AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 18, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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~""^~f, Directors' ~f TOp SeCiet
Afghanistan Situation Report
18 January 1983
Top Secret
NES~1 J( 83=100/OCX
Y
I Jaxucry 19 3
~y 1 Z
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National Security
Information
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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CIA Internal Use Unly
Insurgent attacks are a rinci al reason behind Kabul's energy
and food shortages. 25X1
There has been generally less fighting in western Afghanistan
than along the Pakistani border; Iranian aid has apparently had
more impact among the Shias in central Afghanistan.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
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NESA M $3-10010CX
SOYA M 83-10012CX
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CIA Internal lise Only
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18 January 1983
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DETERIORATING LIVING CONDITIONS IN KABUL
CIA lnternal Use Only
electricity, diesel fuel, gasoline, and food are down sharply in
comparison with previous winters, even though the elec*_ric
transmission lines, severed by the resistance on December 27,
have been repaired. Many stores and light industries are closed
for lack of power; even the wealthier neighborhoods are subject
to brown-outs. Gas lines are long. Fewer vegetahles are being
brought in from the provinces. The Kabulis resentment is aimed
at the Soviet/Afghan authorities and not the resistance.
Comment: The drop in electricity and fuel supplies results
from insurgent attacks against the fuel pipeline and truck
convoys from the USSR; also contributing was the widespread
purchase of diesel fuel for use as heating oil following the
December 27 power blackout. The drop in food supplies probably
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TOP SECRET
C1~^-. Internal Use Gnly
--The attempted killing of the Soviet Ambassador in Malaysia last
Wednesday--undertaker, by the Muslin Brotherhood there tc punish
the Soviets for their involvement in Afghanistan--was a first;
heretofore. Soviet Embassies abroad have had to contend only with
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18 January 1883 25X1
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('rocs-border Movement and Etl- '^ Groups TOP SECRET
75 K loni~~l~~r.
75 Mfrs
CIA Internal Use Only
There has been generally- less fighting in the three western provinces
bordering Iran--Herat, Farah, and Ivimruz--than along the Pakistani
border. The provinces' sparse population, flat and open terrain and
distance from arms sources in Pakistan will probably prevent them from
ever becoming a major battlefield for the insurgency, with the exce;tion
of Herat cit ?.
Background
Most of the inhabitants of Herat (pop. 769.111) and Farah Provinces
(pop. 234,621) are Persian-speaking Tajiks, who can mingle unobtrusively
with the Iranians on the other side of the border, or Pushtuns, who tend
frequent infrequent
E[hnic groups
Baluch
Pashhin
Tapk
Other
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C1A Internal lise only
to live in towns. ~imruz's population (103,634; is mainly Baluch, one
of the country's most isolated ethnic groups.
The provinces' terrain, which is fairly flat and open in the western
half, favors the motorized Soviet/Afghan forces, although they are
stretched thin. The area's sparse vegetation also limits concealment
for the insurgents. The extreme summer heat, especially in Nimru2, cuts
down military activity for both sides.
at
Typica'_ terrair. near Herat City-- Most traffic between
Afghanistan and Isar. occurs near Herat. along the only hard-
surface, all-weather road that crosses the border. The road
links the city with the principal trading centers of eastern
Iran. Customs posts are manned on each side of the
boundary. Most illegal border traffic crosses the boundary
some distance from the highway. The terrain off the
is flat and easily trafficable, even for vehicles.
The Military Situation
There are about 10,000 Soviet troops in the western provinces, most
of them at Shindand in Farah Province. Approximately 10,000 Afghan
troops are located in the three province capitals, particularly Herat,
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TOF' SECRET
and along the main highway and Iranian border. A ke}' Soviet.%P.fghan
priority has been to keep open the highway, which runs from Rushka in
the USSR to Herat City and southward towards Qandahar. Government
control becomes particularly tenuous around the middle of Farah Province
and continues to deteriorate towards Qandahar. According to they Afghan
government's own figures, it controls about half of Herat Province, a
third of Farah and a negligible amount of Nimruz. Other observers have
given somewhat different figures, but all agree that regime forces
control little outside of the three province capitals, Shindand military
base in Farah Province, and scattered military garrisons along t:he main
highway and the Iranian border.
The Western Provinces and Iran
Although the insurgents in far westerr. Afghanistan are poorl}' armed
because of their lor.~ distance from the major sources of arms in
Pakistan, Irar. has provided training and limited materi