JAMAICA: NEED FOR ASSISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 17, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
JAMAICA: Need For Assistance
-leverage-to-avert further political deterioration. In the longer tezz~rn, hoca----
ever, both ZocaZ and international experts agree that substantial Western
assistance--fast-distrcrsing aid for the current fiscctt year--will be essential
for political stability and eeonomZC recovery on the troubled island over the
next four or five years. (S)
Seaga's overwhelming election mandate gives him the
Seaga's Problems and Prospects
Seaga's election has improved prospects for Jamaica's
recovery across the board. Although the government is virtually
bank they into arrears on its foreign
debt Seaga will have widespread support.
for a near erm.among a private sector, organized labor
small farmers, the security forces, and the international finan-
cial community. As .he formulates and begins to implement his
25X1
This memo was prepared by John Gannon of the Office of Economic
Research and the Latin America Division of the Office of
Political Ana ysZS. ? was coordinated with the Nationat Intelligence
Officer for Latin America. This memorandamt ryas requested by the National
Security Adviser to the President. Questions and comments may be addressed to
Chief, Latin America Division, 25X1
Duplicate of SECRET
005514157: R I P
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2
 ., Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2
SECRET
recovery program over the next few months, local opposition
groups probably will have little success in capitalizing on
continuing economic hardship across the country. (S)
The Longer Term ~ ~ _ -
Despite their current euphoria, Seaga's supporters will tol-
erate only a short"honeymoon;" they have high expectations of
"deliverance" from the eight years of negative economic growth
under the Manley government. To consolidate his position, Seaga
will have~to quickly translate his popularity among the local
business community into increased confidence among Western aid
donors and gradually among foreign investors. (S)
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2
a
SECRET
3
SECRET
will largely determine the stability of his government. His
first crisis will be precipitated by powerful unions resisting
further cuts in real wages under a new IMF program. Eventually,
any strains in Seaga's government will benefit the pro-Cuban
left, which is certain to regain its political influence if
Seaga's moderate course does not lead visibly to economic recovery.
(S) ~ ..
Seaga's success in convincing ~~Tas ington an of er es ern onors
to provide increased assistance both in the near and long term
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610002-2