IRAN'S AIR FORCE: FRUSTRATIONS OF A FORMER POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ef Directorate of Top Secret
Iran's Air Force:
Frustrations of
a Former Power
An Intelligence Assessment
NGA Review Complete
Top Secret
NESA 84-/
September 1984
Copy 3 4 6
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E* Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Iran's Air Force:
Frustrations of
a Former Power
Office of Central Reference. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 84-10262C
September 1984
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Iran's Air Force:
Frustrations of
a Former Power[
Key Judgments The Iranian Air Force-formerly the key to the Shah's strategy of military
Information available supremacy in the Persian Gulf-no longer has the resources to carry out
as of 17 August 1984 effective offensive operations and does not provide effective air support for
was used in this report.
the Iranian ground forces. Its lack of effectiveness is caused by deteriorat-
ing equipment, heavy combat losses, excessive political control, low pilot
morale, and dissension between pilots and ground crews.
In our judgment, the Iranian Air Force will fall further behind Iraq in air
combat capability during the coming months and will remain only a minor
factor in the war. Although it will continue to have the ability to raid un-
armed tankers and lightly defended targets inside Iraq or the Gulf states,
we believe that the Air Force lacks the capability to carry out sustained air
attacks against either.
Between 65 and 80 fighter aircraft are fully operational, compared to over
400 under the Shah. Nearly 200 fighters have been lost in combat, and al-
most that many are grounded because of shortages of spare parts and other
maintenance needs. Restrictions on the sale or transfer of US-made spare
parts have played a key role in handicapping Iran's efforts to keep its
aircraft operational.
Iran has been unable to find a supplier of fighter aircraft. Potential deals
with Libya and China have fallen through. Even if a source of fighter
aircraft could be found, we judge it would take at least three to five years
before Iran could field an effective air force. Unless Tehran's relations with
the West improve dramatically, the Air Force probably will be forced to
turn to China, North Korea, or Libya for Soviet-designed aircraft that will
be less advanced than those of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Iran's suspicion of
the Soviets suggests that they will not be asked to supply aircraft directly.
Moreover, the Air Force suffers from a serious shortage of advanced
weapons. Few of Iran's most advanced air-to-air missile, the Phoenix, are
o erational
Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping have been
handicapped by ineffective antiship weapons
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NESA 84-10262C
September
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The clerical regime distrusts the Air Force more than the Army or Navy,
in part because it was the Shah's favorite service and because most pilots
are well educated, US-trained, and have middle- or upper-class back-
grounds. Political leaders control the Air Force by attaching "political
advisers" to airbases, by bribing key officers with consumer goods, and by
playing on the rivalry between officers and technicians.
For their part, most Air Force pilots are suspicious of the regime.
they are motivated to fight primarily by material
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The decline in Iran's offensive capability reduces the threat that Tehran
will expand the air war in the Gulf and thereby endanger US ships or per-
sonnel. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of suicide missions
against US ships by Revolutionary Guard pilots, US fighter aircraft would
have a significant advantage in any air clash.
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Munitions
4
Logistics and Maintenance
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Figure 1
Iranian Fighter Aircraft Bases
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Administrative
\ Line
South
Yemen
Representative radius of F-4E for ground
attack mission 440 nm (815 km)
Symbol represents dominant aircraft at base
0 250
Tot v1
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Jarirsh'yr Xhirk 9
(Khsrk )dhnd)
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Iran's Air Force:
Frustrations of
a Former Power
With some 475 combat aircraft and over 400 quali-
fied fighter pilots, the Iranian Air Force was one of
the largest in the Middle East before the Iranian
revolution in 1979. The Khomeini regime moved
quickly to establish firm control over the armed forces
through a sweeping purge of the officer corps. Sus-
pects were killed or jailed and replaced with officers
who proclaimed their loyalty to the Islamic republic.
Iranian Air Force personnel were particularly suspect
because this was the Shah's favorite service and most
Air Force officers were well educated and trained by
the United States.
Wartime Role of the Air Force
Although Iranian pilots initially displayed consider-
able aggressiveness, the Iranian Air Force never has
been a significant factor in the war with Iraq, in our
judgment. Fighter-bombers frequently attacked eco-
nomic targets and cities inside Iraq during the first
year of the war but did not destroy any important
facilities. Attrition of aircraft and pilots and frustra-
tion over the limited impact of operations subsequent-
ly led the Air Force to restrict combat sorties largely
We believe that increased Iraqi attacks on Iranian
shipping and more effective Iraqi attacks on Iranian
ground forces early this year prompted the newly
appointed Iranian commander, Col. Hushang Sediq,
to step up raids against Iraq.
Further Iranian aircraft losses during the next two
months prompted Colonel Sediq to halt all missions
inside Iraq,
to territorial defense.
Since the first year of the war, Iran has confined its
of their operational fighters during such a short perio
In our judgment, the 25X1
Iranians were stunned by the loss 25X1
though air defense missions continue on a regular
basis near major strategic targets inside Iran, these
have not prevented periodic Iraqi airstrikes against
economic targets and population centers.
Operations Inside Iraq. In our judgment, Tehran does
not want to risk further losses of scarce fighter
aircraft by attacking heavily defended strategic tar-
of time, with so little effect on the war. 25X1
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resumes massive attacks on Iranian cities.
The serious limitations on Iran's ability to trade blows 25X1
with the Iraqi Air Force were again demonstrated this
past summer. Iran briefly resumed attacks inside Iraq 25X1
in June
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judgment, Tehran's quick acceptance of a subsequent 25X1
UN-sponsored cease-fire covering attacks on popula-
tion centers is further evidence that the regime hopes 25X1
to husband its limited air assets. We expect Iran will
refrain from airstrikes inside Iraq unless Baghdad
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Support of Ground Troops.
identity of incoming aircraft,
suggesting that coverag
guns, and HAWK surface-to-air missile batteries. Air
defense is poor, however, in part because of inade-
quate training, Early
warning radars often cannot determine the height or
Khark Island and shipping in the northern Gulf.
The Air Force has committed a large proportion of its
limited resources to protecting the oil facilities on
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Still, during the past
Ground forces are often disappointed
with resupply and transport support, but shortcomings
in this area appear to be caused more by poor ground
force planning and coordination than by Air Force
inefficiency. Refueling tankers-a dozen KC-707 and
KC-747 aircraft-have been particularly important to
the Air Force's combat air patrol mission.
F-14s your- to six-hour patrol missions requiring
two or three airborne refuelings.
two years the Iraqis have hit merchant ships at will
and expanded their attacks to tankers-including at
least one loadin at Khark Island-with no significant
loss of aircraft.
Shipping Attacks. Repeated Iraqi attacks on oil tank-
ers near Khark Island last spring prompted Tehran to
escalate the conflict by striking at tankers calling at
Arab oil terminals. In our judgment, Iran hoped that
this tactic would cause Iraq's Arab allies to press
Baghdad to stop its tanker attacks.
These strikes were often ineffective, however,
and equipment shortcomings.
once again demonstrating the Iranians' operational
In our judgment, the Air Force is especially handi-
capped by its lack of effective antiship weapons. Iran
has used television-guided air-to-ground missiles, but
these are designed primarily for land targets and have
been only marginally effective against tankers,=
Iran's inability to inflict
Iraq's preference for soft targets such as population
centers and merchant ships has left Iran's nine air-
bases with no significant war damage. The bases are
defended primarily by Oerlikon 35-mm antiaircraft
guns, lighter Soviet and North Korean air defense
crippling damage on a moving ship without using
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precision-guided weapons is illustrated by its attack
on a tanker in the lower Gulf on 10 June. An Iranian
F-4 dropped nine bombs, none of which hit the target,
The
aircraft made a final pass firing rockets (probably
2.75 inch) along the bow. Only one of these hit the
ship, causing light damage to the deck.
Status of the Air Force
Inventory. We estimate Iran has between 65 and 80
operational fighter aircraft, down from a prerevolu-
tion total of over 400. Iran's operational aircraft
include 35 to 40 F-4s, 20 to 25 F-5s, and 10 to 15
F-14 fighter aircraft. Although Iran has some 50,000
personnel in the Air Force, we estimate there are
fewer than 150 fully qualified fighter pilots
fighters at Iran's nine airbases.
be as high as 120, but we believe that many of these
lack the equipment or weapons for combat operations.
We estimate nearly 200 aircraft have been lost in
combat since 1980-including at least 10 so far this
year-and another 150 are grounded because of a
shortage of spare parts or other maintenance needs.
Iran's fleet of operational transport aircraft also has
dwindled, although not as seriously as its fighter 25X1
aircraft force.
only 38 of Iran's prewar inventory of 60 C-130 95X1
aircraft are operational 25X1
eight 707s, 28 to 37 C-130s, 12 F-27s, 14 25X1
Falcon 20s, and two P-3s are operational, some 30 less 25X1
transport aircraft than were in Iran's inventory at the 25X1
beginning of the war. 25X1
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September 1980
Wartime
Losses
July 1984
Inventory
Operational
Inventory
Operational
Total 446
233
196
230
70
F-4 195
98
100
80
35
F-5
175
105
90
80
20
F-14
76
30
6
70
15
Note: Estimates of wartime losses and operational readiness of F-4s
and F-5s probably are accurate to within (?) 10 aircraft.
Operational readiness rates for September 1980 were estimated at
50 percent for F-4s, 60 percent for F-5s, and 40 percent for F-14s.
of coolant without which the Phoenix missiles cannot
operate. Iranian technicians
cannot repair the missiles' defective firing and guid-
more than 150 fighter aircraft-two-thirds o Iran's
inventory-are nonoperational because of improper
maintenance or a shortage of parts. Most of these
aircraft have been cannibalized and are strewn
around Iranian airfields
balized aircraft.
the Iranians have
nearly exhausted the spare pars available on canni-
Spare parts shortages run the gamut from tires to
advanced avionics and weapons components.
avionics, engine components, flight control systems,
and radar systems were the most critical shortages.
shortages of navigation
Munitions. The Air Force also suffers from a severe
shortage of operational advanced munitions. At
Bandar-e Abbas, for example, only six of 13 aircraft
assigned to the base are fully armed with two AIM-7s
and two AIM-9s each-and less than 30 AIM-7s and
30 AIM-9s are in stock.
heat-seeking sensors-critical for missile guidance-
are functioning improperly on the AIM-9 missiles.
Many of Iran's AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles
are only marginally operational because of improper
storage, poor maintenance, and a lack of spare parts,
of an inventory of 100 are operational;
equipment and air-to-air missile components were the
most debilitating.
lelectronic warfare equipment
aboard F-4s is in such a state of disrepair that Air
Force headquarters has ordered it removed.
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been the most difficult to acquire,
Parts that can be ob-
taineonly rom US weapons manufacturers have
Nontechnical equip-
little progress in improving maintenance.
difficult maintenance is performed or supervised by
some 120 foreign technicians. Most of these,
are Filipinos, Koreans, and
technicians from at least one West European
ment-such as tires and seats-have been the easiest
to procure because they are less sensitive and more
loosely controlled. Iran has been able to secure some
avionics and electronic equipment but usually at
inflated prices and through circuitous channels.
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many parts are ordered simply 25X1
country are helping to maintain F-4s and F-5s.1
Resupply. Iranian efforts to secure parts for its US-
designed aircraft through the gray arms market have
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Tehran believes that pro-US
by contacting companies listed in the Swiss defense
publication Interavia.
because they can be obtained only from the United
States, parts for the F-14 aircraft were almost impos-
sible to obtain.
Parts for
aircraft that have both civilian and military missions
such as Boeing 707 and 747 aircraft have been
purchased by changing military registrations to civil-
Because of restrictions on military sales to Iran, Iran
Aircraft Industries has been trying without much
success to manufacture engine parts for F-4 aircraft,
Swiss and
Filipino technicians have assisted on this project.
Reliability and Morale. In our opinion, Tehran is
justifiably concerned over Air Force loyalty to the
clerical regime. Most of Iran's combat pilots are US
trained. In June 1981 and again in May 1983, Air
Force officers were arrested for conspiring to bomb
Ayatollah Khomeini's home
feeling among pilots is so strong that it cannot count
on them to engage US forces,
kilometers to major Iranian cities because,
the regime feared a possible coup
lat least
during one recent period, fighter aircraft flying defen-
sive patrols were not permitted to fly closer than 65
Maintaining Political Control
As many as 85 percent of Air Force officers are
opposed to the Khomeini regime,
Many
US-trained pilots still have not subscribed to the
regime's ideology and are uncomfortable with the
political and religious conditions attached to assign-
ments and promotions. Personnel killed or wounded in
the first two years of the war normally were replaced
by those considered by Tehran as religiously fit rather
than professionally competent,
The clerics have ordered many of the best qualified
combat pilots to take administrative positions and
were prepared to remove some 300 officers (pilots and
nonpilots) from the service in 1983 because they were
suspect. Intervention by Iran's Joint Military Staff
affected maintenance of combat aircraft.
Air Force ground personnel have
sabotaged Iranian fighter aircraft, causing an F-5 to
crash in mid-1982 and forcing several F-14s to make
emergency landings. Pilots have complained of engine
and radar malfunctions, landing gear problems, and
misfiring weapons. In our judgment, much of the
intentional sabotage is caused by the intense rivalry
between ground technicians (called homofars) and
pilots, which predates the revolution. The homofars
are jealous of the pilots' privileged positions and
disappointed with their own lack of promotions. Some
pilots have become so anxious about the safety of their
aircraft that they have sought to be grounded for
medical reasons
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Those pilots who continue their operational duties
often are motivated by financial considerations rather
than by loyalty to the regime or professional pride
Many stay on to be eligible for a pension.
Some homofars with special skills have been retained
against their will because they cannot be replaced.
Others are said to stay because of the poor civilian job
market.
the malaise has even
affected Air Force headquarters, where poor working
conditions, lack of promotions, and inadequate pay
increases are the biggest complaints. Dedicated pro-
fessional officers look forward to the end of the war
because they believe that only then can the Air Force
be rebuilt. We have no evidence, however, that this
hope has prompted disenchanted officers to organize
clandestine "peace" groups or to put pressure on the
Air Force command to alter administrative policies.
Most sensitive staff and command positions are as-
signed to those who have convinced the clerics that
they back the regime and have strong religious cre-
dentials.
Air Force Commander Colonel Sediq, the Chief
of Staff, the Chief of Operations, and the command-
ers of most tactical airbases and air defense groups
actively support the regime.
however, some senior officers pretend to be
fundamentalists to gain or keep their positions. Those
whose loyalties are suspect
include less important staff
officers, the commander of a unit at Vahdati Airbase,
the commander of an air defense unit at Khark
Island, and all US-trained flight instructors.
At each level of the Air Force command structure, a
mullah acts as a political and religious adviser to the
commanding officer,
Each airbase has a Revolutionary Society Center
headed by a mullah and about one regime adviser for
every 100 Air Force personnel,
Junior Air Force personnel consider
with the exception of Shiraz Airbase, where
with air operations.' Base commanders elsewhere have
no authority over promotions, job assignments, or
dismissals; and political leaders in Tehran plan all air
combat missions.
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Ithe regime also is 25X1
trying to maintain control of the Air Force by buying
the loyalty of service personnel. Both officers and
Revolutionary Guards receive gifts of land, scarce
consumer goods, fuel, and low-cost housing. Pilots
believe that the Revolutionary Guard receives first 25X1
priority on some consumer goods but that pilots
receive the greater share. Most pilots still oppose the
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Force personnel, in our view, also benefit from
political rivalries within the regime. President Kha-
menei and Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani are compet-
ing to expand their influence and attract followers
within the Iranian Air Force
Khamenei has pushed for
increased benefits for the officer corps, while Rafsan-
jani emphasizes benefits for enlisted men and non-
commissioned officers.
Pilot Training. Although Iran's pilot-to-combat air-
craft ratio of over 1-to-1 is nearly the same as before
the revolution, we estimate the Air Force faces a
shortage of experienced pilots who are trained for a
full range of combat missions. In our judgment, the
clerical regime purged more than a third of the 400
fully qualified active fighter pilots in the Shah's Air
Force before the war with Iraq, and at least another
third were killed during the first two years of war.
Perhaps another 20 to 30 have been killed or have
defected since then.
' Shiraz is the primary base for Iran's remaining advanced F-14
aircraft whose air defense and airborne control missions are
essential for defending Iranian cities and other strategic targets.
The Air Force may have convinced the mullahs that any mistake
caused by political interference there would be very costly.
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The Air Force established a new flight training school
in January 1983, with the ground phase, including
electronic warfare training, conducted at Tehran/
Mehrabad Airbase and the flight phase at Isfahan,
Air Force has graduated at least 16 new fighter pilots,
Early last year the Iranians began pressing Libya,
Syria, and India for training assistance,
the capabilities of Iraqi aircraft or receiving only
basic flight instruction.
Libya accepted at least eight Iranian pilot trainees
late last year.
Iran is continuing to train
Revolutionary Guard personnel to fly military trainer
aircraft, helicopters, and civilian aircraft.
their flying skills are substantial-
ly below the level needed to fly combat missions in
modern fighter aircraft during the coming year. We
cannot, however, rule out their participation in suicide
alert.
attacks using small trainer aircraft. With little train-
ing, these pilots could fly helicopters or fixed-wing
aircraft laden with explosives into ships in the Gulf or
oil facilities on the Arabian Peninsula. Eventually
they may be competent to strafe targets or drop
munitions from low altitudes. Although these are
high-risk tactics, in our judgment, they would disrupt
shipping and force regional states to a high state of
Prospects
In our judgment, the Iranian Air Force cannot play a
greater role in the war with Iraq nor a decisive role
against any other likely opponent unless it obtains
new fighter aircraft and munitions and revives the
morale of its pilots. Iraq's renewed attacks on Iranian
shipping have dramatically reminded the clerical
leaders in Tehran of the importance of airpower to
protect Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf. But
Tehran's continuing suspicions of the political reliabil-
ity of the Air Force will complicate plans to rebuild
Iran's airpower.
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We believe Iran's clerical leaders would be satisfied
with a force much smaller than that of the Shah-
perhaps no more than 150 fighter aircraft. Efforts to
obtain such aircraft from North Korea, China, Libya,
or other arms suppliers are likely to continue, but
Iran's suspicions of the Soviets suggest that they will
not be asked to supply aircraft directly. Unless rela-
tions between Iran and the West dramatically im-
prove, North Korea and China will remain the most
likely sources of fighter aircraft for Iran.
Iran's total reliance on US-made aircraft up to now
will handicap its efforts to rebuild its air combat
capability using Soviet-designed aircraft. Building up
a new inventory of spare parts, training pilots, retrain-
ing technicians, and developing new air tactics will
take at least several years. In any event, the Air Force
most likely could obtain only older model Soviet-type
fighters, at least a generation behind those of Iraq and
Saudi Arabia. Such a small, outdated force would not
pose a major threat to Iran's regional opponents
during the remainder of the decade.
Impact on the War With Iraq. The Iranian Air
Force's reduced combat capability, in our judgment,
has been a key factor in allowing the Iraqis to regain
the initiative in the war. The Air Force is incapable of
preventing Iraqi attacks on ships or population centers
and, in our estimate, will be able to play a minor role
at best in future Iranian offensives. During the com-
ing year, the Air Force will continue to concentrate
resources on defending against Iraqi airstrikes.
Capability Against the Arabian Peninsula. In our
judgment, the Iranian Air Force also lacks the capa-
bility to carry out sustained air attacks against the
shortage of operational aircraft at or near Gulf bases,
its probable inability to achieve surprise, and Tehran's
desire to deny outside powers an excuse for military
intervention argue against large-scale Iranian offen-
sive air operations. The Air Force retains the capabili-
ty to attack individual economic targets on the Penin-
sula but only if it is willing to accept the risk of heavy
aircraft losses. Three years ago, Iranian aircraft
destroyed a Kuwaiti oil-gathering facility and could
repeat this success in an isolated attack.
Unarmed tankers will remain a likely retaliatory
target for the Iranians, especially in the southern Gulf
outside the Saudi and Iraqi air defense zones. The
Iranians have demonstrated a capability to locate and
damage a preselected ship and to return safely to
base. We estimate the Iranians have enough aircraft
and munitions to increase the frequency of these
attacks for a short period which could disrupt tanker
activity.
Iran is attempting to modify naval
Standard antiship missiles as replacements for Mav-
erick missiles. The plan suggests that the Air Force
recognizes the need for more appropriate weapons,
but early tests have not been
encouraging. If technical problems are solved-in our
judgment, an unlikely prospect-the Iranians would
have a much greater capability for damaging or
sinking tankers.
Implications for the United States. The decline in
Iran's offensive air capability reduces but does not
eliminate the threat that Iran might expand the air
war in the Gulf.
We also believe that the
Khomeini regime will go out of its way to avoid
bombing Soviet arms carriers transporting military
equipment for Iraq. Nevertheless, Iran's ability to
launch occasional raids against ships or economic
targets could result in the loss of US-owned commer-
cial ships or US personnel.
Tehran probably would use its Revolutionary Guard
pilots to carry out suicide attacks or raids a ainst US
ships. "volun-
teer pilots" are being trained for these missions. The
greatest threat to ships from the regular Air Force
would be Maverick air-to-surface missiles launched
by F-4 aircraft. Because of its limited destructive
power, however, the missile probably could not cripple
a US warship without a direct hit on the ammunition
magazine or engineroom.
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Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300020001-7
 Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300020001-7
Top Secret
US fighter aircraft, in particular carrier-based F-14s,
would enjoy an overwhelming advantage in air-to-air
clashes. US F-14s have more advanced IFF equip-
ment and better maintained air-to-air missiles than do
the Iranian F-14s.
the Air Force has carefully
selected four to six politically reliable pilots to fly
against US forces, suggesting that there are few
professionally trained pilots who can be trusted in a
clash with US forces.
Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300020001-7
 Top Secret
Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300020001-7
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300020001-7