MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 October 1983
MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA
Summary
Soviet and Cuban arms shipments over the last few months
have merely added to Luanda's already substantial advantage in
firepower over the lightly armed UNITA insurgents. Increased
aid from Moscow and Havana nevertheless will strengthen
Luanda's hold on major cities and key garrisons. UNITA in any
case probably could not have challenged these strongly defended
points. Moreover, the insurgent offensive planned for the next
six months is aimed at broad areas of the Angolan countryside
and apparently intends to do little more than harass or further
isolate the major garrisons. As long as Angolan troops bear
the brunt of the fighting in the countryside, however. the
insurgents seem likely to retain the initiative.
This memorandum was prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs at the request of the NIO for Africa
It was written by
Office of African and Latin American Ana ysis. It has been coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
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Recent Soviet and Cuban Assistance
Since mid-year there have been substantial deliveries of Soviet
weapons and military equipment to Angola.
The Cubans have also stepped up their support. Five Cuban ships
delivered arms in recent months including some 33 medium tanks and several
e
800
mor
armored personnel carriers. In July, Havana reportedly sent
troops to stiffen the defenses around Luanda
A high-level Angolan delegation visited Moscow in early September
apparently to ask for more arms. The Angolans also told Havana in
September they might ask for more troops and the Cubans said they would be
sent if needed, suggesting Havana has at least considered additional
augmentation.
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But More Arms Are Not The Answer
Both Moscow and Havana will find it difficult to provide meaningful
assistance for operations against UNITA. Soviet arms shipments merely add
to Luanda's already substantial advantage in firepower over the lightly
armed guerrillas. Furthermore, the Angolan army does not have enough
trained soldiers to operate even a limited amount of complex equipment.
More hardware does not address the Army's principal military weakness--the
poor performance of its soldiers, who are badly led, trained and
motivated.
Furthermore, much of the military assistance received by Angola has
been intended to strengthen the air defenses in the south. Despite the
expanding UNITA operations, Luanda remains preoccupied with the South
African threat from the occupied buffer zone in southern Angola and from
northern Namibia. Those weapons that will be useful against the
insurgents re still too few in number to
cause a decisive shift in the balance of forces.
Unless Havana decides to change its current policy on how its troops
are used, adding to the 25,000 to 30,000 man Cuban military presence in
Angola is not likely to have much effect. The Cubans play a supporting
role to the Angolans fighting in the field and the Cuban troops guard the
main defense line in the south against deeper South African penetration
and protect the main garrisons threatened by UNITA elsewhere. Havana
could be forced to reverse its longstanding practice of avoiding direct
clashes with UNITA, even though
popular discontent is growing ov
er casualties in Angola.
The increased aid from Moscow and Havana probably strengthens
Luanda's hold on major cities and garrisons. UNITA in any case probably
could not challenge--and apparently has no intention of attacking--these
strongly defended points. As long as Angolan troops bear the brunt of the
fighting in the countryside, the insurgents seem likely to retain the
initiative there.
Moscow, and no doubt Havana, are concerned over adverse trends in
Angola.
Angola's inability to challenge UNITA on the ground might lead it to
use what airpower it has to attack UNITA's bases in the southeast. Luanda
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has had this capability for years but so far has not chosen to exercise
the option. Such airstrikes however near the Namibian border would risk
a South African response.
Luanda Prepares Its Defenses
Luanda was shaken by the UNITA victories in August and the loss of
Cangamba was a psychological as well as a military blow to the
government. The government apparently is also aware of UNITA's plans for
the coming months, and is moving its forces to bolster threatened
garrisons and is revamping its security forces.
Luanda is building up key garrisons in the north and east
improvements to the airfield at Luena and efforts
to fortify e garrison.' The government has also established a small
outpost south of Luena, apparently to block moves from that direction.
Combat aircraft and helicopters were moved to Malange in late August
and additional ground troops apparently have moved into the town. Malange
apparently will be a key base in the northwest. UNITA has been nibbling
at the edges of Malange for several months and has, on occasion, blocked
the rail and road links to the city.
Luanda probably is having difficulty finding sufficient troops to
rebuild its threatened northern garrisons. Troop strength in the north
was drawn down several years ago when Luanda believed it was threatened
primarily in the south and central highlands. The redeployments tom
some Angolan
and Cuban troops from Lubango--a high priority area for defense against
South Africa--were flown to Malange in August. Moreover, Luanda has
launched a highly publicized recruiting campaign that apparently is
intended to round up all those capable of carrying arms.
The government is also pushing ahead with its plans to reorganize the
security forces. Luanda announced in late July that the military would
assume direct rule in provinces threated by UNITA and so far has
established new military councils in Luena, Malange, Huambo, Benguela, and
Lubango. President dos Santos apparently believes that unifying all civil
and military authority in the various regions under a military council
directly responsible to him will end the bickering between the Army and
local security forces that has marred previous counterinsurgency
efforts. Dos Santos has also traveled to the threatened areas to give
major speeches stressing the government's resolve.
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The government presently is publicizing its small counterinsurgency
operations in various parts of the country and probably will soon announce
another of its larger periodic campaigns. Its forces, however, are
unlikely to be able to do much more than conduct limited forays in the
vir-inity of the major garrisons or along the key transportation links.
UNITA's Coming Offensive
In a major radio address in late August, Jonas Savimbi said that
UNITA would intensify its operations throughout the country in October and
extend the conflict to areas as yet untouched by the insurgents. The
promised offensive--to last through April and coincide with the rainy
season--is to be two or three times larger than the highly successful
August campaign which was capped by the capture of Cangamba. UNITA claims
about 10,000 insurgents were involved in the August fighting.
Besides expanding UNITA's area of operations, the offensive is also
intended to further weaken Luanda economically. The move to the northwest
will for the first time bring the war to coffee producing areas north of
Malange. UNITA has already moved to cut access to the diamond mines in
the northeast, and recently preparations
were being made to attack the mines near aurimo. moreover, Savimbi
claims to have formed commando units for raids on the US-operated oil
production facilities in Cabinda. Oil provides over 80-percent of
Angola's foreign exchange; diamonds and coffee provide almost all the
remainder.
UNITA apparently does not plan direct frontal attacks on large well-
defended garrisons. Savimbi said UNITA would harass government held towns
with special commando units and implied that the insurgents would isolate
rather than capture the towns. Direct attacks on the larger garrisons
such as Cangamba have proven costly to the insurgents because their
concentrated forces become vulnerable to the government's superiority in
firepower and airpower.
The promised offensive appears to be within the capabilities of the
insurgents, although all their expectations probably will not be fully
satisfied. The plan emphasizes UNITA's strengths: its ability to operate
in small units throughout the countryside; its superiority over small
lightly-defended government outposts; and its ability to isolate main
garrisons for long periods of time. The provincial capital at Huambo, for
government control noes not extend
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beyond a five mile radius from the town. UNITA apparently plans similar
operations around Luena and Malange.
The South Africans undoubtedly are continuing to provide substantial
materiel support to the insurgents. The surge in UNITA activity since
late last year could not have occurred, in our judgment, without stepped
up assistance from Pretoria, probably beginning in mid-1982. Furthermore,
we believe that UNITA's future plans require that this support be
Luanda still claims South Africa provided direct military assistance
in the form of airstrikes to assist UNITA's capture of Cangamba, a claim
which Pretoria still vehemently denies. The available evidence does not
confirm the claims of either side, although both Luanda and Pretoria had
aircraft in the region capable of bombing Cangamba.
Pretoria has in the past shied away from direct military assistance
to the insurgents and has limited its support to materiel, advisory and
training assistance. South Africa probably will continue this policy and
even if they did directly participate in the Cangamba battle it presumably
was a one-time shot and not indicative of a major shift in policy.
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Congo
,,& Saurimo
Zaire )
UNITA Claims
Control
Influence
Expansion
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Distribution:
Copy 1 -- Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs
2 -- NIO for Africa
3 -- Frederick Wettering, Director, African Affairs, NSC
4 -- Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense, ISA
5 -- Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa,
6 --
7 --
8 --
9 --
10 --
11 --
12 --
13 --
14 --
15 --
16 --
17 --
18-19 --
20 --
21-24 --
25-28 --
29-40 --
DCI
DDCI
Executive Director
SA/DCI/IA
DDI
ADDI
DDO/Africa
NIC Action Group
PDB Staff
ILS
C/DDI/PES
D/ALA
ALA/PS
ALA Research Director
OCPAS/IMD/CB
ALA/AF
ALA/AF/C
ALA/AF/CI I(14 October 1983)
D IA 25X1
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