AFGHANISTAN: 1983 GRAIN ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001200040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution List)
Chief, Strategic Resources Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: 1983 Grain Assessment
1. The attached memorandum assesses the 1983 grain production in
Afghanistan. We
found the 1983 Afghan harve
st was good in most
areas,
about
the same as 1982
.
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2. This as
sessment was produced by
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Agricult
ural Assessments Branch, Str
ategic Resources Di
vision,
Office
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3. Canmen
ts and questions are welcome
and may be addresse
d to th
e Chief,
Agricultural Assessments Branch,
Attachment:
Afghanistan: 1983 Grain Assessment
NGA Review Completed
Cf M
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: 1983 Grain Assessment
OGI/SRD/AAB (March 1984)
Distribution:
1 - Mr. Manny Rubio, D/ANhite House Situation Roam
1 - White House Situation Room
1 - Mr. Geoffrey Kemp, NSC
I - Mr. Elmer Klumpp, USDA
1 - Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury
1 - Mr. David A. Peterson, Commerce
1 - Mr. Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr., AID
1 - Mr. Ralph Lindstrom, State
1 - Mr. Dennis Murphy, State
1 - Mr. George S. Harris, State
1 - Ms. Lilian Harris, State
1 - Ms. Phyllis Oakley, State
1 - Messrs. Peter Modley and Michael Egbert, State
1 - Ra .ond Deitch, JCS/J-5, Pentagon
1 DIA, Pentagon
I - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
I - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIC/AG
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - C/DDO/DCD
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - DDI/ASG/AMB
1 - ONESA/SO/P
1 - C/CPAS/CSG
1 - CPAS/ISS
4 - CPAS/PDG/IMC/ICB
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - C/OGI/GD
1 - C/OGI/GD/NE
I - OGI/GD/ERA
1 - C/OGI/ECD/CM
1 - C/OGI/ISID/NAR
1 - C/OGI/SRD
5 - C/OGI/SRD/AAB
1 - C/OGI/EXS/RG
1 - C/OGI/EXS/PG
8 - OGI/EXS/PG.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Afghanistan: 1983 Grain Assessment
Summary
The 1983 grain harvest in Afghanistan was good in most areas,
approximately the same as 1982. The major exception was in the Khowst valley
where the harvest was delayed and the crop was poor. The 1983 wheat harvest,
the primary grain crop and staple of Afghanistan, is estimated at
approximately 3 million metric tons, sufficient to supply the rural population
and to support the insurgent forces. Urban areas are experiencing some food
shortages, largely due to the breakdown in the transportation and distribution
system, necessitating the continued importation of substantial amounts of
Soviet grain. Military activity appears to have had no significant effect on
overall grain production in 1983
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Agricultural Assessments Branch, Strategic Resources Division, Office of 25X1
Global Issues (AAB/SRD/OGI) with methodological support provided by
Analytic Methods Branch, Analytic Support Group. Comments and 25X1
questions may be addressed to Chief, AAB/SRD/OGI
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Afghanistan: 1983 Grain Assessment
Background
Most of Afghanistan consists of mountains, desert, and forest, and is
unsuitable for agriculture. The more productive soils, comprising only about
15 percent of the land, are found in the valleys and basins. Even in such
locations, however, the cultivation is restricted to about half the arable
area (about 4 million of the total 8 million hectares), largely because of
limited supplies of water. Grains account for nearly 90 percent of the total
cropped area, with wheat occupying 60 percent of the area devoted to grain
production. Other grains grown include rice, barley, and corn. Fruits and
vegetables occupy roughly 6 percent, and industrial crops of cotton, sugar
beets, and oilseeds, as well as poppies, make up the remainder. Agriculture,
although it employs three quarters of the working population, is largely at a
subsistence level with little use of chemical fertilizer or pesticides.
Farming operations are almost totally non-mechanized, with men and draft
animals providing the basic power needs.
Approximately 3.5 million people, out of a prewar population estimated at
15.3 million, have fled the country to Pakistan and Iran. Rapid growth,
however, brought the population back to an estimated 14.3 million by 1983.
Previously, 85 percent of the total population was rural; however, since the
Soviet invasion most of the refugees have been from the agrarian and pastoral
sectors. Many other former members of these sectors have also migrated to the
cities.
This outflow of the population from the rural areas has caused strains on
the resources necessary for agricultural production which accounts for more
than 60 percent of the gross domestic product. Nevertheless, the country has
generally kept food production up to prewar levels. Food shortages, mainly in
the cities but also in a few small isolated rural areas, primarily are due to
disruption of the transportation and marketing networks. Although sufficient
manpower to sow and harvest field crops does not now appear to be a serious
problem, the routine maintenance of vineyards, orchards, and irrigation
networks is being neglected, and eventually there will be some adverse affect
on production.
Limited weather information indicates that the major agricultural regions
of Afghanistan experienced favorable weather during 1983. Although accurate
weather observations for the country are largely unavailable, imagery ~ 25X1
show that nearly normal weather patterns prevailed
during the year. Periodic weak to moderate storm systems, depicted on weather 25X1
satellite imagery, brought precipitation levels to near or slightly less than
the annual average for the region. Imagery also indicates that mountain 25X1
snowcover, necessary for irrigation during the spring runoff, nearly equaled
that of the previous winter and was adequate to replenish well water and
supply the intricate irrigation network. Also, lakes and reservoirs observed 25X1
on reconnaissance imagery were at near capacity through most of the season.
During 1983 there were no reports of significant flooding or droughts which
would have caused extensive crop damage.
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The 1983 Grain Crop
We estimate the Afghans harvested approximately 3 million tons of wheat,
the country's principal grain, in 1983. Our estimate is close to the FAS
estimates and pronouncements of the Afghan government. It is based on a
comparison of historical and current weather data, imagery, press
Both the Afghan press and Foreign Agriculture Service (r,HS) or the
US Department of Agriculture reported a good harvest for 1983, one that was
slightly better than that of 1982. However, Afghan official production
information normally is very limited and unreliable, and the FAS estimates are
made without the benefit of classified imagery.
FAS estimates that 2.86 million tons of wheat were harvested in 1983 on a
sown area of 2.6 million hectares. This estimate is close to that of the
Afghan government, which estimates a harvest of 2.9 million tons on an as yet
unreported sown area. FAS estimated that total area harvested to wheat
increased from 2.34 million hectares in 1978 to 2.6 million hectares in 1982
and 1983, which is about 12 percent-higher than the official Afghan estimate
for 1982 of 2.31 million hectares. Assuming the FAS area estimates are
reliable, there has been an increase in area cultivated since the Soviet
invasion.
Our assessment of the 1983 grain crop relies most heavily on imagery
interpretation. The imagery assessment of the crop is based on a statistical
sample ccmposed of 20 strip targets (approximately 10 NM by 30 NM in size)
acquired twice during the growing season, and on weekly or bimonthly coverage
of 36 point targets. Total coverage of approximately 6360 square miles was
acquired between April and September. This imagery constitutes a sample of
about 3 to 4 percent of the total growing area dispersed throughout the grain-
growing regions. Indeed, there is at least one imagery coverage this year in
each grain-producing province and comparative coverage from the previous year
over many areas. As with any sample, it is possible that some small aberrations
in growing conditions were not observed, but the overall quality of the grain
crop should be quite apparent from a sample of this size.
It has been suggested frcxn the press (that the fighting
in Afghanistan has caused extensive fire or other damage to t e crops, but the
available imagery does not bear this out. There is no evidence of fire damage
to crops on the imagery exploited. In fact, even if only one percent of the
crops were damaged by fire, the chance of missing this on the imagery is less
than I in 100. Moreover, since damage may be more likely in regions of heavy
fighting, and these regions are also more likely to be imaged for military
assessments, we believe no substantial damage has occurred.
US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE WAIVER ON FILE
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Regional Crop Assessment
Eastern Valleys (Baghlan, Kapisa, Laghman,
Konarha, Parvan, Vardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika,
Lowgar, Nangarhar, and Kabol)
This region, consisting of the twelve provinces surrounding Kabul,
although mostly mountainous, contains some of the most fertile and high-
yielding agricultural valleys in Afghanistan. It is, however, also the region
most affected by the Soviet occupation. The major valleys and basins include
Panjsher, Charikar, Nangarhar, Konar, Ghazni, Lowgar, and Khowst. 25X1
The long narrow Panjsher Valley in Kapisa Province 60 miles northeast of
Kabul experienced less insurgent fighting in 1983 than in the previous two
years and agricultural activity appears to have returned to normal. In the
few areas where imagery showed that crops had been destroyed by military
activity in 1982, no damage was observed in 1983, and those areas produced a
good crop. Throughout most of the valley the crops appeared to he it as good
or better condition than they were in 1982. A few fields had lodged grain,
an indication of potentially good yields (see Figure 1). The harvest began on
schedule in late June and yields were in the good range. This year a slightly 25X1
higher percentage of grainfields appeared to be harvested in the many smaller
side valleys as well as the main valle . food
shortages here in early 1983, but 25X1
supplies had become plentiful. many of :25X1
the valley residents who left earlier had returned and were able to farm again.
The grain crop in the densely cultivated basin near Charikar, 40 miles north
of Kabul, appeared in good to excellent condition (see Figure 2). Very few
fields were fallow and many had lodged grain when harvesting commenced in early
June. Yields in this basin, as in 1982, were better than in the nearby Panjsher
Valley. This fertile valley traditionally produced surplus grain for the Kabul
region during good years and could possibly have done so in 1983.
In the Nangarhar Valley surrounding Jalalabad, 40 miles east of Kabul,
yields also appeared in the good to excellent range in 1983, the same or
better than in 1982 and as good as those in the Charikar area. Imagery also
indicated a good corn crop here in late summer. In spite of being located
near the main road connecting Kabul and Peshawar, Pakistan, military activity
had little if any affect on grain production here in 1983.
Grain yields appeared slightly lower in the adjacent Konar Valley along
the Pakistan border (see Figure 3). This valley has experienced some loss of
1 Lodging is a condition that occurs when grain stalks bend or
break and the crop forms a flattened or tangled mass. Generally,
lodging results when the weight of the mature head cannot be
supported by the stalk, and in these circumstances it can
indicate good yields. However, wind, rain or hail also can cause
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population since the beginning of the Soviet occupation, and a few large
tracts of agricultural land have remained abandoned. A large fire, possibly
caused by military activity, was observed on the imagery in one of these
abandoned areas. Also, vehicle tracks, indicating minor crop damage, were
seen in some cultivated areas.
Although imagery indicated that yields in Ghazni and Vardak provinces
were not as good as in the Nangarhar and Charikar basins, the 1983 crop still
appeared considerably better than that observed during 1982. Near the main
highway connecting Kabul and Oandahar, which traverses the center of Ghazni
province, some vehicles had driven off the road and caused minor damage to
agricultural areas. There are more fallow fields in this area than there are
in the Nangarhar and Charikar basins. Also, a few small areas appearing
abandoned in 1982, were again left uncultivated in 1983.
Yields in the Shomali Region around Kabul were only in the fair range.
Although the crop appeared to be in good condition early in the season,
imagery showed that in many areas the beginning of the harvest was delayed two
to three weeks. Most of the crop was heavily lodged before cutting began in
early July. This delay probably lowered yields in the affected areas (see
Figure 4). Only small areas remained untilled this year, but some fields had
been taken over for military purposes. Intense fightin in this area
undoubtedly reduced grain production in this province.
Yields in the Lowgar Valley south of Kabul were also not as high as those
in the Nangarhar and Charikar basins. Similar to the Shomali Region, the
harvest did not begin until July and, even though the grain was heavily
lodged, small and sparse shocks in many fields indicated some poor yields (see
Figure 5). Relatively large abandoned tracts appeared uncultivated in this
valley, where, some villages had been
subjected to bombing. I Ithe 1933 crop
here was better than that in 1982 although there were still manpower
shortages during the harvest.
The Khowst Valley in Paktia Province continued to suffer from severe
agricultural production problems during 1983. This province has experienced
some of the most intense fighting since the Soviet invasion in 1979, and,
large numbers of refugees have left. May
and June imagery showed that much of this year's grain crop in many large
tracts was thin and spotty. Many fields had not been planted at all, and some
fairly large tracts of land appeared abandoned (see Figure 6). Only a few
fields were actually harvested and much of the remaining grain crop appeared
to have been left in the fields to rot. Some areas of the province, however,
did appear to have a good harvest, and some spring grains were observed being
harvested in September. In late summer, the corn crop appeared in good
condition.
Northern Provinces (Radghis, Faryab, Jowzjan, Ralkh, Samangan, Konduz, Takhar,
and Badakhshan)
This region, covering the eight provinces bordering the Soviet Union,
consists of many relatively large and isolated irrigated areas along rivers.
Because of the large area under cultivation, this region has sometimes been
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referred to as the "breadbasket" of Afghanistan. Similar to the crop observed
in 1982, yields in most of these provinces appeared only in the fair range,
not as good as those in many other areas of the country because of the colder
climate, and possibly poorer soils. The grain crop appeared somewhat better
in Konduz where some of the fields were lightly lodged. In Jowzjan and Balkh
provinces, over fifty percent of the cultivated areas imaged were fallow;
however, this is not unusual for this region. Compared to other regions,
shocks were smaller and sparser in most fields. In a few small tracts near
Mazar-e Sharif and Sheberghan, a few fields were being harvested by mechanized 25X1
equipment, the only such areas seen in all Afghanistan. The war appeared to
have had little effect on agricultural production in this region and F no
significant military activity was observed in the cultivated areas.
Central Mountain Provinces (Bamian, Ghowr, and Oruzgan)
This area of steep mountains and small narrow valleys, also known as the
Hazarehj the smallest percentage of cultivated land of any
region. as of 15 March 1983, 25X1
the crop was good and rainfall had been sutticient at at time. Very little
imagery was received in areas other than the Bamian Valley, the most
extensively cultivated area in these provinces. Here the crop appeared in
good condition throughout the season. The harvest began on schedule in mid-
July and continued until early September. This region is harvested later than
any other major growing area because most of the crop is grown at elevations
of greater than 2500 meters. The fertile Bamian valley had. good to excellent
yields this year, some of the best observed in all Afghanistan and even
somewhat better than the good yields seen in 1982. Many fields in this valley
had shocks covering most of the surface of the field. The effects of the war
appeared minimal in this isolated valley. 25X1
Western Border Provinces (Herat, Farah, and Nimruz)
The three provinces bordering Iran are only marginal agricultural areas
and only a small percentage of the land is actually cultivated. Crops are
grown only in small irrigated areas along the few rivers. Imagery showed
grains in good condition in most of the cultivated areas, and prior to the
harvest many fields had lodged grain, normally a good indication of a healthy
crop. The first grainfields were cut in early June, about the same time period
as in 1982, and harvest activities continued without interruption until early
July. Yields appeared similar to those in 198.2; shocks in most harvested fields
were closely spaced and threshing yards were active in many locations throughout
the cultivated area. In late summer, the corn crop also appeared in good
healthy condition and many fields had lush even growth. 25X1
Various reports from the press indicated much military 25X1
activity in western Afghanistan during 1983. in early September
insurgents. However, imagery indicated that agricultural production here was 25X1
only minimally affected. In a few areas military vehicles had driven through
fields and small amounts of the grain crop had been damaged. With estimates 25X1
of up to one-million Afghan refugees currently residing in Iran and assuming
many of them came from these border provinces, the reduction in sown area or
available labor appears only minimal. 25X1
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The South (Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol)
These provinces are mostly desert and crops are grown only in a narrow
irrigated band along the Helmand River, around the city of Qandahar and in a
few small valleys in Zabol Province. Along the Helmand, crops appeared in
good condition and a few fields were lightly lodged. The harvest began on
schedule in late May, and yields appeared in the good range, similar to that
observed in 1982. In the cultivated area surrounding Qandahar City harvesting
activities began about two weeks later, in early June. Here, yields appeared 25X1
somewhat better than those in 1982. Shocks were thicker and more closely
spaced and many more fields were harvested. 25X1
grain production was apparently not
affected significantly by military activity. 25X1
Soviet Imports/Aid
Afghanistan must import foreign grain each year, particularly wheat, to
satisfy consumer demand. Although.the rural population of Afghanistan is
considered self-sufficient, the urban centers are receiving less food from the
rural regions and must depend more on foreign imports, mostly from the USSR.
The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan has caused some disruption in
the transportation system. This, along with the government's inability to
collect grain in the insurgent controlled areas and the farmer's reluctance to 25X1
sell to the government, have all contributed to food shortages.
as of the 28th of March 1983, 160,000 25X1
tons of wheat had already been delivered from the USSR. Wheat imports for
1983, according to FAS, totalled an estimated 350,000 metric tons, mainly from
the USSR. According to FAS, the imports of foreign wheat have increased
steadily over the last 5 years from a reported 200,000 metric tons imported in
1978. 25X1
Reports of additional Soviet agricultural aid to Afghanistan are scarce
so it is difficult to assess the extent and impact 25X1
of such aid. An Afghan radio broadcast in March stated that donation of goods
and equipment worth 10,000,000 afghani were handed over to the Afghan trade
union from representatives of the Soviet trade unions. Another broadcast, in
September 1983, stated that Soviet experts are aiding in the set-up of six new
model farms used to educate the Afghan farmers about modern, mechanized crop
and livestock production. Still another report stated the number of tractors
and combine harvesters, most of which were likely provided by the USSR, is
70 percent higher than in 1982. 25X1
Outlook
Agricultural output for 1984 should be as good or slightly better than
1983, assuming the estimated trend toward increased area sown continues.
Weather was good in the fall and sowing probably occurred on schedule,
although precipitation during February and early March fell below seasonal
norms in some areas. Mountain snows were adequate and should provide the
water required for crop irrigation. Late winter weather patterns indicate
continued near normal weather can be expected into early spring, which should
provide a good start to the growing season. Assuming the favorable weather
conditions continue throughout the season, only additional disruption in the
transportation system from increased fighting, or an effort by the Soviets to
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destroy crops could have any significant affect on production this year. The
interruption of agricultural infrastructure maintenance, primarily work on the
irrigation systems, will create future problems, but should not significantly
affect production in 1984.
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Imagery Sample Areas in the Major Grain-Producing Regions
a h r
`Balkh %
a
i Sheberghan Sharif e
k r
~ ~Sarn>~?5g~
FaIryab )iowzian,
ZAbol
tii rhppr,a. t,tio~, ie
not a arIIy ituihtxh.ewr
dakhsh
Photo location
Grain-producing area
Province boundary
0 200
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