JAMAICA: NEED FOR ASSISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610001-3
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
17 November 1980
JAMAICA: Need For Assistance
25X1
Seaga 's overwhelming- election mandate gives him the
leverage to avert further political-deterioration.- In the longer term, how-
ever, both local and international experts agree that substantial Western
assistance--fast-disbursing aid for the current fiscal year--wiZZ be essential
for political stability and.economic recovery on the troubled island over the
next four or five years. (S)
Seaga's Problems and'Prospects
Seaga's election has improved prospects for Jamaica's
recovery across the board. Although the government is virtually
bankrupt and may be forced further into arrears on its foreign
debt Seaga will have widespread support.
for the near term. among the private sector, organized labor,
small farmers, the security forces, and the international finan-
cial community. As he formulates and begins to implement his
This memorandwn was prepared by John Gannon of the Office of Economic
Research and the Latin America Division of the Office of 25X1
Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence
Officer for Latin America. This memorandum was requested by the National
Security Adviser to the President. Questions and comments may be addressed to
Chief, Latin America Division,
25X1
PA-M-80-10491
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SECRET
recovery program over the next few months, local opposition
groups probably will have little success in capitalizing on
continuing economic hardship across the country. (S)
Despite their current euphoria, Seaga's supporters will tol-
erate only a short "honeymoon;" they have high expectations of
"deliverance" from the-eight years of negative economic growth
under the Manley government. To consolidate his position, Seaga
will have-to quickly translate his popularity among the local
business community into increased confidence among Western aid
donors and gradually among foreign investors. (S)
The Longer Term
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Seaga's success in convincing Washington and other stern donors
to provide increased assistance both in the near and long term
will largely determine the stability of his government. His
first crisis will be precipitated by powerful unions resisting
further cuts in real wages under a new IMF program. Eventually,
any strains in Seaga Is government will benefit the, pro-Cuban
left, which is certain to regain its political influence if
Seaga's moderate course does not lead visibly to economic recovery.
(S)
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/19: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102610001-3