COPING WITH CLASS STRUGGLE: BEIJING'S DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400660001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. [1
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 February 1983
Coping with Class Struggle: Beijing's Dilemma
Summary
Recent press articles and speeches on class struggle in
China illustrate the difficulties Beijing is having in
reconciling certain basic Marxist principles with its reform
program The articles have attempt,ed_to redefine the nature of
class struggle in China today to meet the Policy needs of the
reformers in three areas--rehabilitation of intellectuals,
fighting economic crime, and resisting "bourgeois liberalism" and
Other corrupting influences. In our opinion, the reformers under
Deng Xiaoping believe they cannot ignore the subject of class
struggle. It is a fundamental Marxist principle, and unless
redefined, opponents of reform will use it against them and their
policies. The concept also has strong psychological appeal for
the least-skilled workers and peasants in China, who fear the
renewed emphasis on expertise will limit their chances of
improving both their economic and political status. This
attitude could be exploited by those opposed to the reforms to
hinder implementation and force compromises.
In our opinion, this effort to redefine class struggle will
not be convincing and probably will not significantly advance the
leadership's goals of rehabilitating intellectuals and stemming
.corruption. Moreover, the class struggle issue raises problems
in regard to the recovery of Hong Kong and Taiwan, areas which as
,hotbeds of capitalism are sensitive to Chinese discussions of
this question.
This memorandum was prepared by the Domestic
.Policy Branch of the Office of East Asian Analysis, Deputy
.Directorate of Intelligence. Questions and comments are welcome
and may be directed to the author
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A New Definition
Attention to class struggle has been closely associated with
periods of political violence in China, especially the Cultural
Revolution, and is out of step with the leadership's stress on
order and stability. To deal with the issue, the reformers argue
that class struggle in the old mass movement sense is no longer
necessary in China because the exploiting classes have been
virtually eliminated. They are pushing the line laid down at the
Third Plenum in 1978 that production, not politics, has become
the key link and thus class strus.le should be directed at those
elements that retard production.
Intellectuals
The new line on class struggle holds that intellectuals, -
reviled as the "ninth stinking class" in the Cultural Revolution,
have been transformed through 40 years of socialist education and
are now workers too. Because their talents are crucial to
China's modernization, a major purpose of recent class struggle
discussions has been to overcome the anti-intellectualism still
rife in China. In his 12th Congress speech, Hu referred to the
three main forces of socialism as workers, peasants, and
intellectuals, rather than the classic formulation of workers,
peasants, and soldiers. The new formulation, which has become
standard, in effect asserts that there is no difference between
mental and physical labor and class differences based on
education no longer exist in China.
The pronouncements on intellectuals and class struggle are
intended to support more tangible expressions of the policy on
intellectuals. When they were attacked as bourgeois elements
during the Cultural Revolution, many intellectuals were subjected
to humiliating public trials, physically abused, thrown out of
their jobs, and sent to do manual labor. Now intellectuals are
being restored to their old jobs with their salaries, living
quarters and working conditions improved. In some cases, they
are being given compensatory payments for abuses suffered in the
Cultural Revolution. Beijing is using its new categorization of
classes in an attempt to justify this solic as one of fairness,
not favoritism, toward intellectuals.
Economic Crimes
Articles explaining the new policies on class struggle have
linked it to the attack on economic crime by arguing that,
although exploitive classes have been eliminated, class struggle
in China still exists between the "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
classes--the law-abiding and the criminal., The Shanghai press
has singled out as class enemies smugglers, embezzlers, thieves,
and those who take bribes, because they rob the people and hinder
China's economic progress; class struggle against them is
legitimate. By this argument, status as a class enemy is
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determined by an individual's
actions and not by his class
origin, an interpretation which is a far cry from classical
Marxism-Leninism.
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Bourgeois Liberalism
and
Foreign Enemies
As part of the effort to combat the undesirable side effects
of some reforms, Beijing has included under class struggle the
struggle against bourgeois liberalism and corrupt western
political, social, and artistic ideas. Hu Yaobang in his speech
at the 12th Party Congress strongly defended China's open door
policy, under attack in some quarters of the leadership, but he
also warned of the ideological corruption that could result from
increased contact with the West. Hu made the point that class
struggle will continue to exist and may even intensify because
the Chinese people live in a "complicated international
environment" where capitalism and other forces hostile to
socialism seek to corrupt and sabotage the country. We believe
Hu and other leaders are most concerned about the appeal of
"bourgeous lifestyles" for China's _youth an.d-also feel a ne d to
protect their flanks from critics of the*open door.
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Problems
We believe Beijing's attempts to alter the traditional view
of class struggle and defuse anti-intellectualism have not met
with great success. workers 25X1
and peasants object that intellectuals are being given
p'referential treatment, and cadre resist the policy both to
preserve their influence and on ideological grounds. Strikes and
demonstrations in various parts of China have forced postponement
of some scheduled pay increases for teachers. Opposition to the
policy is sufficiently strong to force central authorities to
reinforce directives calling for improved implementation. They
refer to numerous problems in party work on intellectuals,
charging that many cadre continue to view intellprtualc AS
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From the intellectuals' point of view, the regime still has
along way to go in assuaging memories of Cultural Revolution
excesses and proving that its moderate policies will last.
Beijing has on occasion complicated the task by sending mixed
signals. For example, the phrase "Let a hundred flowers bloom"--
codewords for loosening controls on intellectuals--was dropped
from the final draft of the new constitution, which disturbed
intellectuals. Some leaders have argued, lamely in our view, that
the new relaxed policy toward intellectuals is now so basic that
it does not require specific mention.
Intellectuals have complicated the problem for Beijing by
their tendency to exceed the guidelines every time restrictions
On the arts are relaxed. The dilemma Beijing faces is that,
given the terms which frame political arguments in China, any
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criticism of individual
intellectuals very often
develops into a
criticism of intellectuals
as a class--a situation Beijing wants
to avoid.
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In our view, lumping
the campaign against corruption under
the rubric of class struggle is unlikely to produce the result
Beijing is seeking--pumping life into a campaign that was all but
stillborn. While there is plenty of resentment against
corruption, it does not evoke the same zeal that old-style class
struggle did. The targets ar too numerous, too diffuse, and too
likely to be relatives.
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Linking class struggle with resisting foreign corruption
presents potential problems for the reformers; opponents of the
open door policy can use it to argue against further
liberalization of contacts with the West. Some of the top
leaders are unhappy with growing western influence in many
spheres of Chinese society--music, dress, art, even politics.
They are also worried about increased dependence on the West.
The reformers recognize the problem but are denying that.
"bourgeois liberalism" is a necessary'consequence of the 'opening
to the West.
Potentially much more troublesome is the discussion of class
struggle in connection with the recovery of Taiwan and Hong
Kong. Some articles on class struggle, possibly picking up on
the reunification theme in Hu's Congress speech, have said that
exploitive capitalist classes still exist in the unrecovered
areas of the motherland--Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao--and must be
struggled against. This argument most often appears in the
provincial press, not in the national media, indicating that it
is not the official view as yet. Indeed, it flies in the face of
Beijing's official line that Hong Kong's and Taiwn's social and
economic systems need not change as a result of reunification.
However, provincial versus national press treatment, official
versus unofficial pronouncements, are distinctions that will not
be made by residents of Taiwan and Hong Kong. In our view,
discussion of this point, even in the provincial press, which
does circulate in Hong Kong, can only increase the nervousness in
the colony and complicate Beijing's efforts to regain control.
The class struggle discussion illustrates the difficulties
Beijing is having reconciling its economic and political reforms
with ideology and traditional attitudes. The pragmatic policies
of Deng and his allies must proceed within a Communist framework;
many of the reforms advocated deviate sharply from accepted
'Marxist thinking. Constant harping on the socialist character
the reforms indicates that the reformer's rather forced
reinterpretation of Marxist truth continues to meet with
scepticism from old-line conservatives and that the reformers
consider themselves vulnerable on the ideological front.
of
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A further complication confronting the reformers is the
legacy of Mao Zedong's theories, which gave class struggle an
almost mystical importance. The reform leaders have been
deemphasizing Maoism but they cannot totally repudiate Mao--he is
too important a figure in the victory of the party. They have
a?dopted the tactic of praising Mao's early writings while
treating his role in the Cultural Revolution as the great mistake
of an aging leader. This approach has its dangers; many of the
concepts the reformers find threatening, including class
struggle, are integral parts of Mao's thought dating from the
1930's, and not solely products of the Cultural Revolution. The
leadership is going to have to walk a fine line on these issues
or risk the unwanted side-effects of providing its opponents with
ammunition, confusing its friends, and underminins confidence in
the direction and stability of its policies.
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Distribution
Department of State
1 - Director, INR (Hugh Montgomery)
1 - Director of Research, INR (Ms. Carol Edler Baumann)
- Chief, Northeast Asia Division Office of Analysis for East
Asia and Pacific (INR) (Galen Fox)
1 INR/EC/RE (John Danylyk)
1 - Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asia and
Pacific Affairs (William Rope)
1 - Chief, Economic Section, Office of Chinese Affairs (Richard
Mueller)
United States Information Agency
1- Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (William Crowell)
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - DIO for East Asia and Racific (Charles L. Desaulniers)
1 - Chief, DE3
Central Intelligence Agency
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1
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1
1
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NIO/EA
Chief, China Reports
OCR/EA
Domestic Policy Branch
Foreign Affairs Branch
Defense Issues Branch
Development Issues Branch
Director, OEAA
0/NIC
OCO/IMB/CB
PDB
D/DDI
0EA/NA
0EA/SE
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