INTELLIGENCE REPORT MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLMACY: 1967 (REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XXX)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000010030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 21, 1963
• Content Type: IR

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ILLEGIB
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967
(Reference Title: POLO XXXI)
SECRET
RSS No. 0029/68
21 June 1968
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MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967
For several months during 1967 Communist China's
diplomacy was characterized by an extraordinary degree
of irrationality. In Peking, foreign embassies were
violated and their personnel abused. Abroad, Chinese
diplomatic personnel staged provocative demonstrations
and went out of their way to insult host ;;overnments.
The purpose was to bring the benefits and therapeutics
of Communist Chinas "cultural revolution" to foreign
policy and the foreign policy establishment. It was as
though the Chinese, in their dealings with foreigners,
were seized by a kind of madness; for a time Peking's
usual non-diplomacy--or at best semi-diplomacy--gave way
to outright anti-diplomacy.
The injection of this aspect or the "spirit of
Mao" into the foreign ministry and onto the foreign
scene was resisted by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, a man of
remarkable courage, outspokenness, and style. No other
ranking official has stood so openly and stubbornly
against Mao's "cultural revolution" and survived. Only
the support of his long-time, close colleague Chou En-
lai, seems to have saved him for the time being. Although
partially bent to Mao's will, Chen, With Chou's backing,
won his struggle, at least for the present, to eliminate
the irrationalities of the "cultural revolution" from
the main stream of foreign policy.
This Intelligence Report, produced solely by the
SRS, reviews and analyzes these and other extraordinary
aspects of Co 's conduct of foreign affairs
during 1967. is the research analyst respon-
sible for the UILUOY.
Chief, DI Special Research Staff
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MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967
Contents
Page
Conclusions .........................................i
I. Foreign Policy Immunized from Mao's Purge.....1
A. The Issue of Exporting Mao's Thought ...... 1
B. The Issue of Protecting the Foreign
Ministry ...... .. ...... . ... ..........3
C. The Taming of the Foreign Minister:
Stage One ................................ 5
II. Foreign Policy and Mao's Purge Coalesce ....... 9
A. Mao's "Thought" Exported ................ .9
B. Embassies Harassed ....................... 12
III. Foreign Policy Restored to Normalcy .......... 19
A. Chou's Major Role ......... .. .........21
B. The Taming of the Foreign Minister:
Stage Two ............................... 23
C. Prospects ................................ 29
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MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967
Conclusions
The aberrations which appeared in Peking's foreign
policy tactics in 1967 reflected Mao's desire to project
his will to pragmatic subordinates in order to make them
revolutionary diplomats. The diplomacy they implemented
had a revolutionary logic or rationality. It apparently
was viewed by Mao as a means to apply pressure to certain
"unfriendly" governments to attain concessions or to
retaliate for anti-Chinese actions., Beyond Mao's special
view, however, this diplomacy was in fact illogical and
irrational. The beatings of diplomats, invasion of em-
bassy grounds, and export of Mao's cult aroused national-
istic sensitivities abroad, and the adverse international
reaction has been as harmful to Peking's foreign policy
as Mao's 1958 blunders had been to domestic policy.
Mao's motives in exporting his cult were political
as well as egoistical. He tried to prove to domestic
critics that his "thought" was used everywhere. In one
respect, the burgeoning of the cult in 1966 was roughly
similar, to the intensification of Stalin's cult when the
Bolshevik Old Guard was being purged. The purpose was
to focus universal attention on the dictator and national
leader as the only source of supreme power at a time of
crucial hierarchy realignment, But Mao's export of his
cult went well beyond Stalin's practice. It engaged the
energies of Chinese diplomats including the Foreign Minister
for months, detracting from their processional image.
'.Molotov and his foreign affairs establishment had never
been put through such a simplistic routine, and Mao's pro-
jection on the international scene of his cult was a kind
of peasant ultra-Stalinism which was an innovation on the
domestic practice of the formed Soviet dictator.
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Dissemination in foreign countries of Mao's cult
was opposed by Chen Yi in 1966. In that year, Mao was
willing to support Chen fi's rational view that foreign
policy should be immunized from the effects of the domestic
purge. But Chen had to retreat early in 1967, when Mao
apparently changed his mind and dispatched newly indoc-
trinated diplomats overseas to proselyte his doctrines.
Partly because he resisted irrationalism in
foreign policy and partly because he disagreed with the
methods of the purge as it. was applied to the Foreign
Ministry, Chen 'ii has been subjected to a dialectical
policy of criticism and protection. He is still under
criticism, inasmuch as Mao's real aim is to break his will
and make him accept the methods of the purge "voluntarily."
Chen Yi and the Foreign Ministry have had in
Chou En-lai a high-level defender. Although Madame Mao,
Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng have also defended the Foreign
Minister, Chou has been his primary defender and has, in
his own words, supported the Foreign Ministry "more than
anyone else" in the leadership. Chen's hostility to the
activities of the Red Guards in his Ministry and to the
export of Mao's cult have been tantamount to open conspiracy
against Mao's "cultural revolution." Other leaders have
been purged for less, and only Chou's ability to attain
a special exemption for Chen can plausibly explain his
political survival.
The main consideration for Chou is that Chen is
his most important and loyal supporter. Chen apparently
has a sizeable following throughout the foreign affairs
establishment, If Chen were to be purged, a significant
number of his subordinates would be brought down with him.
Such an extensive purge would be a clear loss of political
power in Chou's government balliwick. It is primarily
for this reason that Chou has run the risk of antagoniz-
ing Mao by defending an opponent of his domestic purge.
Chou's prestige is now committed to the survival of Chen,
and the downfall of the Foreign Minister in the future
would be an ominous sign for the stability of Chou's own
position in the hierarchy of leaders.
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Mao personally sanctioned the return to a degree
of diplomatic caution in foreign policy in the fall of
1967. Only the Chairman himself had the authority to
reduce the emphasis given to exporting his cult and to
censure an ambassador for gauche ("revolutionary") behavior.
He was persuaded, almost certainly by Chou En-lai, that
governments should be influenced only gradually and at
a rate of advance carefully adjusted to what the traffic
of foreign national pride will bear.
The partial return to more restrained and
flexible tactics is only the beginning of a long road
back to refurbishing Peking's influence overseas. It is
being undertaken against a background of considerable
resentment in some of those countries whose governments
were gratuitously antagonized. Chinese diplomatic crudities
probably will be resisted more promptly and vigorously
than they had been prior to 1967. In this sense, Red
Guard diplomacy may continue to have an "irreparable in-
fluence upon our country's international reputation and
foreign relations work," as a Red Guard newspaper put it
in September 1967 in an attack on foreign policy fanatics.
Only by contrast to the wild fanaticism of 1967
can Mao's present foreign policy be c haracte'ized as
rational or normal. In relations with other countries,
a residue of militancy remains in Peking's revolutionary
policy and it will be a constant source of government-to-
government frictions.
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MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967
1. Foreign Policy Immunized from Mao's Purge
In 1966, Mao Tse-tung seemed to be willing to
wall off Peking's foreign policy from the effects of his
domestic purge. Chen Yi was permitted to argue against
the view that Mao's cult, primarily his "thought," should
be disseminated by Peking's diplomats. He was also per-
mitted to keep his Foreign Ministry personnel in their
posts. His rationality was to be tolerated only until
Mao's "revolution" moved to the left at the end of the
year.
A. The Issue of Exporting Mao's "Thought"
The idea of reducing one's basic views on poli-
tics to their core elements and presenting them as a
capsuled body of doctrine (an "ism" or "thought"), imbued
with an aura of immutable truth, was the creation of
Stalin. He had to demonstrate to superior men that he
was not an intellectual "mediocrity" (Trotsky's word).
Beyond that, he had to demonstrate during his purge of
former colleagues that he was the dominant leader as well
as the only theoretical genius. In the mid-1930s, during
the first wave of repression which followed the assassina-
tion of Kirov, the adulatory tone of public references
to Stalin was greatly intensified and Stalin's image
began to take on divine attributes. A similar correla-
tion between the beginning of a major purge and the burgeon-
ing of the leader's cult took place in China in 1966,
Mao's craving for adulation demanded it. But he also
seems to have recognized a political axiom: in the course
of a realignment of power relationships among top leaders,
it is important to focus attention on the dominant man
as the only center of supreme power.
The idea of encouraging foreign tribute to a
charismatic leader's cult was conceived by Stalin, and
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his official biography stated in 1947 that "Millions of
workers from all countries look upon Stalin as their
teacher, from whose classic wi,i tings they learn how to
cope with the class enemy.,.' But Mao apparently was con-
sidering a cruder and more open foreign dissemination of
his classic works, In 1966, the idea of using the diplo-
matic establishment to take Mao's "thought" overseas ap-
parently was deoat.eci in the foreign affairs establishment.
Mao's cult continued to burgeon and even after the editors
of the Peking People's Daily on 1 June 1966 declared Mao's
"thought" to be the guide for "all oppressed peoples and
nations," Chen in the same month told a meeting of Afro-
Asian writers that "We cannot force them to accept all
this Mao thought and Cultural Revolution stuff." Signi-
ficantly, the writers' communique of 10 June did not re-
fer to the "thought" or the Cultural Revolution.
Mao's willingness to keep the effects of his
purge from damaging Peking's relations w'th other govern-
ments continued into the fall of 1966.
Two days after Chen
declared, in his speech of 23 October, that Peking's
enemies would not have tie satisfaction of using mainland
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developments to "sow discord" in China's relations with
friendly countries, Mao seemed to sanction this line by
including Chen and Chen's wife among officials who were
present at the Chairman's meeting with Pakistan's visit-
ing foreign minister. In late October, Chen refuted Red
Guard criticism of Peking"s friendly policy toward "reac-
tionary" governments "such as Pakistan and Cambodia."*
On 30 November, Chen was introduced to a mass meeting of
workers by Chou personally, and he rejected the idea of
establishing Red Guard units in foreign countries, imply-
ing that the best way to proselyte Mao's "thought" to
foreigners was to work on visitors to the mainland rather
than taking it overseas. In mid-December 1966, when Chi-
nese envoys were recalled and Red Guards were permitted
to "make revolution" in the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
Chen had to retreat. After personal harassment in January,
he told on 6 February that "Mao Tse- 25X1
tung's thought applies to underdeveloped countries... and
I say it applies to Australia [as well]."
B. The Issue of Protecting the Foreign Ministry
Chen's first effort to wall off the Ministry
from the effects of Mao's purge was in the period from
May to July 1966, when work teams were sent to each unit
of the foreign affairs establishment, He is accused of
having received orders from Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-
ping and to have protected the party committee of each
unit. According to later charges, in early June 1966,
h.; reassured leading cadres that they would be permitted
to retain their posts. In late June, he directed cadres
to seize their young militant opponents and he protected
*According to a poster in Shanghai, Chen had rebutted
criticism in a speech on 28 October 1966. He also in-
sisted that he was not to be placed in the category of
Mao's political opponents. "I am on the side of Mao, Lin
Piao, Chou En-lai, and Kang Sheng, and not with those
who oppose chem."
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deputy foreign ministers and other professionals. Chen
was also criticized for having suppressed militants in
the Foreign Language institute by sending to the Institute
work teams directed by the former vice director of the
State Council's iox?eign Affairs Staff Office, Chang Yen.
He is said to have subsided only when Chen Po-ta and Kang
Sheng, in mid-July and Chou En-lai, in late July, visited
the Institute and encouraged the young fanatics to denounce
the work teams.
Another major 'mistake'' of Chen's in this period
,was his, desire to maintain a degree of personal integrity
by not attacking Liu Shao-chi. When he had to face Insti-
tute fanatics on 4 August, he courageously declared him-
self' against opportunism, "Chairman Liu's instructions
have my full endorsement. Comrade Shao-chi has put it
very correctly, . he is my teacher.... T sent the work
teams.-and the Central Committee nodded its approval."
(Red Guard Combat Bulletin, 13 April 1967) It was to be
the primary reason for Chen's political survival that Mao,
Madame 19ao, and Chou En-lai apparently made a distinction
oct:ween this expression of personal honesty and aliega-
tions of disloyalty.
Chen Yi's foreign affairs machine was moved a
step closer to a major, overhaul of personnel when Mao,
on 9 September 1966, declared that in all foreign affairs
offices abroad there should be a "revolutionization."
The immediate consequence of Mao's ambiguous instruction
was an increase in study sessions, concealment of signs
of "luxury" living, and more anti-social behavior during
diplomatic functions for personnel of all Chinese Commun-
ist overseas missions,, It: was later to lead to the re-
call of large numbers of Peking's diplomats for testing
and reindoctrination, It provided the atmosphere far the
protracted self-criticism rituals which were imposed on
professional foreign affairs personnel, Liao Cheng-chih,
the former chairman of the Commission for Overseas Chinese
Affairs, was subjected to criticism and self-criticism
in October 1966 and subsequently has not been rehabilitatea.
Chen Yi had to engage in a similar ritual of self-disparage-
ment, but, he seems thus far, to have retained his political
health because of high-level leadership support.
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C. The Taming of the Foreign Minister: Stage One
Chen toad not wi.'lingly accepted the disgrace of
former colleagues, and he had had the courage to defend
Liu Shao-chi to the face of young fanatics. In late sum-
mer 1966, Mao apparently decided to destroy his ebullient
spirit and make him slavishly obedient to the methods of
the purge. The first stage of this process was to extend
from August 1966 to January 1967.
Mao imposed a dialectical policy toward Chen,
on the one hand encouraging criticism against him and,
on the other hand, protecting him from a political death.
On 25 August Chen
laccepted personal responsibility for
"20 mistakes" in foreign policy. That i;, he had to act
the role of scapegoat for policies which his superiors,
especially Chou En-lai, had formulated and implemented.
On 21 October, in the course of a general assault on the
operations of government ministries and the behavior of
ministers, Foreign Language Institute Red Guards pasted
posters opposite tie Foreign Ministry building appealing
for young fanatics to "bombard the Party Committee of the
Foreign Ministry and burn Chen Yi to death." Neverthe-
less, as a protected person, Chen told Red Guards on 11
November that t'.ere was "a limit to the object of revolu-
tion when you come to Chung Nan Hai" where government
offices are iocatcd. "You cannot charge into a place
just because you want to. You cannot expect that a per-
son will see you just because you want to see him, and
you cannot refuse to leave just because you have not seen
the person you want to see..." Chen still had the authority
to demand that the fanatics keep out of his Foreign Minis-
try.
Chou En-lai seems to have worked with Madame Mao
to defend Chen's position as a minister loyal to Mao.
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When, on 10 January 1967, a Red Guard publicly claimed
that Mao had said that Chen was too pleased with himself
and not loyal to the party, the Premier denied that the
Chairman had said anything like that. Chou said that he
had not heard it. Chou also said, incongruously, that
even if Mao had, it did not mean that Chen was not trusted
by Mao. Madame Mao personally defended the Foreign Minis-
ter on the crucial matter of non-involvement in anti-Mao
intrigue-
Chen fi...has said some wrong things, written
a few verses, and said some incorrect things,
but he is not two-faced. Strictly speaking,
he has made mistakes, but we have told him
this to his face...
Chen Yi has carried out the Chairman's line.
He has fought some good battles, and fought
extremely well in the capture of Shanghai.
All the same, he has said some incorrect
things. He is not, however, a plotter, and
when he has made mistakes, he has corrected
them a bit... (Madame Mao's speech to Red
Guards on 10 January 1967)
It was in the context of defenses of Chen's loyalty
that Mao permitted the critical half of his dual protect-
criticize policy to proceed. On 17 January, Foreign Langu-
age Institute Red Guards put up a poster, in he form of
an open letter to Mao, attacking Chen for having incor-
rectly believed that certain leaders, such as Ben Bella
of Algeria, Keita of Mali, and Toure of Guinea could guide
their countries toward "socialism,"
Chen was impelled to make a self-criticism
at a rally of "revolutionary masses" hold on 24 January
and presided over by Chou. At the same time, however,
Chen complained that this self-criticism was made "under
duress
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Chen said that he had made a mistake in follow-
ing the "bourgeois line" of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-
ping at the start of the "cultural revolution." He had
been, he said, responsible for sending out 15 work teams
to suppress revolutionaries in the foreign affairs depart-
ments. He also had to say that he had applied pressure
to "mass movements" in trying to retain "order" in China's
diplomatic activities. Chou and Chen Po-ta appraised his
self-criticism as "exceedingly good," and the implication
was that Chen had been exonerated. It may be conjectured
that Chou and Chen Po-ta had in fact assisted the Foreign
Minister in drafting his confession in the knowledge that
Mao would permit Chen to survive politically only as a
contrite minister.'"'
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The apparently deliberate foot-dragging of Chou
and Chen on the matter of permitting foreign experts in
China to participate in Mao's domestic purge reflects a
basic difference between their caution and the. Chairman's
rashness. The Premier and the Foreign Minister, as ad-
ministrative veterans, were aware of the complexities and
risks inherent in carrying out a policy of struggle-par-
ticipation among experts from different countries who
have varying political views, traditional ways of living,
and contract obligations. In his speech of 28 January,
Chen had indicated that there might occur "situations
where foreign experts are struggling against foreign ex-
perts" partly because among the men from 60 countries
who might participate, there were "different trends of
ideologies among them." Chen, and Chou indirectly, had
calculated correctly. On 29 May 1967, the first issue
of Red Star, a paper of the Marxist-Leninist Activists
working in China as experts, was devoted mainly to a dis-
pute which had developed between the French-speaking
Activists and another group of foreign experts, the Rebel
Bethune Yenan Group. That is, the administrators had
made a pragmatic advance calculation and had been right,
while the revolutionary all along had been unconcerned
with pragmatic calculations about matters which satisfied
his ego, in this case the ego-gratification of encourag-
ing foreigners, even on a voluntary basis, to participate
in his "cultural revolution."
Chen Yi's apology of 28 January for delaying such
participation was made after he had clearly failed to keep
Mao's purge from radically affecting foreign policy. By
the time he had spoken, two irrational elements had been
inserted into the implementation of foreign affairs, namely,
the export of Mao's "thought", and the harassment of embas-
sies. At the same time, an organizational excrescence
was grafted onto the Foreign Ministry to provide revolu
tionary supervision of veteran professionals: "the
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revolutionary rebel liaison station."* More than ever
before, Mao's internal policies were to be directly re-
flected in foreign policy actions.
II. Foreign Policy and Mao's Purge Coalesce
Mao may have decided to purge some officials of
the diplomatic ranks in December 1966 if not earlier.
A. Mao's "Thought" Exported
Mao innovated on the practice of Stalin. Where-
as the Soviet dictator had concealed the role of his over-
seas envoys in disseminating his writings, Mao openly used
*The "revolutionary rebel liaison station" was estab-
lished in the Foreign Ministry on 18 January and it began
to supervise the work of veteran professionals. Its acti-
vities extended to each section of the Foreign Ministry.
At the same time, a "rebel group" was set up in the State
Council's Foreign Affairs Office."
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his entire diplomatic establishment in various countries
to distribute his booklet and the buttons of his cult.
A sort of peasant, simplicity ma:a'ked the practice of im-
pFlling trained ambassadors to repeat aloud quotations
of remarkable banality and irrelevance. Red Guards later
rFported Chen ri's attitude. "Even as late as 1967, Chen
Yi said- '1 do not agree with reading Mao quotations
abroad an-1 presenting Mao buttons. 111 Molotov had not
been impelled to implement any absurdity of a similar
nature by Stalin, and this policy of Mao's may be char-
acterized as ultra-Stalinism--that is, the cult carried
to an irrational extreme.
Regarding neutral countries, the first group of
reindoctrina.ted Chinese diplomats returned to the Chinese
embassy in Burma in mid -January 1967, and in February
and March, the symbols of his cult were being disseminated
in Rangoon and northern Burma. Proselyting Chinese dip-
lomats were active in Nepal and Ceylon starting in March,
and in Cambodia starting in May. Their actions provoked
the leaders of these neutral countries to engage in an
unprecedently vitriolic exchange of mutual recriminations
with Peking in the spring and summer, in some instances
merely adding to already existing tensions and in other
instances creating new antagonisms. For example, diplo-
matic relations with Indonesia and Tunisia were suspended,
all Chinese aid programs in Burma were closed down, and
frictions were increased with Cambodia, Ceylon, and Nepal.
Regarding friendly countries, neither Pakistan
nor North Vietnam were made exceptions. Mao's "thought"
was disseminated in Pakistan from the Cninese embassy as
early as January 1967. This policy cut directly across
the grain of Chen Yi's continuing efforts to placate the
Pakistanis, at first in the summer of 1966 when he tried
to mollify the Pakistan ambassador regarding the closing
of the mosques in Peking after Red Guard rampages, and
again in his speech of 23 March 1967 when he pledged that
Peking's enemies would not succeed in using the "cultural
revolution" to "sow discord" in Sino-Pak*stani relations.
The Pakistanis were so anxious to sustain a working rela-
tionship witn the Chinese that they did not publicize such
Red Guard outrages as the depredation of Muslim religious
symbols. For their part, the Chinese leaders had made
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an unprecedented military-aid investment in the non-Com-
munist government and they continued to accord the enemy
of India with a special status.
The North Vietnamese acted more vigorously to
prevent proselyting in their country. They kept NCNA
accounts of Vietnamese popular love for Mao out of their
own propaganda media and they implicitly rebuked the Chinese
Chairman by writing their criticism of his cult between
the lines of an article in the Ma 13,946377 issue of the
theoretical journal, Hoc Tap.
Overseas Chinese
refugees, who fled to Canton from North Vietnam, indirectly
confirmed Hanoi's policy of censorship when they complained
that they had not been permitted to study the Chairman's
writings there. Chou En-lai had to deny this: on 14
November, he told Red Guards that nonpermission to study
Mao's "thought" had been an excyse of the refugees who
were really afraid of being killed by U.S. air strikes.
Nevertheless, the Chinese-language newspaper in Hanoi,
controlled by the Chinese embassy, continued to publish
praise of Mao's writings in articles intended for local
Chinese personnel and overseas Chinese.
Mao apparently believed that the purge of his
former lieutenants required a demonstration that his
doctrines were not simplistic or archaic and that they
in fact had validity for other countries. Mao used Peking's
propaganda media and his entire diplomatic machinery to
act out an international charade and to make believe that
his "thought" was accepted in all countries. High-level
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sanction for this policy was implied in Hsieh Fu--chih's
speech of 18 May (he complained of British efforts to
restrict "the growing influence" of Mao's doctrines in
Hong Kong) and in Mao's own statement (he complained in
mid-summer of 1967 that internationally "there is fear
of the influence of China, of Mao Tse-tung's thought,
and of the Great Cultural Revolution"). Mao's persistence,
throughout the summer of 1967, in trying to demonstrate
that his doctrines were acceptable everywhere suggests
that he not only was unconcerned about foreign ridicule,
but also that he was obsessed by the desire to attack
domestic disparagers of his "thought." Only after Mao's
policy had created considerable tension in relations with
Nepal and Cambodia (among other countries) was the Chair-
man willing to permit Chou En-lai to send personal letters
of reassurance to King Mahendra in mid-August and Prince
Sihanouk in late September.
B. Embassies Harassed
The policy of harassing embassies with mass
demonstrations and temporary strikes by Chinese employees
was not unprecedented in Communist China. However, in
the years prior to the "cultural revolution," diplomatic
immunity of embassy grounds and personnel had been respected.
In the fall of 1966, the old practice of abiding by diplo-
matic restraints seemed to prevail.* Madame Mao, carrying
out Peking's reaction to Moscow's 26 August protest demand-
ing protection of Soviet embassy grounds and personnel,
told Red Guards on the 28th that "You should not enter
foreign embassies and consulates, but you can legitimately
demonstrate outside." Demonstrations in front of "un-
friendly" embassies continued within the limits of this
guideline into 1967 and during the siege of the Soviet
embassy from 26 January to 11 February. The temporary
*However, in the fall of 1966, some foreign diplomats
were being abused by young fanatics in the streets.
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lull in embassy harassment which followed the retreat
from the siege of the Soviet mission corresponded roughly
with the duration of a conservative period in Mao's
domestic purge.* Embassies of "friendly" countries (e.g.,
Albania, North Vietnam, and Pakistan) were kept free from
the policy of harassment in all periods.
However, in the period between April and September
1967, "unfriendly" embassies and their personnel were
brought under attack. Diplomatic immunity was transgressed
in the course of a deliberate procedure and foreign diplo-
mats were beaten and mission grounds were invaded. But
envoys from "unfriendly" countries who were beaten were
protected from dismemberment or death by special guards
assigned to them.
Most of the harassment incidents were planned
in nature and probably had the ultimate sanction of Mao.
Demonstrations against the Indonesian embassy were supple-
mented by Red Guard beatings of two expelled Indonesian
diplomats in late April in violation of the usage of diplo-
matic immunity. Planned harassment was invoked against
*The failure of Peking Radio, NCNA, and the press to
carry Chou En-lai's speech which ended the siege on 11
February may have been a reflection of Mao's displeasure
with Chou's line of justification. Following a ppssage
in which Chou had declared that "there is no need to in-
trude into the embassy" and that "we have also permitted
their diplomatic personnel to engage in normal activities,"
Chou provided a Maoist rationale. He said that Chairman
Mao had "taught us in each and every class struggle we
must slight the enemy strategically and take full account
of him tactically... This is what we have been doing in
the current struggle against the Soviet revisionist lead-
ing clique. But this by no means illustrates that we are
weak..." Mao apparently refused to permit further dis-
semination of the view that he had taught Red Guards how
to retreat in the struggle with the Soviet leaders. There
was no justification for, or indication of, a retreat in
the solidly hard anti-Soviet speeches of Chen Yi which
were publicized internationally on 11 and 15 February.
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the British on the mainland in May in connection with Hong
Kong, and this was followed by protests against alleged
British support of Israel in the war with the Arabs. On
16 May, the British consulate in Shanghai was invaded by
Red Guards and the charge, Hopson, was besieged on the
same day in his office in Peking. The two Shanghai con-
sulate diplomats were beaten by Red Guards on 24 May.
Mao's speech criticizing Britain during the Arab-Israeli
crisis on 6 June was followed the next day by a Red Guard
entry into the Peking embassy./
Militants in the Cultural Revolution Group were
permitted to act in an extreme leftist way following
Mao's directive of March 1967 that Red Guards "should not
only be internal revolutionaries but should also be inter
national revolutionaries." According to a Red Guard news-
paper, after a detailed examination by the Cultural Revo-
lution Group, Kang Sheng, on 6 June, "formally termed the
Liu-Teng foreign affairs line as 'three surrenders and
one annihilation."'* Wang Li, on 7 August, made an in-
flammatory speech which encouraged fanatics such as Xao
Teng-shan to stir up the extreme leftist attitude among
the Red Guards regarding foreign affairs.
It was in the context of this sanctioned leftism
that embassy entry--prohibited by Madame Mao in August
1966--was permitted. The entry of British missions in
May and June by Red Guards was not criticized by regime
leaders. On the contrary, it seems to have been a sanc-
tioned policy from May to late August, correlated with
specific regime efforts to apply pressure on London and
Hong Kong authorities. Red Guard entry into the Indonesian
*"Surrender to imperialism, revisionism, and reaction-
ary ruling classes; annihilation of [support to] revolu-
tions."
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embassy on 5 August seems also to have been a regime-
planned affair in retaliation for an earlier invasion--on
the same day--of the Chinese embassy in Djakarta. The
regime tried to control the policy and succeeded in pre-
venting Red Guard spontaneous initiatives from becoming
unauthorized entries. For example, following the 13
August release of a Soviet ship as a result of Kosygin's
protest over its detention in Dairen since late July,
Chinese troops on 14 August sealed off the Soviet embassy
and kept stone-throwing Red Guards from breaking in.
The policy of controlled invasion was implemented
against the "unfriendly" Mongolians. Following the humilia-
tion of a Mongolian embassy chauffeur (who was badly beaten
in mid-day on 9 August for having closed the ambassador's
car door on a photo of Mao thrust at him by Red Guards
in Peking), young fanatics sped in lorries to the Mongol-
ian embassy. Before PLA troops or police were dispatched,
they entered embassy grounds, climbed up to the second
story of the mission building, and painted anti-Mongolian
slogans on it. But by early evening, PLA and public
security forces moved in, surrounded the compound, closed
the gates, and forbade anyone to enter or leave. Sub-
sequent protests by the Foreign Ministry on the 10th and
demonstrations on the 11th and 12th were more restrained
affairs.
Invasion of the Soviet embassy seems to have
been sanctioned by the regime's leaders. On 17 August,
PLA troops, which had been surrounding the embassy for
several days, apparently acted on an order to led the
Red Guards through .heir cordon. The Red Guards stormed
into the consular office building, smashed furniture,
and set fire to records. In the center of Peking, a
Soviet embassy car was attacked and burned.
Invasion of the British embassy also seems to
have been planned. It was part of the leadership's
retribution against London's failure to capitulate to an
ultimatum. When, on 17 August, the Hong Kong authorities
suspended the publishing permits of three major pro-Com-
munist newspapers and arrested important staff members,
Mao apparently was angered by this evidence that he had
failed to cow the "imperialists."
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On 21 August, "revolutionary journalists" were
used to launch a demonstration in front of the charge's
office, and the Chinese leaders made the point clear that
the British embassy was their primary target by reducing
the size and virulence of the demonstrations in front of
the Ceylonese, Mongolian, and Kenyan embassies. After
the British rejected the ultimatum and began prosecuting
the arrested newspapermen, Mao was confronted with the
choice of backing down from o_^ carrying through the threat
to subject the British to "serious consequences." Shortly
after the expiration of the 48-hour deadline at 10;00 PM
on 22 August, Red Guards were let into the embassy com-
pound by PLA troops and police who had surrounded it.
Subsequent denials by Chou En-lai and Madame
Mao (among others) that the Chinese leaders had been
responsible for the invasion and the burning of the
charge's rffice failed to mention the crucial matter of
the ultimatum committing them to some form of retribution
against the British. Nevertheless, the Red Guards ap-
parently exceeded their authority by burning the charge's
office and beating members of his staff, including women.
The subsequent de-escalation of the policy of
harassing embassies probably reflected Mao's acceptance
of Chou's view that several governments were seriously
considering a drastic reduction of their missions in Pek-
ing, and that some were even prepared to suspend diplo-
matic relations. dates the eas-
ing of tensions among worried diplomats in Peking to 29
August. On that day, a large-scale and carefully organized
Red Guard demonstration near the Soviet embassy was in
progress when PLA troops suddenly rolled up in trucks
and dispersed the crowd with loudspeakers. From that time
on diplomatic missions felt a
definite easing of tension. Chou En-lei's"five prohibi-
tions" of 1 September had a further effect of relaxing
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the atmosphere among the foreign diplomatic community.*
In early September, a Chinese Foreign Ministry protocol
officer began to express "regrets" regarding the haras-
sments of the spring and summer.
Developments suggest that Mao had permitted the
Cultural Revolution Group to continue on a leftist course
against the embassies and that Chou reluctantly had ac-
cepted this course. That is, Mao had tolerated the ram-
pages stimulated by such Group militants as Wang Li and
Chi P.n-yu, who used Yao Teng-shan to stir up an extrem-
ist attitude throughout the foreign affairs establishment
in August. Wang Lis speech of 7 August was made, and
acted on by Yao, only because these militants believed
they had Mao's sanction to be "revolutionary." When Chou
intervened later in August, it was Mao who had to be
persuadel to withdraw his sanction. The burning of the
British charge's office provided Chou with the outrage
to use in arguing Mao back to rationality at a time when
he was willing to return to reason. More importantly,
Wang Li was a Cultural Revolution Group militant who had
just committed Mao to a greater danger on the internal
scene. In the wake of the July Wuhan incident, Wang ap-
parently had helped to incite a nationwide attack on the
army, creating a real possibility of PLA disaffection.
The retreat from the fanaticism on this internal matter
made it easier for Chou to justify a retreat on the ex-
ternal scene.
*Following the 1 September meeting of the enlarged
Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, wall posters
in Peking carried Chou's "five prohibitions," which were
(1) do
not
beat diplomats,
(2)
do
not stone embassies,
(3) do
not
burn embassies,
(4)
do
not enter diplomats'
houses,
and
(5) do not violate
the
boundaries of the
diplomatic missions.
On 7 October, with the issuing of a joint Central
Committee-State Council directive, Red Guards were warned
and embassies were reassured that Chou's prohibitions had
become national law.
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There is some evidence that the immediate target
of Wang Li was Chen Yi, and that the ultimate target was
the prestige and position of Chou En-lai, Wang's attack
on the Foreign Ministry was made at a time when Chou "more
than anyone else" had been supporting the Ministry. (Chou's
speech of 2 September 1967)
Kang Sheng, however, seems to have joined in the
defense of Chou and Chen after the internal and external
line moved to the right. On 1 September he told Red Guards
that they must make distinction between the formulators
of the "three surrenders, and one annihilation" foreign
policy line--namely, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and
Wang Chia-hsiang--and Chen Yi; "1f Chen Yi has errors,
he can make a self-examination." In this speech, Kang's
ominous remark- '"it is certain that foreign relations
circles have enemies; I have evidence, but I shall not
publicize it today"--suggests that the information later
cited by Red Guard posters and newspapers in attacking
Yao Teng-shan were supplied by Mao's foremost party police-
man. Kang may also have supplied the materials which were
later used to disgrace Wang Li and finally Chi Pen-yu.
Chou seemed to be protecting a base of personal
j.ower. In his speech of 2 September, Chou not only com-
plained that Yao 'Teng-shan had interfered in the work of
the foreign policy specialists, but also he was angered
b Yao's effort to "to ple" Chen.
Regarding the temporary seizing of power in the
Foreign Ministry by the rebel "liaison station," Chou
castigated the Peking Foreign Language Rebel Regiment for
having instigated the attempt. He also attacked Yao
Teng-shan for certain wild actions in various sections
of the Foreign Affairs establishment, but the subsequent
Red Guard accusation that Yao had become the Foreign
Minister for four days between 19 and 23 August is exag-
gerated. The context of his remarks suggest that it was
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in August, after Wang Li had made his militant speech on
the 7th, that he (Chou) had been the strongest voice raised
in defense of Chen's ministry. "I supported the Foreign
Ministry in the Central Committee more than anyone else
and I shall be responsible to the Central Committee."
(Quoted in Reed Guard Newspaper, 15 September 1967)
III. Foreign Policy Restored to Normalcy
The end of the em bass harassment policy in
late August was abrupt.
But Mao frequently has reversed a major line drastically.*
Not only Chinese employees of foreign embassies, but also
important Chinese diplomats were surprised by the sudden
reversal of line on the matter of exporting Mao's "thought"
and revolutionary doctrines.
*He is the only leader with sufficient power in the
regime to be able by fiat to change a basic policy. This
despotic and dictatorial power and this tendency to switch
to new lines suddenly had been criticized privately in
the CCP. Mao reported this criticism of his Stalinist
peremptory style of leadership: "I have 'come to the de-
clining years like Stalin.' I am 'despotic and dictator-
ial' giving you neither 'freedom' nor 'democracy.' I
am 'craving for greatness and success' and being 'partial.'
I have 'set a bad example to those under me.' I am also
one who 'would not change direction until he comes to
the end of his wrong course,' and 'once he turns, he
turns 180 degrees. 11' (Mao's comment of 15 August 1959,
presumably quoting from statements made at the time by
Peng Te-huai or his allies)
In late August 1967, the "end of his wrong course"
was reached partly because of the prospect that foreign
embassies would engage in a large-scale exodus from Pek-
ing.
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A. Chou's Major Role
As a consequence of a top leadership conference
held in Peking from 21 to 27 October to discuss ways to
bolster their damaged image overseas and improve their
hegemony over the world revolutionary movement, reassur-
ing messages were sent out to certain friendly countries.
In addition, Chou was permitted by Mao to be realistic
about proselyting revolution and Mao's "thought" abroad,
and in two speeches in late December 1967, he reasserted
a degree of pragmatic realism into Peking's tactics.
Speaking to workers in the foreign affairs field
in late December 1967, Chou invoked the name of Mao to
underscore the authority of the new line.
In foreign affairs, we have to concentrate
on revolutionizing ourselves and not others.
In international relations there are certain
norms which we must respect. [A] majority
of the countries we deal with are imperialist,
revisionist, or reactionary, and not leftist.
Chairman Mao said: 'Our embassy in the
Congo (B) praised the Premier of the Congo (B)
and not the President. Again our embassy
has emphasized certain things such as on
invitation cards they have written Mao quo-
tations. As a result, relations have be-
come tense.' Therefore, Chairman Mao,
while meeting with the Prime Minister of
the Congo (B) [on 3 October] personally
told him: 'Your President has acted cor-
rectly [in boycotting the Chinese embassy
reception on National Day]. He has cor-
rected for us our Great Power Chauvinism.'
Chairman Mao said this three times.
The export of Mao's "thought" was to be carried out in
a more tactful manner and Red Guards need not be organized
in foreign countries. Speaking to an Afro-Asian Writers'
Conference in late December 1967, Chou stated that Peking
did not desire slavish imitation of China by other countries.
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Referring to Japan, Chou laid it down that such actions
as forced readings of Mao's quotations by the Chinese-
oriented friendship association was excessive and unneces-
sary. This retreat from the gauche aspects of export of
Mao's '-thought' was to be a temporary victory for Chen
Yi.
But before Chen was to resume his Foreign Minister
duties, Chou worked with a small ad hoc staff in the Min-
istry. He apparently set up a "Supervisory Sub-Committee,"
probably to restrict the role of the "liaison station"
while it was engaged in "rectification." He apparently
restored the authority of the Ministry's Party Committee.
The "Supervisory Sub-Committee'?--which stressed supervi-
sion rather than operational control--and the Party Com-
mittee were directed by Chou on 18 October to inform his
Private Office and the Peking garrison in the event that
Ministry archives ""both official and personal should be
touched." This was a warning against any repetition of
the invasion of the Ministry and pilfering of some of its
confidential files by militant members of the Foreign
Language Institute or by any other unauthorized persons.
Chou temporarily seemed to be depending on these two com-
mittees to send along all major foreign policy matters
for decision to his personal office. That is, they as-
sumed the Foreign Minister's functions prior to Chen Yi's
return to political and physical health. They also seem
to have acquired a watchdog function over personnel dur-
ing the "cultural revolution."
Ministry professionals were still subjected to
criticism, but they were protected from personal abuse.
Chou's directive of 18 October specified that the Minis-
try's "four great movement"--i.e., 'struggle against self,
criticize revisionism, pay attention to affairs of the
nation, and carry out the Cultural Revolution to the end"--
was "permissible" provided that officials were subjected
only to reasoning rather than "beating, dragging out,
or 'plucking out."' Some old professionals were exoner-
ated and re-established official contacts with foreign
embassies. Others, including Liao Cheng-chih of the Com-
mission for Overseas Chinese Affairs, were beyond redemp-
tion. His Commission may have been absorbed by the Foreign
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Ministry. Some Deputy Foreign Ministers resumed a fair
degree of their former daily functions, but others, such
as Wang Ping-nan, who wAs 'struggled" but not exonerated
on 18 October, may still be in trouble.
B. The Taming of the Foreign Minister: Stage Two
Mao's dialectical po;icy of protection-criticism
toward Chen Yi reflects a special concern of Chou En-lai
to sustain Chen in his post. Mao and his wife apparently
have sufficient trust in Chou to accept his sympathetic
view of Chen. The second stage of the criticism of Chen
extended from April to September 1967.
Only the hypothesis that Chou is the leader most
concerned with preserving Chen in his posts can account
for the fact that Mao has not purged a man who had at
one time derided his "thought," who defended the integrity
of men after they were condemned, and who criticized the
methods of Mao's creatures. the Red Guards.
Chen's resurgence within the Foreign Ministry
against the "liaison station" in the conservative period
of February and March 1967 was made at a time when Chou
had complained (mid-February) that the ignorant fanatics
in the Ministry had gone "too far" in their supervision
of professionals. Chen later admitted that on 12 Febru-
ary, he had "openly scolded the rebels." Red Guards later
revealed that in the conservative period Chen, at a For-
eign Ministry cadres' meeting, banged on the table and
shouted: "In the past, you have put up many big char-
acter posters about me. Now I am going to have my say."
Chen proceeded to criticize the "liaison station" during
its temporary retreat ("rectification") within the Minis-
try and to put "pressure on the revolutionary masses" so
that high-level Ministry officials could "recover their
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posts?" Chen's basic goal was to protect Foreign Minis-
try personnel.* When the consei vative period was reversed
and Chen was again brought under attack, starting on 2
April, Chen Po-to--who had defended the Foreign Minister
on the same platform with Chou on 24 January--acted to
keep criticism within limits. On 16 April, Chen Po-ta
replied to the request of the "liaison station" for a
face-to-face confrontation with Chen Yi by saying that
Chen, as the Foreign Minister,. is representing the state,
that they must not come to "drag out" Chen, and that they
should give him a chance to correct his errors. Chen Po-
ta then evoked the name of Chou En-lai as the leader who
was "presently and directly" in charge of the Foreign
Ministry to deter the young fanatics from abusing Chen.
The unmoll.ified "liaison station" nevertheless persisted,
and on 19 April demanded that Chen be brought down.
Under the dual policy of leadership protection
and Red Guard criticism, Chen was permitted to participate
in diplomatic functions in April. Criticism was sustained
throughout May. a French embassy official reported the
exultation of an "ignorant" young diplomatic guide who
declared that Chen's influence in the Ministry had been
reduced, and the British charge noted at the end of the
month that Chen was constantly surrounded by "aides" and
had a "haggard appearance," Chou had to swim with the
tide of anti-Chen criticism. He apparently believed that
Mao continued to approve of the existence of the "liaison
station" within the Foreign Ministry, he gave "full sup-
port, come what may, to the liaison station set up by the
revolutionaries to lead revolution and supervise business
*In general perspective, a primary crime of Chen Yi
was his desire to preserve the veterans in his Ministry:
"To sum up, Chen Yi wants to protect all the 'old revolu-
tionaries,' all the old staff, all the old diplomats, all
who have professional ability, regardless of their poli-
tical coloration, and this is not a proletarian approach
at all." (Article by the Revolutionary Rebel Committee
of the Foreign Affairs and Political Departments of the
CCP Central Committee in Foreign Affairs Red Flag, 8
May 1967)
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operations" (Chou speech of 26 May). On the other hand,
he apparently believed that Mao did not approve of Red
Guard attacks on the Foreign Ministry; in the same speech,
he criticized outside Red Guard units for invading the
Ministry's confidential files on 13 May and for storming
the State Council's Foreign Affairs Staff Office on 29
May.
Dialectically, Mao continued to protect Clhcii.
The Chairman had Chen join him and Lin Piao during; t:a 1. 1:s
with the visiting president of Zambia on 24 June. The
protective half of Mao's policy was sustained, and a wall-
poster put up in Peking on 1 August stated that the CCP
Central Committee had ascertained that "Vice Premier and
concurrently Foreign Minister Chen Yi" as well as Li Hsien-
nien and Yu Chiu-li "are men of Chairman Mao's command."
The critical half was kept within limits in
early August, primarily because Chou En-lai had laid down
general guidelines for it. But in late August, the young
fanatics temporarily exceeded these limits. In August
and September, Chen was subjected to seven criticism meet- 25X1
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This did not mean that Chen was permanently to
be shielded from semi-public or private criticism sessions.
Mao's apparent awareness that more than one year of per-
secution is necessary to break the will of an ebullient
and intelligent man was implied in the statement of Chou
En-lai on 16 September that Mao had declared- "Chen Yi has
still to be first criticized and then protected." At a
private meeting of "thorough criticism and repudiation"
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held in the Foreign Ministry on 18 September, Chen was
impelled to say to young fanatics: "Your criticism is
fine and thorough. I bow my head and admit my guilt be-
fore Chairman Mao and before the revolutionary young
fighters." (Quoted in Shumchun Reference News, 17
November 1967)
The formal reassertion of Chen's authority in
the Foreign Ministry followed his self-abasement on 18
September.
Also in late November, NCNA referred to Cheri as "Foreign
Minister" and he was reported to be 25X1
fully in charge of the Ministry, but working only six.
hours a day.
Mao's sustained persecution of Chen Yi was not
merely motivated by a desire to test his political loyalty
to himself, Lin Piao, and Madame Mao. That matter had
been ascertained earlier, as witness Madame Mao's and
Chou En-lai's 10 January 1967 defense of the Foreign
Minister on the important issue of whether Chen was an
anti-Mao plotter. Mao seems to have been motivated by
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a passion to break Chen's determination to be honest
about comp ades, rational about foreign policy, and
moderate in the persecution of the "cultural revolution.'"
Chen was loyal to Mao, but he would not willingly accept
the purge or professionals. He would not accept will-
ingly the irrationality of imposing a supervision by
ignorant young fanatics ('"ignorant" as attested to by
foreign diplomats in Peking) on intelligent foreign
policy veterans. He had to be impelled to accept the
egregious policy of exporting Mao's ego-cult. Yet Mao
wanted Chen to accept these matters "voluntarily," that
is, under terror and psychological pressure. Just how
"voluntary' Chen's final submission had been, when Chen
"bowed his head" on 27 Augus
Chen is still to be "first criticized and then
protected," as Mao put it. This obviously is a course
that Chou does not desire for Chen, but he may believe
that it is better to have half of Chen than no Chen at
all. Chen is loyal to Chou and is therefore a reliable
aide to have in the course of any future maneuvering for
position in the hierarchy of leaders. Chen apparently
has a sizeable following throughout the foreign affairs
establishment and these forces may well represent a reli-
able source of support for Chou. Nevertheless, Chou has
to accept Mao's dialectical protection-criticism policy
against Chen and the role of scapegoat for foreign policy
"mistakes" that has been imposed on the Foreign Minister.
Chou has had to resort to various flabby argu-
ments to jistify retaining Chen, He told young fanatics
on 16 September 1967 that "This minister, Chen Yi, is
different from other ministers. This is a question af-
fecting China's reputation and prestige in the interna-
tional sphere." He has also had to use flabby arguments
in setting himself apart from Chen's "mistakes"--such
as the "serious mistake in the question of Algeria. He
held that it was a revolution, but I saic' it was a coup
d'etat." While complying with the policy of using Chen
as the foreign policy scapegoat, Chou apparently still
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hopes to preserve his political health. Chen's fate will
depend on how much Mao is willing to accept Chou's view
of Chen as still loyal. But it will also depend on Chen's
willingness to demonstrate to the Chairman that he is an
obedient captive who will accept the methods of Mao's
domestic purge.
C. Prospects
Although selective harassment of embassies sub-
sided in late August, the policy of selective holding of
hostages has been sustained as a political weapon to
retaliate for anti-Chinese actions abroad or to gain con-
cessions on special issues. The hostage policy is almost
certainly viewed by the Chinese leaders as less likely
to lead to a break in diplomatic relations than embassy
harassment and physical abuse of foreign envoys. Never-
theless, even the more rational Chinese leaders indicated
in the directive of 7 October that Peking will carry out
demonstrations and other "political expressions of will"
in front of the embassies "if it is thought necessary."
Mao may now permit Chou and Chen to try to re-
store Peking's prestige overseas by using a policy of
"dosage." That is, he may now accept their view that
gradual and cautious methods must be used to advance revo-
lutionary policies, that advances must be made only with
a view to what the traffic in each country will bear.
"Friendly" countries once again are feeling the effects
of relatively restrained and rational diplomacy. But
the list of "unfriendly" countries has expanded since 1966.
Mao apparently has stopped deluding himself that
a clear loss of prestige, indicated by Peking's isola-
tion in 1967, is really a clear gain. However, it is
not to be expected that he will discontinue his long-term
policy of supporting revolutions overseas. His comment
on this policy in mid-1967 seems to be an indication of
the course he will continue to pursue. As he put it some-
time after the Arab-Israeli crisis of June 1967:
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Our China is not only the political center
of world revolution, but also should be-
come the military and technological center
of world revolution. We should give them
arms and can now openly give them arms, in-
cluding clearly inscribed Chinese weapons
(except in certain areas). We intend to
give open support to become the arsenal
of world revolution.
Support of insurrections will be sustained because it is
an obsession of Mao's that has not changed. He obviously
views himself as the leader of all leftist revolutions.*
The return to a more flexible but still revolu-
tionary policy is only the beginning of a long road back
to refurbishing Peking's influence- overseas, It is being
undertaken against a background of resentment in some of
those countries whose governments were gratuitously anta-
gonized. Chinese diplomatic crudities probably will be
resisted more promptly and vigorously than they had been
prior to 1967. In this sense, Red Guard diplomacy may
continue to have an "irreparable influence upon our coun-
try's international reputation and foreign relations
work," as the Red Guard Newspaper put it on 15 September
1967. Although the paper attributed Peking's impaired
overseas image to Yao Teng-shan, the real responsibility
for this policy aberration must be Mao's.
*Mao's Stalin-awareness almost certainly is reflected
in his desire to surpass the dead Soviet dictator in in-
ternational prestige as the revolutionary leader par ex-
cellence. Mao has had Stalin praised for "greatly assist-
ing the revolutionary struggles of all peoples," but it
is necessary that the image of Stalin as an advocate of
world revolution should not dwarf Mao's. Whenever Mao
permits his aides to defend Stalin, they apparently are
required to sustain the pretense of Mao s superiority,
pontificating on the merits "and mistakes" of the Russian.
(People's Daily-Red Flag joint article, 13 September 1963)
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The morale of foreign policy personnel is prob-
aibly at an unprecedently low point. Leadership insist-
ence that Peking's international situation is "excellent"
apparently has not been accepted by working-level offi-
cials. Signs of disillusionment were reflected in the
December 1967 speech of one official:
Some comrades will ask: In what respect
can the present situation be described as
excellent? Since China is opposed every-
where and setbacks are encountered every-
where, how can the situation be described
as good?
In addition to cynicism regarding policy failures, many
diplomats are still being subjected to indoctrinatioli
and testing, and this process in itself is sufficiently
callous to terrorize the ranks. But V.ao seems to be less
concerned about morale than the perpetuation of his
"cultural revolution" in all areas of the Peking regime.
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