EL SALVADOR: MILITARY PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102750001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 2, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
2 January 1981
MEMORANDUM
El Salvador: Military Prospects
The armed forces, despite training, equipment, and logis-
tical problems, have contained insurgent operations with present
weaponry and personnel. But it has been a military struggle
between two weak opponents and the left is clearly in the process
of upgrading its armament. Especially with increased external
support, the guerrillas could relatively quickly present a more
formidable threat--one that would severely tax both the resources
and the will of government forces. Major external aid probably
will be essential for the Salvadoran armed forces to survive. To
be effective in forestalling victory by a guerrilla movement
totally inimical to the US, such aid probably would have to be of
a magnitude several times the $5-6 million and small number of
advisors presently under consideration.* Even with increased
assistance there would be no guarantee of success.
Current Strategy of the Far Left
* There is, however, no reliable estimate of the Salvadoran
armed forces military needs.
This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office
of Political Analysis and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research,
the Office of Economic Research, OER/Trade & Aid, the Clandestine Service, and
the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. It reflects information
available as of 2 January 1981. Comments and questions may be directed to
Chief, Latin America Division, OPA
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The continuing reports of an imminent leftist offensive are
supported by some circumstantial evidence. Rumors suggest large
numbers of international volunteers from Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Panama will participate in a major offensive this month.
Nevertheless, Chalatenango is the logical starting point for
a campaign to demonstrate military and political momentum as a
prelude to a major offensive in 1981. The insurgents' present
tactics appear to be to sustain a high level of assassinations
and other spectacular terrorist attacks, and to escalate rural
military assaults. An immediate goal is to control a "liberated
zone" in which to set up a provisional government. The far left
is assured of receiving more than token recognition for such a
shadow government. They believe this further international
isolation of the civil-military junta would undercut any plans by
the incoming US administration to boost military support for the
junta.
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Continued improvements in armament would put a final offen-
sive strategy within reach once the guerrillas overcome the
logistical and training problems associated with an influx of new
equipment. At the moment, both Salvadoran radicals and Havana
might exaggerate the extent of the current leftist push, hoping
to precipitate a rightwing coup or a Christian Democratic with-
drawal from the government prior to the change in US administra-
tions. It is clear, however, that both Cuba and Nicaragua are
already collaborating more closely and stepping up their assis-
tance. If a major offensive were to show promise, it could have
a snowball effect, spurring recruitment, submerging tactical and
personality differences among insurgent groups, and encouraging
foreign supporters to accelerate diplomatic and military aid by
several orders of magnitude.
Status of the Civil Military Government
The recent junta shakeup and the present government restruc-
turing promise some greater efficiency and a higher political
profile for junta President Duarte, but no greater civilian
control over the armed forces. The Defense Ministry controls
military affairs and retains veto power over policy in other
important areas.
The cogoverning Christian Democratic party did gain a
commitment from the military to crack down on abuses by the
security force and to begin cleaning house. So far, the military's
actions offer a hint of promise in some areas. But no more than
a marginal near term impact on the level of officially tolerated
antileft terrorism is expected.
In a virtually unprecedented action, the military has
admitted responsibility for the recent murders of several cam-
pesino leaders, promising indemnification and disciplinary action
against those involved. The transfers of some high-level officers
associated with abuses are scheduled for January. The transfers--
if they take place--would be an important symbolic gain but would
still fall well short of the Christian Democrats' objectives;
moreover, they would only be a superficial restructuring from the
military's perspective. The military is, meanwhile, footdragging
in the investigations of the assassinations of six leftist
leaders and the murders of the four US Catholic women.
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Continuing indiscriminate warfare against the left will
likely lead to another crisis between the military and the
Christian Democratic movement. On the whole, the military still
has a low opinion of the party for failing to attract broader
popular and international support. There remains latent senti-
ment for throwing out the civilians entirely, even though the
military high command appears to recognize the political utility
of the party's participation. The improved personal relationship
between Christian Democratic leader Duarte and leading military
officers has been the glue holding the coalition together through
several crises. But it has been at the expense of isolating
Duarte from some elements of his party.
US Aid
The US military aid extended to date has neither increased
US influence over the Salvadoran armed forces nor made them
substantially more effective. The limited deliveries, attached
conditions, and on again off again timetable have left many
Salvadoran officers believing US aid is illusory. This rein-
forces their resolve to go it alone, employing their own standards
and practices.
The recent US interruption of economic and military aid to
the Salvadoran Government conveyed different signals to different
elements of the military institution:
-- Some officers, despite their resentment, perceived the
halt as an effort by the US to show its displeasure
with security force abuses and encourage change.
-- Other officers, however, read the US action as under-
mining the institution's long term chances for survival.
In effect, they perceived the US siding with a small
group of opportunistic Christian Democrats who--if they
could not inspire the US to provide aid when it was
most needed--were not worth retaining in the junta.
-- When the economic and previously agreed upon military
aid was then quickly restored, some officers felt the
token offerings and promises to the Christian Democrats
had already paid off, and their enthusiasm for follow-
through waned.
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Any move by the US with regard to military aid will be
subject to similarly varying interpretations. Continuing to
withhold military aid will probably not restrain and may even
encourage the extreme right. Rightwing plotters, feeling they
have little to lose with the current US administration, could
even gamble on a coup in the next several weeks. So far, how-
ever, they appear to lack critical-high level support. Many
rightwing officers, in tandem with archconservative civilians,
believe the incoming US administration will allow them to deal
with the left as they see fit. They would tend to interpret
upgraded military aid as license to employ indiscriminate tactics
to crush the left. Other officers might recognize that such an
increase was conditioned on improved performance, but we doubt
they would be willing to risk military disunity by cracking down
strongly on rightist elements while the guerrilla left remains
such a potent threat.
Thus, US aid will not necessarily ensure the continuance of
a civilian component in the government--indeed it could provoke
an outright military takeover. Moreover, military aid also entails
tradeoffs with other US interests. Assisting the government as
presently constituted will, for example, strain US relations with
Mexico, which has publicly stated its opposition to US military
aid; diplomatic complications would multiply were US assistance
being given to a purely military rightwing government. Another
consideration is that foreign supporters of the Salvadoran
guerrillas would probably respond to increased US assistance by
stepping up their own aid to the insurgents, feeding even more
widespread violence. Finally, even under an optimistic scenario,
it seems unlikely that the guerrilla threat can be permanently
eliminated, so that some US support might have to continue for an
extended period.
In our judgment, the Salvadoran Government will probably not
be able to withstand the threat from the left without substantial
US or other external aid in the future. Arms flows to the insur-
gents, the likely policies of the foreign supporters supplying
the radicals, and the weaknesses of the Salvadoran military
institution argue such a need. El Salvador is a very small
battlefield and the momentum could shift very quickly to the 25X1
insurgents with the addition of only a thousand or so well armed
combatants and a weakening of the will of government forces.
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SUBJECT: El Salvador: Military Prospects
Orig - Dr. Brzezinski
1 - Vice Admiral Inman
1 - Secretary of Defense
1 - Deputy Secretary of Defense
1 - Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
1 - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 - Asst. to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 - The Honorable Ronald I. Spiers
1 - Robert Pastor
1 - Lt. Gen. Tighe, Jr.
1 - The Honorable David E. McGiffert
1 - A/DCI
1 - DCI
1 - Exec. Registry
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - AS/NFAC
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - D/OPA
1 - OPA/LA
NFAC/OPA/LA (2Jan81)
25X1
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