CUBA: THE MARIEL EXPERIENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102500001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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C i inteUig nce Ag n y l~ ? ` -
The Honorable John P. White
Deputy Director
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Office ui 0503
Washington,
6 NOV 1980
Dear John,
The enclosed memorandum responds to your
request.
Sincerely,
Funk C. Carlucci
Enclosure:
PA-M-80-10473
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NFAC,5? k~
MEMORANDUM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
31 October 1980
CUBA: The Mariel Experience
Summary
The refugee exodus from MarieZ promoted by the Cuban Government frbm April
through September 1980 gave President Fidel Castro a modest safety valve to get
rid of disillusioned or unproductive Cubans, as well as a lever to try to edge
the US closer to the negotiating table. When the exodus threatened to become a
negative political factor for the Carter Administration in the presidential
campaign--potentially contributing to the success of a candidate who is viewed
with grim foreboding in Havana--Castro terminated it. The tactic, however, has
not been definitively abandoned. The MarieZ experience has taught Castro how
sensitive and vulnerable Washington is to a massive, uncontrolled influx of
refugees and he can be counted on to resume the exodus--or simply threaten to
do so--whenever he believes it politically useful.
To develop the exodus as a potent political tool, Castro
needs large numbers of Cubans who are willing to leave virtually
all of their material possessions behind and start life over in a
new environment. We estimate that there are probably more than a
million Cubans in this category; that is, they would be willing to
emigrate to the United States if given the opportunity. Cuban
officials have claimed privately that some two million (20 percent
of the total population) want to leave and have formally regis-
tered with Cuban immigration authorities. In fact, with the
Mariel sealift terminated, the flow of Cubans leaving the island
This memorandum was written by Cuba Analytic Center, Latin
America Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was requested by John White
of the Office of Management and Budget. It was coordinated with the Office of
Economic Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence
Officer for Latin America. The memorandum reflects information available as of
30 October 1980. Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to
Chief, Latin America Division,
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illegally--through the Guantanamo Naval Base, in small boats, and
by defecting from transiting aircraft in Canadian and West European
airports--is again on the rise, which reflects continuing internal
pressures that Castro will have to alleviate periodically.
Distressing living conditions, a grim, long-term economic
outlook, political and economic discrimination, and disillusionment
over unfulfilled promises appear to be the primary reasons why
such a sizable segment of the Cuban population has been alienated
from the Castro regime. This situation almost certainly will hold
true for many years, assuring Castro credibility should he choose
to threaten yet another exodus.
For the short term, however, Castro is not likely to take
this course. Because an exodus forces him to pay a price in
international prestige and domestic turmoil, he will restrict its
use only to those situations in which there is significant poli-
tical or economic advantage to be gained in the context of Cuban-
US relations. Moreover, he is likely to wait until after the US
presidential elections. In the event of a Republican victory, he
will probably take time to assess the new administration before
deciding whether to create another confrontation. If he sees his
fears of a sharply rightward swing vindicated, he is even less
likely to undertake moves that could be used as a pretext for US
intervention.
A Democratic victory on the other hand--if not accompanied in
subsequent months by some reciprocation for recent Cuban gestures--
would increase the likelihood of a unilateral resumption of a
refugee exodus as a way of pressing Washington to focus on bilateral
problems. Castro expects some reward for having:
-- Terminated the Mariel refugee operation.
-- Released all US prisoners in Cuban jails.
-- Significantly reduced Cuba's anti-US rhetoric.
-- Dropped his demand that the US economic denial program--
the so-called blockade--be terminated prior to any
bilateral talks.
-- Resolved the problem of asylees in the US Interests
Section in Havana.
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-- Acted dramatically to halt aircraft hijackings to Cuba by
disgruntled Cuban refugees.
To satisfy Castro, any US reciprocal moves probably would
have to include a partial lifting of the embargo (such as on
medicines or certain food products), regularizing the refugee
flow, and the initiation of broad-ranging bilateral talks on
normalization of relations. If the United States responds, the
current hiatus in the refugee exodus is almost certain to continue.
At the same time, Havana will subtly remind the US that the Mariel
experience can be repeated. The Cuban officials who cited the
potential of two million more emigrants, for example, may have
intended to impress US policymakers with the magnitude of the
exodus that could be resumed if some progress is not made toward
improving bilateral relations.
Castro has a number of options should he choose to resume
pressure on Washington. He could:
-- Reopen Mariel for the refugee sealift.
-- Open other Cuban ports for this purpose as well, hoping
to dilute the effectiveness of the US Coast Guard's
Florida Straits patrol.
-- Flood the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay with thousands
of refugees who would quickly overtax the base's facili-
ties and threaten its security (this would also have the
effect of focusing world attention on the base itself).
-- Harass the US by raising the issues of Puerto Rican
independence and the Guantanamo Naval Base in the UN and
other international forums.
-- Renege on his pledge to return hijackers to the US for
prosecution.
-- Further exploit the Cuban exile community in the US as a
pressure group.
The chances for a resumption of the Mariel refugee sealift
in the next several months--and probably into early spring 1981--
are slim no matter what the US election outcome. Over the longer
term, however, as population pressures in Cuba increase and popular
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disenchantment grows, Castro will be increasingly prone to use
unrestricted emigration as a lever against the United States--more
so with a Democratic administration and less so with a Republican--
as long as bilateral relations remain stalemated.
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31Oct80)
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