WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT INSURGENCY IN CHAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 27, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMAKY
Special Report
Insurgency in Chad
DOcUMENT Sr^~~'`S BRANCH
FRls COPY
Dg NuT UNTROY
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RETURN r~r iE-61
Secret
N2 675
27 February 1970
No. 0359/70A
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The Republic of Chad, a former French colony in central Africa, has been
increasingly absorbed since 1965 in combating a Muslim-led insurgency in the
eastern and ne?thern parts of the country. This insurgency, rooted in ethnic and
iuligious factors, has been fed by maladministration and oppressive taxation. Chad's
Muslims, about half of the population of 3.5 million, regard with contempt the
black Christianized and animist tribesmen of the south, particularly the Sara, who
have dominated the government since Chad became independent in 1960.
At this time, the insurgency is still essentially on a minor scale. It is poorly
organized and lacks arms, mass backing, and significant external support. Neverthe-
less, its continuing spread in recent years clearly demonstrates the inability of
President Tombalbaye's government to deal with the problem. Last year, he called
for massive new help from France, which responded by committing combat troops
to an augmented counterinsurgency effort and by taking on an expanded military
and administrative training role.
Although the dissidents have been stung by heavy losses in engagements with
the French since last summer, the prospects for ending the insurgency are not bright.
The rebels have not been crushed but are merely lying low, awaiting more favorablc
conditions. They are well aware that Paris, under domestic pressure to disengage, has
announced its intention to begin a phase-out later this year.
ETI-INIC AND HISTORIC ROOTS OF
INSURGENCY
Chad's north-south split stems from a cen-
turies old ethnic and cultural cleavage that has
fostered enmity between the light-skinned and
black Muslin peoples of the north and east, and
the non-Muslim, black southern tribesmen. Many
of the Muslims are nomadic herdsmen who have
traditionally defied any authority higher than
their tribe or clan. These rugged tribesmen are
noted for their warrior traditions. They not only
engage in frequent squabbling among themselves
but also war on sedentary peoples in their ter-
ritory.
Most of them are animist, although a few are
Christianized. The people have long been seden-
tary cultivators and produce most of Chad's
major crop, cotton.
For centuries before the arrival of the
French in the late I 800s, the Muslims dominated
and exploited the southerners. Even after the
French conquest, dissension continued for years
in eastern and northern Chad. Nevertheless, the
French colonial period ended the Muslim
monopoly on power and provided opportunities
for the more adaptable southerners to prepare for
political control at independence. This was par-
ticularly true in the fields of education and
administration.
The Negroid tribesmen of the south, by con-
trast, have historically been much less bellicose.
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Since independence, the Muslim population
has been further alienated by the exploitation of
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unscrupulous and inept government officials.
Moreover, many of the southern administrators or
prefects have been insensitive to the customs of
the Muslims. For example, the hunting of big
game is now outlawed in Ouaddai prefecture,
where it was a major activity before independ-
ence. The hunters have been forced to turn to
fishing, and even on that they are taxed. Further-
more, the Muslims resent the compulsory attend-
ance of their children at state schools where they
are taught French; they would prefer to send
their children to Koranic schools, which tend to
aggravate religious and cultural differences.
Until recently, President Tombalbaye paid
little attention to the needs of the Muslims,
whom he has long suspected of seeking to divide
Chad into two separate states. Starting in 1963,
after he had consolidated his power base, Torn-
balbaye ordered the arrest of many prominent
Muslim politicians. Although he has subsequently
released some of them, he has effectively limited
their power. The Muslim elite-in common with
all their countrymen-resent this restricted role in
the n:irmal political process. Educated Muslim
youths especially resent the discrimination they
experience in both the private and public sectors,
where most of the important positions are filled
by either foreigners or southerners.
In addition, President Tombalbaye has fa-
vored his native south with government largesse
and with development projects. The east-central
and northern prefectures suffer from a paucity of
schools, public health centers, and other social
projects for which there is a growing need..
DISSIDENCE IN EAST-CENTRAL, CHAD
Overt Muslim dissidence was held in check
during the first four years of independence by the
presence of some 4,000 French troops. In 1965,
however, the French withdrew the bulk of their
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forces as part of a drastic cutback in Africa.
Because Paris still considered Chad strategically
important to the maintenance of its position
south of the Sahara, a "strike force" of some 800
troops was kept on at Fort Lamy. A small num-
ber of other French military personnel remained
to train Chadian troops.
Just four months after the departure of the
French, active insurgency began. The initial out-
break occurred at Mangalme, in Guera prefecture.
From there, the dissidence spread steadily. It now
affects an area of approximately 25,000 square
miles, including parts of seven prefectures.
In 1969, French sources placed the total
number of insurgents at about 2,700. Last month
the French claimed to have killed some 1,200
dissidents over the previous nine months, but at
least some of these losses have almost certainly
been made tip through new recruitment. The in-
surgents' arsenal is usually limited to what can be
captured from government forces, but also in-
cludes sonic crude, homemade weapons such as
spears, swords, and a varied assortment of guns.
The ratio of guns to men is reportedly very low.
The rebels usually operate in small bands,
using hit-and-run tactics
against government out-
posts, small villages, con-
voys, and economic tar-
gets such as cotton-proc-
essing plants. They live
off the land, operating
from bases in the bush
and in Sudan. Their ac-
tivity tends to increase
during the May-to-Octo-
ber rainy season, when
government troops are
hampered because the
country's roads become
impassable.
President Tombalbaye
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As the insurgency spread in east-central
Chad, the Tombalbaye government was further
challenged by a separate source of opposition to
its authority in the northern area, known as the
"BET." The Muslim nomads of this area, espe-
cially the Toubous who roam on both sides of the
border with Libya, had been the most difficult to
pacify during the colonial period. After independ-
ence, the Toubous became infuriated when south-
ern administrators sought to impose their author-
ity over these fiercely independent people.
The Toubous are led by a derdei (sultan)
who has been in self-imposed exile in Libya since
1966. Their most serious uprising so far extended
from March to August 1968, during which there
were a number of sharp clashes with government
forces. On several occasions, both then and since,
French troops have had to be called in to relieve
hard-pressed government forces.
The organization most frequently associated
with Chad's dissidence is the National Liberation
Front of Chad (FROLINA), an offshoot of a
Muslim socialist party that was dissolved when
Chad became a single-party state in 1962.
FROLINA bands are most active in Guera, Batha,
and Salamat prefectures, although in 1969 they
were reported in four other east-central prefec-
tures as well. Some FROLINA bands have been
spotted within 150 miles of Fort Lamy.
FROLINA's leadership remains unclear, de-
spite the frequent mention in the foreign press of
Dr. Abba Siddick as its secretary general. Siddick
is a former minister of education and was once a
power in the ruling Chad Progressive Party. He
reportedly split with Tombalbaye in 1963 and has
since lived in exile, most recently in Libya. Al-
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tlic,ugh he claims to speak for FROLINA, he
seems to lack a significant following within the
country. He has been away from Chadian politics
too long and appears to be too old to appeal to
the younger generation.
FROLINA's present field commander is El
Hadj Issaka-until recently resident just over the
border in Sudan. Issaka lacks the charisma of his
more flamboyant predecessor, Ibrahim Abatcha,
who was killed in battle two years ago, but he
does seem to command the respect of the rebels.
Although FROLINA remains a very loosely knit
organization, Issaka appears to have set up a chain
of command and to have appointed leaders over
all the local rebel groups. Operational missions
seem to be assigned only in a very general sense,
however, leaving much to individual initiative.
There is sonic evidence that locally collected
money and captured arms are forwarded to
Issaka's mobile headquarters for distribution
among FROLINA bands.
FROLINA's over-all objectives are unclear.
Spokesmen have called for "freedom, democracy,
and progress" and for replacing the Tombalbaye
regime with one more amenable to Muslim inter-
ests, but no mention has been made of secession.
Essentially, FROLINA opposes non-Muslim au-
thority in Muslim areas but does not seek to take
over the government in Fort Lamy. The Muslims
would probably like to live along traditional lines
with a minimum of interference from any kind of
authority, especially if it happens to be non-
Muslim.
The only other organized insurgent group is
the Chad Liberation Front. The Front has far
fewer adherents than FROLINA and seems to
operate mainly within the confines of Ouaddai
prefecture. Past attempts to unify the two insur-
gent groups have been unsuccessful, and there
have been reports of FROLINA attacks on par-
tisans of the Front.
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Although the insurgents have long solicited
help ir the Arab world, foreign support has been
minimal. Senli-independent Muslim sultanates in
neighboring Sudan have furnished sanctuary and
limited material support. Both insurgent organiza-
tions are known to have agents in Algiers, Khar-
toum, and Cairo for propaganda purposes, and to
maintain contacts with potentially sympathetic
governments. FROLINA has tried to obtain arms
from various Arab states, from Cuba, and from
the USSR, but there is no hard evidence that any
of these countries has complied.
President Tombalbaye has become in-
creasingly apprehensive about the intentions of
his Arab neighbors. Relations with both Libya
and Sudan had been warming, but since last year's
extremist coups in these countries, there has been
a noticeable chill. Early this year, the Libyans
gratuitously offered to "mediate" between Tom-
balbaye's government and the rebels, and also to
provide economic assistance if Chad wo'.ild agree
to adopt an anti-Israel stance. This was :,ejected
by the Chadians, who considere:i the Libyan offer
an unfriendly act. The French, in their current
arms talks with the Libyans, have sought and
received assurances that no Libyan aid will be
given to the Chadian insurgents. Khartoum has
reportedly made an offer similar to Libya's, but
Sudan's internal problems will probably preclude
any involvement beyond what little the rebels get
from the semi-independent sultanates astride the
border.
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Finally persuaded that the dissidence was
becoming too difficult to handle alone, Tony
balbayo last year swallowed his pride and reluc-
tantly called on the French for large-scale help.
Paris responded with a combined military-civil
assistance mission, headed by a former colonial
governor and a general. French troops began ar-
riving in April 1969 and were sent to beleaguered
Guera prefecture. where the French began a siz-
able build-up at
Mongo. The actual
combat mission was as-
signed to the largely
veteran Foreign Le-
gion, some 1,000 of
whom are now in
Chad. Support troops,
including air force per-
sonnel, and the
800-man strike force
at Fort Lamy, bring
the total French mili-
tary commitment close
to 2,500 men.
After their forces
arrived, the French
urged the Chadians to
adopt a more offensive strategy, utilizing the
greater French firepower and mobility to launch
frequent search-and-destroy operations. The net
effect has been a number of successful encounters
for the government forces and a noticeable drop-
off it rebel activity. French and Chadian combat
units are integrated in the various tactical areas,
and even the local prefect has a French military
adviser. The French commander has assumed
direct tactical and operational command of all
forces, but has left Chadian General Doumro in
administrative control of the Chad Army.
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Legionnaire
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t;ithough the French have apparently had
some success in curtailing the rebel menace, their
secondary mission of retraining the Chadian
Army will take considerably longer-at least until
the summer of 1971, according to the French
commander. He has pushed for the integration of
French military instructors at all levels, and has
set up joint staffs at both high and low echelons
in the hope of increasing the training of Chadian
officers.
ursuing rebel group
On the adminis-
trative side, the French
have been pressing
Tombalbaye to make
sweeping reforms in
the government appara-
tus. In response, the
President announced a
series of measures last
summer restoring some
power to the tradi-
tional Muslim chiefs.
He also urged his pre-
fects to get closer to
the people, and to as-
sume more responsibil-
ity for local matters.
Within the past few
weeks, the President
has created a new commission for administrative
reform headed by one of his ablest ministers.
Nevertheless, the French interiention has
been irksome to some Chadian officers and ad-
ministrators, particularly in the middle ranks.
These men not only resent the dilution of their
authority, but fear that their position and future
may be threatened. Perhaps in response to these
pressures, and to demonstrate Toinbalbaye's de-
sire to show a little less than total reliance on
France, Chad has sent 350 men for military train-
ing in the Congo (Kinshasa). Tombalbaye has also
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urged the Israelis to give more military support,
and has sounded out the US as well.
The French involvement has become in-
creasingly unpopular with French public opinion.
This seems to have motivated Paris to announce a
pullback, now set to begin next summer. French
officials claim that this applies only to military
forces, however, rind that administrative reform
personnel will remain indefinitely.
Opposition and discontent are not limited to
Muslims. There are cabinet ministers, prefects,
middle and lower level functionaries, and military
officers who oppose one or another facet of Tom-
balbaye's policies. Chadian youth, especially stu-
dents abroad in France and Belgium, are also
irritating to the government. No evidence exists,
however, that any of this opposition is organized.
Potentially, however, Tombalbaye's most
dangerous critics are the co}intry's youth. Young
Chadians are increasingly impatient with the pace
of change and methods of the government. In the
past, the President has shrewdly muted this
source of discontent by absorbing at least the
more educated into the large bureaucracy. Recent
Legionnaire with
captured insurgent
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National Libaratlon Fron; of
Chad (FROLINA) and Chad
Libaratlon Front
K A N E M / I H I L T I N E
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budgetary pressures will force a cutback in gov-
ernment jobs, however r, and, as job opportunities
are very limited, th.'s may lead to unrest among
those who are forced -to look elsewhere.
Many of Chad's younger civil servants are
irked over the lingering French presence at vir-
tually all levels of government. What they resent
most is the patronizing attitude of these French-
men, many of whom were involved in France's
African empire during the colonial period.
Economically, Chad is saddled with a primi-
tive economy that lacks exploitable resources and
is dependent on cotton for most of its foreign
exchange. Even this crop has to be subsiuized by
the French to keep it competitive on the world
market. Additionally, the maintenance of a large
military force to combat the insurgents absorbs
about one third of the budget, which in the past
has relied on French subsidies. Paris is under
economic stress itself, however, which has forced
it to cut back somewhat its African commit-
ments. The Chadians have been seeking aid else-
where, but the short-run economic picture offers
little encouragement, and future develcpment will
at best be slow.
Militarily, the French intervention seems to
have temporarily forestalled any serious threat
from the rebels. The insurgents now venture out
only when virtually assured of success. Moreover,
further training of the Chadian Army will appar-
ently not be affected by the French cutback.
Nevertheless, the current lull may just be part of a
waiting game the insurgents are playing until the
French troops withdraw. The rebels could well be
using the time to improve their over-all organiza-
tion and to seek more and better arms.
President Tombalbaye seems to have become
convinced of the need for reform in the adm:nis-
crative structure. He also seems to be willing to
pay more attention to the needs and asrirations
of his people, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
There are signs, however, that this may be too
little and perhaps too late. No matter what its
good intentions, the government is handicapped
by a serious shortage of trained and dedicated
cadres. Moreover, some sciv:,,es are likely to be
reduced as the financially hard-pressed govern-
ment is forced to cut back the present overgrown
bureaucracy.
There is little indication that the festering
ethnic and religious problems dividing the coun-
try will be brought closer to solution in the near
future. There is, in fact, reason to believe that the
French withdrawal may trigger renewed hostilities
on an even greater scale. There seems to be no
alternative to Tombalbaye, however, who still ap-
pears to be the major figure in Chad regardless of
his tainted image among the Muslims.
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