AFGHANISTAN: RESISTING SOVIETIZATION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000400020005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan:
Resisting Sovietization
A Research Paper
NESA 84-10.312
December 1984
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I Directorate of Secret
A Intelligence
Afghanistan:
Resisting Sovietization
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by (Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution b Office of Soviet
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief. South Asia
Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 84-10312
December 1984
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Summary
Information available
as of 14 November 1984
was used in this report.
Afghanistan:
Resisting Sovietization
The Soviet program to transform Afghanistan into a reliable Communist
client state thus far appears to have had no impact. Lack of security
prevents Communist workers from trying to develop regime programs in
more than two-thirds of the country. In areas where there is a regime
presence, Sovietization measures have failed to develop significant support
for the Afghan Government:
? The Kabul regime has bought only temporary loyalties by bribery.
? Soviet and Afghan media fail to indoctrinate Afghans because of their
cynicism, ignorance, and illiteracy.
? The Afghan education system barely functions and is widely distrusted.
? Afghans educated in the USSR often are antagonized rather than
indoctrinated. Many returnees cannot obtain appropriate or attractive
positions to spread regime influence.
Long-term obstacles to Sovietization include the Afghans' history of
resistance to foreign domination and to control by any central government,
as well as distrust of government schools and of attempts to change
traditional ways. Afghans, moreover, disapprove of Soviet society as well as
the Soviet presence.
An active insurgency and traditional Afghan opposition will probably
hamper Sovietization over the long term, so that for many years Afghan
submission to Soviet rule will have to be forced.
Moscow has shown no signs of growing impatient over the Sovietization of
Afghanistan. In Kabul the temptation to become passive probably will
increase as the younger generation grows up with an impression of regime
pervasiveness, and some Afghans will support the regime to improve their
livelihoods and gain privileges. Outside Kabul, the Soviets will continue to
pursue programs to make cooperation with Kabul appear attractive, and
propaganda will continue to remind Afghans of the benefits of complying
with the regime.
Secret
NESA 84-10312
December 1984
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The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
KHAD and the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs
Sociological Factors Hampering Sovietization
Resistance to Change
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Afghanistan:
Resisting Sovietization
The Soviet program of transforming Afghanistan into
a stable Communist client state has made little
progress in the five years since the Soviet invasion.
Despite Soviet dominance over the Afghan regime,
the populace shows outward compliance only in areas
where the Soviet presence is strong.' The Sovietization
program for Afghanistan involves intimidating and
indoctrinating the Afghan people and gradually trans-
forming Afghanistan's economic, political, and social
life to conform to the Soviet model. At their current
rate of gaining adherents to the regime, the Afghan
Communists will need decades before they can rule
without a large Soviet military presence.
Soviet achievements in absorbing Central Asia and
controlling Mongolia and Eastern Europe, in our
view, do not assure success in Afghanistan, though the
Soviets believe they will ultimately prevail. Afghans
have historically resisted foreign domination and con-
trol by any central government; Afghanistan's moun-
tainous terrain is especially suited to guerrilla war-
fare; its nonindustrial, subsistence economy does not
readily permit the Soviets to intimidate the labor
force; and-most important-the Afghan resistance
receives substantial foreign military and political sup-
port.
Apart from Kabul, Communist influence has proba-
bly declined since the Soviet invasion. Our analysis of
government control of Afghanistan's population,
based on reports of military operations and population
movements, indicates that, of a population of about 14
million, no more than 5.6 million, or 40 percent, live
in government-held areas. This is a substantial decline
since 1980 when an estimated 7.6 million people, 51
percent of the then total of 15 million, lived in
government-held areas.
The Communists' plans to win support and advance
Marxist doctrine have been extensive but generally
unimplemented. According to an Afghan party docu-
ment, a program for expanding regime influence
involves securing distticts that are politically and
economically important so that state workers can
safely pursue converting the local populace, inducing
local leaders to support the regime, and recruiting
youth for regime service, particularly in KHAD, the
Afghan intelligence organization. The document pos-
its a combination of force, subversion, and bribery;
backing only those whose influence is well established;
and concentrating on strategically important areas.
Soviet control of the policymaking apparatus of the
Afghan regime has not assured control of the civil
servants or policy implementation.
ment find that their plans and orders are often
sabotaged or frustrated.
mirror that of the USSR.
The Afghan Communists have attempted to imple-
ment several reforms to expand the influence of the
central government and promote Marxist goals. One
reform-designed to end perpetual debt of small
landholders and landless peasants-limited or can-
celed loan repayments and returned :land that money-
lenders had seized. A second reform restricted pay-
ment to brides' families and curtailed other
marriage-related expenses, set the minimum age for
marriage at 16 for girls and 18 for boys, and made
consent mandatory for both bride and groom. This
reform was designed to restructure economic relation-
ships and limit familial control, thus making the
younger generation more susceptible to regime au-
thority. Plans for other reforms often mentioned in
the Kabul media concern land redistribution, govern-
ment control of irrigation systems, government grants
of seed and fertilizer, the eradication of illiteracy,
revision of the school curriculum to reflect Marxist
objectives, and revision of the judicial system to
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Factory workers in the A han-
Soviet Friendship Hall
Attempts by the Taraki and Amin regimes to imple-
ment the reforms were ham-handed and left such
bitterness that the Babrak regime has only paid
lipservice to their implementation,
Mullahs told the peasants that cancella-
tion of debts was against tribal codes and amounted to
theft, as did acceptance of confiscated land. Marriage
reforms were also condemned as un-Islamic, and
young women felt insulted by limited bride prices,
The old ruling classes
strongly opposed policies that undermined their finan-
cial control and social status. The government could
not protect its workers from attacks and intimidation,
and the regime did not have enough personnel to
maintain a long-term presence in each village.=
the government reacted to the
resistance by arresting and executing many religious
figures. As a result, the regime appeared even more
anti-Islamic and generated greater hostility among
the people.
The Kabul regime is aware that its measures to
implement Marxist reforms have been inadequate. In
early 1983 an Afghan party document concluded that
the central administration could not support its agents
in the field and that party and state officials lacked
knowledge of local situations. The document charged
party officials with laxness in spreading propaganda,
showing poor judgment in using local resources to
improve the lot of the people, and failing to coordinate
activities. The document also noted abortive attempts
to buy the loyalty of local insurgent groups-attempts
that have sometimes resulted in the slaying of regime
representatives.
In our view, even where the Soviet presence has been
strong, the ruling party has produced only a small
class of privilege-seekers. According to US Embassy
reports, the gulf between the party and the people is
wide and growing. In Kabul, the regime's privileged
class has burgeoned since the Soviet invasion. The
younger, lower-ranking members of the new class
wear Western dress and loiter in the streets, according
to US Embassy reports. Party members frequent the
best restaurants, where they use alcohol and consort
with prostitutes. The consequences are further alien-
ation of the people from the rulers
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Offices of Central Committee
of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan
The Babrak regime has been unsuccessful in gaining
legitimacy by portraying itself as Islamic and egali-
tarian. Afghans easily see
through such measures as changing the flag to include
Islamic green, forming a Supreme Council of Islamic
Affairs, publicizing regime support for mosques and
Islamic shrines and institutions, and invoking the
name of Allah at all official functions. According to
US Embassy reports, insurgents still consider the
regime anti-Islamic and frequently attempt to assassi-
nate regime-backed mullahs. With considerable suc-
cess, guerrillas call on Afghan soldiers to desert and
join in the "holy war" against the Soviets.
We believe Sovietization has failed to produce loyal
followers of the regime because the program itself is
inadequate and is executed without dedicated person-
nel. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan,
guided by Soviet advisers, oversees the implementa-
tion of Marxist policies and the efforts to develop a
loyal following for the Kabul regime. In some areas
the party uses the Ministry of Nationalities and
Tribal Affairs along with KHAD to spread propagan-
da and subversion, often through offers of money.
Indoctrination efforts depend mainly on the National 25X1
Fatherland Front, Afghan and Soviet media, and the
Afghan and Soviet education systems.
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA), the primary tool for Communist reform, has
been unsuccessful in significantly augmenting its
numbers or in reducing the bloody factionalism that
hampers its operation. Factional purges, desertions,
assassinations, and intimidation by insurgents have
kept party membership limited.
we estimate that party membership is
less than one-third of the regime's public claim of
120,000. Struggles between the Parchami faction (an
estimated 40 percent of the members) and the Khalqi
faction (an estimated 60 percent) have produced
armed clashes, low morale, desertions from the armed
forces, and collaboration with the insurgents. The
Soviet Ambassador has often had to mediate in party
disputes and unity has
remained elusive despite Soviet attempts to deal even-
handedly with the factions. Moscow has permitted the
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The Afghan Government and Military
Soviet advisers and technicians oversee all aspects of
Afghan Government policy,
Ithe
main purpose of those advisers who are not concerned
with combating the resistance or consolidating Soviet
control is to ensure that production goals are met. We
believe that the greatest concentrations of Soviet
advisers are in the Ministries of National Defense
and Foreign Affairs and in KHAD, the Afghan
intelligence service.
Kabul's foreign policy slavishly follows the Soviet
line. Soviet advisers in the Foreign Ministry, acting
on instructions from Moscow, have more authority
than their counterparts in other ministries,
The Defense Ministry is also permeated with Soviet
advisers. Soviet
advisers attached to Afghan units control the units'
administrative and operational activities. The advis-
ers make all decisions concerning operations, organi-
zation, promotions, and transfers of officers.
advisers
oversee the implementation of Soviet policies, main-
tain close liaison with Interior Minister Gulabzoi,and
educate young Afghans in Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
halqis
in the Interior Ministry are often responsible for
attacks on the ruling Parchamis.
gas is being pumped.
The Economy
The Soviets control key sectors of Afghanistan's
national economy but have made no attempt to
socialize local economic systems. Since the invasion
in 1979, Moscow has largely replaced Western lend-
ers and donors in Afghanistan, providing about $850
million in economic assistance as grants and about
$50 million in development assistance. Western aid,
meanwhile, has declined from some $100 million
annually to almost nothing. Since 1975 the Soviets
have provided credits, equipment, and technical
assistance to develop Afghan industry. The Soviets
import about 95 percent of Afghanistan's gas produc-
tion, which we estimate was 2.7 billion cubic meters
in 1983. Press reports indicate that the Soviets over
the years have consistently paid less than the world
price for gas, and Afghan officials say the Soviets
have not permitted Afghans to check on how much
The long-term prospect is for the Afghan economy to
be absorbed into the Soviet economy. Afghanistan
will probably be subsidized in the way that poorer
parts of the USSR are and Mongolia was during long
periods of its Sovietization.
ment of Soviet advisers,
ruling Parchami faction to increase its power gradual-
ly, but the Soviets have had little choice but to allow
the Khalqi faction to maintain its influence in the
Army and an independent military force in the pro-
vincial police command
Moscow probably hopes that a new generation enter-
ing the party will give its loyalty to leaders free of
factional enmity. So far, however, there is little sign of
emergence of such leadership. Both factions have
sought to recruit new party members, depending upon
the ethnic, tribal, and clan connections that distin-
The Soviets have removee t e most uncompromising
factional leaders from the Afghan scene for long
periods-through ambassadorial assignments or
guish Afghan politics.
"training" in the USSR.
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Afghan officials said in late 1983 that elections would
be held during 1984 for village, subdistrict, and
province councils, and that later a "national council"
would be chosen to replace the Revolutionary Coun-
cil, Afghanistan's nominal governing body since 1978.
Prime Minister Keshtmand subsequently said the
PDPA would be the leading party in the elections.
These statements indicate plans to duplicate the
Soviet system of centralized party control behind a
democratic facade. Since January 1984, however,
public mention of the plans has been rare, possibly
because of difficulties in reaching more than a small
portion of the potential electorate.
KHAD and the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal
Affairs
Chief among the party's instruments for propaganda
and subversion are KHAD and the Ministry of Na-
tionalities and Tribal Affairs, but their efforts to win
tribal support have yielded few results. Large sums of
money have usually bought local loyalties for no more
Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs in spring
1984 were distributing thousands of pamphlets and
large numbers of cassettes of speeches among tribes-
men, particularly in the eastern border provinces. The
propaganda alleges that many benefits arose from the
1978 revolution, associates a feudal society with the
insurgency, claims that insurgent leaders live in luxu-
ry in Peshawar, asserts that the refugees support a lost
and unpopular cause, and charges that the insurgents
kill innocent Afghan civilians and destroy their prop-
erty. the propaganda is
usually ignored, even when accompanied by the provi-
sion of food and medical care.
the government's
political action program is rudimentary and inept. At
a village in Balkh Province in winter 1983-84, for
example, government spokesmen promised villagers
weapons, clothes, and wheat. Only the weapons were
delivered, and the regime officials lost interest in
political programs once the Soviets completed repairs
on an area road. any
political benefits that may have resulted were de-
stroyed after regime soldiers appropriated food from
the villagers and Soviet soldiers shot several farmers,
assuming they were insurgents.
The National Fatherland Front
Regime-sponsored groups under the umbrella Nation-
al Fatherland Front claim national following and
promote party goals, but we believe the groups have
little substance outside Kabul and are generally inef-
fectual. The Front claims to "activate the people
toward economic and social progress," according to
press reports. Encompassed in the Front are the
Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
(DYOA), the Democratic Women's Organization of
Afghanistan, trade unions, and associations for writ-
ers, artists, and other groups
The Front, led by PDPA Politburo member Saleh
Muhammad Ziray, numbers only a few thousand
members, nearly all in Kabul
programs to promote Soviet art and culture, present
Marxist-Leninist themes, and portray Soviet history
and Afghan party achievements are not popular be-
cause of the political themes and fear of reprisal by
insurgents. We believe that most Front organizations
do little more than issue statements supporting regime
policies.
The youth organization is more aggressive but not
notably more effective than the other Front groups.
Patterned after the Soviet Komsomol, the DYOA
seeks recruits for local militias and channels recruits
into indoctrination programs,
the youth organization also
tries to rem orce discipline and propagate Communist
ideology in the Afghan military. US Embassy sources
indicate that the regime recently ordered schoolteach-
ers to recruit new DYOA members. A student's
refusal to join results in loss of education privileges.
A countereffort by the resistance inhibits participa-
tion in the DYOA.
senior regime officials grew concerned that
insurgent organizations in Kabul in spring 1984 were
vigorously recruiting Afghan youth. In the short term,
Afghan and Soviet efforts to indoctrinate Afghan
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Antiregime broadcasts, in our view, may boost insur-
gent morale but play only a minor role in countering
Soviet and regime propaganda. Three clandestine
radio stations broadcast criticism of Soviet and
Afghan regime policy.
insurgents who hear the broadcasts show great pride
in having their own radio station. Two of the stations
broadcast from insurgent strongholds within Afghan-
istan, and the third apparently broadcasts from
Mashhad, Iran.
Cassette recordings are probably more effective than
the clandestine broadcasts)
tapes distributed by Panjsher insurgents
are popular, though scarce. The tapes-designed to
encourage other insurgents present music, Afghan
poetry, and commentaries on fighting. Cassettes from
personally identified sources are akin to Afghans'
traditionally accepted medium for news: rumors
passed orally
The impact of resistance publications, like that of the
Communist press, is limited by widespread illiteracy.
Insurgent organizations in Peshawar maintain several
publications, some of
which may be smuggled into Afghanistan. In our
youth probably succeed only when the parents have
influenced the children to accept Communism or
when the children have long been isolated from their
families and villages, perhaps raised in a regime
orphanage.
The Media
We believe Soviet efforts to use the media for indoc-
trination have failed because of the Afghans' cynicism
and ignorance of international issues. Antiregime and
Western media also contribute to that failure, though
only in small measure.
Communist Control, Goals. Since their invasion in
December 1979, the Soviets have created a smaller
version of their propaganda apparatus for the Af-
ghans.
view, most of them exaggerate claims of insurgent
successes. Given the low rate of literacy along with
the danger to anyone observed by the regime in
possession of an insurgent publication, we doubt that
such publications are extensive or effective
The effect of Western broadcasts is limited by recep-
tion problems, lack of interest, and ignorance of
world affairs. US Embassy reports indicate that
Voice of America and Radio Liberty are sometimes 25X1
jammed, fully or partially. Although Radio Paki- 25X1
stan, Voice of America, and BBC have local audi-
ences, listeners generally find the programs too short 25X1
and thus seldom tune in, 25X1
Moreover, Afghans have no interest in 25X1
Western radios' extensive reporting on international
sports. Although they enjoy news of anti-Communist
groups and personalities, such news is poorly under-
stood. the East-West
conflict is seen as a struggle between Soviet atheism
and religious faith. Polish opposition leader Lech
Walesa and Solidarity are seen as "Catholic mujahe-
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Soviet advisers control all Kabul radio and television
broadcasts and write scripts promoting socialism and
criticizing US policy. The Soviets exert similar con-
trol over Afghan publications, many of which did not
exist prior to the Soviet intervention
Kabul Broadcasts. Kabul broadcasts reach a wide 25X1
audience, yet have little 25X1
effect on popular opinion. Radios are widely available,
and in the countryside, 25X1
Kabul radio is popular because of its Afghan 25X1
music and continual service, but its propaganda elicits 2bAl
derision. Most of the radio and television programs
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Afghanistan
purvey political, social, and economic themes that
even the urban audiences consider irrelevant. US
Embassy sources indicate that Kabul citizens find
most international news meaningless. A marcher in
the Kabul demonstration on 25 December 1983 pro-
testing the US intervention in Grenada confessed to
having no idea where or what Grenada was. US
Embassy reports indicate that on issues of public
interest-such as military service and the resist-
ance-most listeners reject the regime line out of
hand.
Kabul Press. We believe the Afghan press has little
influence on Afghan society because its audience is
limited and lacks interest. Kabul newspapers are
modeled on Moscow's. Because the national literacy
rate is below 10 percent-though it may be 20 percent
in Kabul-the press reaches only a small portion of
the populace US Em-
bassy reports indicate the vast majority of literate
Afghans ignore the press. In early 1984, after several
months of walking about the capital, an Embassy
officer reported not having seen a single Afghan
buying, reading, or even carrying a newspaper. De-
spite a population of some 1.7 million, Kabul appar-
ently has only two newspaper kiosks, both with old
newspapers for sale, and newspaper display stands-
so prevalent in the USSR-apparently do not exist in
Kabul.
According to US Embassy reports, the Kabul press is
patterned after the Soviet press, with three major
dailies serving supposedly as organs of various re-
gime institutions. The Truth of the April Revolution
is, like Pravda, the organ of the party Central
Committee. Homeland is Kabul's Izvestiya, the organ
of the Revolutionary Council, which, in turn, is
meant to resemble the Supreme Soviet and the
Council of Ministers. Friend serves as the organ of
the National Fatherland Front, which supposedly
represents all Afghan nationalities and social groups.
The three major dailies are basically compilations of
regime slogans arranged tofit the occasion. More
doctrinaire than Soviet newspapers, the Afghan pa-
pers generally lack the frank or offbeat articles that
occasionally appear in the Moscow press. Articles
critical of economic mismanagement or other faults
on the part of lower ranking officials are rare in the
Kabul papers, where all problems are attributed to
"imperialists" and antirevolutionary elements.
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The book trade has little effect in Afghan society,
apart from its role in supplying schools. US Embassy
sources indicate that Soviet-published books dominate
the juvenile market and are also prevalent in Kabul's
used book outlets. The high proportion of new Soviet
books appearing in the used book market suggests the
regime may be supplying them directly to dealers in
an attempt to increase distribution.
Soviet Media. In our view, the cynicism and illiteracy
of the Afghans render Soviet media at least as
ineffective as Afghan media in shaping public opinion.
Moscow radiobroadcasts in Dari, Tajik, and Pashtu,
along with Soviet television, are heard clearly in
Kabul. Soviet media regularly stress that the Afghan
revolution is irreversible and portray the Afghan
people as busily engaged-with Soviet assistance-in
consolidating the gains of the April 1978 revolution
under the leadership of the Afghan party
According to a former Afghan education official, a
steady flow of Soviet propaganda comes from trans-
lating centers like Tashkent to remind Afghans of
their ethnic and cultural ties to the USSR. The
official quotes the Tashkent press as stressing the
need "to tell our Uzbek brothers in Afghanistan about
the great progress we have made under Communism
in Central Asia." Another theme centers on the need
"to extend help to our backward brothers in Afghani-
stan to enrich and develop their primitive literature 25X1
and culture." Most of the propaganda, according to
the source, is aimed at Afghan youth.
Education
We believe the Afghan and Soviet education systems
so far have had little impact on the Afghans' political
attitudes. In addition to sending thousands of Afghans
to the USSR annually, the Soviets have reshaped
Afghanistan's education system into a mechanism to
indoctrinate and to reward party and military service.
Although the Soviets have radically altered the Af-
ghan curriculum to promote indoctrination, Afghani-
stan's school system has only limited influence since it
has ceased functioning everywhere but in a few major
cities
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Most of the Soviet-prompted curriculum changes are
designed to promote Communist ideology
traditional dis-
ciplines are largely neglected. In the elementary and
secondary schools the
curriculum developed by Columbia University was
replaced with the Soviet curriculum in winter 1979
and reduced from 12 years to 10. Afghan textbooks
are published in Tashkent, and course content stress-
es the merits of Communism,, Some books are only
slightly modified versions of Soviet texts, with praise
of Babrak substituted for praise of Lenin. In the first
grade, the first lesson concerns the April revolution.
Marxism-Leninism is introduced in the second grade.
According to US Embassy reports, a Ministry of
Education document prescribes that children in the
seventh grade study "Socialism, the Dream of the
World's Working Class," "The Struggle of the Two
World Systems, " and "The Three Principal Forces of
the Revolution." These subjects are also taught in the
higher grades, along with others concerning the party,
the April 1978 revolution, and aid from the 'frater-
nal" USSR. Socialist indoctrination appears to have
replaced religion in the public system, but mosque
schools still function, when local conditions permit,
in both government- and insurgent-controlled areas.
Kabul University's curriculum has also undergone
changes, F_ J In May 1978
required courses were introduced concerning Marx-
ist-Leninist theories of economics, history, and soci-
ology. Russian language also became mandatory,
replacing English as the required foreign language.
The world literature course deals only with Marxist
authors, and Afghanistan's history has been rewritten
to emphasize Soviet aid and Western colonialism. US
Embassy sources indicate that the social science texts
at Kabul University are sophisticated rehashes of
party formulas carried regularly in the regime press.
Progovernment clergy are trained both at the univer-
sity and in the USSR.
the number of elementary and secondary
schools had dropped from 2,700 to 50. At Kabul
University-the only major university in the coun-
try-enrollment dropped from 14,000 in 1978 to
6,000 in 1983, according to a former Afghan profes-
sor the other postsecon-
dary institution, Nangarhar University in Jalalabad,
was attended by only about 30 women in autumn
1983. Prior to the Communist takeover, enrollment
was about 400. Before 1980, as is common in male-
dominated Muslim societies, men comprised most of
the student body. Now most of the students are
women. Most eligible men have fled the country,
joined the resistance, or been conscripted, and the few
remaining male students are members of KHAD or
the ruling party.
As part of its propaganda effort, the regime has
introduced widely publicized literacy courses in Kabul
and claims tens of thousands have been graduated.[
the
courses are almost wholly political and indicates that
only some 2,000 persons have attended them, mostly
women and elderly civil servants.
The barrage of anti-US propaganda in the schools has
had little impact so far on any age group, according to
US Embassy reports. In summer 1984, Kabul school-
children formed a chattering, enthusiastic escort for a
strolling US official when they discovered his nation-
ality. The official reports finding similar friendliness
among Afghan youth in the Kabul bazaar. A Western
journalist in summer 1984 also reported that the
Kabul man in the street still seems delighted to talk to
Americans.
Patronage and Rewards. We believe that the universi-
ty is used mainly to reward military service and party
work. As of fall 1983, men have not been admitted to
Kabul University unless they have completed three
years of military or police service,
Party members,
are admitted to the university
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University of Kabul, Physics and Science College{
9At- without having to take the required entrance exami-
nation. Since 1981 the regime has not given anyone a
diploma for secondary or university studies until
completion of military service.
since 1981,
students-even those in medical training-have been
promoted on the basis of party work rather than
academic achievement.
the caliber of students deteriorated markedly after the
Communist takeover because admission examinations
to Kabul University have been waived for students
who enter the Army upon graduation from secondary
school.
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Afghan Students in the USSR. In our judgment,
extensive Soviet programs to train and indoctrinate
Afghans in the USSR have produced limited and
sometimes counterproductive results.
we estimate that some 8,000 Afghans,
including some 2,000 military personnel, annually
attend Soviet institutions for training and education.
According to Kabul press reports in January 1984,
Afghan students in the USSR were attending 66
educational institutions at 24 different locationsC
each year several
hundred Afghan youth visit Young Pioneer counter-
parts in the USSR.
included in those receiving political training in the
USSR are Khalqis, Parchamis, nonparty officials,
middle-level government officials, schoolteachers and
administrators, and foreign trade officials
offered as bribes, and others are there to avoid
conscription into the Afghan military.
fghans returning
from the USSR have acquired technical, operational,
or administrative skills but continue to lack political
sophistication or ideological commitment. Many of
the Afghans return hostile or indifferent toward the
Soviets and their political system.
Afghans trained in the
USSR usually maintain the same views and orienta-
tion after a stay in the USSR as they had beforehand.
Moreover, many returnees probably are not assigned
appropriate or attractive positions that would extend
Communist influence, in part because the regime
lacks control of the countryside. The US Embassy in
Kabul in summer 1984 reported that some Afghan
youths who had studied in the USSR had returned
politically indifferent. Some were working as clerks
selling Japanese stereo systems. Others had been
assigned undesirable tasks or work outside Kabul but
chose to remain in the capital unemployed.
many Afghans resent
the Soviets because o the hostility that Soviet citizens
in Moscow and other cities show them.
in summer 1983
Afghan students returning from t e USSR spoke of
strained relations with their Soviet counterparts. In
Afghan officials privately expressed
concern over problems that Afghan students had in
the USSR. The Soviets blamed the Afghans for
Soviet military casualties and accused the students of
being involved in smuggling and black marketing. The
Afghan students complained that they were not trust-
ed and that their movements were restricted.
Similar problems affect Afghan military trainees in
the USSR. Afghan mili-
tary students often return from the USSR with anti-
Soviet attitudes despite the attempts at political in-
doctrination. The Afghans complain of unsatisfactory
living conditions, low stipends, and harassment by
local citizens.
Sociological Factors Hampering Sovietization
Along with a history of resistance to foreign domina-
tion and central government control, obstacles to
Sovietization include the Afghans' traditional distrust
of government schools and attempts to change tradi-
tional ways. Most Afghans also harbor a special
dislike for Soviet society and the Soviet presence.
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Distrust of Government Schools
In our view, the regime's use of schools to propagate
Communist ideology has reinforced the Afghans'
traditional distrust of the government, particularly in
rural areas. rural
Afghans believe government teachers-usually out-
siders from cities and larger towns-corrupt the
young, especially girls, by teaching concepts contrary
to local tradition. Rural Afghans also question the
value of formal education for children destined to be
herdsmen and subsistence farmers.
the peasants believe educated peo-
reason as well.
Resistance to Change
We believe Afghans' traditional resistance to change
is a serious impediment to Sovietization. A measure of
the rural Afghans' resistance to outside views is that,
the most openmind-
ed of them consider highly conservative Iran an
advanced society. In Kabul the reluctance to change
is evident even among those who sympathize with or
passively accept the Soviet presence.
in spring 1983 many Afghan
civil servants' reaction to Soviet advisers was general-
ly subdued and passive, though many resented the
Soviets' treating them "like children."
Distaste for Soviet Society
We believe that Afghans' impressions of Soviet soci-
ety, though often unrealistic, are overwhelmingly
negative.
Afghans have a common impres-
sion of Soviet society from their observations of Soviet
troops. Insurgents hold the Soviets in low esteem
because they lack a sacred scripture, they are not
fighting for a faith, and their way of life is anti-
Islamic. Afghans believe that Soviet atheism pro-
motes use of alcohol, often to excess, and is destruc-
tive to family life. The concept of sexual equality
promoted in Soviet and regime media and the percep-
tion of Soviet women working outside the home are
considered evil. Another common theme in insurgent
impressions of Soviet society is that children in the 25X1
USSR are removed from their families and raised in
government institutions,
Soviet propaganda has not dispelled these Impres-
sions, which have given the Afghan peasantry a
unique interpretation of Communist propaganda.
`democratic" and "socialist'
have strongly negative connotations, and Afghans
happily admit that their friends are the "imperialist"
states. Afghans believe
that, if the Soviets triumph, Afghans will be unable to
practice their religion, their women will work outside
the home, and their land will be taken away.
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We believe that many regime loyalists resent the
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Outlook and Implications
Despite the lack of progress so far, the Soviets will
continue to pursue a variety of indoctrination pro-
grams as part of their long-term effort to consolidate
Communist control in Afghanistan, building a loyal
cadre of Afghans who may someday administer an
effective pro-Soviet government.
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It will be years before the Sovietization process will
have much impact:
? The programs cannot be pursued effectively so long
as the government has little presence outside Kabul.
? The presence of Soviet troops will continue to cause
the Afghans to view the Kabul regime as a foreign
puppet.
? The Soviet presence cannot be reduced until the
Afghan Army can assume the major burden of the
fighting, not likely for years into the future.
With continued foreign support, the insurgency may
remain active for decades, continuing to delay and
restrict the Sovietization process. Insurgent morale
has remained high over the past five years.
when evidence of war weariness
appears among insurgents, it leads to thoughts of
emigration rather than to acquiescence to the Kabul
regime. Moreover, traditional Afghan resistance to
the Soviets and to any central government may prove
insuperable. The indoctrination programs and propa-
ganda are not likely to win the minds of most Afghans
young or old.
But the Soviets probably already calculate that the
Sovietization process will take decades. Their experi-
ences in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia
undoubtedly give them reason to hope that they can
attract and train a core of opportunists and ideologues
willing to do their bidding. In Kabul the temptation to
become passive and accept the Communist authorities
will probably increase as the younger generation
grows up with an impression of regime pervasiveness.
Some will continue to join the ruling party to improve
their livelihoods and gain privileges.
Outside Kabul, the Soviets will pursue programs that
test the popular mood, raise the cost of opposition, and
make cooperation with Kabul more attractive. Eco-
nomic and technical assistance programs might con-
vince at least some to limit their support to the
insurgents. Propaganda concerning social programs
will continue to remind Afghans of the rewards of
compliance with the regime.
While building cadre and trying out new programs,
the task of maintaining a minimum base of govern-
ment authority will continue to fall to Soviet troops
and their small number of Afghan military allies.
Moscow will maintain at least enough troops in
Afghanistan to protect its puppet government and
launch spoiling attacks against insurgent bases and
bands. Soviet leaders clearly hope that this military
effort will entail only a low cost while they wait for
the initial Sovietization efforts to bear fruit.
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