CHINA: PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000401460001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL /7'10
Wwwwo-
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
China: Provincial Developments
Summary
Beijing carried out a reorganization of provincial
government bodies last quarter, replacing older and leftist cadre
with younger, reform-minded figures. Although the political
inexperience of the new cadre may hamper their effectiveness,
Beijing has strengthened its position for the party rectification
drive set to begin this winter.
The pressure to improve economic performance has sharpened
provincial rivalries and interprovincial competition in foreign
trade. In domestic trade Beijing is experimenting with a system
of regional economic units to improve efficiency.
Governmental Organizations Restructured
The central government completed a thorough "overhaul of
provincial government leadership during the last quarter in
preparation for the Sixth National People's Congress (NPC), held
in June. Twenty-six of 29 governors were replaced along with
many vice governors (see appendix). In some provinces the entire
leadership was changed; most of the changes took place in March
and April. The government shakeup follows a similar but less
sweeping reorganization of the party bureaucracies carried out
last winter.
Almost all of the new appointees fit the reformist ideal--
young, educated, with proven competence in economic or political
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe China
Division of the Office of East Asian Analysis, Directorate of
Intelligence. Questions and comments are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Bran
ch
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administration. Several have backgrounds in business or
technical fields, not politics. Beijing also claims to have
eliminated most "leftists," those with records of serious
Cultural Revolution abuses or ties to the Gang of Four.
Although Beijing has largely succeeded in putting its
choices in place in the provincial governments, the new leaders
may not be as successful in carrying out their reform mandate as
Beijing hopes. Governmental bodies have essentially
administrative responsibilities, and real power resides in the
party bureaucracies. Beijing apparently had to compromise in its
restructuring of the party organizations, which was less complete
than the governmental reorganization. Moreover, we believe the
new appointees lack the political experience and network of
connections so important in China and will find their plans
frustrated by obstructionism at lower levels and by the
machinations of less reform-minded cadre--including older,
supposedly retired cadre.
Nonetheless, the leadership changes are one more
demonstration that the reformists now have the upper hand. The
overhaul also strengthens Beijing's position for the coming party
rectification, set to begin this winter.
Provincial Trade Competition
Foreign Trade: Beijing is pressuring provinces to increase
foreign trade and foreign investment. Even provinces such as
Jiangxi, with little to attract foreign investors; have been told
to improve their performance. Foreign investment conferences
have been held in several provinces, including Hubei, an inland
province with little involvement in foreign trade. Hubei, if
successful, will serve as a model to other inland provinces.
The stampede for foreign investment has led to competition
between provinces. Fujian, for example, announced publicly that
it will offer better terms to foreign businessmen than Guangdong,
its more successful rival. Joint venture firms that expected to
be able to market their products throughout China have found
their access to markets restricted to the province where they are
located, as other provinces have imposed trade barriers to
protect their own industries.
Several provinces have opened or plan to open offices
outside China to lure investment--Guangdong and Fujian in Hong
Kong and Tokyo; Zhejiang, Beijing, Liaoning in Hong Kong.
Shanghai has an office in Hong Kong and plans to open others in
not yet chosen cities. Shanghai and Manila recently signed an
agreement to open liaison offices to further economic, technical
and cultural cooperation.
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Shanghai is a special case in foreign trade, having long
been China's major international trading hub. In recognition of
its special status, Beijing in April granted Shanghai
considerable autonomy in foreign trade. Its new freedom will
empower Shanghai to borrow or use retained foreign exchange to
import whatever it needs directly; to negotiate directly with
foreign investors; to -strike its own export deals; and to handle
foreign trade for neighboring localities. The central
authorities intend Shanghai, rather than Hong Kong, to be the
principal "open door" through which foreign trade and investment
enter China.
Domestic Trade: The central government is also taking
measures to promote domestic trade and improve economic
efficiency. The most important of these is the establishment of
a system of "economic regions," integrated economic units that
cut across province borders and are administered from the
region's major city. The Shanghai delta region, including parts
of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, is by far the most advanced and is to
serve as a model for other coastal regions. A region centered on
Chongqing, Sichuan, is apparently intended as a model for inland
regions, but is much less developed. Other regions are planned
around Guangzhou, Xian, Beijing-Tianjin, Shenyang, Fuzhou, and
Wuhan.
In other parts of China where the authorities have not
designated economic regions they are encouraging interprovincial
cooperation contracts. For instance, Gansu has signed agreements
with Beijing, Nei Monggol, and Liaoning for various cooperative
projects. Several provinces in the northwest have formed a
consortium to market their products.
The economic and political obstacles confronting the push
for cooperation are considerable. Previous attempts to set up
economic regions have met with failure. A poorly developed
infrastructure, competition for scarce resources, and a lack of
experience in managing complex economic organizations are some
factors working against success. Shanghai, which is relatively
advanced economically, will probably do well, and Guangzhou is
promising. Other projected economic regions and cooperation
pacts are likely to prove less successful.
Population Problem: Beijing continues to push for reduction
of the birth rate and continues to meet with limited success.
Reports from several provinces tell of birth rates that remain
well above targets. In some areas birth rates have even begun to
go up slightly because of the agricultural responsibility system,
which gives an economic incentive for having larger families to
till more land or have more workers within a family engaged in
sideline occupations.
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Superstition Lives: The Public Security Bureaus in several
provinces in east China have issued notices forbidding a variety
of traditional Chinese superstitious practices. Among the
proscribed activities are witchcraft, exorcism (frequently used
in healing rituals), fortunetelling, and geomancy. Cultural
authorities in Shanghai have also protested the reappearance of
superstitious elements in plays--many traditional plays have
ghosts and demons in them. The party views the revival of
superstition and traditional religion as a challenge to its
authority and a harmful reminder of the feudal past.
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Appendix: The New Provincial Leadership
Note: In the following table, names in parentheses indicate the
previous holder of a position. The figure 1 after a name
signifies a ranking secretary designated as "First Secretary";
this is the older formulation that was retained for those men who
continued in the position after the reorganization. New
appointees are simply called Secretary. This chart was prepared
with the assistance of FBIS.
PARTY HEAD PARTY SECRETARIES
Anhui Huang Huang
(ZPou Zi ian-1
,eijing Duan Junyi-1
Fujian Xiang Nan-1
Gansu Li Ziqi-1
Fen Jixin)
Guangdong Ren Zhongyi-1
iuangxi
Yang Haibo
Wang Yuzhao
Jiao Ruoyu
Chen Xitonq
Hu Ping
Ma Xingyuan
Chen Guangyi
Liu Bing
Lin Ruo
Li Li an
Qiao Xiaoguang- Wie Chunshu
-izhou Chi Biqing-1
Yang-1
ilongjiang Li Lian Chen Lei
(Yang Yichen) Chen Junsheng
Liu Jie-1 Liu Zhengwei
Yu Mingtao
Guars Guangfu Wang Quanguo
(Chen Pixian) Huang Zhizhen
Mao Zhiyong-1 Xiong Qingquan
Jiao Linyi
Ji angsu Han Peixin Shen Daren
(Xu Jiatun-1) Gu Xiulian
Jiangxi Bai Dongcai-1 Xu Qin
Jilin
31 Aug 82 Zhao Zengyi
(Jiang Weiging)
Qiang Xiaochu-1
Zhou Guanqchun
Zhu Houze
Su Gana
Zhang Shuguang
Xing Chongzhi
Zhang Gensheng
Gao Di
Liaoning Guo FFeng-1 Dai Suli
Li Tieying
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GOVERNOR/CHAIRMAN
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
CHAIRMAN
Yuan Zhen
Wang Guangyu
Shi Junjie
Wang Yuzhao
(thou Zijian)
Yang Weiping
(Gu Zhuoxin)
Zhao Pe ei
Chen Xitong
(JiaD Ruoyu)
Thao Pengfei
(Jia Tingsan)
Hu Hong
Cheng Xu
Ping
Na Xingyuan)
u g
(Liao Zhigao)
Jia Zhjie
Chen Guangyi
(Li Dengying)
Li Dengyinq
(Wang Shitai)
Xie Fei
Wu Nansheng
Wang Ning
Liang Lingguang
(Liu Tianfu)
Luo Tian
(Li Jianzhen)
Huang Yun
Jin Baosheng
Chen Huiguang
Wei Chunshu
(Qin Yingji)
Huang Rong
Wang Chaowen
Wang Chaowen
(Su Gang)
Wu Shi
(Xu Jiansheng)
Gao Zhanxiang
Xie Feng
Zhang Shuquang
(Liu Bingyan)
U U ingyan
(Jiang Yizhen)
Hou Jie
Chen Lei
hao Dezun
He Zhuxang
Luo Gan
He Zhukang
(Dai Suli)
Shen Yinluo
Wang Qun
Qian Yunlu
Huang Zhizhen
(Han Ningfu)
Han Ningfu
(Chen Pixian)
Liu Zheng
Liu Zheng
(Sun Guozhi)
Sun Guozhi
(Wan Da)
Sun Han
Zhou Ze
Gu Xiulian
(Han Peixin)
Chu Jiang
(Xu Jiatun)
Wang Shufeng
Zhao Zenqyi
(Bai to Sept, then
Ma Jikong
Zhao)(Yang Shangkai)
Zhao Xiu
Zhap N i
Liu Jingzhi
Zhao Xiu
(Zhang Gensheng)
Yu Ke
(Li Youwen)
Quan Shuren
Sun Weiben
Xu Shaofu
Quan Shuren
(Chen Puri)
Zhang Zhengde
(Huang Oudong)
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Distribution for China: Provincial Developments
Department of State
1 - Director, INR
1 - Director of Research, INR
1 - Chief, Northeast Asia Division Office of Analysis for East
Asia and Pacific
1 - INR/EC/RE
1 - Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asia and
Pacific Affairs
1 - Chief, Economic Section, Office of Chinese Affairs
United States Information Agency
Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - DIO for East Asia and.Pacific
1 - Chief, DE3
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/China Reports
1 - OCR/EA
1 - OCR/ISG
2 - C/OEA/CH
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV
1 - D/OEAA
1 - D/NIC
5 - OCO/IMB/CB
1 - PDB
2 - D/DDI
1 - OEA/NA
1 - OEA/SE
1-- FBIS China
1 - C/PES/DDI
1 - FR
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