ETHIOPIA: THE TIGREAN INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 4, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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I I --
Central intelligence Agency
4 November 1983
ETHIOPIA: The Tigrean Insurgency
militarily.
The Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has taken
advantage of Addis Ababa's preoccupation with the rebellion in
neighboring Eritrea Province to expand its military operations
significantly since 1980. It now operates in large portions of
the Tigrean countryside and in Tigrean-inhabited areas of
Gonder and Welo Provinces. Despite its gains in the past three
years, the TPLF clearly lacks the strength to achieve victory
fighting will continue indefinitely.
The central government is increasingly concerned over the
expanding insurgency and has launched several military
campaigns in an effort to dislodge the guerrillas. These
attacks have had only limited success and government control of
Tigray Province remains restricted to the major towns and
highways. With neither side capable of military victory or
willing to enter serious negotiations, we expect inconclusive
This memorandum was requested by Frederick L. Wettering, Director of
African Affairs, National Security Council. It was prepared by
Horn of Africa Branch, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
ALA M 83-10174
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Roots of the Insurgency
The Tigreans, largely Christian peasant farmers, share a common
cultural and religious heritage with Ethiopia's dominant Amhara ethnic
group. For centuries the Tigrean and Amhara royal houses vied for control
of the country and recognition as the legitimate defender of Ethiopian
culture and Coptic Christian Orthodoxy.
The collapse of Emperor Haile Selassie's Amhara regime in 1974
weakened central government control of the countryside, prompting a
renewal of Tigrean nationalism that had been dormant since the 1940s.
This rebirth culminated in the formation of the TPLF in March 1975. The
Tigrean front grew slowly at first, primarily because of competition
within the province from other groups on the left and right. It gradually
absorbed the smaller Tigrean resistance forces and defeated rival
non-Tigrean guerrillas.
The TPLF increased significantly in size and strength following its
alliance in 1978 with the Marxist Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF), the major Eritrean guerrilla group. The agreement gives the TPLF
access to arms and training. In addition, the TPLF gained valuable
experience in more conventional fighting by participating in joint
operations with EPLF units in Eritrea. We estimate that the TPLF now has
approximately 15,000 armed regulars and several thousand additional poorly
armed "militia" troops.
Ideology and Support
The TPLF leadership was originally dominated by Marxist nationalists
from the urban areas; we believe they still play a key role in the
organization, although more conservative, less doctrinaire figures have
reportedly assumed leadership positions in recent years. This shift is
probably a reflection of the increasing numbers of conservative Christians
who have joined the TPLF. In an effort to broaden the appeal to these
elements, we believe the TPLF leadership has downplayed ideology,
stressing instead the historical appeal of Tigrean nationalism and the
threat posed to the traditional Tigrean social structure by Addis Ababa's
internal socialist policies.
The TPLF's goals have never been clear. According to a Tigrean
spokesman, the Front would like to see the government of Ethiopia
established as a civilian-led federation, providing for the full and equal
participation of the various nationalities in the country. Failing this,
he stated that the TPLF would like to acquire either a strong measure of
autonomy or full independence for the province. We believe, however, that
the Tigrean leadership has the basic long-term goal of supplanting Amhara
domination with Tigrean hegemony.
C G C o F T
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The TPLF leadership apparently recognizes that the movement is unable
to achieve its goals alone.
the Tigreans have been attempting to form an alliance of iopian
dissident groups--such as the Eritreans and Somalis--to apply military
pressure on the Mengistu regime along a broad front. We believe this
proposal is unrealistic and holds little prospect for success. Unlike the
TPLF, the other key insurgent groups in Ethiopia are committed to
independence from the central government.
Since the late 1970's the Tigrean People's Liberation Front has
sought economic and military assistance from several Arab
states--especially Saudi Arabia--and the West. The movement's Marxist
reputation and predominantly Christian membership have effectively
deterred Arab support, however, and there has been little response from
Western nations unwilling to jeopardize relations with Addis Ababa. As a
result, the TPLF has been forced to rely on arms captured from the
Ethiopians or those provided by such sources as Sudan and the larger, more
self-sufficient EPLF, which has a large stock of captured equipment and
the capability both to produce some light armaments and repair damaged
weapons and vehicles.
The close ties between the leadership of the TPLF and the EPLF are
based on ideological compatability and, to some extent, a common Coptic
Christian heritage. In addition to providing arms, the EPLF trains
Tigrean recruits at facilities in Eritrea and supports the TPLF in its
conflict with their mutual antagonist, the Eritrean Liberation Front,
another dissident faction. In return, the Tigreans fight alongside EPLF
forces in Eritrea and support their effort by harassing goverment supply
lines and garrisons in Tigray Province.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations
The TPLF insurgents have successfully used classic guerrilla tactics
in their campaign against the central government. They have ambushed
convoys of regular Army forces, raided isolated garrisons, taken
foreigners hostage, and attacked government facilities in large towns to
gain publicity or to capture supplies. In addition, they have
aggressively attacked the government's poorly armed and ill-trained
militia, severely undermining its morale.
Despite the TPLF's impressive growth in numbers in recent years, its
military capabilities remain limited. The guerrillas are lightly
armed--unlike the EPLF, they have little artillery and no armor to oppose
Mengistu's regular forces--and suffer from a lack of vehicles. Without
large amounts of outside assistance or a significant expansion of activity
from other dissident groups--which we consider unlikely--the TPLF's
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ability to pose a serious military threat to the stability of the regime
will remain limited. 25X1
The government, nevertheless, is increasingly concerned about the
TPLF's aggressiveness. The guerrillas not only are challenging Addis
Ababa's control of Tigray Province and threatening the supply routes to
Eritrea Province, but also expanding their operations to lightly defended
areas of adjoining provinces. These attacks, at times in cooperation with
other dissident groups, highlight Addis Ababa's vulnerability. To counter
this, the government has been forced to divert troops to defensive roles
or convoy escort duty and to rely on air transport to move supplies to the
north. There are now some 20,000 government soldiers with Soviet advisers
in Tigray and nearby provinces. Despite several large military campaigns,
the government has failed to subdue the guerrillas, largely because it has
been unable to engage them in fixed battles or effectively apply its
superior numbers, firepower, and mobility in the inaccessible terrain of
Mengistu is facing war-weariness in the urban areas and a growing
morale problem among northern military units, but continues to maintain a
hard-line policy toward the Tigreans. He reportedly has refused to hold
any talks to explore the possibility of a political accommodation. The
Ethiopian leadership recognizes that any major concessions made to the
Tigreans will become a model for Ethiopia's many other dissident groups.
Outlook
We believe the military confrontation is likely to continue
indefinitely, with little or no prospect for a major breakthrough by
either side. The TPLF almost certainly will expand its strength and
continue to resist Addis Ababa's attempts to control the province. The
Tigrean insurgents--considerably lagging behind the Eritrean movement in
military clout--are incapable of conducting sustained conventional
operations or holding territory against largescale government campaigns.
Until it achieves these capabilities, the TPLF will remain unable to meet
its military and political goals.
For its part, the central government lacks the ability to defeat the
insurgency or to prevent its expansion. Moreover, Mengistu fails to
understand the deep cultural and historic roots of the Tigrean rebellion,
and his commitment to a strong centralized regime in Addis Ababa appears
to rule out any political solution. Despite his problems with Tigray,
Mengistu is as yet under no serious pressure from within the regime to end
his efforts to achieve a military victory. He and his supporters may view
the Tigrean rebellion--mistakenly--as an off-shoot of the Eritrean
conflict which will evaporate once Eritrea is pacified. Although Mengistu
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almost certainly will continue to seek a military solution against both
movements, we consider his prospects for success to be virtually
nonexistent.
Over the longer term, a continuing military stalemate in the north
would exacerbate morale problems within the military and popular
discontent with the war. We believe Mengistu's hold on power and support
within the military leadership remains firm, however, and barring his
assassination, he will be able to prosecute his current policies
indefinitely.
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Tigrean Insurgency
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\(Assab)
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Periodic
operations
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Dehelak'Deset
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SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: The Tigrean Insurgency
Distribution:
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ALA/AF/H
Director, African Affairs, NSC
(2 November 1983)
Frederick L. Wettering,
DCI
DDCI
Executive Director
SA/DCI/IA
DDI
ADDI
DDO/Africa
NIO for Africa
NIC Action Group
PDB Staff
ILS
C/DDI/PES
D/ALA
ALA/PS
ALA Research
OCPAS/IMD/CB
ALA/AF
ALA/AF/H
c r P D T
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