perhaps even more critical was the eventual direct assignment of
Soviet forces to man air defense units in tho UAR. As a result of Israeli
air raids deep into Egyptian territory, Nasser prevailed upon the USSR in
January 1970 to provide the UAR with the SA-3 SAM system, th?n
deployed only in the USSR and Eastern Europe. By late spring, at least
15 SA-3 firing battalions had been installed near Cairo and Alexandria. An
estimated 4,000 Soviet military personnel quickly arrived in the UAR to
man these firing units and to provide the necessary ancillary support. By
mid-1971, an estimated 10,000 Soviet military personnel - exclusive of
about 6,000 advisers - were in the country
23. Although Egyptian personnel continue to train on the SA-3
system, it will be some time before they can operate the equipment
effectively on their own. Some Egyptian SA-3 crews may be close to
completing their training or may already be in an operational status. Even
as Egyptian crews achieve operational status, however, large numbers of
Soviet personnel will be required for some time if the system is to operate
at anywhere near its designed maximum level of effectiveness.
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Results of the Program
Soviet Objectives Served
24. As Moscow assesses the returns from 16 years of military aid,
it must conclude that the program has served Soviet objectives well.
Although the USSR has acquired no ideological converts from its foreign
aid, it has gained considerable influence and leverage. Soviet support for
nationalist governments has contributed substantially to the weakening, or
elimination, of Western influence in many countries and has led to an
expansion of Soviet presence into such areas as the Middle East, South
Asia, and North Africa. Moreover, through the procurement of Soviet arms,
a number of states - notably Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Somalia,
and Syria - now are largely or almost totally equipped with Soviet military
equipment and are continually dependent on the USSR for logistical and
technical support.
25. Through its military technical assistance - in conjunction with
economic technical assistance and academic training - the Soviet Union
has exposed many of the nationals of these countries to socialist ideas and
techniques - an exposure which Moscow hopes will influence the
institutional development taking place in the Third World. Moreover, it has
established important relationships with military leaders, as well as junior
officers, who in the future may hold key positions in their countries.
Countries which obtain most of their arms from the Soviet Union have
difficulty balancing Soviet military technical assistance with similar Western
programs because of the sharply reduced contacts with Western
organizations, techniques, and methods.
26. Moscow undoubtedly has experienced its greatest success among
some of the Arab countries. For 16 years the Soviet leadership has taken
advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost to the point of driving out
nearly all Western political influence among its major Arab clients. Cairo's
two defeats by Israel in 1956 and 1967 permitted Moscow to expand its
presence and achieve its greatest degree of influence in the UAR. The USSR
has strengthened its naval presence in the Mediterranean considerably by
virtue of arms aid to the Arab states. Although some Arab recipients
occasionally criticize Moscow's foreign policies, they have, in effect,
retreated from their professed policies of nonalignment and tend to
cooperate with the USSR on many international issues. For example, there
was almost no criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia from the
major Arab arms recipients.
27. Arms aid also has produced considerable influence for Moscow
in South Asia. By serving as the principal arms supplier to Afghanistan
in the past 15 years, the USSR has helped to ensure that country's friendly
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neutrality. Soviet arms aid to India has increased Moscow's influence in
that country and circumscribed that of the West and recently helped to
place the USSR on the Indian side in that country's dispute with
Pakistan.(3) As Soviet military aid to India expands, receptivity to Soviet
requests - such as for maritime facilities - is likely to increase.
The Question of Base Rights
28. Moscow has not used its aid program to acquire formal base rights,
but it has sought and obtained a variety of operating privileges which, in
some cases, give Soviet overseas military activities' all the support they
currently require. The Soviets have helped their clients develop ports and
air bases which can be used by Soviet forces on a limited basis and which
might even be run in part by Soviet personnel. The USSR, for example,
has acquired the use of Egyptian facilities at Port Said, Alexandria, and
Mediterranean fleet operations.
Moscow's Influence: How Durable?
29. While arms aid has undoubtedly increased Moscow's influence and
le---;; -age in many LDCs, it has not enabled the Soviets to control these
countries' domestic and foreign policies. Realizing this, the Soviet Union
has been careful not to abuse the influence it has gained, and only rarely
has it tried to use it to exact political concessions.(4)
30. There are many examples of the limited nature of Soviet
influence. Despite large amounts of aid, Syria and Iraq condemned the
a
arms aid. After the overthrow of the Kasstm regime in Iraq in February
1963, the new Iraqi government attacked the international Communist
movement, violently repressed the local Communist Party, and stepped up
military operations against the Kurds. In retaliation, the USSR first slowed
the pac,? of its military deliveries to Iraq and then stopped deliveries
altogether. This stoppage of deliveries resulted in a sizable diminution in
Iraqi operations against the Kurds. The Iraqis subsequently ceased their
anti-Communist propaganda campaign and reduced their repression of local
Communists, and the USSR agreed to resume normal military aid shipments.
in at least one instance, Moscow has tried to exercise levers
fl,
h
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ostensible Soviet-Egyptian ac ,eptanc-. of US peace initiatives following the
August 1970 ceasefire. Algeria tends to stay aloof from too-close Soviet
ties, and Libya does not hide its suspicions of Soviet intentions in the Middle
East. No. have prominent Arab Commun -ts or Marxists been
commensurately aided by the increased Soviet presence. Moscow's leading
supporters in the UAR recently were purged and Soviet-Sudanese relations
seriously weakened as a result of the decimation of the Sudanese Communist
Party in the wake of the unsuccessful left-wing coup. Particularly distressing
to the Soviet leadership has been the inability of regimes which they viewed
with favor -- such as Kassem, Ben Bella, Keita, and Nkrumal! - to remain
in power, in spite of sizable amounts of Soviet aid.
31. Perhaps the Soviet Union's most outstanding failure has been its
effort in Indonesia. Moscow lost practically all its investments after the
abortive 1965 coup attempt in that country. Not only has the bulk of
Soviet equipment become unserviceable (some of it has been sold for scrap),
but Moscow has received very little repayment on the huge Indonesian arms
debt.
Conflicting Commitments
32. Moscow also has discovered that the expvnsion of its military
assistance program has been tempered by some common problems which
accompany a large-scale military aid undertaking. The USSR occasionally
has found itself with conflicting commitments which have complicated its
bilateral relations and limited its options. Soviet military aid to Somalia,
for example, has made it difficult for Moscow to further its policies in
Ethiopia and Kenya. Moscow's assistance to the Kassem regime in October
1958 added on important irritant to those already existent in
Soviet-Egyptian relations at the time and triggered the first polemical
exchange between Nasser and Khrushchev. Moscow's support of Indonesia
prevented friendly relations developing with Malaysia.
33. The primary example of this dilemma in recent years has been
the Soviet effort to tread a tightrope between India and Pakistan. Pakistan,
which until 1960 had been exclusively supplied with Western military
equipment, subsequently turned to Communist China for most of its recent
arms acquisitions. The Soviet failure to undercut the growing Chinese
Communist influence through the supply of military equipment under a
1968 arms agreement and growing adverse reaction to the agreement in
New Delhi led to a suspension of arms deliveries to Islamabad in 1969.
Moscow, however, continued to seek closer relations with Islamabad and
even extended nearly $210 million in economic aid to Pakistan early in
1971. The Soviet-Indian Friend: hip Treaty signed in August 1971 indicates
that Moscow has clearly chosen India's side in the conflict and probably
precludes - at least for the short term - any resumption of Soviet arms
aid to Pakistan.
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:34. Moscow also has viewed with some concern the prospect of Soviet
arms recipients using t'ieir wenpons for aims not always consonant with
Soviet interests. There is no uvidence to suggest the USSR has prompted
any major recipient to engage in hostile acts, Soviet leaders, however,
obviously are aware that their equipment is being acquired for potential
use against "hostile" neighbors, and the posPession of sizable amounts of
arms encourages some countries to engage in political and military activity
that they otherwise might have not undertaken. In spite of its large military
aid program in Indonesia, for example, Moscow was unable to dissuade
Sukarno from his policy of "coi frentation" with Malaysia or to prevent
him from pursuing policies favorable to the Chinese Communists.
Financial Burden for the Recipients
35. Moscow's willingness to provide arms aid to eager recipients has
led the latter to divert scarce resources from economic development and
thus has contributed to internal economic dislocation and financial distress.
Despite the favorable terms on which Moscow usually sells arms, most
recipients have experienced difficulty in meeting their scheduled debt
payments. Only about one-fourth of the estimated $3.2 billion arms debt -
the Nalue of aid re#eived less discounts - had been repaid by the end of
1970. Among the major recipients, the UAR, Syria, and Indonesia have
repaid only about 22%, 17%, and 10%, respectively, of their debts. Indonesia
alone accounts for about one-third of the total outstanding Soviet arms
indebtedness.
36. Difficulties in debt service have led to frequent requests by
recipients to reschedule debt payments. Although rescheduling does little
more for the USSR than maintain influ,nce already gained, it prefers
rescheduling to the irritation likely to result from d.-fault. Moscow has
most likely expects eventually to write off a substantial portion of the
unpaid arms debt of its primary recipients.
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Growing Cost to the USSR
37. Initially, Moscow was able to keep the cost of military assistance
low by delivering mainly obsolete equipment made available by its own
modernization program. Thus, in the I 950s and early 1960s, most Soviet
military aid was drawn from existing - although often unused - stocks
of military materiel. As these stocks were depleted and the demand from
recipient countries for more sophisticatd weapons rose, the USSR
eventually was compelled to shift mrre to the export of currently
operational equipment. Some types of equipment delivered to LDCs - for
example, the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun, the Mirka-class minesweeper, and
the Vydra-class landing craft - have. not even been provided to other Warsaw
Pact countries.
38. The costs of the Soviet arms program has continued to mount
as Moscow has sought to satisfy more of the demands for late-model
equipment. The assortment of advanced conventional weapons already
provided to some clients probably will be made available to other recipients,
nd a few newer types of equipment - for example, T-62 tanks - probably
will soon enter the inventories of the larger recipients. The process of
replacing the obsolescent equipment of existing clients is a gradual one,
and the countries that seem to be the most likely new clients of the USSR
over the next year or two are, for the most part, relatively small.
Outlook for the Program
39. The USSR will continue to use its military aid program as a
primary foreign policy instrument for expanding its influence in the Third
World. Such aid has a more immediate impact and creates a greater degree
of political dependence than other forms of assistance. Most military aid
in the future probably will go to the countries which have been the principal
recipients in the past and consequently have developed a dependence on
Soviet arms and political support. The USSR constantly will have to upgrade
the weapons in its aid program to replace obsolete equipment and to meet
competition. Such modernization will ensure a continued requirement for
Soviet ti hnical assistance. Beyond these basic trends, the magnitude of
Soviet military aid will depend on unpredictable events, such as regional
hostilities, and other opportunities.
40. In any event, most Soviet arms aid will continue to go to the
Arab countries - where Soviet prestige Is greatly involved, Western interests
are being eroded, and the political cost of "letting down" the recipients
would be large. Afghanistan and India also will continue to receive large
amounts of aid in order to maintain the large investments made and
influence achieved. The uncertainties of domestic and regional politics in
Africa probably will turn up new prospects over the next several years.
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Zambia, for example, in its growing frustration over the Rhodesian, probh.;m,
may provide Moscow with an opportunity to compete effectively with the
West as well as the Chinese.
41. Although the USSR is not actively promoting its military wares
in Latin America, there are unsettling changes taking place which in time
may offer new opportunities for the Soviet Union. Largely because of US
restrictions on arms exports, many Latin American countries already have
shifted much of their arms procurement to West European sourc,ss in order
to modernize their military forces. Some countries, with Chile the most
notable example, have installed leftist governments which have indicated
a willingness to expand relations with the Communist countries. These
developments reflect growing dissatisfaction with US military assistance to
the area and could increase Latin American receptivity to Soviet military
aid blandishments.
Conclusions
42. Since the mid-1950s, the USSR has extended an estimated $6.7
billion in military aid to 29 less developed countries. The UAR and
Indonesia together account for nearly 50% of total extensions, while six
other countries -- India, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Iran, and Afghanistan -- have
received most of the rest. Besides providing a great variety of weaponry
to its client states, the USSR has trained some 26,000 foreign military
personnel within its own schools and has stationed thousands of advisers
and technicians in the recipient countries at an estimated cost to the
recipients of at least $600 million.
43. Moscow has charged relatively low prices for its arms and has
made generous repayment arrangements with its arms clients. Repayment
periods have run around ten years at an interest rate of 2%. The USSR
also has provided discounts averaging about 40% from the list price value
of equipment. General economic difficulties, however, have forced some
recipients to seek an easing of terms and a rescheduling of payments. By
the end of 1970 the less developed countries had repaid only about
one-fourth of their estimated $3.2 billion arms debt.
44. In contrast to the USSR's economic aid program, Soviet military
assistance has been characterized by rapid delivery, immediate impact, and
a development of rapport with key military leaders in the nonaligned
countries. The Soviet leadership consequently considers arms aid as a
valuable and effective instrument of policy. It has been used to build
positions of influence at the expense of the West, sometimes to undercut
the Chinese, and to improve opportunities for access by Soviet forces to
ports, airfield, and other facilities.
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45. In pursuing its objectives, the USSR has encountered both success
and failure. Partly as a consequence of these Soviet military aid programs,
Western influerce has been eroded in many countries, and Moscow has
become the dominant foreign influence in several important areas, notably
the Middle East. Military aid has not, however, provided Moscow with strong
or dependable control over client states or improved the fortunes of local
Cammunist parties.
46. From the Soviet point of view, the outlook for arms aid is
encouraging. The major objective of the program - the replacing of Western
with Soviet presence and influence - apparently is being met for the most
part. Conflict and instability in the Third World during the years ahead
will probably providr. Moscow with additional opportunities to dispense
military aid. From the recipients' point of view, the outlook for the program
is also favorable. In most instances, their armed forces have shifted from
Western to Soviet equipment and have graduated from simple to more
complex armament. The USSR has generally been willing to underwrite
larger programs for its recipients than the United States, and Soviet terms
for military equipment have consistently been more attractive than those
of Western suppliers. The recipient countries will continue to seek arms
and technical support, especially if the USSR remains circumspect in using
the military aid program for political leverage.
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Statistical Tables
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Soviet Military Aid Extensions to the Less Developed Countries
million US $
Recipient
Total
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Jan-Jun
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
6,690
117
238
281
30
556
828
416
387
901
257
371
584
395
264
962
103
Afghanistan
280
75
--
--
25
1
--
--
--
125
--
10
44
--
--
Algeria
Burma
Burundi
Cambodia
395
N.A.
Negl.
12
--
--
--
--
--
--
3
107
--
135
--
--
50
--
--
--
--
--
N.A.
Negl.
--
100
Ceylon
2
6
--
--
Congo (B)
14
Cyprus
26
26
Equatorial
Guinea
Negl
--
--
--
Cl)
Ghana
.
10
--
-
CO
--
--
--
6
--
3
1
-
--
Guinea
11
--
--
--
8
2
--
N
A
India
768
--
--
--
13
2
74
53
209
80
149
.
.
--
`l
~y
O
Indonesia
1,092
--
.8
--
5
283
441
95
61
199
--
-
--
Iran
310
--
--
150
-
10
150
--
Iraq
ib
722
--
--
131
98
113
--
--
41
181
80
8
45
25
N
A
l~l
ya
L
Maldive Islands
113
Negl.
- --
--
--
--
--
--
-
--
113
.
.
--
H
Mali
4
--
--
--
-
2
--
--
--
2
Morocco
13
--
--
--
3
--
8
--
--
--
Nigeria
9
--
--
--
Pakistan
30
--
--
--
9
--
--
--
Somalia
45
--
--
30
Southern Yemen
17
--
--
--
--
35
-
--
10
--
Sudan
66
--
--
--
7
5
5
--
Syria
527
42
75
90
60
--
35
25
125
66
75
--
-
-
--
--
N
A
Tanzania
2
--
--
--
--
--
--
-
2
--
.
.
Uganda
10
--
--
--
--
--
--
10
-
--
United Arab
Republic
Yemen
Th
2,135
77
--
--
155
--
60
--
-
150
--
-
270
--
150
20
100
30
250
10
25
--
--
--
175
10
100
5
50
2
650
--
N.A. a_/
--
a.
e value o the 2971 Soviet commitment to the
ZVAR remains undetermined but is certain y substantial -- that is, ores
$200 million.
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Jan-Jun
Recipient Total 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Total 5,753 15 136 195 95 216 322 .786 577 284 321 442 408 366 336 912 342
Afghanistan 275 5 38 20 16 2 -- 1 20 3 35 30 25 30 30 20 --
Algeria 261 -- -- -- -- -- -- 3 7 60 30 85 40 15 1 20 --
Burma N.A. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Burundi N.A. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Cambodia 10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 1 -- 2 -- 4 2 -- --
Ceylon 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2
Congo (B) 4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- -~ -- -- 2
Cyprus 18 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 18 -- - -- --
Equatorial
V) ( Guinea Negl. -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- --
^ Gana 10 3 3 2. 2 Cn
-- -- -- -- r M
J N Guinea 11 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 f7
India 6.19 15 4 54 2 60 165 50 90 84 50 45
Indonesia 858 8 -- 5 17 55 448 185 90 50 h7j
1 Iran 100 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15 73 30 25 10
'-7 Iraq 545 14 26 60 114 96 10 25 28 47 50 30 25 20
Libya 45 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - 30 15
Maldive Islands Negl. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Mali 4 -- -- -- -- -- 2 -- - -- -- 2 -- -- -- -- --
Morocco 13 -- -- -- -- 3 -- 7 1 -- -- 1 1 -- -- -- --
Nigeria 9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6 3 --
Pakistan 8 -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- --8
Somalia 40 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15 10 4 -- 2 3 6 -
Southern Yemen 12 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 4 4 2
Sudan 60 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - 5 15 40 --
Syria S18 10 40 90 30 15 15 35 35 15 5 15 48 35 35 50 45
Tanzania 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 1 --
Uganda 7 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 5 -- 1 -- -- --
United Arab -- -- --
Republic 2,245 -- 50 35 30 150 175 150 150 75 80 100 170 100 90 640 200
Yemen 77 -- -- -- -- -- -- 20 25 10 2 2 10 5 1 2 -
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Table's 4
Soviet Military Technicians
in Less Developed Countries a
1969 and June 1971
Country
June 1971
1969
Total
9,670
63745
Afghanistan
160
200
Algeria
1,000
1,200
Cambodia
30
Congo (B)
15
Ethiopia
5
Guinea
65
65
India
300
455
Indonesia
30
Iran
30
15
Iraq
320
320
Mali
30
105
Morocco
20
20
Nigeria
50
1 30
Pakistan.
10
10
Somalia
250
180
Southern Yemen
120
100
Sudan
400
200
Syria
750
500
Tanzania
5
35
Uganda
45
30
United Arab Republic
6,000 b/
3,000
Yemen
100 -
100
a. Minimum estimates of the number of per-
sons present for a period of one month or
more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest
five. Figures also include a small number of
Eastern European technicians.
b. Does not include Soviet military person-
nel assigned to Soviet operational units in
the 7/nited Arab Republic.
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Major Soviet Military Equipment Delivered, by Recipient a/
Afghan- Al- Cava- Congo
Equa-
torial
Indo-
istan
geria bodia Ceylon (B) Cyprus Guinea
Ghana Guinea India
nesia Iran Iraq
Lib
a M
li
y
a
Heavy tanks
Medium tanks
Light tanks (amphibious)
436
357
--
--
--
32
20
11
550
176
758
130
12
Self-propelled assault guns
Personnel carriers, armored
and amphibious
48
300
100
500
--
21
--
--
--
19
--
32
--
10
24
5
29
--
119
400
600
150
1
100
24
283
--
100
Artillery pieces
1,750
950
221
--
25
32
--
30
79
463
550
575
,
1,422
104
80
vi
1
Light cruiser
Destroyers
Submarines
16
Minesweepers
4
12
n
N
6
lJ
Submarine chasers and escort
vessels
-
5
16
Motor torpedo and missile boats
2
8
26
i
Other, including auxiliary
vessels and landing craft
Medium jet bombers
--
--
26
10
H
Light jet bombers
35
32
--
--
--
--
28
15
Jet fighters
190
128
14
5
4
150
c/
112
236
Heavy transports
i
7
--
--
--
40
6
13
Other, including non-jet combat
aircraft, trainers, trans-
ports, and helicopters
Guided missile systems d/
Air-to-surface e/
Air-to-air f/
42
22
12
Surface-to-air
50
26
96
1
h/
17
8
i/
Surface-to-surface
9
8
12
Antitank k/
24
28/
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Major Soviet Military Equipment Delivered, by Recipient a/
(Continued)
Type of Equipment
Morocco
Nigeria
aak;nf
Southern
Heavy tanks
Medium tanks
122
2
550
5-
155
42
--
2-
--
60
__
Light tanks (amphibious)
2
42
102
985
25
--
2,310
135
Self-propelled assault guns
30
33
14
--
87
Personnel carriers, armored
and
hibi
-
140
--
--
250
65
amp
ous
Artillery pieces b/
80
100
3
90
-
350
5414
6
172
600
40
36
1,700
155
Submarines
6
1/
Minesweepers
-
--
--
13
1/
Submarine chasers and
~-
-'
2
2
--
--
13
escort vessels
Motor torpedo
and missile
--
--
--
--
-'
--
--
t2
1
boats
Other, including auxiliary
-
--
22
--
--
56
Cl)
n
N
P
vessels and landing craft
--
3
--
8
--
by
.
,
Aircraft
Medium jet bombers
Light jet bombers
12
__
--
__
-
--
--
50
--
lJ
L
Jet fighters
12
33
108
25
10
6
--
76
8
H
Heavy transports
Othe
i
--
--
24
--
326
--
5
895
18
r,
ncluding non-jet comb
at
-'
--
-
-
28
__
aircraft, trainers, trans-
ports, and helicopters
5
13
14
3
5
16
183
1
15
535
55
Guided missile systems d/
Air-to-surface e/
Surface-to-air
3
--
24
133
--
--
324
Surface-to-surface
10
--
--
134
Antitank k/
--
4
--
--
23
a T is t Z
--
--
30
--
--
100
.
o
e represents total a iveries, including some East European and Chinese Communist equipment, and does not reflect
attrition or current inventory. Neither does the table indicate deliveries of equipment to Soviet forces in Egypt.
b. Including recoilless cannons and mortars over 100 mm in size. The figure for the UAR also includes the delivery of sir
FROC rocket launchers.
c. Excluding those HIG-21 fighters assembled at the aircraft assembly plant at Zesik.
d. Data reflect numbers of aircrafts, ships, and vehicles having missile catac-'lity.
e. Indicating number of :"U-26 aircraft equipped with ASM (two per aircraft).
f. Indicating number of fighter aircraft equipped with AAM (two to four per aircraft).
g. Indicating number of SAM firing battalions (sites) -- six launchers per Sri-2 site, four launchers per SA-3 site.
h. Algeria has received an undetermined number of SAMs, and now may have an operational capability.
L. Equipment for SAM firing battalion originally delivered to Iraq has been resold to the UAR.
J. Indicating number of Komar- and s a-clans boats equipped with SSM (two to for per vessel) and three coastal defense
size sites in the UAR.
k. Indicating number of vehicles used as Zaao:chers (three missiles per vei: c:c).
1. Including two old destroyers and five old au_marines returned to the USSR i?: exchange for newpr models.
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